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## THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF QUASIMODAL *HAVE TO* IN ENGLISH

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### ABSTRACT

According to Lightfoot (1979: 112), what is perhaps “most remarkable” about the reanalysis of the premodals is the subsequent development of a set of semantically identical but syntactically full verbs to fill the vacuum created. Lightfoot terms these verbs “quasimodals” and dates their appearance with modal meaning in the 15th century. I will question three of Lightfoot’s claims: the date of the modal uses of the quasimodals, their syntactic status, and their relationship to the reanalysis of the premodals. My paper will examine the semantic and syntactic development of three quasimodals in English: *have to* and *ought to*, which are equivalent to the modals *must* or *should*, and *used to*, which, although an habitual marker, is frequently equivalent to modal *would* (and earlier *should*, *will*, and *shall*). I will re-examine van der Gaaf’s hypothesis (1931) that *have to* and *ought to* develop from meanings of possession to those of duty, obligation, necessity, and that the change from full verb to auxiliary results in a change in syntactic order, from *have* + object + infinitive to *have* + infinitive + object (much like the traditional account of the development of the perfect). I will consider functional and semantic aspects of the development of these verbal periphrases in light of Traugott’s work on grammaticalization (1982, 1988, 1989).

### 1. INTRODUCTION

In his now well-known treatment of the modal auxiliaries in the history of English, Lightfoot (1979: 112) considers “perhaps the most remarkable change of all” to be the development of the quasimodals *be going to*, *have to*, and *be able to*, which are semantically equivalent to *shall/will*, *must*, and *can*, and “differ only syntactically in that they have all the usual properties of other verbs”. The development of the quasimodals in English raises two issues: their relation to the grammaticalization of the modal auxiliaries, and the course of development of the different quasimodals, that is, where they originate, how they develop into verbal periphrases, and to what extent they are grammaticalized in Modern English.

Many accept Lightfoot’s view of a drag-chain relationship between the quasimodals and the modals, namely, that the reanalysis of the premodals, including the loss of nonfinite forms and past tense meanings, creates a morphosyntactic vacuum which is “immediately filled by creating a new set of semantically equivalent verbs”. Though neither Warner (1983: 199) nor Plank (1984: 320-331) deny that there is some connection between the two events, they suggest that the relationship *must* be more complex than Lightfoot envisions. They point to several problems in Lightfoot’s analysis. Modal senses

for these particular full verbs are in existence long before the Early Modern English genesis Lightfoot postulates, whereas for him the semantic changes are a consequence of the reanalysis of the quasimodals. Furthermore, as Plank (1984: 322) points out, the quasimodals are not simply suppletive of the modals, since none of the quasimodals was, or is, used exclusively in its nonfinite form or with past-time reference; thus, their grammaticalization is not motivated in the way Lightfoot suggests. Finally, there exists, both before and after, a variety of other quasimodal expressions ignored by Lightfoot.

The reanalysis of the modals and rise of the quasimodals are better seen as interrelated parts of an ongoing and continuous process of grammaticalization, not one occurring only at discrete points in the history of a language. For example, Lehmann (1985: 311-315) sees grammaticalization as a gradual, unidirectional, and harmonious process of renewal resulting from the opposing forces of creativity and restraint in language: “there is one overall movement of grammaticalization, seizing all the devices which a language has as its disposal within a given functional domain and pushing them gradually and simultaneously along the stages of a scale, normally without changing their mutual order on that scale” (311). Implicit in the view of grammaticalization as a continuous process is the notion of auxiliary as a “fuzzy” or gradient concept (Ramat 1987: 3). Rather than a clear dichotomy between auxiliary and main verb, there seems to exist a continuum from less fully grammaticalized (more fully lexicalized) to more fully grammaticalized, with a number of intermediate steps. These intermediate forms constitute verbal periphrases, complex (but monoclausal) verbal structures with syntactic cohesiveness and semantic/functional unity (see Lehmann—Quesada 1991), but as Kliffer notes, with “differing degrees of periphrastic fusion”, which increases over time (1981: 17, 18-19). Cohesiveness in periphrases is thus graded, or scalar. Moreover, verbal periphrases need not contain full-fledged auxiliaries (Lehmann—Quesada 1991). Anderson concludes that “periphrasticness ... does not coincide with syntactic auxiliarihood”, though periphrases, like auxiliaries, have “equivalence in semantic status to the inflexional paradigmatic oppositions” (1989: 5, 3)

While the grammaticalization of the modal auxiliaries in English has been extensively studied, the development of the quasimodals has been relatively neglected. In the context of the development of verbal periphrases in general, this paper examines the rise of the quasimodal *have to*. A full understanding of the origin and development of *have to* depends on determining the synchronic and diachronic relationship of the two structures *I have a paper to write* and *I have to write a paper*, which have previously been accorded very different treatments despite their functional similarity. Only the latter has been considered a verbal periphrasis. Following a review of the semantic features and syntactic status of both constructions in Modern English, the paper will propose that they develop from a single source, a full verb *have* + object + infinitive structure with possessive meaning, but that they have reached different stages of grammaticalization in Modern English. The source structure has itself remained ungrammaticalized.

## 2. HAVE TO CONSTRUCTIONS IN MODERN ENGLISH

### 2.1. *have to* (+ object)

Most discussions of the modal auxiliaries in Modern English include *have to* on semantic grounds, primarily the similarity of *have to* with modal *must*, but the morphosyntactic differences between the two forms are recognized by the classification of *have to* as a

“quasi-modal” (Coates 1983: 52; Perkins 1983: 65; Leech 1987: 73), “semi-modal” (Palmer 1979: 17, 18; 1987: 128), or “semi-auxiliary” (Quirk et al. 1985: 137).

Like *must*, *have to* can express both deontic and epistemic necessity. The deontic meaning is one of duty or obligation: “to be under obligation, to be obliged; to be necessitated *to do something*” (*OED*, s.v. *have*, def. 7c):

1. a. My other sister and I **have to** do all her work (Mrs. H. Ward, *Rob. Elsmere* [Nelson] 184; cited by Visser 1969: 1479).
- b. We **had to** learn everything for ourselves, didn't we, Fanny? (Evelyn Waugh, *Vile Bodies* [Penguin] 30; cited by Visser 1969: 1479).

