IDEAS AND CONTRIBUTIONS:
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
Ideas and contributions

DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Towards a Citizens’ Democracy
Ideas and Contributions is a translation of the document Ideas y aportes. The latter was prepared using materials produced by the Project for Democratic Development in Latin America (PRODDAL), in particular the Report on Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy.

The analysis and political recommendations contained in the Report on Democracy in Latin America and Ideas and Contributions do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), its Executive Board or its Member States.

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Latin America today presents an extraordinary paradox. From one perspective, the continent can look back with great pride on more than two decades of democratic governments. From another, the region faces a growing social crisis. Deep inequalities remain entrenched, serious levels of poverty prevail, economic growth has been insufficient, and dissatisfaction with those democracies—manifest in many places by widespread popular unrest—has been growing, often with deeply destabilizing consequences.

The Report represents an unprecedented effort to understand and overcome this paradox. By combining quantitative indicators and detailed interviews with in-depth surveys and an on-going dialogue with a cross-section of prominent leaders and opinion-formers across the region, the Report provides a comprehensive analysis of the state of democracy in Latin America. In addition, it seeks to move beyond a simple diagnosis of existing challenges and proposes new approaches to tackling many of the festering problems that now put at risk many of the region’s successes of the past 25 years.

While the Report is the product of an independent team of experts and therefore not a formal statement of UNDP or United Nations policy, as an outline of the central obstacles facing, and the opportunities for, democracy in the region, we believe that it helps to frame an agenda for Latin American countries and UNDP and its development partners in the months and years to come. UNDP is very pleased to have sponsored it.

At the heart of the challenge lies the fact that while democracy has spread widely across Latin America, its roots remain shallow. Thus, the Report warns that the proportion of Latin Americans who would be willing to sacrifice a democratic government in exchange for real social and economic progress now exceeds 50 percent.

There are several reasons for this trend.
The most important is that democracy is, for the first time in Latin American history, the incumbent form of government. Incumbents get blamed when things go wrong, with jobs, income and many basic services failing to meet steadily growing public expectations.

Exacerbating matters, many of the other underpinnings of democratic governance—a free press, strong human rights protections, an independent and vigorous judiciary—still need to be significantly strengthened. This is all the more critical considering that many traditionally disenfranchised groups are denied access to power through more formal channels, leading them increasingly to express their frustrations through alternative, sometimes violent, routes.

Beneath this surface turmoil, there are some encouraging signs. First is that regardless of the crisis, the countries in the region have not sought a return to authoritarianism but broadly sustained their democratic institutions. Second, citizens are also starting to draw a distinction between democracy as a system of government and the performance of those governing in particular. Many are simply “dissatisfied democrats”—a phenomenon well known in many longer-established democracies—which partly explains why opposition movements today are tending not towards military solutions but populist “outsiders” promising a new broom and fresh approach.

At the same time, people do increasingly differentiate between organs of government in apportioning blame. While legislatures and political parties enjoy the support of less than a quarter of the population, the Judiciary, Executive and Security Services tend to do somewhat better.

Nevertheless, if democracy is to survive and flourish, Latin America needs to work much harder at ensuring democratic institutions, from legislatures through to local authorities, are transparent and accountable and have the skills and capacity to carry out critical work. That means making sure power at all levels of government is structured and distributed in a way that gives real voice and space to poor people and creates mechanisms whereby the powerful—whether political leaders, corporations or other actors—are held accountable for their actions.

There are no short cuts—entrenching democracy is a process, not an event.

But making public institutions work more effectively is only part of the story. The other part is to be able to prove to constituents that democratic governments are working on the kind of issues that matter most to them, are capable of addressing them, and are being held to account when they fail to do so.

In practice that means building a legislative institutions and a judiciary that protect human rights and give scope for the cut and thrust of
vigorous—but peaceful—political debate; a police force that provides safe streets and safe borders; decentralized power so that local people can monitor and mobilize to ensure schools with well trained teachers and hospitals with proper drugs and equipment; and a thriving civil society and a free press that participate fully in entrenching democracy and that are in the vanguard of attacks on corruption and mismanagement by government and business alike.

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—ranging from halving extreme poverty and hunger to putting all boys and girls in school all by the year 2015—provide a vehicle that can help address these issues at national and regional level. Because in a very real sense they are the first global manifesto for ordinary men and women and children all over the world: a set of concrete, measurable, pocket-book issues that everyone can understand and applaud.

As important, as part of a global compact between rich and poor countries, whereby the developed world is committed to provide support to developing nations that make good faith reforms, the MDGs offer a real opportunity for harnessing the external support in terms of trade access, debt relief and increased assistance that so many Latin American countries desperately need to bolster their own efforts.

If Latin America—and the world—can seize this opportunity then there is every chance of building a new virtuous circle where renewed economic growth boosts the MDGs, which in turn helps build and sustain more effective democracies better able to accelerate equitable, social and economic progress. But to make such a vision a reality, all Latin Americans, and especially the regions’ leaders first have to confront these critical issues of democratic governance head on and make sure that development and democracy are no longer seen as alternatives but two sides of the same coin.

Mark Malloch Brown

Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
There was a time not long ago when many people believed that politics had died, and that the impersonal market and technocratic know-how would lead us to development. But the market requires the juridical security that institutions provide. And technology does not answer general questions concerning why or for whom, but rather serves as a vehicle to attaining development.

That is why, in recent years, economists and development agencies have been taking a second look at institutions. In other words, they have rediscovered politics (although they prefer not to say so).

It is in the context of this rediscovery that the Report seeks to promote the reinvention of politics as an aid to development in Latin America.

Indeed, at the request of governments, UNDP has been devoting increasing attention to the challenge of deepening democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, most of its national cooperation programs are aimed at promoting this objective through the modernization of various branches of State, political reform, local governance and effective integration into the ‘global village’. In no fewer than 17 countries, UNDP has participated in dialogues designed to build consensus between authorities, political forces, civil society members and non-traditional actors. Given that UNDP is a knowledge-based organization, a number of regional and national projects have been or are concerned with the evaluation of alternatives and the dissemination of good practices on democratic governance.

Against this backdrop, the Executive Board of UNDP approved the Second Regional Cooperation Framework for the period 2001–2005, which includes “preparation of a report on the state of democracy in Latin America [which] will be the result of the joint efforts of the academics and political and social agents of the region.”¹ This document, which I am honored to introduce, is the final product of that effort. Its production
involved over 100 analysts, 32 presidents or former presidents, more than 200 political and social leaders and nearly 19,000 citizens surveyed in 18 different countries.

In its most elementary sense, democracy is none other than ‘government of the people’. The Report seeks to take this old idea seriously, and apply it to the present and future of the Americas: Government of the people means that decisions that affect everyone should be taken by everyone. In Latin America, therefore, we must welcome the emergence of governments elected by popular vote and the advances achieved in political representation and participation over the past several decades. But the challenge of how to expand politics remains. That is, how to submit for debate and resolution all of those issues that affect the collective interest. In turn, this necessitates greater diversity in terms of options and the granting of more power to the State so that it can fulfill the mandate given to it by its citizens.

Government of the people thus means a State of citizens in the full sense of the term. A system of electing authorities but also a form of organization that guarantees the rights of all: civil rights (guarantees against oppression); political rights (part of the public or collective decision-making process); and social rights (the right to live in safety and security).

The seminal idea of the Report is to integrate the different dimensions of citizenship in the building of democracy through the expansion of politics.

Is it necessary to point out that ‘politics’ is not only (or always) what politicians do, but what citizens and their organizations do when they become involved in public affairs? And is it necessary to add that, viewed in this light, democracy is a form of human development? If human development, as UNDP reports have argued time and again, is “a process of enlarging people’s choices to lead lives they value,” then I would say that democracy is human development in the public sphere. It is the expansion of the collective options that impact on the quality of our lives. Hence the statement by Amartya Sen that “human development is the process of expansion of the real freedoms enjoyed by a people” may indeed serve as a definition of democracy.

The debate is open. How does one preserve and improve the democratic system that our countries now operate under? How does one expand social citizenship and reduce the poverty and inequality that remain our great weakness and a serious threat to the democratic system? How does one expand politics or reclaim the public domain for debate and popular participation? How does one return economics to politics and, without populism, place the market in the service of citizens? How does one ensure that the State promotes the democratization of society? How does one guarantee that the State is able to prevail over other centers of power? And
finally, how does one make certain that the global village is governed and that this government also represents all Latin Americans?

The Report does not seek to provide answers to these questions, but rather it helps to elucidate them. Moreover, the Report is merely a pre-text, both in the sense of a preliminary document that needs improvement and in the sense that it offers an excuse or an opportunity to pursue a dialogue that has already begun.

This dialogue is the raison d’être of the Project for Democratic Development in Latin America (PRODDAL), which is being implemented by UNDP with the generous support of the European Union and of national governments, institutions and individuals, all of whom I cannot list here but whom I certainly wish to thank.

In addition to the Report, other outputs that we hope will stimulate and enrich a much needed debate (which I would call a ‘debate on the democratization of our democracies’) are: a book in which 26 outstanding intellectuals offer their thoughts; a statistical compendium containing a comprehensive survey of citizens; and academic essays that explore the foundations of our understanding of democracy.

Latin America is multiple yet one. Consequently the political debate must be based on the particular realities and dreams of each country. That is why UNDP has planned meetings in each of them. We also wish to pursue this dialogue through a series of regional events, through the network of governance stakeholders that supports PRODDAL and, of course, through interactive ‘e-communication’. Welcome to the debate!

Elena Martínez
Assistant Administrator and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean of UNDP

2. This definition was first proposed in UNDP’s Human Development Report 1990, Oxford University Press.
The Report on Democracy in Latin America offers a number of responses to questions that Latin American societies have about their democracies. We have conducted this exploration bearing in mind the needs of our women and men, which are not adequately addressed in the political debate.

Our hope is that the Report will encourage debate in society, and that it will help people to understand better their particular democracy and the need to improve it.

There is no unease about the concept of democracy, but there is disquiet within democracies. Overcoming this requires that we use the most valuable instrument that democracy affords us: freedom. Freedom to discuss the things that cause anxiety, which some would rather conceal. Freedom to say that the Emperor has no clothes and to try and understand why. Freedom to know why a system that is virtually synonymous with equality exists alongside the highest level of inequality in the world. Freedom to know if what we are discussing is what we need to be discussing or whether it is what others have forced upon us. And freedom to know our priorities and the matters that are urgent.

Indeed, while recognizing its limitations, the Report is an exercise in freedom, which in politics basically means exercising the right to know and to decide what we wish to do with our societies. In part, the crisis of political representation can be better addressed if we are aware of what to ask for, that is, what to demand of our representatives.

A text in itself will not achieve this objective. It is also essential to actively promote debate and to incorporate into the daily decision-making process of social organizations the issues highlighted here—and others that we may have omitted—in order to stimulate a new type of discussion.

To this end, the Report contains critical analysis of the state of our democracies from the standpoint of democracy. Inevitably, this has led us to point out its shortcomings and weaknesses.
But there is a danger in exploring what is lacking, while forgetting what we have. The deficits and pitfalls that threaten our democracies should not make us forget that we have left behind us the long legacy of authoritarianism—the fears of assassination, forced disappearances, and torture and the deafening silence of the absence of freedom. A history in which a few appropriated for themselves the right to interpret and determine the destiny of all.

