1. Key Concepts in AIME
   a. Pragmatism
      i. Peirce (“How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” 1878, p. 293): Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function.
         1. It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows:
         2. [Maxim of Pragmatism or Pragmatic Maxim—] Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
      ii. James (“Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence,” 1878, p. 17): I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action—action which to a great extent transforms the world—help to make the truth which they declare. In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the should-be, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the cogitandum as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival.
      iii. James (Will to Believe, 1896, p. xii): The truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, 'works' best; and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses.
         1. (p. 77): To explain a thing is to pass easily back to its antecedents; to know it is easily to foresee its consequents.
         2. Now, there is one particular relation of greater practical importance than all the rest, — I mean the relation of a thing to its future consequences.
         3. So long as an object is unusual, our expectations are baffled; they are fully determined as soon as it becomes familiar. I therefore propose this as the first practical requisite which a philosophic conception must satisfy: It must, in a general way at least, banish uncertainty from the future.
            a. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, conceive the object of our conception have. Then,
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

5. James (Dictionary, 1902, p. 321): [Pragmatism is] The doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences…. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions.

iv. James (1903) “Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking” (Title by James for Peirce’s Harvard Lectures)
   1. Peirce ([Peirce to Mrs. Franklin], 1903, p. 720): I had intended to print them; but James said he could not understand them himself and could not recommend their being printed. I do not myself think there is any difficulty in understanding them.
   2. Peirce (“Three Cotary Propositions of Pragmatism,” Lecture VII, 1903, p. 250): pragmatism is the doctrine that every conception is a conception of conceivable practical effects.

v. Schiller (“The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics,” 1903, p. 30): [Pragmatism in] In Peirce's sense, [is] that a conception is to be tested by its practical effects.

vi. Stream of Consciousness, Pure Experience & The Thing & its Relations
   1. James (“On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” 1884, p. 5): If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward colouring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades.
   2. James (“A World of Pure Experience,” 1904 p. 542): to 'fulfil a function' in a world of pure experience can be conceived and defined in only one possible way. In such a world transitions and arrivals (or terminations) are the only events that happen, though they happen by so many sorts of path. The only function that one experience can perform is to lead into another experience; and the only fulfilment we can speak of is the reaching of a certain kind of end.
   3. James (“The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience,” 1905, p. 281): Thoughts, we all naturally think, are made of one kind of substance, and things of another. Consciousness, flowing inside of us in the forms of conception or judgment, or concentrating itself in the shape of passion or emotion, can be directly felt as the spiritual activity which it is, and known in contrast with the space-filling objective 'content' which it envelopes and accompanies. In opposition to this dualistic philosophy, I tried, in a recent article in this JOURNAL, to show that thoughts and things are absolutely homogeneous as to their material, and that their opposition is only one of relation and of function.
      a. There is no thought-stuff different from thing-stuff
   4. James (“The Thing and its Relations,” 1905, p. 29): immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else.
      a. Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the original flux of life before reflexion has categorized it.
   5. Dewey (“The Realism of Pragmatism,” 1905 p. 326): This lesson learned, we can think freely and naively in terms of things—because things are no longer entities in a world set over against another world called 'mind' or 'consciousness,' with some sort of mysterious ontological tie between them.
      a. Again, pragmatism has learned that the true meaning of subjectivism is just anti-dualism. Hence philosophy can enter again into the...
realistic thought and conversation of common sense and science, where dualisms are just dualities, distinctions having an instrumental and practical, but not ultimate, metaphysical worth; or rather, having metaphysical worth in a practical and experimental sense, not in that of indicating a radical existential cleavage in the nature of things.

6. This turn to “pure experience” and “immediate experience” (Dewey, 1905, p. 399) had to be countenanced as turns to phenomenology.

vii. Bawden (“What is Pragmatism?”, 1904, p. 421): And the following are samples of its fundamental concepts: The test of truth is utility: it's true if it works. Hence the final philosophic wisdom: if you can't have what you want, don't want it. For man is the measure of all things. The universe ultimately is a joint-stock affair: we participate in the evolution of reality. Our action is a real factor in the course of events. In the search for truth, we must run the risk of error. Lies are false only if they are found out: a perfectly successful lie would be tantamount to absolute truth. We must 'will to believe.'