In these cases, external circumstances, not the speaker, impose the constraint. The epistemic meaning of logical necessity for *have to* is generally considered “rare” (Palmer 1979: 46; 1987: 128; Coates 1983: 57; Bybee and Pagliuca 1985: 67), an “Americanism” (Perkins 1983: 61; Coates 1983: 57, Leech 1987: 79, 83), or a feature of the speech of young people (Coates 1983: 57), but Quirk et al. (1985: 145) note that this usage is now well established in British English:

2. a. This **has to** be the biggest ant-hill ever seen (given by Perkins 1983: 61).
- b. It **had to** be the same boulder that he and Betty had sat upon so often (Lanc9-1675; cited by Coates 1983: 57).

Here the speaker concludes that something is necessarily the case. As Leech notes (1987: 80), however, the deontic and epistemic meanings can blur in a sentence such as *Every clause has to contain a finite verb*. That is, the occurrence of a finite verb may be dictated by the rules of language (deontically) or it may be necessarily the case (epistemically). Sentences with *have to* can also be ambiguous between the two readings: the sentence *Ingrid has to arrive before we do*, can continue deontically with “because she promised to help with the preparations” or epistemically with “because she set out an hour earlier” (Bybee—Pagliuca 1985: 73-74). Coates proposes the unified meaning of ‘it is necessary for’ for both readings of *have to* (1983: 55, 57). Finally, like many of the modals, *have to* has a future sense; the *OED* suggests that it is a “kind of Future of obligation or duty”.<sup>1</sup>

There appears to be almost universal agreement about the semantic contrast between *have to* and *must* in their obligative reading: *must* is generally subjective, while *have to* is always objective.<sup>2</sup> That is, with *must* the speaker is normally expressing his or her authority; the deontic source is the speaker. With *have to* the deontic source is always

<sup>1</sup> Jespersen (1940: 206) argues that *have to* with *yet* (or *still*) has a pure future meaning, but Kirchner (1952: 384-86) contests this, suggesting that it is a substitute for the negative: thus, *he has yet to learn how to laugh at himself* = ‘he has not yet learned to laugh at himself’.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Curme (1931: 395), Kruisinga (1931: 380), Visser (1969: 1478), Antinucci—Parisi (1971: 35), Palmer (1979: 58, 93, 106-107; 1987: 128-129), Coates (1983: 55), Quirk et al. (1985: 225), and Leech (1987: 79, 82-83). Haegemann (1980) argues that while with *have to* in the simple tense the speaker denotes an outside authority, with the progressive of *have to* (e.g. *My children are having to eat an apple after their meals*), the speaker disclaims any commitment as to the imposition of obligation (cf. Coates 1983: 56).

external to the speaker, either the authority of another or the constraint of circumstances.<sup>3</sup> For this reason, *have to* may be used when the speaker disapproves of the obligation expressed (Palmer 1987: 129) or, for purposes of politeness, when the speaker wants to represent “his wish as objective necessity” (Curme 1931: 395; Leech 1987: 79; cf. Fleischman 1982: 59, 172-173). Compare the following examples from Haegeman (1980: 3):

3. a. My children **must** eat an apple after their meals.
- b. My children **have to** eat an apple after their meals.

In (3a) the speaker seems to be compelling the children to eat an apple, while in (3b), some outside authority, or an internal drive, compels the children. *Have to* may contrast with *must* in the logical necessity reading, too; Perkins suggests (1983: 61) that *have to* is used when the statement is based on empirical evidence over which the speaker has no control. Still, *must* is the “normal” and stronger form in the epistemic cases (Leech 1987:83).<sup>4</sup>

Semantically, *have to* contrasts with *must* in several other ways. *Have to* allows an habitual interpretation, while *must* is limited to a semelfactive reading (Coates 1983: 56, 57; Perkins 1983: 65; Leech 1987: 79, 90): *He has to leave for work by 7:00 o'clock {today, every morning}* vs. *He must leave for work by 7:00 o'clock {today, \*every morning}*. The two forms also behave differently under negation: with *must*, *not* negates the predication, but with *have to*, *not* negates the modality (Antinucci—Parisi 1971: 35; Coates 1983: 55, 57; Perkins 1983: 61; Palmer 1979: 94-95; 1987: 130):

4. a. We **mustn't** talk politics on this pleasant evening (Angus Wilson, *No Laughing Matter* [London, Secker & W.]; cited by Visser 1969: 1812) (= ‘we are obliged not to talk politics’).
- b. They don't **have to** work for a living (Frank Swinnerton, *Quadrille* [London] 153; cited by Visser 1969: 1560) (= ‘they are not obliged to work’).

Finally, unlike *must*, *have to* has a past tense form with the past time meaning ‘it was necessary for’ (Coates 1983: 56-57; Perkins 1983: 62; Leech 1987: 96; Palmer 1987: 129), either past deontic or past epistemic:<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Because authority lies outside the speaker and the statement is not performative, Palmer (1979: 92-93, 106) prefers the classification “dynamic” to “deontic” modality for this usage.

<sup>4</sup> Contrasting the sentences *You must be mad to do that* and *You have (got) to be mad to do that*, Palmer (1979: 46-47) argues that the former preferably receives an epistemic reading (‘I believe you are mad to do that’), while the latter preferably receives a dynamic (deontic) reading (‘It is necessary for you to be mad in order to do that’). Such a clear contrast does not exist for me.

<sup>5</sup> Since *have to* is suppletive of *must* in the past (see below), there seems to be no way to distinguish in the past between subjective and objective obligation imposed by the speaker or some other authority.

Sentence (a) may be the indirect version of either (b) or (c):

(a) Mary said that John **had to** cook dinner.

(b) John **has to** cook dinner. (= he is constrained by circumstances or an outside authority)

(c) John **must** cook dinner. (= he is constrained by the speaker)

Haegeman (1980: 5) suggests that the past progressive is used in place of the simple form to express objective obligation (i.e., the indirect version of b).

(d) Mary said that John **was having to** cook dinner.