While we have many problems, some of them very serious, we must nevertheless hold on to the memory of this past and never lose sight of it, so that our children will know that freedom did not emerge spontaneously, that the right to protest, speak, think and decide with the dignity of free men and women was achieved in a long and bitter struggle. We need to be critical of our democracy because these memories require that we preserve and improve it.

Democracy is built through politics. Yet politics also has major weaknesses, which have led to increased rejection of politicians in our societies. The Report does not shy away from highlighting the seriousness of the crisis that surrounds politics and politicians. But it is these politicians that have led the struggle, paying for their defects or failures with their prestige and honor. They do not have the purity of those who risk only expressing an opinion. Many have the courage to enter an arena in which, more often than not, what they confront are not grand ideas but passion and misfortune. Some become fearful and abandon the fight, while others commit errors and, in one way or another, pay for them. But a majority did something more than simply offer an opinion on how things should be done. Although they committed themselves and lost, many returned to try again, some successfully.

This is not a sentimental defense of politicians but a simple observation that the building of democracy is no easy task. It requires men and women who are prepared to take part in a struggle in turbulent territory where interests and passions all play themselves out.

Democracy is exercised through politics, the only activity that can bring people together in the challenging but rewarding process of struggling with the human condition to build a society based on greater dignity.

As Max Weber observes: “politics is a long and hard struggle against tenacious resistance for which both passion and moderation are needed. It is absolutely true, and history attests to this, that in this world the possible is never achieved if the impossible is not attempted again and again. But in order to do this one must not only be a leader but also a hero in the simplest sense of the word. Even those who are neither one nor the other need to first develop the strength of mind that would enable them to survive the
Towards a citizens' democracy

destruction of all hope, if they wish to be able to achieve even what is possible today. Only a person who is confident that he would not give up when, in his view, the world seems too stupid or too abject for what he offers; only a person who when faced with all of this is capable of responding with a ‘nevertheless’, only a man built in this way has a ‘vocation for politics’.

Lastly, a warning about the limitations of this work. The Report on Democracy in Latin America offers an analysis of the situation in the region, provides a wealth of data and suggests an agenda for tackling the principal challenges. It is only a partial effort, however. Democracy is a phenomenon central to which are its human and cultural dimensions. The history we have inherited, the social impulses driven by our hopes and frustrations, and the passions that revolve around power relations often contain indications or explanations that are not fully reflected in data and analysis. We remark on this absence to show that we are aware of it and to underscore our reluctance to pigeonhole and to reduce to figures the immense complexity of human experiences. We have focused only on one segment, albeit an important and necessary one, of the vast experiment that is democracy.

Dante Caputo
Director of the Report
This Report is an initial input into a more extensive process of analysis and social dialogue. Its purpose is to evaluate democracy, not only in terms of elections, but more broadly in terms of a democracy of citizens.
The Report on Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy is part of the strategy of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to promote, inter alia, democratic governance and human development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Human Development Report 2002 argues that democracy is not only valuable in its own right but also that it is crucial for development. It is through both politics and economics that it is possible ‘to expand people’s choices’, in other words to achieve human development.

Based on the priorities determined by the countries of Latin America, UNDP has designed a series of programs to strengthen democratic governance. Indeed, most of the activities being carried out by the organization’s 24 national offices are in pursuit of this objective. This is also true of a number of regional initiatives, among them the Project for Democratic Development in Latin America (PRODDAL).

The Report, which has been prepared by an independent group of experts operating under the PRODDAL framework, is an initial input into a more extensive process of analysis and social dialogue. Its purpose is to evaluate democracy not only in terms of elections but also, and more broadly, in terms of a democracy of citizens. It seeks to identify successes, failures and challenges and proposes a reform agenda to encourage the strengthening of democracy in Latin America.

The method chosen for the preparation of the Report combines the criteria of academic excellence, rigorous empirical underpinnings and the broad participation of stakeholders and analysts. To this end:
- A field study was defined, involving 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

- A theoretical framework was constructed and submitted for peer review by distinguished international academics.

- An opinion survey was conducted of 18,643 citizens from the 18 countries.

- Based on the theoretical framework, a methodology was developed to measure fundamental aspects of democracy. The results are set out in more than 100 tables.

- Two hundred and thirty one interviews took place with leading political, economic, social and intellectual figures from the 18 countries, including 41 current and former presidents and vice-presidents.

- Discussion workshops were held with experts on the theoretical framework, the methodology used for the indicators, and the economic analysis. Seminars were convened with political and social leaders to discuss the key issues raised in the Report.

- Opinion articles were solicited from a range of academic and political figures on principal issues or challenges.

- An analysis was undertaken of the authoritarian legacy inherited by the 18 democracies, with 30 variables considered in each case.

- An expanded agenda was prepared for the discussion of democratic reforms in Latin America, based on four issues: politics and democracy; the State and democracy; economics and democracy; and globalization and democracy.

- A process to promote debate on this agenda has been set in motion.

In addition to the Report, various other supplementary materials have been prepared for broad dissemination, including:
• A book containing articles written by outstanding political and academic figures, who have contributed their ideas and views to the debate on the strengthening of democracy in Latin America.

• A statistical compendium that compiles and systematizes hitherto dispersed data on democracy and citizenship in the countries of Latin America, together with the indexes prepared for the Report and the survey results.

• The materials used to develop the conceptual framework of the Project, along with the peer review by distinguished analysts.

• The results of a round of consultations with Latin American leaders.

The Report does not seek to evaluate Governments or their countries or to establish any sort of national ranking of democracy. Its purpose is to identify the major challenges to democracy and to promote broad debate on them.

The Report also acknowledges the difficulty of addressing the shortcomings of democracy, since these are influenced by various factors, some of which were either not examined at all or were touched on very briefly. Moreover, although the Report adopts a regional approach, it reflects full awareness that ‘all politics is local’ and that both its theories and its conclusions should be viewed in the individual national context.

The Report consists of three sections. The first establishes the conceptual framework and places the development of democracy in the context of a region with high levels of poverty and inequality.

The second section analyzes the data obtained from the indicators of political, civil and social citizenship and the indexes, the opinion survey of citizens and a round of consultations with Latin American leaders.

The third section provides ideas to spark the debate on the strengthening and deepening of democracy in Latin America, emphasizing the crisis of politics, the capacity of nation-states to build citizenship, State reforms, economic reforms and the impact of globalization.
Never before have there been so many countries living under democratic systems and never before have Latin American democracies been so robust. But what has been achieved is not yet secured.
Over the course of 200 years of independent existence, democracy in Latin America has emerged and ended on dozens of occasions. Even as it was being enshrined in Constitutions, it was being destroyed in practice. War, tyranny and short periods of stability are associated with much of this history of independence, during which even flagrant violations of democracy were committed in its name.

By 1978, the region had entered an unprecedented era. Authoritarian regimes gradually gave way to democratic ones. Never before have there been so many countries with democratic governments and never before have Latin American democracies been so robust.

But there is no assurance that what has been achieved is secured. Indeed, the 25 years that have passed since the start of the democratization in the region have not been without their setbacks. At the same time as the armed conflicts were winding down in Central America and others continued in South America, a number of countries experienced failed coup attempts, mutinies, mass street demonstrations and other crises that led to the resignation or expulsion of their Presidents. In all of these cases, however, a way out was found that preserved the legal order and allowed democracy ultimately to prevail.

But political democracy in Latin America exists alongside limited rule of law and serious economic and social problems. In 2003, poverty affected 43.9 percent of the population and extreme poverty some 19.4 percent. The region, moreover, has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world.

While Latin America is now less at risk of violent attacks against its institutions, other weaknesses have come to the fore. Notably, democracy appears to be losing its dynamism. Although it is the preferred system of government, there is little faith in its capacity to improve living conditions, public regard for political parties is at its lowest level, and the State is
viewed with both expectation and distrust. In some cases, furthermore, the thrust towards democracy that has characterized the past few decades appears to be waning. Latin America is at a crossroads. The structural reforms associated with the Washington Consensus have not generated economic growth that meets the demands of the population. The idea is gradually emerging that the State should return to its role of guide or regulator of society. The need for a political system that addresses the main problems of the times and the need for a new type of State are key issues in a new debate in which the region’s future is at stake.

Democracy cannot be built by itself—nor can freedoms or the rule of law. All require politics, that is, the deliberate action of societies and their governments. This action requires the greatest amount of information possible so that the criteria on which social aspirations are expressed and policies are formulated can be clarified.

MAIN IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT

- Democracy has become the dominant political system throughout Latin America.

- Democracy co-exists with a difficult socioeconomic situation. Poverty and inequality are crucial problems in the region.

- The dimensions of political, civil and social citizenship are not integrated. Progress has been greatest in the first category. All of the guarantees of civil citizenship are still not available to all citizens on an equal basis.

- The difficulty experienced by the State in satisfying social demands is due in part to its limited resources and limited tax base. The State’s power is also restricted by internal and external interest groups.

- Political institutions have been weakened. Party representation does not reflect the interests of much of society. New movements and forms of political expression are emerging but they still lack institutionalized channels of representation. There is a need to give politics back its content and capacity for change.

- There are several different models within the market economy. The strengthening of democracy necessitates a debate on these various options.
For most people, the word ‘democracy’ may have more than one meaning and these tend to be imprecise. For practitioners of politics, democracy has a fundamentally procedural dimension: it establishes the rules that allow for peaceful competition for power (to choose governments and representatives of the people), mainly through fair and regular elections. The Report argues that democracy requires the full development of citizens,\(^1\) necessitating the complete exercise of political, civil and social rights, as enshrined in various United Nations (UN) instruments.

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1. The Report’s theoretical framework draws inspiration from the broad concept of democracy developed by Guillermo O’Donnell. It has been subjected to rigorous review by a group of international academic contributors.
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CHARTER

On September 11th 2001, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 34 member countries of the OAS, meeting in Lima, Peru, signed and adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The Charter is a significant advance to the previous OAS resolution 1080, that had guided since 1991 the legal and political conduct of American states “in the case of a sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process”. By introducing the notion of “an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime”, the Charter envisages a response by OAS member states to preserve democracy, even before the interruption of a democratic government.

The Charter is based upon the principle that those who would attempt to break the constitutional order would confront a united community of countries in the Americas who would defend democratic institutions.

In the chapter on integral development and combating poverty of the Charter, the six articles highlight the link between democracy and economic development. Matters such as illiteracy, creation of productive employment, observance of economic, social, and cultural rights, the preservation and good stewardship of the environment, and access to quality education for all, are also highlighted. The Charter includes as well, the elimination of all forms of discrimination and intolerance, the promotion and protection of human rights of indigenous peoples and migrants, and respect for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in the Americas. The Charter recalls what it was expressed at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Americas in Quebec about the constitutional subordination of all State institutions to the legitimate civil authority and the respect for the rule of law of all entities and sectors of society. Particularly in Latin America there is a great urgency to recover the idea of a strong, efficient and prestigious State. A State capable of vigilance, regulation and control. A democratic State that respects and guarantees the rights of all.