viii. Truth Happens : : True if it Works
1. See James (1896): The truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, 'works' best; and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses.
2. James (“Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” 1904, p. 142): This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process, the process, namely, of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.
3. Bawden (“What is Pragmatism?”, 1904, p. 421): And the following are samples of its fundamental concepts: The test of truth is utility: it's true if it works. Hence the final philosophic wisdom: if you can't have what you want, don't want it. For man is the measure of all things. The universe ultimately is a joint-stock affair: we participate in the evolution of reality. Our action is a real factor in the course of events. In the search for truth, we must run the risk of error. Lies are false only if they are found out: a perfectly successful lie would be tantamount to absolute truth. We must 'will to believe.'
4. Dewey (Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1920, p. 156): “Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruits ye shall know them…. When a claim or pretension or plan is acted upon it guides us truly or falsely; it leads us to our end or away from it. Its active dynamic function is the all-important thing about it, and in the quality of activity induced by it lies all its truth and falsity. The hypothesis that works is the true one…”
5. McGill (“Pragmatism Reconsidered,” 1939, p. 314): A hypothesis is true if it "works" or is "useful" for whom?

ix. Provisional History of Pragmatism
2. Peirce ([Peirce to Mrs. Franklin], 1903, p. 720): In the sixties [was more likely 1872] I started a little club called the Metaphysical Club. It seldom if ever had more than half a dozen present. Wright was the strongest member and probably I was next. Nicholas St. John Green was a marvelously strong intelligence. Then there were Frank Abbott, William James, and others. It was there that the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light.
   a. Ladd (“Charles S. Peirce and the Johns Hopkins,” 1917, pp. 717): so devious and unpredictable was his [Peirce’s 1880] course that he once, to the delight of his students, proposed at the end of his lecture, that we should form (for greater freedom of discussion) a
Metaphysical Club, though he had begun the lecture by defining metaphysics to be "the science of unclear thinking."

3. Peirce ("What Pragmatism Is," 1905, p. 162): Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what he so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism.
   a. (pp. 170-171): Questioner: I am astounded at your definition of your pragmatism, because only last year I was assured by a person above all suspicion of warping the truth,—himself a pragmatist,—that your doctrine precisely was "that a conception is to be tested by its practical effects." You must surely, then, have entirely changed your definition very recently. Pragmatist: If you will turn to Vols. VI and VII of the Revue Philosophique, or to the Popular Science Monthly for November 1877 and January 1878, you will be able to judge for yourself whether the interpretation you mention was not then clearly excluded. The exact wording of the English enunciation, (changing only the first person into the second,) was:
   b. "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object."

4. James ("A Defence of Pragmatism II: What Pragmatism Means," 1907, p. 352): This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by any one for twenty years, until I, in an address before Professor Howison's Philosophical Union at the University of California, brought it forward again, quoting Peirce, and making a certain application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the times seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at present it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals.

x. Antecedents + Consequents / Conditions + Consequences
   1. James (Will to Believe, 1896, p. 77): To explain a thing is to pass easily back to its antecedents; to know it is easily to foresee its consequents.
   2. Peirce ("What Pragmatism is," 1905, p. 179): Now, it is well known that propositions in formal logic go in pairs, the two of one pair being convertible into another by the interchange of the ideas of antecedent and consequent, subject and predicate, etc.
   3. see also Peirce, "Logic of Relatives," 1897
   4. What about antecedents + emergents + consequents ?

xi. Instrumentalism, Functionalism & Immediatism : : Immediate Empiricism
   1. Dewey ("The Realism of Pragmatism," 1905, p. 325): Ideas, sensations, mental states, are, in their cognitive significance, media of so adjusting things to one another, that they become representative of one another. When this is accomplished, they drop out; and things are present to the agent in the most naively realistic fashion. 'States of conscious- ness' refer to getting knowledge; to the situation when things as objective fail us; have, so to speak, gone back on us; when accordingly we neither have them to know nor
yet to know with. It is in this situation, and only in this situation, that 'states of conscious-ness' exist or have meaning, cognitively speaking. And if I put in the phrase, 'cognitively speaking,' it is only to take account of the emotions; and with reference to the emotions the significant point is that they also arise and function in problematic situations; in situations whose objective determination or character is not known, not presented.

a. Instrumentalism is thus thoroughly realistic as to the objective or fulfilling conditions of knowledge.
   i. Schiller ("The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism’,” 1905, p. 238): And on the whole 'pragmatism' seems the best name for this method which has so far been suggested. [note 1:] Prof. Dewey's 'instrumentalism' might perhaps be substituted were it not so open to linguistic and aesthetic objections.