5. a. I felt I **had to** see you, because I want you to know the truth (R. Graves, *I Claudius* [1938] 166; cited by Visser 1969: 1479) (= ‘I was obliged [by circumstances] to see you’).
- b. Through the years she sensed that something like this **had to** happen some day. (Th. Pratt, *The Tormented Fawcett Public*, 36; cited by Visser 1969:1486) (= ‘it was necessarily the case that, it was necessary to conclude that this would happen’).

The morphosyntactic status of *have to* is considerably less clear than that of *must*. On one hand, van der Gaaf (1931: 184; echoed by Visser 1969: 1478; see also Harris 1986: 355) suggests that in Modern English, *have to* is “to all intents and purposes an auxiliary”, while on the other, Coates (1983: 54) asserts that it has none of the seven defining criteria of modal auxiliaries.<sup>6</sup> Bolinger (1980) sees it as “peripherally auxiliary”, a “quasi-auxiliary”, located about midpoint on the scale between full auxiliary (e.g. *should*) and full verb (e.g. *regret to*). Anderson considers it “ambivalent with respect to auxiliary status” (1989: 4). Huddleston’s exhaustive enumeration, which identifies eighteen criteria for auxiliary status and twelve for modal status, shows that *have to* sometimes exhibits auxiliary behavior in respect to inversion, negation, emphasis, verb phrase deletion, and *do*-support and always exhibits auxiliary behavior in respect to contraction and preverbal modifiers,<sup>7</sup> but does not have the morphological characteristics of modals.

Morphologically, *have to* is clearly unlike the modal auxiliaries: it has the 3rd person present form (6a) and nonfinite forms (6b) of a full verb (Palmer 1979: 58, 94; 1987: 129, 131; Haegeman 1980: 1; Quirk et al. 1985: 145; Leech 1987: 83):

6. a. The orator, he says, **has to** consider three things (F.L. Lucas, *Style* 52; Visser 1969: 1479).
- b. Kreisler felt it an indignity to **have to** open this letter (Percy Wyndham Lewis, *Tarr* [Tauchn.] 169; cited by Visser 1969:1479).

It is felt that these provide forms missing in the paradigm of the semantically similar but morphologically defective *must* and that in this regard *have to* is suppletive of *must* (Curme 1931: 395; Jespersen 1940: 206; Palmer 1979: 97; Haegeman 1980: 4-5; Coates 1983: 57; Quirk et al. 1985: 145).<sup>8</sup>

Syntactically, *have to* behaves inconsistently. Unlike the modals, *have to* may cooccur with other modal auxiliaries (Perkins 1983: 62; Quirk et al. 1985: 145):

<sup>6</sup> These include the NICE properties (negation, inversion, code, emphasis) and lack of third person -s, non-finite forms, and cooccurrence with other auxiliaries.

<sup>7</sup> My judgment of the acceptability of *have to* preceding epistemic adverbs and subject quantifiers differs from Huddleston’s. I cannot accept either *?I have certainly to leave tomorrow* or *?The children have all to get influenza shots*. Likewise, my dialect does not permit contraction of *have* in this context, for example, *?I’ve to be there at 8:00 o’clock*.

<sup>8</sup> Vincent (1987: 242) notes that the suppletiveness of sets of forms like *must /have to* or *can/be able to* is controversial: “when is a periphrasis ... to be considered part of the paradigm ... and when is it to be considered an adjacent but essentially independent construction?” However, Anderson (1989: 2) would consider the complementarity of *must* and *have to* to be indicative of their paradigmatic relationship.

7. I suppose we **might have to** think about it (S.8.2A.29; cited by Coates 1983:55).

In questions, lack of *do* with *have to* is “somewhat old-fashioned” (Quirk et al. 1985: 145): British English either substitutes *have got to* (without *do*) or follows the newer American English pattern with *do* (Kirchner 1952: 420, 422; Visser 1969: 1559-1561; 1973: 2205). In negatives, British English generally agrees with American English in using *do*, though *have got to* is also substituted (Kirchner 1952: 433-434; Visser 1969: 1559-1561; 1973: 2204-2205; Quirk et al. 1985: 131, 146); forms without *do* are not unusual in American English and are found occasionally in British English (Kirchner 1952: 426-29).<sup>9</sup>

However, two features of *have to* point to its auxiliary status. First, unlike full verb *have*, *have to* can undergo phonological reduction and to-contraction to [hæftə], [hæstə], and [hædə], often represented orthographically as *hafta*, *hast*, *had* (Bolinger 1980: 293; Plank 1984: 339; Palmer 1987: 128, 162). Following Bolinger, Plank considers to-contraction to be indicative of the auxiliary status of *have to* since this occurs only with a limited set of forms, all expressing modal or aspectual meanings.<sup>10</sup> Second, *have to*, can cooccur with full verb *have* (Jespersen 1940: 206; Kirchner 1952: 383):

8. He **had to** have more money (Lewis, *Arr.* 126; cited by Kirchner 1952: 383).

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the syntactic status of *have to*, most would agree that *have to* is at least partially grammaticalized in Modern English. Huddleston’s (1980) study shows that even the modals do not function as a coherent group syntactically; using his criteria, there appears to be a continuum of verbal forms from full verb to auxiliary, exhibiting auxiliary and modal features to a lesser or greater extent, rather than two clearly defined classes. As Bolinger suggests, and as we will see below, this fact of English has a historical basis: “if these facts [about *wanna*, *hafta*, *gonna*, etc.] are terribly irregular, that is only one of the trials in the purgatory of auxiliaries-to-be” (1980: 297).

## 2.2. *have* + object + *to* + V

The *have* + object + *to* V construction, though it is believed to be diachronically related to the *have to* V (+ object) construction (see section 3), is rarely discussed in synchronic grammars of English. While some semantic similarity is recognized, the distinction in meaning between the two constructions remains unclear, and they are usually considered to be quite separate constructions syntactically.

The *OED* (s.v. *have*, def. 7a) gives the following definition for *have* + object + *to* V: “to possess as a duty or thing to be done. With object and dative inf. expressing what is to be done by the subject”. Van der Gaaf (1931: 180-183; followed by Visser 1969: 1474-1482) establishes three semantic subclasses of the construction: one expressing pure

<sup>9</sup> Because of the presence of *to*, Harris (1986: 348) terms constructions such as *I haven’t to be there until tomorrow* “blends”, neither clearly an auxiliary nor a main verb structure.