César Gaviria, Secretary General of the Organization of American States
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, establishes a broad concept of citizenship, encompassing political, civil and social rights. In addition, in 2000, the UN General Assembly pledged in its Millennium Declaration that: “We shall spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law and respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development”.

For its part, the Organization of American States (OAS) has adopted mechanisms to strengthen democracy and to react to situations that threaten to interrupt it, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. Together with the Rio Group, the Ibero-American Summits and other regional forums, these platforms have been promoting an agenda that emphasizes the importance of politics and an integral conception of democracy. Increasingly, the international community is tending towards a broader common vision of democracy. The Report advances the idea that, in order to prevent setbacks to the democratic process, it is necessary to view the democratic system not in isolation but as part of the framework of political, civil and social citizenship. The great challenge is how to fortify this emerging consensus and to translate it into support for reforms that strengthen Latin American democracies.

Democracy is a key dimension of human development, which is defined “as a process of enlarging people’s choices to lead lives they value”. So, to paraphrase a well-known expression, human development may be defined as ‘development of the people, for the people, and by the people’. Of the people, because the aim is to lead a more humane life; by the people, because development depends on the creative effort of men and women, not on nature or luck; and for the people, because the objective is not to add zeros to the national accounts but to improve the lives of people. Thus, the true goal of public policy is to provide more options for citizens to live their lives in an increasingly satisfactory way—in a word, development is ‘freedom’. And freedom, in addition to being the objective, is the best way

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Two keys reasons for a freedom-based approach to development:
1) The evaluative reason: assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced; 2) The effectiveness reason: achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people.

Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom

According to Guillermo O’Donnell’s rigorous formulation, democracy is more than a set of conditions for electing and being elected (‘electoral democracy’), it is also a way of organizing society with the aim of protecting and expanding the rights of individuals (‘citizens’ democracy’). This broader vision of democracy is based on four main ideas: (a) The individual has inherent rights; (b) society is organized in a way that guarantees the exercise of these rights and promotes the expansion of citizenship; (c) free and competitive elections, together with the rule of law, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democracy; and (d) the historical specificity of Latin America in its nation-building processes.

If citizenship is the foundation of democracy, then the discussion on the state of democracy and the debate on democratic reforms must encompass its various dimensions: political citizenship; civil citizenship; and social citizenship.

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Political rights must serve as instruments to promote full citizenship. The expansion of citizenship is a universal impulse in all democracies, just as expanding it is a task for each individual country.

Political, Civil and Social Citizenship

Political citizenship includes the right to participate in the exercise of political power: as a member of a body vested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are the Parliament and local government entities.

Civil citizenship consists of the right to individual freedom: freedom of the person; freedom of expression; and freedom of thought and religion. In addition it comprises the right to own property, the right to enter into valid contracts and the right to justice. The latter is different from the others, since it concerns the right to defend and to claim all of the rights of a person in an equal position to others, through due legal processes. Hence the institutions that are directly concerned with civil rights are courts of justice.

Lastly, social citizenship covers the entire range, from the right to security and to a minimum of economic well-being to the right to fully share the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized human being, consistent with the dominant standards in the society. The institutions directly concerned in this case are the educational system and social services.

T. H. Marshall
Despite poverty, inequality, violence and institutional crises, Latin American societies have preserved and protected their democracies.
A. POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

The advance of democracy in Latin America is reflected in the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), a compound measurement prepared for this Report that combines four variables: the right to vote; fair elections; free elections; and elections as a means of gaining access to public office. The value of the EDI ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating complete absence of electoral democracy and one the maximum amount of electoral democracy. The average EDI for Latin America rose rapidly from 0.28 in 1977 to 0.69 in 1985, increasing to 0.86 in 1990 and to 0.93 in 2002.

Note: This graph is based on data contained in the Statistical Compendium of the Report.
The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) is a new measurement of the democratic electoral system that has been developed for this Report. This type of measurement has been used extensively in academic circles. An important step in relation to discussion of this methodology was taken with the publication by UNDP of the Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world.

Elaboration of the EDI is based on the most recent advances in the field of measurement theory which are explained in the technical note to the statistical compendium of the Report. The four elements of the EDI, which are considered essential to a democratic regime, are illustrated by the following conceptual tree.

The rule of aggregation of these four elements is formally expressed using the following formula:

Electoral Democracy Index =
Right to vote x Fair elections x Free elections x Access to public office

The EDI is one factor in the process of analysis of the Latin American reality and should not be seen as a complete measure of democracy. A debate began recently on the possible use of measurements of democracy as one criterion for identifying countries to receive development funds. One example of this is provided by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) of the Government of the United States, which, together with other data, uses measurements of democracy and the rule of law prepared by Freedom House and the World Bank. PRODDAL believes that there is still not sufficient consensus and a proven and accurate methodology to justify the taking of this type of decision based on measurements of democracy.

With regard to the first component of the EDI (the right to vote), all of the countries of the region today recognize the universal right to vote. Some of
the most important political struggles of the first half of the twentieth century concerned the granting of the right to vote to the illiterate, the working classes, and women. This is a significant achievement, notwithstanding the problems encountered with, for example, under-registration and the procurement of identity documents in some countries. Other states have imposed restrictions, including limiting the voting right of members of the military and police and of citizens who live abroad.

With regard to the second component of the EDI (the fairness of elections), a total of 70 national elections were held in the region between 1990 and 2002. In most instances where irregularities were observed they did not appear to have had a determining impact on the outcome of the polls. Only in two cases (in the Dominican Republic in 1994 and in Peru in 2000) were the problems of such magnitude that the opposition rejected the results.

With regard to the third component of the EDI (free elections), while some problems may remain, in general, candidates who have wanted to participate have been able to do so and citizens have been able to cast their votes and choose between alternatives. In light of the region’s history, these improvements are noteworthy. There are no longer legal restrictions—that existed before—on majority parties, such as the Partido Justicialista (PJ) in Argentina or the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, and on parties with smaller electoral bases, such as the communist parties of Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica. These restrictions, which were frequently employed from the late 1940s up to the 1960s in most cases (until 1985 in Brazil), have now been lifted. In addition, with the resolution of armed conflicts in Central America during the 1990s, constraints imposed due to the inability of States to guarantee the physical integrity of candidates have also been removed, with the exception of those in Colombia.

With regard to the fourth component of the EDI (elections as a means of gaining access to public office), two basic questions must be asked. One is whether or not key public positions (the President and Member of Parliament) are held by the winners of elections. The other is whether or not those who accede to these offices continue to hold them for the duration provided for by law. In cases where they are replaced, does this occur in
accordance with constitutional norms? In this respect, an assessment of contemporary Latin America is very positive. The transfer of the presidency has become normal practice, contrasting with the situation that existed between 1950 and 1980. This is one of the clear signs of the significant advance of democracy in the region.

It must be noted, however, that coups or failed coup attempts have taken place and that a number of countries have experienced severe institutional crises. Examples are the closure of Parliament by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori in 1992 and his resignation amidst a major scandal eight years later, the failed attempt by Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano to close Congress in 1993, the removal of Ecuadorian President Abdala Bucaram in 1997, the assassination of Paraguayan Vice-President Luis María Argaña in 1999, the ousting of Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad in 2000, the fall of Argentinean President Fernando De la Rúa in 2001, the crisis that ensued following the attempt to remove Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April 2002, and the interruption of the mandates of Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada and Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Although they did not result in classic military coups, these incidents pointed to a worrisome trend regarding the interruption of the exercise of power. Except in Peru, in 1992, in all of the cases mentioned, a ‘transition’ was sought that respected constitutional norms in a bid to ensure the continuity of the democratic regime.

In any analysis of political citizenship, it is essential to examine the issue of representation. Electoral participation in Latin America is average: 62.7 percent of eligible voters took part in elections held between 1990 and 2002. In many cases, this level of participation is due to the fact that voting is compulsory under the law or the Constitution. However, some countries have recorded low levels of participation. Exceptions occur when the electoral register does not include all eligible citizens and/or when voting is not mandatory or, when it is, no effective action is taken against those who do not participate. With very few exceptions, the elected authorities in Latin America have gained access to office in elections (parliamentary or presidential) in which the citizen participation rate has been greater than 50 percent.

The transfer of the presidency has become normal practice, contrasting with the situation that existed between 1950 and 1980. This is one of the clear signs of the significant advance of democracy in the region.
In a democracy, political parties are the main vehicles for representing interests, promoting the participation of citizens, formulating government agendas, training political leaders and educating citizens. Bearing in mind these roles, the crisis surrounding political parties in Latin America is one of the greatest threats to democracy in the region.

In many cases, political parties have ceased to be the only protagonists in the political sphere. They have either been replaced by or are accompanied by ad hoc movements, many of which have charismatic leaders. Lack of organization and party discipline and the fragmented state of the parties are obstacles to good governance and hinder oversight by the opposition. In addition, the phenomenon of crossing party lines exacerbates the problem of the diminishing credibility of parties. Many citizens and even leaders in

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### ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 1990–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>52.5</td>
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<td>57.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>51.9</td>
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<td>91.6</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>Automatic</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
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<td><strong>Latin America (</strong>)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Extra-regional references**

- Western Europe 96.2 73.6
- United States 69.5 41.3

**Notes:**

(*) Figures that exceed 100% indicate that the number of persons on the electoral register exceeds the voting age population. This is typically a reflection of a voter register that has not been updated by removing names.

(**) Region figures are the average or mean of all elections in all countries.

**Sources:**

Latin America believe that political parties are not performing their functions effectively. Indicators like the decline in electoral support for the largest parties—19.1 percent between 1990 and 2002—and the relatively high rate of electoral volatility during the same period, support this conclusion.

**HOW CITIZENS AND LEADERS VIEW POLITICAL PARTIES**

A very low percentage of the citizens surveyed by Latinobarómetro in 2003 said that they had confidence in political parties. According to surveys conducted by Latinobarómetro, the level of confidence in political parties declined from 20 percent in 1996 to 11 percent in 2003. Of all of the region’s institutions, political parties inspire the least confidence.

Leaders interviewed for this Report expressed a similar opinion. In only two countries do a majority of leaders believe that parties are effectively fulfilling their functions.

*Source: Latinobarómetro, 2003; UNDP, Round of consultations with Latin American leaders, 2002–2003*

The leaders consulted in the drafting of this Report stressed that the search for solutions, such as authoritarianism and ‘movements’ that enjoy the ‘passive’ support of the military, is not a suitable way of dealing with the loss of confidence in political parties. Rather, they believe that it is necessary to find formulas that restore credibility and legitimacy to the political arena. As one of them emphasized, the solution is not to be found outside of politics, but within it.

Another variable that has an effect on the electoral contest is campaign financing rules. In Latin America (except Venezuela), the system of mixed financing is predominant, under which political parties receive both public and private resources. In terms of public financing, most countries provide direct (cash or bonds) or indirect (services, tax benefits, training) subsidies. There are three methods of distribution: the first is proportional to electoral strength; the second is a hybrid arrangement under which part of the funding is distributed equally among all parties and another part is disseminated according to electoral strength; and the third is a combination of the previous two systems. In most countries there is the condition that the party or movement should obtain a minimum percentage of votes or be represented in Parliament if it is to receive public finance.
A majority of states place limits on private financing (bans on foreign donations or anonymous contributions, for instance). In most countries, during an election campaign, the competing parties enjoy free access to the State media, to private media or to both. In nearly all of the countries of the region, there is some organ responsible for supervising the financing of political parties (the exception is Uruguay) and there is a penalty system that has the power to impose fines, to reduce the amount of funds that have been allocated or even to remove the party from the register or to withdraw its legal status.