2. Dewey ("The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” 1905, p. 393): The criticisms made upon that vital but still unformed movement variously termed radical empiricism, pragmatism, humanism, functionalism, according as one or another aspect of it is uppermost, have left me with a conviction that the fundamental difference is not so much in matters overtly discussed as in a presupposition which remains tacit: a presupposition as to what experience is and means. To do my little part in clearing up the confusion, I shall try to make my own presupposition explicit. The object of this paper is, then, to set forth what I understand to be the postulate and the criterion of immediate empiricism.

   a. Immediate empiricism postulates that things—anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing'—are what they are experienced as.

3. Dewey (Studies in Logical Theory, 1909, pp. 15, 52): The entire significance of the evolutionary [or genetic or developmental] method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character, its value, is known when, and only when, it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation.

   a. In other words, datum and ideatum are divisions of labor, cooperative instrumentalities, for economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of experience.
   b. Sheldon (review of, 1904, pp. 101-102): But the question I wish to raise is, have we here a philosophic account of experience, that is, one which applies universally to all the facts?... In short, have they [pragmatists] been truly empirical, as they profess to be when they take 'evolution' (save the mark!) as a war-cry?...
   c. The fact is, pragmatism borrows this genetic method from just one of the sciences (perhaps because it forms the most useful basis for pragmatism) and straightway declares it the only genuine philosophic method. But, you say, in the other sciences we are dealing with inanimate, unconscious things, which are only abstractions anyway. I answer that you take your method from a science (biology) which deals with what you must condemn as abstractions, namely, individual organisms, which are to any one of us only parts of the total presented world. But, you say, the 'functional' method has always been found useful in dealing with
vital and conscious phenomena, and therefore must be presupposed here.

4. Laguna (“The Practical Character of Reality,” 1909, pp. 396, 397-398): Recent discussions of the practical character of reality seem very significant when one considers their bearing on the relation between what are probably the two most distinctive doctrines of pragmatism. The first of these doctrines may be called instrumentalist; the second is immediatism. By instrumentalism is meant that element of pragmatism which has grown out of the application of the evolutionary method to logical problems. 
   a. Let us turn now to what has been mentioned as the second distinctive doctrine of pragmatism, namely, immediatism. The doctrine of immediatism is the pragmatist's substitute for ontology. It is briefly expressed in the formula, that reality is, or things really are, what they are experienced as. The formula owes its point to the distinction between things as known and things as otherwise experienced.
   b. The fallacy of older theories is supposed to lie precisely in the assumption, that the object of knowledge alone is real; or, otherwise put, that reality sustains but a single sort of relation to us, namely, that of object to be known. Such an assumption, however, fails signally to do justice either to the nature of reality, or to our relations to it.

5. *Creative Intelligence*
   a. Bode (“Consciousness and Psychology,” 1917, p. 255): The process of intelligence is something that goes on, not in our minds, but in things; it is not photographic, but creative.

xii. **Pragmatism = Axiology + Epistemology + Ethics + Logic + Metaphysics + Ontology**
   1. Peirce and Dewey had little, if anything, to say about ontology. Peirce’s concerns were only somewhat with diagrammatic ontology.
   2. James (“The Thing and Its Relations,” 1905, p. 36): had only minimal reference to ontology, but what he did say is quite insightful:
      a. It is just because so many of the conjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology.
      b. So far as things have space-relations, for example, we are free to imagine them with different origins even. If they could get to be, and get into space at all, then they may have done so separately. Once there, however, they are additives to one another, and, with no prejudice to their natures, all sorts of space-relations may supervene between them. The question of how things could überhaupt [in general] come to be is wholly different from the question what their relations, once the being accomplished, may consist in.