<sup>10</sup> For Bolinger (1980: 294) *to*-contraction with forms such as *have to* is comparable to *have*-contraction with the modal auxiliaries: *could have* > *coulda*, *might have* > *mighta*, etc.

possession (9a); one expressing duty, obligation, or necessity in addition to possession (9b); and one expressing, preponderantly or exclusively, duty, obligation, or necessity. While van der Gaaf (1931: 186) asserts that the pure meaning of obligation correlates exclusively with the order *have to V* (+ object) (9c), Visser (1969: 1482) observes that “nowadays obligation without possession is also expressed in constructions that have the object between *have* and the infinitive” (9d):

9. a. Ursula was happy to **have** somebody **to** look after (Compton Mackenzie, *Sinister Str.* p. 624; cited by Visser 1969: 1475).
- b. I **have** some questions **to** ask you (F.L. Green, *Odd Man Out* [Penguin] 58; cited by Visser 1969: 1477).
- c. We **have to** obey orders, whether we agree with ‘em or not (Priestley, *Magicians* [1951] 172; cited by Visser 1969: 1479).
- d. “I suppose Maud could go.”—“Maud has her rooms to do.”—“Well Elsa.”—Elsa **has** her dinner **to** get.” (Mackenzie, *Poor Relations* [Hutchinson], 89; cited by Visser 1969: 1483).

In many cases the meaning of ‘possess’ in *have* is more or less weakened (cf. Kruisinga 1931: 379; Jespersen 1940: 226). While both van der Gaaf (1931: 183) and Visser (1969: 1474) acknowledge the difficulty of clearly distinguishing among examples of the three subtypes,<sup>11</sup> Kirchner (1952: 372-374n.) rejects any such attempt as ad hoc. He does not believe that the meaning of *have* + object + *to V* can be determined from its separate parts, nor that it has (or ever had) the meaning of possession: “Man darf die Fügung nicht in ihre Elemente zerlegen und ‘Besitz’ oder anderes von ‘have’ abhängig machen.” According to Kirchner (1952: 377-378), the construction has the primary meaning of “Notwendigkeit” (necessity) (10a-b). Kirchner believes that the construction may also express “Möglichkeit” (possibility), translatable with German *können* or *werden*, or equivalent to *can* (*could*) in English (Visser 1969: 1476) (10c):

10. a. the farmer **had** much ill-temper, laziness and shirking **to** endure from his hand sawyers (Emerson; cited by Kirchner 1952: 377).
- b. I **had** an English paper **to** write over the v[a]cation (El. Dundy, *The Dud Avocado* [Penguin] 60; cited by Visser 1969: 1484).
- c. I grew up believing that young people **had** something **to** learn from their elders (Drinkwater, *B.* 60; cited by Kirchner 1952: 377).

The meaning of necessity seems especially overt—and the meaning of possession very remote—when the object is a dative of origin or when it express time or place, what Visser terms “quasi-objects” (1969: 1487):

11. a. he **has** himself **to** thank (Macy 67; cited by Kirchner 1952: 378).

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<sup>11</sup> Van der Gaaf admits, “It is not taken for granted that there can be no difference of opinion as to the interpretation of some of the instances that have been adduced. Possibly a few of them might have been placed in a different category from the one to which they have been assigned” (1931: 183). Visser makes even a stronger disclaimer: “The classification is in many cases avowedly arbitrary ... A large number of patterns are just on the line and defy proper discrimination” (1969: 1474).

- b. he **had** thirty years **to** wait (Adams, 235; cited by Kirchner 1952: 379).
- c. We **had** some miles **to** drive, even from the small station (Joseph H. Shorthouse, *John Inglesant* Ch. 1; cited by Visser 1969: 1487).

The order *have* + object + *to* V rather than *have to* V + object is usual, if not obligatory, when the object is negative or when the object is *it* (Kruisinga 1931: 382; van der Gaaf 1931: 187-188; Kirchner 1952: 379-381; Visser 1969:1484-1485):<sup>12</sup>

- 12. a. The Germans **have** nothing **to** gain by organising demonstrations (M.G.D. 6.9.'49, 6; cited by Kirchner 1952: 381)
- b. I wish I **had** it **to** do over again (Elmer Rice, *The Adding Machine* 1; cited by Visser 1969: 1484)

Unlike *have to* V (+ object), *have* + object + *to* V is generally considered a syntactic construction rather than a (partially) grammaticalized verbal periphrasis. In both cases, *have* is morphologically a full verb. In this construction, it generally takes *do* in negative and interrogative sentences (Visser 1969: 1561-1562), though it is also found occasionally without *do*:

- 13. a. She **hasn't** a single thing **to** do (Lewis, *B.*109; cited by Kirchner 1952: 426)
- b. How much work **have** you still **to** do (Coll.; Misc. 205; cited by Kirchner 1952: 420)

It may also occur with other modal auxiliaries. However, *have* in this construction may be contracted, unlike *have* in the other construction, which is contracted with *to*, and also unlike full verb *have*:

- 14. a. I've my slippers **to** put on (Atherton, *Cr. C.*, 156; cited by Kirchner 1952: 378)
- b. if to-day [young people] think they've nothing **to** earn from anybody (John Drinkwater, *Bird in Hand* 60; cited by Visser 1969: 1485)

The syntactic relationship of *have*, the object, and the infinitive also differs in this construction. When the nominal object follows the infinitive, it is seen as the object of the infinitive, and the infinitival phrase is considered the object of *have*. In contrast, when the nominal object is placed between *have* and the infinitive, it is considered the object of *have*, and the infinitive is taken as an adjectival or adverbial adjunct to the object (Poutsma 1904: 549; Kruisinga 1931: 379; van der Gaaf 1931: 184; Jespersen 1940: 203). However, Jespersen (1940: 226-227) later treats the infinitive in the *have* + object + *to* V construction as “retroactive”, that is, as governing the preceding object. The nominal object is thus seen as the object of the infinitive, not of *have*, and the syntactic analysis of the construction is almost identical to that given to the *have to* V (+ object) construction.