The participation of women in politics has increased significantly over the past 15 years or so: the average rate of female representation in Parliament rose from 8.0 percent to 15.5 percent between the late 1980s and today, thanks in particular to the introduction of quota laws in 12 countries of the region. This 15.5 percent, however, is poor in comparison to the number of women in society. Furthermore, female participation in other areas of politics remains very limited.

DEMOCRACY AND THE GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Two of the characteristics that a democratic regime should possess are particularly problematic from the gender perspective: the inclusion of all adults; and the right of all adults to participate in the affairs of State and Government. The existence of these rights does not guarantee that all citizens, especially women, can enjoy them. Experience shows that Western democracies, even the most solid ones with the least problems in terms of social justice, fail to guarantee in practice the right of participation.

*Celo Jardim Pinto, Professor in the Department of Political Science, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil*

At the same time, the social configuration in various countries is such that indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants are prevented from exercising their right to political citizenship. The representation of these minorities in Parliament is scandalously low, since few countries have adopted effective measures to promote integration and affirmative action.

In addition to representative democracy, in which citizens elect certain authorities at regular intervals, various other mechanisms of citizen participation have emerged over the past 25 years. Some are mechanisms of direct democracy, such as plebiscites, legislative initiatives, and referendums
As a Mayan woman and as a citizen who has been engaged in the process of building a multicultural society, I know what democracy means, that it is created by the people and that it is for the people. The main problem with our ‘democracies’, at least in Latin America, is that they are not complete. They appear to be what they are not, since they were conceived within mono-cultural States, excluding some and granting privileges to a few, to the detriment of the majority. We, indigenous men and women, are peaceful and respectful and seek harmony not only between human beings but also with other forms of life and elements of nature.

For indigenous peoples, consultation, participation and consensus are of the greatest importance in relation to decision-making—in order that the decision of the majority will prevail as a democratic principle. This process is based on recognition that all human beings are equal and have the same rights and obligations. We want our political systems to change for the benefit of all, so that there is equality of opportunity without exclusion of any kind. Indigenous peoples pin their hopes on the future. They would like democracy to be inclusive, representative and inter-cultural, in other words, respectful of differences.

The unity of Guatemala and that of other similar countries must be based on such a rich source of diversity, which, in turn, must be reflected in an ‘ethnic democracy’.

Otilia Lux de Cojti, former Minister of Culture, Guatemala
independent resources for small municipalities manifests itself, since wealth continues to be concentrated in the major urban centers. Yet, while power has been transferred at the regional level, opportunities have also been created for cronyism, nepotism and corruption by small local ‘oligarchies’.

Participation also occurs through the social communications media or through myriad non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are part of

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**FORMAL PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Non legislative powers (1)</th>
<th>Legislative powers (2)</th>
<th>Index of formal presidential powers (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.38 Medium low (*)</td>
<td>0.44 Medium high (*)</td>
<td>0.41 Medium high (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.23 Medium low</td>
<td>0.37 Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.62 Very high</td>
<td>0.56 Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.66 Very high</td>
<td>0.59 Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.00 Very low</td>
<td>0.59 Very high</td>
<td>0.29 Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.23 Medium low</td>
<td>0.36 Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.37 Medium low</td>
<td>0.44 Medium high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.50 Medium high</td>
<td>0.59 Very high</td>
<td>0.55 Very high</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>0.42 Medium high</td>
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<td>0.25 Medium low</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>0.24 Medium low</td>
<td>0.37 Medium high</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>0.34 Medium low</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.19 Very low</td>
<td>0.30 Medium low</td>
<td>0.25 Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.38 Medium low</td>
<td>0.39 Medium low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.48 Medium high</td>
<td>0.15 Very low</td>
<td>0.31 Medium low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Extra-regional references**

**Notes:**
(1) This score is the average of the values assigned to the legislative censure of cabinet and presidential power to dissolve congress.
(2) Weighted average legislative powers of the President.
(3) The overall index of formal presidential powers is an average of the President’s non-legislative and legislative powers.
(*) The level of these powers is assessed from a regional comparative perspective. A country that has a ‘very high’ level in any of the power dimensions means that its record is above one standard deviation of the regional mean. ‘Medium high’ means that its score falls within the regional average and one positive standard deviation. The same method is used to assess ‘medium low’ and ‘very low’ levels. Region figures are the average or mean of all cases.
Sources:
so-called civil society. While these actors make an essential contribution to democracy, they cannot replace purely political institutions, since they are not bound to respect the basic principle of democratic representation.

The media and civil society, particularly social movements made up of indigenous peasant or urban groups, have played a critical part in some recent developments in Latin American politics. A common means of expression for these new forces are national pacts, or consultative mechanisms that bring together political parties, civil society organizations, including social movements, the business sector and the State authorities.

The institutional design of countries establishes a separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, with the former being the dominant power. An index of formal presidential powers (see previous page) reveals that the average for Latin America is 0.39, while the corresponding figure for the United States is 0.31. In practice, though, limitations are placed on presidential powers, arising from lack of effective parliamentary support, which makes constant negotiations—formal and informal—necessary in order for the executive to be able to govern. At the same time, indicators suggest that, even though the judicial branch enjoys a certain degree of independence, there are still restrictions on its effective performance.

Both the indicators and the round of consultations demonstrate that, with few exceptions, there has been a reduction in the number of restrictions imposed on elected authorities from within the State, especially as a result of

We must remember that, after its promising beginnings, democratization did not proceed along an upward trajectory to the present. There have been advances and reversals, rebellions, civil wars and revolutions [...]. Looking back on the rise and fall of democracy, it is clear that we cannot rely on social forces to ensure that democracy will continue to progress. Democracy appears to be somewhat uncertain. But it also depends on what we do. Even though we cannot rely on benign impulses to promote it, we are not helpless victims of blind forces over which we have no control.

With a proper understanding of what democracy needs and the will to satisfy its requirements, we can act to fulfill democratic ideals and practices and, what is more, to advance them.

R. Dahl
the decline in the power of the military. They also show an increase in the level of political tolerance, which has favored opposition action in many countries of the region. But leaders place emphasis on another type of constraint on the power of the elected government: those restrictions that are imposed from outside of the State. As will be seen later, those interviewed in the round of consultations argue that de facto power centers are the source of severe constraints that affect the ability of governments to respond to the demands of citizens.

B. CIVIL CITIZENSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Relevants issues</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to life, physical integrity and security</td>
<td>International treaties, legislation and implementation of legislation related to fundamental civil rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality before the law and protection against discrimination</td>
<td>International treaties, legislation and implementation of legislation related to general rights and the situation of workers, women, indigenous communities and minors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of justice</td>
<td>Financial resources allocated to the justice system and measures to protect the rights of accused persons and persons deprived of their freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press and right to information</td>
<td>Legal, political and economic restrictions on freedom of the press, violence against journalists, access to public information and habeas data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The right to life, equality before the law, due process, privacy, freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of expression are the core elements of civil citizenship. These rights are enshrined in the Constitutions and law of all of the countries of the region.

It is in the effective implementation of these rights and guarantees that problems arise. This is the case in regard to the right to life and physical integrity. On the one hand, for example, illegal armed groups operate in some countries, which the State has not been able to control and which carry out assassinations and extrajudicial executions and engage in acts where ‘justice is taken into one’s own hands’. On the other hand, violations continue to be committed by members of official security agencies, which are frequently beyond the control of elected governments and have responded to conflict with violence.
The foundation of citizenship is the premise that all individuals are autonomous and hence enjoy basic equality ... Effective citizenship concerns not only voting without coercion, but also the formation of relations between citizens and the State and between citizens themselves (individuals are protected and empowered by their status as citizens). The development of such relationships is an ongoing process, occurring before, during and after elections. Citizenship is no less violated when the voter is coerced as when a woman is beaten or a rural peasant maltreated without any hope of a court punishing those responsible, or when the home of a poor family is illegally invaded by the police... The rule of law reinforces citizenship and therefore is a core element of democracy.

G. O’Donnell

The State also faces serious difficulties when it comes to protecting its citizens from ordinary violence, as demonstrated by the large number of criminal homicides in the region (25.1 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants)—the highest rate in the world. Domestic violence against women is also a problem that plagues all of the countries of the region, but which is more pronounced in a context of poverty and social and educational deficit, as in many Latin American nations.

With respect to guarantees of due process, some indicators reflect the fact that violations of the rights of accused persons and prisoners are widespread. The proportion of detainees awaiting sentence in the region is 54.8 percent, and, in 2000, the prison population exceeded capacity by some 38.2 percent. There are serious limitations on access to justice, particularly in the case of certain ethnic and social groups, for which the principle of equality before the law does not apply.

The exercise of citizens’ rights is influenced by the origin or social status of the individual. In many countries, there is an unresolved tension between the concepts of collective citizenship and individual citizenship, since subordinate groups, such as the poor, immigrants and indigenous peoples, experience a real disadvantage. Citizens’ perceptions confirm these inequalities.
Despite the progress achieved in Latin America in the adoption of constitutional and legal norms for the recognition and protection of the rights of individuals belonging to socially disadvantaged groups, citizens’ perceptions in this regard suggest that much remains to be done to ensure reasonable conditions of equality before the law.

In accordance with the data provided by Latinobarómetro 2002, most people believe that the rich always, or nearly always succeed in exercising their rights with little difference between subregions and countries. On the other hand, similar majorities expressed the view that the poor, immigrants and indigenous groups suffer serious legal disadvantages. This situation is present both in countries with long democratic traditions and in those that have recently made the transition to democracy. It is also present in countries with different rankings in the Human Development Index. Citizens’ perceptions of the legal situation of women are markedly better. In all countries, most people believe that today women always or nearly always exercise their rights. This majority varies between a minimum of 54.8 percent in Mexico and Bolivia and a maximum of 78.5 percent in Uruguay.

In order to examine all of these perceptions of the capacity of individuals belonging to vulnerable groups to exercise their rights, an indicator of the perception of legal equality has been developed (see www.democracia.undp.org). In all Latin American countries, only a minority of people have the perception that vulnerable groups always or nearly always manage to exercise their rights (in none of them does the proportion exceed 31 percent). The average level of the index of perception of equality before the law in the countries of Latin America tends to be low (2.19 points out of 5 possible points: minimum, 1 point).

### Table: Perceptions of the Equality of Specific Groups Before the Law, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Always, or almost always succeed in asserting their rights (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and Mexico (2)</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Region</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercosur and Chile</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Always, or almost always succeed in asserting their rights (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- The number of women, indigenous people, poor people and immigrants varies between 18,040 and 19,489. Index number = 17,359.
- (1) Includes the answers given to the alternatives “always” and “almost always” as offered in the question.
- (2) Includes the Dominican Republic.