3. **The “new” metaphysics**
   a. However, in many ways Peirce, James, and Dewey did not really have to countenance ontology given that metaphysics as concerned with the "fundamental nature of reality," especially the new metaphysics, which began in earnest with Kant, was ontology. Nonetheless, through the twentieth century ontology supplanted metaphysics within philosophy proper.
      i. Through the eighteenth century and first decade of the twentieth, the new metaphysics was summed up in a word:
**plurality** or **pluralism**, e.g., James’ (1909) *A Pluralistic Universe*

ii. But that would change post-Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. Thereafter, the word was **relativity** (see Actor-Network Theory notes above).

iii. Though the late nineteenth century, it was said that the problem of reality “shifted from the field of ontology or cosmology, to that of epistemology” (Rogers, *A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, 1899, p. 88).

iv. Pragmatism, as extensively a new metaphysics and its insistence on “following the call of the wild,” stemmed this tide for about twenty-five years.

b. James’ (“A Defence of Pragmatism,” 1907, p. 200): Refinement has its place in things, true enough. But a philosophy that breathes out nothing but refinement will never satisfy the empiricist temper of mind. It will seem rather a monument of artificiality. So we find men of science preferring to turn their backs on metaphysics as on something altogether cloistered and spectral, and practical men shaking philosophy's dust off their feet and following the call of the wild.

c. Coe (“Review of *A Brief Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, 1899, p. 545): That we are entering upon a revival of metaphysics is clear enough, not only from the activity of avowed metaphysicians, but also from the tendencies of a considerable proportion of the most eminent psychologists of the day. If the new metaphysics shall have something important to say, sooner or later the timidity and even exhaustion attending the long preliminary inquiry as to how we know will be followed by the exhilaration of conviction. From academic debates as to starting point and method, we shall advance to positive results, which in the nature of the case will constitute an oracle for the guidance of life. Then will metaphysics once more speak the language of the people, and literature, art, and social organization will experience a new inspiration. Doubtless the dawn of such an era would bring forebodings lest, by descending into the streets and the market place, philosophy should become uncritical, dogmatic, possibly a tool of ecclesiastical or other parties.

d. Dewey (*The Quest for Certainty*, 1930, pp. 195-194): The change for the underlying philosophy and logic of science is, however, very great. In relation to the metaphysics of the Newtonian system it is hardly less than revolutionary. What is known is seen to be a product in which the act of observation plays a necessary role. Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known. Moreover, the metaphysics of existence as something fixed and therefore capable of literally exact mathematical description and prediction is undermined. Knowing is, for philosophical theory, a case of specially directed activity instead of something isolated from practice. The quest for certainty by means of exact possession in mind of immutable reality is exchanged for search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events. Intelligence in operation, another name for method, becomes the thing most worth winning.
i. The principle of indeterminancy thus presents itself as the final step in the dislodgment of the old spectator theory of knowledge.

e. See Bergson, Whitehead, etc.

f. But metaphysics was ultimately marginalized through a number of processes:
   i. Secularism and the “death of God” = death of metaphysics.
   ii. Science’s disregard for anything behind or beyond the physical.
   iii. Phenomenology’s methodological inroads into and reduction of the concerns of metaphysics.
   iv. Heidegger’s “end of metaphysics” and turn toward the essence of being.
   v. Ernst Mach’s “antimetaphysics” and the Vienna Circle’s logical analysis and reduction of philosophy to language and the symbolic via logical positivism.
      1. Mach (1896): English inquirers are never clouded by metaphysical fogs, at least never make them the "cardinal issue. In Joule's case, every idea is put to the test of experiment, every experiment reacts upon his ideas.
      2. Carnap (“The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” 1932, pp. 60, 67, 73, 77): The development of modern logic has made it possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of metaphysics.
      3. Just like the examined examples "principle" and "God," most of the other specifically metaphysical terms are devoid of meaning… what is unintelligible, meaningless for us, cannot become meaningful through someone else's assistance, however vast his knowledge might be. Therefore no god and no devil can give us metaphysical knowledge.
      4. But what, then, is left over for philosophy, if all statements whatever that assert something are of an empirical nature and belong to factual science? What remains is not statements, nor a theory, nor a system, but only a method: the method of logical analysis.
      5. Blumberg & Feigl (“Logical Positivism,” 1931, 281-282): One of the most interesting phenomena in recent European philosophy has been the convergence of two significant traditions: the positivistic-empirical and the logical…. To facilitate criticism and forestall even more unfortunate attempts at labelling this aspect of contemporary European philosophy, we shall employ the term "logical positivism."… it is precisely the union of empiricism with a sound theory of logic which differentiates logical positivism from the older positivism, empiricism, and pragmatism.
4. **Death, demise or fall of Pragmatism**
   
a. Campbell ("One Hundred Years of Pragmatism," 2007, p. 2): The 'golden age' story places "the demise of Pragmatism at the beginning of the Depression, or the arrival of Logical Positivism, or the outbreak of World War Two, or Dewey's death in 1952, or the rise of ordinary-language philosophy later in the 1950s.) This kind of 'golden age' theme is behind such com-ments as John E. Smith's 1957 suggestion that Pragmatism "dominated the field of professional philosophy [in America] from about 1880 until the third decade of the present century.
   