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<sup>12</sup> Van der Gaaf (1931: 187-188) argues that the order *have to* V (+ object), with its meaning of pure obligation, is not usual with negative objects because “doing one’s duty, meeting an obligation or a necessity, performing a task does not, as a rule, consist in doing nothing”. A duty may, however, consist in abstaining from doing something; in this case, the order with end position of the object is allowed, as in *I have to not find fault with him, I have to find no fault with him*.



In fact, Kirchner (1952: 372-373n.), who considers *have* + object + *to* V a unified periphrasis, observes that “durch Jespersens Bezeichnung wird der Zusammenhang der Fügung, die als Ganzes betrachtet werden muss, viel klarer”.<sup>13</sup>

2.3. The semantic distinction between *have to* V (+ object) and *have* + object + *to* V  
 The question of the semantic distinction between these two constructions has vexed grammarians of Modern English; as Kirchner (1952: 373) remarks, “Die Konstr. hat den Grammatikern bisher vie (uneingeständenes) Kopfzerbrechen verursacht.” In many instances, both orders are possible with little apparent difference in meaning. For example, Poutsma (1904: 549) admits that “sometimes the difference is only one of theory. Thus *I have no end of calls to make* expresses the same as *I have to make no end of calls.*” Jespersen (1913: 395) also admits that “the difference between *I have something to tell you* and *I have to [I must] tell you something* is not always very well marked.” Kruisinga (1931: 383) must eventually conclude that “when the leading verb has so little meaning as ‘to have’ in [these] sentences, the difference between the two constructions becomes very small”; in a similar vein, van der Gaaf (1931: 187) concedes that the “element of possession in *have* may have faded to such an extent that the two constructions do not differ any longer from a semantic point of view. There is no appreciable difference between, ‘*I have my correspondence to attend to*’, and ‘*I have to attend to my correspondence.*’ Kirchner (1952: 374-375) is critical of both Jespersen’s and Kruisinga’s attempts to distinguish the two constructions semantically.<sup>14</sup>

Nonetheless, all of the grammarians cited in the previous paragraph feel that in certain cases there is indeed a semantic distinction. Poutsma (1904: 549) sees a “clear”

<sup>13</sup> A related set of constructions is *have got to* V (+ object) and *have got* + object + *to* V. Like *have to* V (+ object), the former expresses objective obligation and logical necessity; *not* negates the modality. But it does not express habitual meaning and is rare in the past tense. It is both more emphatic and more colloquial than *have to* V (+ object). The morphosyntactic status of *have* in this construction is quite clearly that of an auxiliary. It has no nonfinite forms (though it does have 3rd person present and past tense forms), it does not take *do* in interrogatives and negatives, it undergoes contraction with the subject, it does not cooccur with modal auxiliaries, and it precedes epistemic adverbs, *never*, and subject quantifiers (see Curme 1931: 360-361, 395; Jespersen 1932: 47-54; Kirchner 1952: 217-220; Visser 1969: 1477-1478, 1479; 1973: 2202-2206; Fodor—Smith 1978; Palmer 1979: 18, 46-47, 92, 95, 106; 1987: 128-131; Huddleston 1980; Coates 1983: 52-54; Perkins 1983: 60-62, 65; Quirk et al. 1985: 137, 141, 142-143; Leech 1987: 79-80, 83, 90; *OED*, s.v. *get*, def. 24). However, because of some variability in its syntactic behavior, Quirk et al. (1985: 142) consider it a “modal idiom” with “in-between status”. More clearly auxiliary-like is the recent (American) form *got to*, which Quirk et al. (1985: 142) argue “resemble[s] a single modal auxiliary” and which Bolinger (1980: 294, 297) considers very close to an established auxiliary. It has a defective paradigm, lacks nonfinite forms, and undergoes *to*-contraction (see Curme 1931: 360-361; Jespersen 1932: 53; Kirchner 1952: 220; Visser 1973: 2205-2206; Fodor—Smith 1978; Quirk et al. 1985: 142; Bolinger 1980: 294-295, 293, 297). The other member of the set, *have got* + object + *to* V, receives only passing mention in synchronic grammars of English. Jespersen (1932: 52-53) notes that the infinitive here is “supplementary” (i.e. “retroactive”), but questions whether there is a clear distinction between *I have got to do this* and *I have got this to do*. Kirchner (1952:221, 429) gives a similar analysis and observes that *do* is rare in the negative of this construction. He believes that *have got to* V (+ object) and *have got*+ object + *to* V are interchangeable expressions of necessity.

<sup>14</sup> As both Söderlind (1958: 67n.) and Visser (1969: 1482n.) observe, Kirchner (1952: 374-375) later contradicts himself in recognizing some semantic difference in the following quotation from Kruisinga: “there is the speech which a man makes when he *has something to say*, and ... when he *has to say something*”.

difference in meaning between *I have much money to spend* and *I have to spend much money*. When the two orders are found in the same quotation, Kruisinga (1931: 381) recognizes a semantic contrast, as does Jespersen (1940: 205), who cites the following example from Trollope:

15. The writer, when he sits down to commence his novel, should do so, not because he **has to tell** a story, but because he **has** a story **to tell** (Trollope A208).

However, Jespersen glosses the lines wrongly, I believe, as follows: ‘the writer sits down to write not because he has something which he burns to tell, but because he feels it incumbent on him to be telling something’. For van der Gaaf, the difference depends on the degree to which *have* retains its possessive semantics:

But there is a slight difference between, ‘I am much busier now than I used to be; *I have a (my) baby to look after now*’ and ‘..... *I have to look after a (my) baby now*’. In the first sentence we recognize the words of a happy young mother, *who has a baby now*, and to whom the duty of looking after her little darling is a source of joy and happiness. [The second sentence] somehow makes one suspect that the care of the baby is a mere task to the mother (1931: 187).

Visser (1969: 1482-1483) believes that the difference does not depend “on the different meanings of *have*, but on the different kinds of obligation underlying the statements”. He argues that the order *I have to write a letter* is used when the obligation is the result of another’s direct command or direction, while the order *I have a letter to write* is used when the obligation does not result from the command of another, but rather is a self-imposed task: it means ‘to be burdened with’ or ‘to feel it incumbent on oneself’. I am in sympathy with Visser’s position that the semantic difference between *have to V + object* and *have + object + to V* does not depend on the possessive meaning of *have*.