**Sources:**
- Processing of question p24u from the UNDP, Survey, proprietary section of Latinobarómetro 2002 (question p24u: “and still thinking about how things work in this country, would you say that in practice women, indigenous people, poor people, immigrants, succeed in asserting their rights always, almost always, almost never or never?”).
C. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Relevant issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs</td>
<td>Health and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Employment, poverty and inequality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scope of social citizenship is a controversial matter. While there is consensus on what are political and civil rights, the same is not true of social rights. Even though many States recognize them, there is frequently a disconnection between their legal existence and their practical implementation. The satisfaction of social rights is a goal that is constantly being pursued.

For analytical purposes, the Report distinguishes between two dimensions of social citizenship. One is ‘basic needs’, which includes, above all else, health and education. The other dimension is ‘social integration’, within which employment, poverty and inequality are examined.

The Constitutions of the countries of Latin America defend the right to health and education, yet other aspects of well-being (housing and social security, for instance) receive unequal treatment, both in practical and formal terms. This order of priorities corresponds with the development goals set out in the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000.

- **Health**: The infant mortality rate in Latin America is high (33.34 deaths per 1,000 live births between 1995 and 2000), although it is much less than it was some years ago (55.91 deaths per 1,000 live births between 1980 and 1985). Life expectancy at birth has increased by five years, from 64.7 years between 1980 and 1985 to 69.7 years between 1995 and 2000. While chronic infant malnutrition, measured by comparing size and age, declined by four points during the 1990s, it remains high, affecting 189 of every 1,000 children.

- **Education**: Attendance within the primary, secondary and tertiary education sectors now stands at 92 percent, 55 percent and 27 percent, respectively. The rate of adult illiteracy is 12.7 percent, as opposed to 21.5 percent in 1980. Even though there has been a marked improvement in the coverage of the educational system, on average, an individual in the region attends school for only 5.2 years, far below the level in industrialized countries and in nations with emerging economies.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
   Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day, as well as the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

2. Achieve universal primary education
   Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

3. Promote gender equality and empower women
   Eliminate gender disparity in the primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

4. Reduce child mortality
   Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

5. Improve maternal health
   Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
   Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other serious diseases.

7. Ensure environmental sustainability
   Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.
   Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.
   By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development
   Develop further an open, ruled-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.
   Address the Special Needs of Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Countries and small island developing states.
   Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.
   In co-operation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.
   In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries.
   In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.
This result is not unexpected, bearing in mind that, according to data compiled by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some 60 percent of children in the region are categorized as poor.

- **Employment:** In 2002, the urban unemployment rate was 9.4 percent. Informal employment in the period between 1990 and 2000 amounted to around 46.3 percent of the labor force.

- **Poverty:** In 2003, 225 million (43.9 percent) Latin Americans were living in poverty, of whom 100 million (19.4 percent) were indigent.

- **Inequality:** The Gini Coefficient, which measures the degree of inequality in income distribution (with zero representing absolute equality and one total inequality), has a value of 0.552, meaning that Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. The richest ten percent of the population earns a level of income that is 30 times that of the poorest ten percent.

Thus, after 25 years of democracy, significant progress has been made in relation to social citizenship, particularly improvements in the education and

![Income Distribution, Latin America 2002](image)

**Notes:** The data are population-weighted and have been drawn up on the basis of the most recent figures available on the distribution of income among urban households, by quintiles and deciles, as percentages of gross national income. For Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela, the figures are for 2002. For Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Paraguay, the figures are for 2001. The data for Chile are for 2000, those for Peru for 1999.

The distribution of income column does not total 100% because the distribution of the income divided by quintiles and deciles also does not total 100% for certain countries.

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Statistics Unit, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
health services. However, it is clear that unmet needs, as illustrated by high levels of poverty and unemployment, are a major social problem in Latin America.

The link between the political, civil and social dimensions of citizenship deserves more attention. Nevertheless, it is clear that those groups that are constrained in terms of their access to power, such as indigenous peoples and other minorities, are also those that are most restricted in the area of social citizenship.

In sum, the process of democratization in Latin America has focused on political citizenship, and has not satisfactorily addressed the challenge of social citizenship. While we have elected governments—a very significant advance in itself—poverty and social inequality persist, as the following comparison between Latin America, Europe and the United States demonstrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>0.552 (3)</td>
<td>42.2 (6)</td>
<td>3,856 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>0.290 (4)</td>
<td>15.0 (7)</td>
<td>22,600 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>0.344 (5)</td>
<td>11.7 (8)</td>
<td>36,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Number of voters based on members of the population who are entitled to vote, 1990-2002.
2. Gini Coefficient. The higher the Gini Coefficient the greater the degree of inequality.
3. Simple average for the 1990s, Perry et al., 2004, p. 57.

Given the large number of sources and the different methodologies used to process the data, it is recommended that the information in the above table be viewed as indicative.

The shortfall in relation to social citizenship has remained constant despite the efforts of democratic governments and the ambitious economic reforms of the past decade. The following table highlights the distinction between reforms and reality. It also offers a preliminary snapshot of the democratic deficit in Latin America, evidence of the urgent need to build a democracy of citizens.
Economic Reform Index (1) | Electoral Democracy Index (1) | Annual growth in real GDP per capita (% (3)) | Poverty % (2) | Indigence % (2) | Gini Coefficient (2) | Urban unemployment (1)
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
**Southern Cone sub-region (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay)**
1981 - 1990 | 0.66 | 0.44 | -0.8% | 25.6 | 7.1 | 0.509 | 8.8
1991 - 1997 | 0.82 | 0.88 | 1.3% | 20.3 | 5.5 | 0.527 | 8.7
1998 - 2003 | 0.84 | 0.91 | 1.0% | 26.0 | 8.7 | 0.519 | 12.1
**Brazil**
1981 - 1990 | 0.52 | 0.70 | 1.8% | 48.0 | 23.4 | 0.603 | 5.2
1991 - 1997 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 0.6% | 40.6 | 17.1 | 0.638 | 5.3
1998 - 2003 | 0.79 | 1.00 | 1.2% | 37.0 | 12.7 | 0.640 | 7.1
**Andean sub-region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela)**
1981 - 1990 | 0.53 | 0.83 | -0.5% | 52.3 | 22.1 | 0.497 | 8.8
1991 - 1997 | 0.76 | 0.86 | 0.9% | 50.4 | 18.2 | 0.538 | 8.3
1998 - 2003 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.0% | 53.1 | 25.5 | 0.545 | 12.0
**Mexico**
1981 - 1990 | 0.61 | 0.31 | 1.7% | 47.8 | 18.8 | 0.521 | 4.2
1991 - 1997 | 0.78 | 0.70 | 0.4% | 48.6 | 19.1 | 0.539 | 4.0
1998 - 2003 | 0.81 | 1.00 | 2.1% | 43.1 | 16.7 | 0.542 | 2.6
**Central America sub-region (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama)**
1981 - 1990 | 0.55 | 0.59 | 4.0% | 45.2 | 31.1 | 0.551 | 9.1
1991 - 1997 | 0.80 | 0.89 | -3.7% | 52.1 | 27.9 | 0.526 | 9.1
1998 - 2003 | 0.85 | 0.97 | 2.6% | 52.5 | 28.9 | 0.554 | 8.7
**Latin America**
1981 - 1990 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.7% | 46.0 | 20.4 | 0.554 | 8.4
1991 - 1997 | 0.79 | 0.87 | 0.7% | 41.9 | 17.9 | 0.557 | 8.8
1998 - 2003 | 0.83 | 0.92 | 1.2% | 41.8 | 17.4 | 0.566 | 10.4

Notes:
(1) Simple average; (2) Population weighted; (3) From period to period.

The Economic Reform Index comprises five components: international trade policy, taxation policy, financial policy, privatization, and capital accounts. The Index ranges from zero, indicating a lack of market-oriented reforms, to one, indicating the application of strong market-oriented reforms.

For GDP data, the methodology employed was as follows: (a) real GDP was added (based on 1995 dollars) for the years of the period under analysis and this figure was divided by the number of years in the period; (b) the latter was divided by the average population in the period; (c) GDP per capita for this period was divided by that of the preceding period, giving the geometric root based on the number of years in the period under analysis. This provided the annual growth rate per capita.


The methodology and data pertaining to the Electoral Democracy Index can be found in the Statistical Compendium of the Report. The other data come from numerous ECLAC publications, with the exception of the data on the Gini Coefficient for 1990, which are sourced from Deininger and Squire, 1998.

The figures for poverty, indigence and the Gini Coefficient are averages of only a few years. The data on poverty, indigence and urban unemployment are not strictly comparable, since they are not all based on national surveys.
Citizens’ support for democracy is a key requirement for its sustainability. History shows examples of democracies that have been destroyed by political forces that have enjoyed the backing or at least the passivity of a substantial proportion and, in some cases, majority of the members of society. Democracies become vulnerable when, inter alia, authoritarian political forces find in the attitudes of citizens fertile territory for action. Hence the importance of being aware of the level of support enjoyed by Latin American democracies.

### DEMOCRACY AND AREAS OF FRAGILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific attitudes related to the validity and importance of democracy</th>
<th>Percentage of the total sample of all 18 countries</th>
<th>Percentage that prefers democracy to any other form of government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the president may go further than the law allows</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe that economic development is more important than democracy</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would support an authoritarian government if it solved economic problems</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not believe that democracy has the capacity to solve the country’s problems</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe that democracy is possible without political parties</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe that democracy is possible without a national Congress</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the president should be able to impose order using force</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the president should be able to control the communications media</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the president should be able to disregard Congress and political parties</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not believe that democracy is essential to achieve development</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n varies between 16,183 (democracy is possible without a Congress) and 17,194 (democracy is not essential for development). Source: UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinobarómetro 2002.

To this end, a survey was conducted in May 2002 on citizens’ perceptions of democracy. The survey of 18,643 persons covered a population of more than 400 million in the 18 countries included in the Report.
According to surveys carried out by Latinobarómetro, in 1996, some 61 percent of people said that they preferred democracy to any other kind of system. By 2002, this figure had dropped to 57 percent. The preference for democracy, however, does not necessarily imply firm support.

In order to understand this situation better, the Report analyzed the responses to 11 questions that aimed to gauge attitudes towards democracy, the manner of exercising power in a democracy, the main institutions in a democracy and numerous social issues.

The results show that many of those who stated that they preferred democracy to other systems of government have quite undemocratic views on various other social matters. In 2002, nearly one-half (48.1 percent) of those who prefer democracy to any other kind of system, ranked economic development over democracy and a similar percentage (44.9 percent) was willing to support an authoritarian government if it solved its country’s economic problems. These responses warrant attention.

The Report identified three main categories in which the opinions and attitudes of Latin Americans on democracy may be grouped. Forty-three percent of those surveyed are considered to be ‘democrats’, 26.5 percent are considered to be ‘non-democrats’, and the remaining 30.5 percent is ‘ambivalent’. Democrats are those who maintain a favorable attitude towards democracy; non-democrats are those who hold views that go against democracy (for example, they would support a regime capable of resolving a country’s economic and social problems even if it was not democratic). The ambivalent, or those whose position is ambiguous, are situated at an almost equal distance between democrats and non-democrats. A more detailed analysis, though, shows that the ambivalent are closer to democrats in terms of their support for democracy over other desirable objectives and their support for representative institutions. Yet, they are closer to non-democrats with respect to the means of exercising power, willing to grant the President exceptional powers. This intermediate category has opinions that are seemingly contradictory.