b. Abel (Review of *F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism*, 1969, p. 842): It is undeniable that pragmatism is not today the lively and controversial issue it once was. Many of its insights and themes have, as Winetrout points out [in F. C. S. Schiller], been absorbed by other philosophies. Many have also become so well accepted that they are integral portions of our "common sense." (No one today has to be persuaded that there are deficiencies in traditional logic, or that scientific theories may more fruitfully be regarded as instruments than as substantive ontologies.) Winetrout says, "In recent years we have heard a good deal about the death of pragmatism. Some mourners have stopped short of obituaries and have merely put pragmatism on the critical list...”
   
c. MacGilvray ("Five Myths about Pragmatism," 2000, p. 481): This death of pragmatism as a moral and political project was brought about largely by the view that, whatever its merits as an epistemological doctrine, it was incapable of distinguishing between good and bad consequences and so in ethical terms collapsed into an affirmation of, or "acquiescence" to, prevailing cultural norms.
   
d. Mumford (*The Golden Day*, 1926, pp. 191-192, 181-182): With all the preoccupations fostered by the Gilded Age, which were handed down to the succeeding generation, it was inevitable, I think, that James's ideas should have been caricatured. His doctrine of the verification of judgment, as something involved in the continuous process of thinking, instead of a preexistent correspondence between truth and reality, was distorted in controversy into a belief in the gospel of getting on. The carefully limited area he left to religious belief in The Will-to-Believe was transformed by ever-so-witty colleagues into the Will-to-make-believe. His conscious philosophy of pragmatism, which sought to ease one of the mighty, recurrent dilemmas of his personal life, was translated into a belief in the supremacy of cash-values and practical results; and the man who was perhaps one of the most cosmopolitan and cultivated minds of his generation was treated at times as if he were a provincial writer of newspaper platitudes, full of the gospel of smile.
   
e. On the surface, these reactions betrayed little more than the ingrained bias of James's academic colleagues ; and yet, as I say, the caricature was almost inevitable, and in his persistent use of financial metaphors he was himself not a little responsible for it. James's thought was permeated with the smell of the Gilded Age: one feels in it the compromises, the evasions, the desire for a comfortable resting place. Getting on was certainly never in James's mind, and cash values did not engross even his passing attention; but, given his
milieu, they were what his words reenforced in the habits of the people who gave themselves over to his philosophy. Personally, he was "against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost; and against all big successes and big results;" but there was nothing in his philosophy that necessitated these beliefs in his followers.

f. the Nineteenth was the greatest of centuries; and they did not fancy that the followers of Watt and Smiles were the highest types of humanity the earth had known. But what of people who did believe in the triumphs of the land-pioneer and the industry pioneer: what of those who thought these were the Coming Men, and their works the final glory of Progress?… Machines got on: real estate went up: inventions became more ingenious: money multiplied: physical comforts increased: all these achievements could not be denied. But men and women they somehow did not reflect these great triumphs by an equivalent gain of beauty and wisdom....

g. He [William James] gave this attitude of compromise and acquiescence a name: he called it pragmatism: and the name stands not merely for his own philosophy, but for something in which that philosophy was deeply if unconsciously entangled, the spirit of a whole age.

xiii. The “new” vitalism
xiv. The “new” realism

1. Marvin ("The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology," 1912, p. 51): The new realism is a “reaction against the whole enterprise of Locke, Kant, and their followers, to get a fundamental science, and not merely against their idealism. Neo-realism is not only a different theory of knowledge, but, what is more important for metaphysics, a different doctrine as to the place of epistemology in the hierarchy of the sciences.”

xv. The “new” teleology
xvi. Art of the Possible v Art of the Plausible

1. Firth (“Spiritual Aroma: Religion and Politics,” 1981, p. 584): Now politics has been variously described as the art of the possible, or the art of the plausible.

2. However this may be, one basic character of religion is clear—after a certain point it becomes the art of the implausible, in the sense of resting upon postulates which are nonempirical, which claim an inner rather than an outer appearance of truth, since they may run counter to what are ordinarily thought of as natural laws. In this promise to provide explanations which go beyond the world of sensory experience lies much of the appeal of religion.

3. Is pragmatism the art of the consequential?