### 3. DEVELOPMENT OF *HAVE TO* CONSTRUCTIONS IN ENGLISH

#### 3.1. Traditional account of the development of *have to* in English

It is generally accepted that the *have to V (+ object)* construction develops from the *have + object + to V* via a number of stages (see, especially, van der Gaaf 1931: 180-186; Visser 1969: 1474ff.).

In the first stage, *have* is a full verb meaning ‘to possess, have in possession’. The nominal object functions as the direct object of *have*, denoting the thing possessed, and the inflected infinitive functions as an adverbial adjunct of purpose, though in Modern English it is more commonly interpreted as a condensed adjectival clause (van der Gaaf 1931: 180; Visser 1969: 1476).<sup>15</sup> This construction is still in use in Modern English when “the idea of ‘having’ is clearly felt to be present in *have*” (van der Gaaf 1931: 186; also Visser 1969: 1475). Though the order of the construction is variable in older English, “nowadays it is invariably *have—object—infinitive*” (Visser 1969: 1475; also van der Gaaf 1931:181).

In the second stage, the semantics of *have* are considerably weakened; meanings of possession and obligation or duty exist side-by-side (van der Gaaf 1931: 181-182). Visser (1969: 1477) suggests that *have* means “to have something or somebody to look after or

<sup>15</sup> That is, the structure is similar to that found in a Modern English sentence such as *John is the person for you to see* (= ‘the person who you should see’).

attend”, while according to *BTS* (s.v. *habban*, def. VII) *have* means “to *have* as a duty or thing to be done”, with the construction ‘expressing what is to be done by the subject’. The syntactic relations of the object and the infinitive are unchanged. The construction continues to exist in Modern English, according to van der Gaaf (1931: 186) and Visser (1969: 1477). Again, the order of the construction is relatively free in older English, but “today it is have—object—infinitive” (Visser 1969: 1477).

In the third stage, the possessive semantics of *have* are completely bleached; it expresses duty or obligation exclusively. *Have* is no longer a full verb, but has been (partially) grammaticalized (van der Gaaf 1931: 184; Visser 1969: 1478). The order of the construction has been transposed to *have* + infinitive + object. Van der Gaaf (1931: 184; repeated by Visser 1969: 1478) suggests that this shift in word order results from the auxiliatation of *have*: “*have*, when it expressed nothing but duty, obligation, compulsion, necessity, gradually had the place assigned to it occupied by auxiliaries, namely before the infinitive, while at the same time the object began to be placed after the infinitive”. The syntactic relation of the nominal object also changes: it is no longer the object of *have* but of the infinitive (van der Gaaf 1931: 184; Visser 1969: 1478).

In the fourth step, *have*, now grammaticalized as an auxiliary of modality, begins to occur with intransitive infinitives. Kirchner (1952: 381-382) believes that this construction develops out of the earlier construction with a transitive infinitive, but Visser (1969: 1485) questions this development.

While this sequence of four stages is generally accepted, the timing of the stages is a matter of considerable debate. All agree that the first stage is found in Old English (van der Gaaf 1931: 180-181; Visser 1969: 1475; Mitchell 1985: 401), and most see the second stage as also having been attained by the Old English period (van der Gaaf 1931: 182; Visser 1969: 1477; *BTS*, s.v. *habban*, def. VII; *OED*, s.v. *have*, def. 7a). The third stage is more problematical, perhaps being attained in the Middle English period. *BTS* (s.v. *habban*, def. VIII) recognizes the meaning of pure obligation in Old English. Plank (1984: 320) asserts that the *have to* construction “is found with a purely modal sense of intention/futurity and/or obligation already in OE and increasingly in ME”. Callaway (1913: 43) feels that in some of his Old English examples, the infinitive seems to denote necessity, but “most of the examples are doubtful”. Van der Gaaf (1931: 182-184), who finds only three examples of stage three in Old English, does not believe it became fully established until Early Modern English; he appears to suggest that Old and Middle English instances with fronting of the object facilitated the fixing of this word order (see Visser 1969: 1480-1481 for examples).<sup>16</sup> He attributes the slow acceptance of the order *have* + infinitive + object to competition from the *be to* and *ought to* constructions and to the continued existence of the *have* + object + infinitive construction (185; see also Kirchner 1952: 382). Visser dates the third stage from c. 1200. The *MED* (s.v. *haven*, def. 11b) identifies a meaning of obligation in Middle English, as do Kenyon (1909: 109) and Kerkhof (1966: 85). The most conservative approach towards the dating of these three stages is taken by Mitchell (1985: 401-402): he argues that neither stage two nor stage three is represented in Old English, only stage one; he rejects the proposed obligative

<sup>16</sup> Visser (1969: 1480; also Mitchell 1985: 402) admits that in cases where the object is fronted, only the context, not the word order will determine whether *have* expresses nothing but obligation. Kirchner (1952: 382) argues that one cannot take such examples, or ones in which the object is elided, as instances of *have* + infinitive + object order.

meanings of Old English examples cited in other sources on semantic grounds, interpreting them all as expressing possession.<sup>17</sup> He concludes, “As always, *we* can see the writing on the wall. I do not think that it was visible to the Anglo-Saxons in this particular instance.”

The fourth stage is clearly a much more recent development. Kirchner (1952: 381-382) sees the intransitive form as common only from about 1800 onward. Ando (1976: 511) finds no examples in Marlowe. The earliest examples in the *OED* (s.v. *have*, def. 7c) are dated 1579, 1594, and 1596, with a gap to 1765. Jespersen (1940: 204-205) finds no examples in Shakespeare or Milton, only one example in Chaucer, and a scarcity of examples even in 18th and 19th century novels. However, both van der Gaaf (1931: 185-186) and Visser (1969: 1485-1486) cite a number of examples from Middle English. The one Old English intransitive infinitive given by van der Gaaf (1931: 185) as “undoubtedly denot[ing] duty, obligation” is rejected by Jespersen (1940: 205) on syntactic grounds and by Mitchell (1985: 401) on semantic grounds (see n. 17).