Individuals who maintain a specific view do not, for the most part, belong to a particular group or social class. Above all, a social breakdown of the democrat category reveals that support for democracy is to be found to a

**Forty-three percent of those surveyed are considered to be ‘democrats’, 26.5 percent are considered to be ‘non-democrats’, and the remaining 30.5 percent is ‘ambivalent’.**
Towards a citizens’ democracy

ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, SUB-REGIONAL AVERAGES, 2002

Note: n = 15,216. The figures indicate percentages of the valid sample. Source: UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinobarómetro 2002.

similar extent in various sectors of society. Nonetheless, the following conclusions can be drawn.

• Persons with a higher level of education (complete or incomplete) tend to be democrats. In contrast, there are no major differences between persons with primary and secondary education.

• Democrats have experienced greater educational mobility in comparison to their parents.

• There are more young people among non-democrats.

• On balance, non-democrats see themselves as having experienced a sharper decline in economic mobility than other groups in comparison to their parents. They also tend to expect their children to experience less upward economic mobility.
### SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF PEOPLE ACCORDING TO ATTITUDE TO DEMOCRACY, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Structure of the sample</th>
<th>Attitude to democracy</th>
<th>Significance (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Non-democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and Mexico (1)</td>
<td>% of people n=6,402</td>
<td>46.60</td>
<td>19.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Region</td>
<td>% of people n=4,377</td>
<td>37.30</td>
<td>28.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR and Chile Latin America</td>
<td>% of people n=4,438</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>21.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>% of men</td>
<td>51.50</td>
<td>52.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>47.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>% 16 to 29</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>40.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 30 to 64</td>
<td>54.30</td>
<td>52.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 65 to 99</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>38.16</td>
<td>46.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>% without schooling</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 1 to 6 years</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>31.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 7 to 12 years</td>
<td>43.10</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% advanced studies, completed or not</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average years of study</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical level (2)</td>
<td>% low</td>
<td>41.50</td>
<td>40.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% medium</td>
<td>49.20</td>
<td>46.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% high</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>8.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average economic level index</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (3)</td>
<td>% who experienced social development under an authoritarian regime</td>
<td>51.80</td>
<td>55.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% who experienced social development in a transition period</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>11.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% who experienced social development under a democracy</td>
<td>36.60</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of social development system other than democracy</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>6.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. (1) Includes the Dominican Republic.
2. (2) Based on an economic index drawn up on the basis of possession of objects and education of the head of the family. This index may vary between zero and ten. A value between zero and 3.33 indicates a low economic level, a value between 3.34 and 6.66 indicates an average economic level and a value between 6.67 and ten indicates a high economic level.
3. (3) The number of years of social development during which the respondents lived under an authoritarian regime is used to determine whether they experienced social development under a democracy, in a transition period, or under an authoritarian regime. A person’s social development is believed to take 11 years (between the ages of seven and seventeen).
4. (*) indicates when the measure of association used or the analysis of variance (ANOVA) is significant to within 5%. (**) indicates when the result is significant to within 1%. When the calculation of a measure of association or ANOVA is not appropriate, this is indicated by (..). For information on the tests carried out in each case, reference should be made to the Statistical Compendium of the Report.


What is more, by examining the participation of citizens (see pages 56-57) it is possible to determine which of the orientations described above (democrat, non-democrat and ambivalent) is more common and thus to add a new element to the study of support for, and the vulnerability of, democracies in the region.

Most Latin American citizens are not disconnected from political and social developments in their countries. Only a small minority, 7.3 percent,
Towards a citizens’ democracy

has not engaged in any kind of social activity in recent years. An additional 22.1 percent of people surveyed limited themselves to exercising their right to vote in their country’s last presidential election. Overall, approximately 30 percent may be categorized as demobilized citizens.

Nearly four out of every ten persons surveyed (37.6 percent) participate in the public life of their nation beyond their involvement in elections. In addition to voting, they contact public authorities when there are problems that affect their communities, they take part in public demonstrations and they contribute time, labor or money to initiatives aimed at resolving such problems. These citizens actively exercise their rights.

In Latin America, democrats tend to participate slightly more actively in the political life of their countries than non-democrats and the ambivalent. In addition to voting (which nearly all of them do), some 43 percent of democrats engage in other forms of political action, such as public demonstrations and contacting public authorities and officials. By contrast, 37 percent of non-democrats and 39 percent of the ambivalent may be classified as active. A significant finding is that democrats are not always the most active participants in society.

In light of the above analysis, a Democracy Support Index (DSI) has been developed that is based on the following elements.

• Democratic preferences.
• The size of each preference group and the proportion of democrats and non-democrats.
• Average distance between the attitudes of each group—whether democrats or non-democrats are closer to the ambivalent.
• Level of political activism among individuals in these groups and the position of democrats and non-democrats.

When the DSI has a value that is significantly higher than one, there is strong support for democracy. When the value is close to one there is political balance between the preferences of democrats and non-democrats. In such a situation, there is still the potential for instability, since citizens’ support for democracy cannot be guaranteed. When the DSI has a value that is much lower than one, and, in fact, is closer to zero, citizens’ support for democracy is said to be fragile. In the event of a severe political crisis, the future of democracy could be easily compromised.

In Latin America, DSI values support the conclusion that democrats are better placed than their adversaries, non-democrats (see page 58). Indeed, the value of 2.03 for the region is very positive in terms of support for democracy. The preference for democracy does not vary much between socio-economic sectors and between the members of different political
### SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF PEOPLE BY DEGREE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Structure of the sample</th>
<th>Degree of citizen participation</th>
<th>Significance (2)</th>
<th>The test were carried out by comparing persons who only vote with those who take political action, with or without additional action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Joins in, whether or not voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and Mexico (1)</td>
<td>% of people</td>
<td>n=7,387</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>20.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Region</td>
<td>% of people</td>
<td>n=5,178</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR and Chile</td>
<td>% of people</td>
<td>n=5,330</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>23.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>% of people</td>
<td>n=17,895</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>22.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>% of men</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>45.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.50</td>
<td>58.20</td>
<td>54.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>% 16 to 29</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>28.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 30 to 64</td>
<td>57.80</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>59.80</td>
<td>57.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 65 to 99</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>39.68</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>42.06</td>
<td>38.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>% without schooling</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>14.10</td>
<td>11.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 1 to 6 years</td>
<td>35.40</td>
<td>38.50</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>37.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 7 to 12 years</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>39.80</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>39.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% advanced studies, completed or not</td>
<td>15.90</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>13.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years of study</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>8.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continues on next page.
### Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structure of the sample</th>
<th>Degree of citizen participation</th>
<th>Significance (2)</th>
<th>The test were carried out by comparing persons who only vote with those who take political action, with or without additional action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Joins in, whether or not voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic level (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>% low</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>52.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% medium</td>
<td>46.50</td>
<td>43.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% high</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average economic index</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic not covered (4)</td>
<td>% referencing a topic not covered</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>31.40</td>
<td>27.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% not referencing a topic not covered</td>
<td>81.60</td>
<td>68.60</td>
<td>72.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence (5)</td>
<td>Average confidence in institutions and actors</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Includes the Dominican Republic.
2. (*) indicates when the measure of association used or the analysis of variance (ANOVA) is significant to within 5%. (**) indicates when the result is significant to within 1%. “ns” indicates that the test was not significant to within 1% or 5%. When the calculation of a measure of association or ANOVA is not appropriate, this is indicated by (..). For information on the tests carried out in each case, reference should be made to the Statistical Compendium of the Report.
3. Based on an economic index drawn up on the basis of possession of objects and education of the head of the family. This index may vary between zero and ten. A value between zero and 3.33 indicates a low economic level, a value between 3.34 and 6.66 indicates an average economic level and a value between 6.67 and ten indicates a high economic level.
4. Based on question p27u: “What topic of concern to you was not tackled by the candidates in the last election?”
5. Based on the index of confidence in institutions and actors, constructed on the basis of questions on confidence in: “judiciary,” “government,” “municipalities,” “Congresses,” “political parties” and “people leading the country.”

- Inactive citizen does not take part in politics or else participates sporadically in activities that require less effort than voting. May join in social activities.
- Active citizen contacts the authorities and takes part in public demonstrations, but is not active in all areas of citizen participation.
- Highly participatory citizen is active in all areas of citizen participation.

Source: Questions processed from the UNDP proprietary section and other questions of Latinobarómetro 2002.
parties. But lower levels of support are associated with lower levels of education, reduced prospects for social mobility and mistrust in democratic institutions and politicians. Conversely, citizens who participate more tend to be better educated and hold higher economic status.

The above analysis yields the following conclusions:

- Based on the processing of data Latinobarómetro 2002, 43 percent of people expressed a preference for democracy—the largest group.
- When asked to choose between economic development and democracy, many respondents appeared to opt for the former.
- Those from countries with lower levels of social inequality tend to be more partial to democracy.
- Analysis of the profile of so-called non-democrats reveals that this group attracts has more of its membership from the less educated sectors. Members of this group tend to be people whose social development occurred during periods of authoritarian rule, who have a perception of low social mobility in comparison to their parents, who have low expectations regarding a better future for their children and who have less confidence in institutions.
- Most citizens are not disconnected from political and social developments in their country.
- On the whole, democrats tend to participate slightly more actively in the political life of their nation.
With just 17 exceptions, the 231 leaders who were interviewed for the Report expressed the view that democracy has made significant progress over the past decade. For the first time in the continent’s history, all of the countries of Latin America meet the electoral definition of democracy.

When questioning the degree of progress or the strength of democracy skeptics most often point to prevailing conditions of poverty, inequality and social segmentation. As one former President noted: “We have achieved our Republic, but we must still build our democracy. The Republic preserves our individual freedoms, ensures that a despotic government does not kill us, imprison us … [B]ut in addition to these so-called negative freedoms, there are other freedoms, the positive freedoms, having to do with social rights”.

### Issues to be Tackled in Order to Strengthen Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political reform</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in participation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional, party-related</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat inequality</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social policy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for democracy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat corruption</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly all of those consulted shared the opinion that greater participation by citizens in any form strengthens democratic institutions. As one leader put it: “Poverty is diffuse, unorganized ... the more democratic power is strengthened, the more pressures from below increase upward ... This is the test that we must now pass.”

They also agreed that more participation through political parties is good for democracy. This is in spite of the fact that they were skeptical about whether parties are functioning effectively as a mechanism for promoting citizen participation and about whether they can again play an active role in this regard.

According to consultees, the highest level of participation through mechanisms other than parties is usually seen in relation to the strengthening of deliberative and decision-making bodies at the local level. It is at this level that leaders emerge who are able to attract greater popular support and civil society organizations that manage to involve citizens function best.

The relative shift to the local level is a positive development insofar as it means that certain institutional instruments that have traditionally been beyond the control of citizens (for example, local deliberative organs) are moving away from the old patrimonial order and are being seen as appropriate spaces for the exercise of citizenship. However, other leaders believe that some of the new forms of participation, especially those that are presented as an alternative to parties, are not so positive, since they tend to deinstitutionalize politics.

Indeed, according to one President, “even though civil society is increasing in importance, no one still has a clear idea of who they are and what they represent.” Moreover, civil society tends to deny the value of politics.

Lastly, some leaders noted that a competitive relationship exists between political parties and certain civil society organizations. For many, an increase in these forms of alternative participation, when it occurs at the same time as a crisis or the withdrawal of a party, creates a situation in which special types of demands emerge that constitute an obstacle to the development of government policies at the national level and which may even threaten good governance.
THOUGHTS ON CIVIL SOCIETY

[Deepening democracy... requires the involvement of civil society, particularly because of its ability to make those invisibles visibles. There cannot be rights of citizenship if these rights are not available to all. Rights for some, however large this group may be, are not rights, but privileges. Citizenship is the expression of a social relationship that has as a basic premise all individuals, without exception.

Between 30 and 60 percent of the population of our countries suffers from some form of social exclusion, that is, denial of their citizenship. These people become the huge invisible mass in our societies as a result of their failure to organize themselves, to struggle for political inclusion and to have some prospect of change in the circumstances that generate inequality, poverty and social exclusion. Civil society loses and the democracy loses. If, for some reason these groups of invisibles manage to organize themselves, then civil society wins and democracy wins, because their presence as effective actors is the indispensable requirement for their permanent inclusion as citizens...

... [T]he invisibles in Latin American societies... [are] those who are not part of civil societies, simply because they have no identity, project, social organization and method of struggle to affirm themselves, defend themselves, to conquer rights and public recognition. They are the politically deprived of any real power. If we are to respect the truth, it is necessary to recognize the advance of formal citizenship, the citizenship that carries the right to vote, particularly during the period of recent democratization.

Cándido Grzybowski, Director of IBASE
(the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis)
Most leaders are also of the view that controls on power, which are necessary in a democracy, have increased. However, a number of reservations need to be highlighted in this regard. Some consider the level of presidential power to be excessive, restricting the independence of the legislative and judicial branches of State in a number of countries. This is a criticism that has been leveled by trade unionists and civil society leaders. According to one trade unionist, “There has been a kind of centralization of power in the executive branch. In other words, the other powers—the legislative and judicial branches—which should function autonomously ... in their monitoring and oversight roles ... do not do so and are subordinated to the executive branch.”

Despite the increase in citizen participation and controls on power, those surveyed identified two major problems within the democracies of Latin America: the role of political parties; and the tension between institutional powers and what they refer to as de facto power centers.

Political parties, which are vital to democracy, are going through quite a severe crisis. Many of those consulted believe that they are no longer adequately fulfilling their role and have not been successful in promoting the demands of citizens. As a result, non-political or ‘anti-political’ organizations/movements are emerging to engage in the political process. In the opinion of some consultees, parties have become the personal property of political leaders. They have abandoned their ideologies and programs, and are usually split into camps that side with one personality or another. In addition, they lack the capacity to make proposals or to put forth strong government teams to ‘resolve the problems of people’. In general, according to the views of interviewees, far from expressing the majority will of the population, parties are acting in accordance with the interests of individuals and are under immense pressure from legal and illegal power groups.

Nearly all leaders recognize the centrality of political parties and the harmful consequences of their tarnished reputation. But there is no agreement among them about the causes of the crisis or possible solutions to it.

For some political leaders, the problem is one of communication. As a Chilean leader said: “I believe that parties have lacked the ability to clarify their proposals before public opinion, the choice that they represent, the path they offer.” However, this type of explanation is not sufficient for those who come from countries in severe crisis. For them, it has not been a case of citizens turning their backs on parties, but rather, parties abandoning citizens.

The imposition of restrictions by de facto power centers has been a longstanding problem in Latin America. While constitutional texts grant
substantial authority to the executive and considerable weight to the legislature and judiciary, in the past, real power has tended to reside with other entities, such as the armed forces, or with non-institutional groups, such as families with certain surnames. Although consultees point to some strengthening of the institutional set up, the problem persists in new forms.

In recent years, institutional powers have become more democratic—that is, they are under greater control, they are less personalized and they are no longer as exposed to the threats of a military coup. However, institutional powers have become weaker in comparison to de facto power centers.

Interviewees confirmed that a strong presidential system is characteristic of most democracies in Latin America. But this assessment varies according to sub-region. The Presidents of Central America and the Caribbean endorse this view and they include the executive when identifying the groups with the greatest amount of power. According to one: “The Presidency still carries a great deal of power”; and this power is based on considerations that go beyond constitutional attributes: “When one has a strong leadership and wins elections by an overwhelming majority ... there is no way that the Congress can control the President.” By contrast, the Presidents of countries in the Southern Cone place more emphasis on the space between the formal power of the President and his effective capacity to exercise it. According to them, the image of the President as ‘caudillo’ does not correspond with reality: “The President is rather limited in his capacity, in general.” One therefore sees a weakening of the old ‘caudillo’ tradition on the continent.

Those interviewed view the armed forces as a less decisive actor on Latin America’s political stage. Except in the case of an “extreme threat, when the military takes to the street” (journalist), consultees believe that the region’s armed forces have lost power, either because they have been institutionalized or because internal divisions prevent them from utilizing their power to the full.

A broad majority believes that the business and financial sectors, together with the communications media, limit the power of governments. The formation of an alliance between both blocs (a frequent occurrence) creates the capacity to mold opinions, to determine the agenda and to shape the public image of officials, political parties and institutions.

Various mechanisms were highlighted during the consultations via which the business class exercises influence over the government. A political figure noted that: “Its capacity to influence is based ... on the fact that they finance the election campaigns”; “Since the business sector makes investment decisions and without investment there is neither growth nor employment, you have there a power of veto.” A former President added: “The great de
facto power of the incipient democracy is private economic power ... Comprised of pressure groups that influence the conduct of the President, legislators, judges and other government functionaries and officials of the public administration.” The ramifications are rather negative. A political figure concluded that: “We have a democracy that is divorced from the general interest and tied largely to de facto power centers that ultimately control the country’s economy through their oligarchies and replace the democratic government with a plutocratic government.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO EXERCISES POWER IN LATIN AMERICA?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>De facto powers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic groups/the business and financial sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional powers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political institutions and political leaders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians/political operators/political leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraterritorial factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/US Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral lending agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The international factor/the external factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational/multinational corporations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total does not equal 100% because multiple responses were permitted.

Some interviewees view the communications media positively, especially for its watchdog role. One business executive stated that: “The true monitoring is done by the press.” But the media is often perceived as a means of control that is itself uncontrolled, a power center that goes beyond informing. A political figure said that: “They form public opinion, determine surveys and, consequently, are the ones that exercise the greatest influence on governments ... They have totally replaced political parties.”

In addition to the business and financial sectors and the communications media, consultees pointed to the power of various other national and foreign actors. Nearly one-half believes that the Church maintains influence, although this is declining in comparison with the past. They also highlight the fact that the growth of evangelical churches is undermining the power of the Catholic Church. Many stated that trade unions, in particular, public sector unions, enjoy the power of veto through strikes and popular mobilizations, and are a key actor in defining the national labor agenda.

Many interviewees mentioned the influence of illegal powers or criminal forces linked to drug trafficking, money laundering, the smuggling of
contraband and other related activities. A high-level official said that: “Drug traffickers buy off everyone and everything—judges, border guards, police, entire institutions. It is an aggressive, anti-democratic and terrible power that even succeeds in electing its own representatives to Congress and other bodies.”

Furthermore, consultees stressed the power of various extraterritorial entities, especially the United States, multilateral lending agencies and risk-assessment bodies. One President said that: “Without a favorable assessment from the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank and the IDB [Inter-American Development Bank], the country’s economy would collapse in short order ... the stamp of approval of the Government of the United States in the multilateral agencies is essential.” Another President added: “Sovereign Governments are dependent on the evaluation of a private risk agency.”

The pressure applied by extraterritorial powers is viewed very negatively. A President stated that: “We have lost the capacity of national decision-making, since international organizations establish conditionalities that adversely affect growth itself, and... ultimately, democracy.” A high-level official noted that: “Economic policy is not managed democratically ... There is a single standard for the region. And anyone seeking to depart from this standard comes up against the reality that he cannot do so or if he does, he does so at his own risk.” Mention was also made of the lack of responsibility of the extraterritorial powers. According to one President: “Multilateral organizations are not responsible for the political consequences of the obligations that they impose on you (...) in other words, an international bureaucrat comes and, following the guidelines of his organization, establishes a line and afterwards this gentleman completes his mission and leaves.”

In sum, the leaders who were surveyed believe that Latin America has made significant advances towards democracy. For the first time in the continent’s history, the political regimes of all countries meet the definition of electoral democracy. They also point to an increase in citizen participation and controls on the exercise of power, as well as the near elimination of the risk of military insubordination. However, they draw attention to two key problems in the democracies of Latin America: the role of political parties; and the tensions between institutional powers and de facto power centers.

Political parties are not adequately fulfilling their roles, particularly in terms of promoting the demands of citizens. Moreover, the institutionalization of the processes of social participation is faint or incipient and the relationship between parties and civil society organizations tends to be conflictual. The leaders consulted see these problems clearly and are not
seeking solutions outside of the realm of politics, but, rather, within it. They are convinced that it is important to have strong parties.

Meanwhile, the de facto power centers, particularly the business and financial classes, are viewed as a source of restrictions that limit the capacity of governments to respond to the demands of their citizens. Although the communications media is seen as a legitimate check on the activities of governments, it is a matter of concern that, even as its role and ties to economic interests expand, the sector is not subject to any kind of control and sometimes does not demonstrate a sense of responsibility commensurate with its influence. Another reason for the loss of autonomy of governments concerns the part played by the United States and multilateral lending agencies. One notes also the new threat posed by illegal power centers, especially those with links to drug trafficking and money laundering.

### Future Agenda by Topic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Number of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic revitalization, debate on the use of productive resources</td>
<td>66 (42.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(gas, oil, coca; privatization, financial reform)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation issues</td>
<td>28 (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional integration into the Andean Region/MERCOSUR/FTAA</td>
<td>22 (14.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt</td>
<td>13 (8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free-trade treaties</td>
<td>4 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the IMF, World Bank, IDB</td>
<td>1 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/health reform</td>
<td>45 (28.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and inequality</td>
<td>44 (28.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>26 (16.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence, delinquency, citizens security</td>
<td>13 (8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reform/role of parties/decentralization</td>
<td>55 (35.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State reform (openness, modernization, improved administration)</td>
<td>33 (21.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
<td>9 (6.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial reform (state of law and legal certainty)</td>
<td>15 (9.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic security (defense of democratic freedoms and promotion of human rights and peace)</td>
<td>15 (9.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>10 (6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution of the politico-institutional conflict and institutional weaknesses/ institutional rebuilding</td>
<td>9 (5.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money laundering and drug trafficking (the coca question)</td>
<td>5 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between government and society; national conciliation</td>
<td>2 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Report concludes that democratic development is closely linked to the search for greater social equality, the fight against poverty and the expansion of citizens’ rights. Thus it is essential to review the policies that have been implemented and the action that has been taken to date, to learn from recent experience, to analyze emerging social realities and to explore new paths. This will facilitate the expansion of our horizons and open our eyes to formulas to recast the debate on politics and the place of politics in Latin America.

For nearly two decades, particularly throughout the 1990s, the Latin American agenda has included democratic strengthening, the crisis of politics, reform of the State, structural reforms of the economy and the impact of globalization. However, although substantive aspects of these issues have been addressed, the debate has overlooked other factors, which in light of the preceding analysis should be placed at the center of the discussion.

The Report is a call to action. It demands real commitment to democracy, and its strengthening and expansion. To this end, the intention is to encourage debate and to help revive Latin American thinking on democracy. Our hypothesis—that problems associated with democracy can be resolved through more democracy—contains the idea that more democracy means more citizenship and that this demand for more citizenship has not been broadly discussed in key countries, multilateral organizations and Latin American societies themselves. The problems of democratic development combine the limitations of the State and demands for economic growth (the results of which frequently include inequalities) with the inability of politics to integrate the aspirations of citizens, the tensions prevalent within fractured societies, the existence of de facto power centers that exercise significant influence and permeate the highest decision-making forums and globalization that constricts the
democratic space by taking key issues that affect the future of society out of the hands of citizens.

**THE AGENDA OF CITIZENS: MAIN PROBLEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment problems</td>
<td>34.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty, inequality and insufficient income</td>
<td>26.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and drugs</td>
<td>11.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient service and infrastructure</td>
<td>6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>11.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is necessary, therefore, to identify clearly the problems that affect us, to discuss them and to develop the social and political channels needed to deepen our democracies.

The Report argues that the democracies of Latin America are incomplete in terms of civil citizenship and, more importantly, social citizenship. After many years and a strenuous political and social struggle, we have finally achieved democratic political rights, but we still lack full democratic citizenship. We must move from electoral democracy to a democracy of citizens for two basic reasons: because the quality of democracy is limited without full civil rights and an increase in social rights; and because the sustainability of democratic political rights, as well as the social value of democracy (relevance), may be affected if citizenship is not expanded.

In order to move from electoral democracy to a democracy of citizens, it is important to consider the power of the State and its capacity to democratize, that is, to expand citizenship. Consequently, the Report argues in favor of a widening of the political debate in the region and proposes an Expanded Agenda of Democratic Reform.
Towards a citizens’ democracy

There are four major items on this agenda.

a) Restoration of the content and relevance of politics and its institutions. The significance of democracy to citizens is not addressed solely by concentrating on the reform of political parties. Although this is a necessary condition, new initiatives are required that will move us closer to a participatory democracy, in which civil society organizations can expand their involvement in the democratic process.

b) The need for a new ‘statehood’. A broad debate on the role of the State in strengthening democracy. This should not be limited to the issue of the size of the State, but should focus on the capacity of the State to expand democracy.

c) An examination of the economy from the perspective of democracy, to highlight the potential diversity of economic policies and their impact on democratic development. Poverty and inequality are not just ‘problems for society’, they also pose a challenge to democracy. Economic issues should be part of the content of politics. A system of politics that turns its back on this debate will find itself embroiled in a crisis of representation, since it will be failing to take account of one of the main problems facing Latin Americans.

d) An assessment of the autonomous space that Latin American democracies require to ensure their growth in the era of globalization. First, while it has
promoted democracy, globalization has imposed restrictions, including on the strongest and most developed nations. Second, paradoxically, although globalization has eroded the capacity of governments to act, particularly in regard to the effectiveness of their instruments for economic regulation, it has left them to deal with the complex task of maintaining social cohesion, but with less scope for action. Third, there is a huge difference between noting the limits established as a result of globalization and accepting the passivity of governments in the face of it. Fourth, it is dangerous to develop an attitude of fatalism in light of globalization, on the grounds that the imbalance of forces is such that there is no room for autonomous politics. The question of how to expand the autonomy of Latin American democracies in relation to defining and resolving the principal problems that affect the continent not only concerns each individual country, but also the region as a whole. Therefore a political revitalization of regional efforts is urgent and meaningful.

Democratic power is the ability to address effectively problems related to the expansion. Statehood is fundamental to the construction of democratic power.
This Annex contains a selection of the data referred to in the Report. Where appropriate, it offers a brief interpretation or explanation. It also contains information on the source of each item.

1. New indexes developed for the Report: the EDI and the DSI

*The Electoral Democracy Index*

The average EDI for Latin America rose rapidly from 0.28 in 1977 to 0.69 in 1985, increasing to 0.86 in 1990 and to 0.93 in 2002 (UNDP Indicators).

- Achievement: Twenty-five years ago, most of the eighteen countries covered in the Report had authoritarian governments. Today all of these countries meet the basic criteria for an electoral democracy.
- Challenge: Problems remain in the Andean Region with respect to attempts to remove from power elected governments in ways that do not strictly conform to constitutional provisions.
- Explanation: The EDI combines four variables: the right to vote; fair elections; free elections; and elections as a means of gaining access to public office. The value of the EDI ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating complete absence of electoral democracy and one the maximum amount of electoral democracy.

*The Democracy Support Index*

The average DSI for Latin America in 2002 was 2.03 (UNDP, Survey)

- Achievement: The DSI indicates that democrats are in a better position than non-democrats.
- Explanation: The DSI measures democratic preferences, the size of
each preference group and the proportion of democrats and non-democrats, the average distance between the attitudes of each group—whether democrats or non-democrats are closer to the ambivalent—and the level of political activism among individuals in these groups and the position of democrats and non-democrats. When the DSI has a value that is significantly higher than one there is strong support for democracy. When the value is close to one there is political balance between the preferences of democrats and non-democrats. In such a situation, there is still the potential for instability, since citizens’ support for democracy cannot be guaranteed. When the DSI has a value that is much lower than one, and, in fact, is closer to zero, citizens’ support for democracy is said to be fragile. In the event of a severe political crisis, the future of democracy could be easily compromised.

2. The state of democracy

*Political citizenship*

- Some six percent of the leaders consulted stated that there is ‘full democracy’ in their country; around 66 percent said that, in their country, there is democracy ‘with few or some limitations’; around 17 percent acknowledged that ‘many limitations’ are placed on democracy in their country; and roughly eight percent admitted that their country ‘was not a democracy’ (UNDP, Round of consultations with Latin American leaders, 2002–2003).
- Sixty-four-point-six percent of citizens of Latin America claim that politicians in government lie in order to win elections and hence do not fulfill their electoral promises (UNDP, Survey, proprietary section of Latinobarómetro 2002).
- The participation of women in politics has increased significantly over the past 15 years or so: the average rate of female representation in Parliament rose from 8.0 percent to 15.5 percent between the late 1980s and today (UNDP Indicators, based on figures provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union).
- Some 59 percent of the politicians consulted expressed the view that parties are not adequately fulfilling their role. Only 18 percent believe that parties are adequately fulfilling their role (UNDP, Round of consultations with Latin American leaders, 2002–2003).
- Some 41.9 percent of those surveyed said that, provided ‘things work’, they would be willing to tolerate a certain degree of corruption (UNDP, Survey, proprietary section of Latinobarómetro 2002).
• Some 31.4 percent of those surveyed stated that they were aware of one or more cases of clientelism (UNDP, Survey, proprietary section of Latinobarómetro 2002).
• Of the leaders consulted in Latin America, 79.7 percent emphasized the influence that the business and financial sectors have over governments, while 65.2 percent underlined the power of the communications media (UNDP, Round of consultations with Latin American leaders, 2002–2003).

Civil citizenship

• Sixty-seven percent of those surveyed stated that women always or nearly always manage to exercise their rights. The corresponding figures for immigrants, indigenous people and the poor are 30.8 percent, 23.1 percent and 17.8 percent respectively (UNDP, Survey, proprietary section of Latinobarómetro 2002).
• The rate of criminal homicide in Latin America in the late 1990s was 25.1 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest regional value in the world (UNDP Indicators, World Health Organization).
• The average number of prisoners in Latin America in 2000 was 145 per 100,000 inhabitants, far below the 686 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in the United States. However, some 54.8 percent of the prison population is detainees awaiting sentence, while the comparable figure for the United States in 18.8 percent (UNDP indicators, based on The International Center for Prison Studies).

Social citizenship

• The HDI. The regional (unweighted) average of the Human Development Index rose from 0.683 in 1980 to 0.715 in 1990 to 0.762 in 2001 (UNDP).
• Infant malnutrition (measured by comparing size and age) fell from 23.1 percent in the late 1980s to 18.9 percent in the late 1990s (UNDP Indicators, World Health Organization).
• Infant mortality declined from 46.1 deaths per 1,000 live births between 1985 and 1990 to 33.3 between 1995 and 2000 (UNDP Indicators, based on information provided by the United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
• Illiteracy in persons older than 15 years dropped from 21.5 percent in 1980 to 12.7 percent in 2000 (UNDP Indicators, based on information provided by UNESCO).
• In 2003, 225 million people in the region (43.9 percent) received a level
of income that was below the poverty line (UNDP Indicators, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).

- The Gini Coefficient for Latin America is 0.552, while the values for Europe and the United States are 0.290 and 0.344 respectively (UNDP Indicators, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank and others). The Gini Coefficient measures the degree of inequality in income distribution. A figure of between 0.25 and 0.35 is considered ‘reasonable’, while a number higher than 0.55 represents extreme inequality.

- The rate of open urban unemployment in Latin America in 2002 was 9.4 percent, the highest level in two decades. In 2001, some 46.3 percent of non-agricultural jobs were in the informal sector (UNDP Indicators, International Labour Organization and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).

3. Citizens’ support for democracy

In 2002, 57 percent of the citizens of Latin America said that they preferred democracy to any other system. Of these people, however, 48.1 ranked economic development over democracy and 44.9 percent said that they would be prepared to support an authoritarian regime if it was able to resolve the country’s economic problems (UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinobarómetro 2002).

- Challenge: Many of those persons who declared a preference for democracy hold contradictory views. It is important to note, though, that their responses relate to hypothetical and abstract situations. It is a positive sign that a majority of citizens support democracy even though the benefits of democracy have tended to vary.

In 2002, 43 percent of citizens had democratic attitudes, compared to 30.5 percent who were ambivalent and 26.5 percent that were non-democratic (UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinobarómetro 2002).

- Explanation: These figures are derived from responses to 11 questions that aimed to gauge attitudes towards democracy, the manner of exercising power in a democracy, the main institutions in a democracy and numerous social issues.
4. The economic model

The Index of Economic Reform rose from 0.58 in the 1980s to 0.83 in the period between 1988 and 2003, following the introduction of market-oriented reforms (UNDP Indicators, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).

- Explanation: The Index of Economic Reform consists of five components: international trade policy; tax policy; financial policy; privatization, and capital accounts. The index ranges from zero, indicating an absence of market-oriented reforms, to one, indicating the application of strong market-oriented reforms.

Some 70.3 percent of those surveyed expressed support for State intervention in the economy, while only 26.4 percent said that they preferred the market to find its own equilibrium (UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinobarómetro 2002).
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