The changes involved in the development of the *have to* periphrasis can be summarized as follows:

- a) bleaching of the possessive semantics of *have*;
- b) fixing of the word order with end position of the object;
- c) (partial) auxiliatation of *have*;
- d) change in the function of the nominal object, from object of *have to* object of the infinitive; and
- e) extension of the construction to include intransitive infinitives.

### 3.2. Problems with the traditional account of the development of *have to*

Apart from uncertainties of timing, there are several problems in the development postulated in the traditional analysis. First, as Mitchell observes, “the main problem is semantic” (1985: 401). Disputes among scholars about the meaning of *have to* constructions in earlier stages of the language make clear that word order—*have* + object + infinitive or *have* + infinitive + object—alone does not distinguish between the possessive and the obligative meanings in Old and Middle English. In the apparent absence of other formal indicators, it seems very difficult to distinguish between instances of *have to* expressing possession, possession combined with obligation, and pure obligation. Such fine distinctions depend upon an individual scholar’s reading of the context, about which there is often little agreement. Second, the interrelationship among the different changes is not altogether clear. For example, is the change in word order a consequence or a cause of the grammaticalization of *have*? Third, both the syntactic and semantic mechanisms involved in the change in status of the nominal object are opaque: how and why should a nominal object governed by *have* come to be governed by the infinitive? Finally, the traditional account does not explain the origin and meaning of those *have* + object + infinitive constructions in Modern English which are virtually interchangeable with *have* + infinitive + object constructions. A Modern English sentence such as *I have my work to do* corresponds to the third stage in meaning but not

<sup>17</sup> I believe that Mitchell (1985: 401) is wrong in interpreting the *OED* definition (7a) “to possess as a duty or thing to be done ... expressing what is to be done by the subject” as a definition of the first stage of the traditionally-recognized development; it seems to me to capture the meaning of the second stage in the development of *have to*.

in syntax. Kirchner (1952: 372ff.) who sees a “Kontinuität” from Old English to the present, both in meaning and word order, for the *have* + object + infinitive construction would consider this Modern English sentence to be a remnant of the original construction. Visser (1969: 1483), on the other hand, appears to consider it an innovation: his earliest examples date from 1611. At the same time, however, he gives examples from Old and Middle English in the previous section (1969: 1481) which express pure obligation but exhibit the order *have* + object + infinitive.

### 3.3. Parallel development in Romance

The development of *have* + infinitive in English is very similar to that of Latin *habere* + infinitive in the Romance languages, though in Romance the process has progressed further semantically—to a pure future—and syntactically—to a synthetic form. While there is a large literature on the development of this new synthetic future in Romance (see Pinkster 1987 for bibliographic references), Fleischman (1982: 58-59) gives a comparatively useful synopsis of the standard view; she recognizes three stages in the development from a meaning of possession through a “future-oriented modality” to a pure future (52). In the first stage, *have* has its full meaning of possession, but with a “nuance of obligation”, as in *I have a letter to mail*. At this stage, the construction is quite limited in its distribution (Benveniste 1968: 89-90). In the second stage, the possessive meaning of *have* is bleached and the obligative meaning comes to predominate, as in *I have a letter to write*.<sup>18</sup> She points out, correctly, that one cannot actually possess an unwritten letter. There is gradual loosening of the selectional restrictions of *have* and wider distribution of the construction (Benveniste 1968: 90; Pinkster 1987: 207). In the third stage, the order of the construction becomes fixed (as infinitive + *habere*, see Benveniste 1968: 91) and a syntactic reanalysis, or rebracketing, takes place, as in *I [have to write] [a letter]*. A later stage is the creation of the synthetic form. Fleischman admits (1982: 52) that determination of the exact point when the construction comes to express pure future meaning is difficult.

While not radically departing from the standard view of the development of the Romance future, Pinkster (1985; 1987) presents a modified view which, I believe, sheds some light on the development of *have to* in English. Working within a Functional Grammar framework, Pinkster argues that the Latin construction consists of *habere* + object + “praedicativum”, or secondary object (1987: 193, 208). The nominal object is both the object of *habere* and at the same time the patient of the action denoted by the praedicativum (1987: 208). The praedicativum is a gerundive, later replaced by an infinitive, functioning as an objective complement, not, as has been argued, as an infinitive of purpose (1985: 202; 1987: 208). The important semantic feature of the praedicativum is that it is future oriented since it denotes posterior properties of the object, properties resulting from a future action (1987: 193, 209, 210). Thus, Pinkster suggests, auxiliation of *habere* as a future tense form proceeds via the channel of the praedicativum (1987: 210), through the future-oriented meaning of the infinitive or gerundive, per se.

<sup>18</sup> Benveniste (1968: 90-91) argues that the Latin construction does not have a meaning of obligation; rather, it has a meaning of predestination, out of which develops a future meaning: ‘what is to happen’ becomes ‘what will happen’.

### 3.4. New view of the development of *have to* in English

The following view of the development of *have to* in English attempts to overcome some of the problems in the traditional view. The development is seen (loosely) within the Functional Grammar progression from full verb to operator, as developed for the English modals by Goossens (1984; 1987) or for Romance perfect and future forms by Pinkster (1987). As will become clear, I think, the development of the quasimodals suggests the need for an intermediate step (or steps) between predicate formation and operator, that of verbal periphrasis.

3.4.1. Full verb structure. The *have to* construction with purely possessive meaning, such as *He had a gift to give you*, has existed unchanged since Old English; it has been entirely resistant to grammaticalization. In Modern English, as in Old English, it consists of a full verb *have* with its nominal object, followed by an infinitive functioning as an adjunct to the noun. The object is normally a concrete object which can be possessed. The construction exhibits the invariable order *have + object + to V*, unless the object is fronted; the object never follows the infinitive. In the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (*HCET*), possessive *have + object + to V* structures are of high frequency: 60% of the Old English examples (to 1150), 76% of the Middle English examples (1150 - 1500), and 75% of Early Modern English examples (1500 - 1710).<sup>19</sup> In both the Malory and Milton corpora (see Kato 1974; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985), such examples constitute 72% of the total. Examples from Old English (16), Middle English (17), and Early Modern English (18) are the following:

16. a. þu **hefdest** clað **to** werien (*Lamb. Hom.* 33; cited by Visser 1969: 1475).  
‘you had clothes to wear’
- b. Gif ceorlas gærstun **hæbben** gemænne oððe oðer gedalland **to** tynnane (*LawIne* 42; cited by Callaway 1913: 43).  
‘if men have meadow in common or other community land to enclose’
- c. Ic **hæbbe** anweald mine sawle **to** alætanne & ic **hæbbe** anweald hig eft **to** nimanne (WSNEW 98; *HCET*).  
‘I have power to release my soul and I have power to take it back again’
17. a. That Nature **had** a joye hir **to** behelde (Chaucer, *Anel.* 80).  
‘That Nature had joy to behold her’
- b. Paraunter thou **hast** cause **for to** singe! (Chaucer, *TC* 1.854).  
‘Perchance, you have cause to sing’
- c. “Nay!” quod this Monk, “I **have** no lust **to** pleye” (Chaucer, *CT.NP B*<sup>2</sup>.3996).  
“No!” said this Monk, “I have no desire to play”
18. a. the Sword **had** power **to** restraine them (Milton, *TE.3.219.1*; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985:589).
- b. how much right the King of Spaine **hath to** govern us all (Milton, *TE.3.214.3*; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985:609).
- c. I **have** these reasons **to** perswade me (Milton, *AR.2.556.14*; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985:614).

<sup>19</sup> For a description of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, see Kytö—Rissanen (1988). I use the abbreviations of the *HCET*. Figures given here are approximate.

Note that certain nominal objects are particularly common, such as *power, right, cause, need, reason, will, pleasure, joy, or time*.

The substitutability of another verb of possession, such as *own* or *possess*, for *have* is evidence of both the syntactic status of *have* as a main verb and of the semantics of the construction. Further evidence of the postulated syntactic structure is the optionality of the infinitive and the impossibility of changing the order of the object and the infinitive. A change in word order produces either an absurdity as in *I have no desire to play* > *I have to play no desire* (17c) or a clear change in meaning as in *you had clothes to wear* > *you had to wear clothes* (16a) (van der Gaaf 1931: 186). As the infinitive is an adjectival adjunct to the noun in the possessive structure, the sentence can be paraphrased with a relative clause, as in ‘you possessed clothes which you could wear’.<sup>20</sup> Here the noun *clothes* is referential, whereas in *I had to wear clothes*, it is non-referential. Lack of grammaticalization is evidenced by the fact that *have* and the infinitive have separate subcategorization frames (cf. Ramat 1987: 16), or select distinct theta roles. The infinitive in the possessive construction may control its own object (internal argument) as distinct from the object of *have*, as in (16c), (17a), and (18a-c), where there are two different objects. In the obligative structure, however, the infinitive and *have* must control the same object (*He has (\*a letter) to mail the parcel*).<sup>21</sup> If the infinitive in the obligative structure is intransitive, the entire structure is necessarily intransitive (*He has (\*home) to arrive by noon*), whereas in the possessive structure, if the infinitive is intransitive, *have* is still obligatorily transitive (*She has a child to care for* vs. *\*She has to care for*). Further evidence of the lack of grammaticalization is the inability of *have* in this structure to be contracted: *He’s the ability to say the right thing* or *\*She’s no reason to leave*. Note that in an ambiguous sentence such as *That is the only reason he has to go*, when *has* is contracted to *hasta*, only the obligative, not the possessive, reading is possible. When *has* is stressed, however, the possessive interpretation is favored.

*Have* in this structure thus fails the four tests that Lehmann and Quesada (1991) give for delimiting verbal periphrases. The infinitive is adverbial in nature. It is optional. There is what they call “+implicature”; that is, *I have a nice, warm coat to wear* implies the existence of *a nice, warm coat*. And there may be lack of subject identity between head verb and infinitive.

Finally, one should note that while the meaning of the *have* + object + *to V* structure is primarily one of possession, it also has a modal coloring of possibility or obligation captured in the clausal paraphrase with *can/could* or *must* :

<sup>20</sup> Kirchner (1952: 375-377) admits that *have* + object + *to V* can have possessive semantics when the infinitive is in a “relativische Beifügung oder nähere Bestimmung zu dem von ‘have’ abhängigen Obj.,” as in *he hasn’t a leg to stand on* or *she had lots of news to tell us*.

<sup>21</sup> If *have* and the infinitive have different subjects (external argument), the resulting structure is causative, as in *He had her leave*. Like the possessive structure, the causative structure consists of a full verb *have* (see Lehmann—Quesada 1991). Causative *have* constructions with a *to*-infinitive are quite common in the Early Modern English section of the Helsinki Corpus, e.g., *Consider fyrst the length that you will have the other sides to containe* (RECORD C1V). The occurrence of such structures is perhaps a contributing factor in the differentiation of *have* + infinitive constructions in Early Modern English (see below), and the restriction of causatives to bare infinitive complements in Modern English.

19. a. you never **had** a career **to** ruin (W. Somerset Maugham, *The Circle* II [Brit.Pl.] p. 618; cited by Visser 1969: 1475) (= ‘you never had a career which you could ruin’).
- b. I **have** two [horses] **to** sell (Thackeray, *Vanity F.* [Everym.] 314; cited by Visser 1969: 1475) (= ‘I have two horses which I *can* or *must* sell’).

3.4.2. Semantic development of *have*. The loss of possessive meaning in *have* has traditionally been seen as an integral part of its grammaticalization. However, as Bybee and Pagliuca (1985: 71-74) convincingly argue, “this emptying of lexical content is a **prerequisite** to grammaticalization because grammatical functions in themselves are necessarily abstract” (72, my emphasis). There is a period of lexical development, they suggest, in which the verb becomes “sufficiently abstract and generalized” to be suitable for grammaticalization; they see the following progression in the loss of physical, concrete meaning: from ‘to hold in one’s hand’ to ‘to have physically present’ to ‘to have or own (not physically present)’ and finally ‘to have abstract possession’ (of, for example, time, kinship, or an idea) (72). As a survey of the entries in *BT* for *habban* indicates, this generalization of meaning has already occurred in Old English, both in contexts where *have* is accompanied by an infinitive and in those where it is accompanied by a simple noun phrase.

The loss possessive meaning in *have* has also traditionally been viewed as an instance of desemanticization or bleaching, what Lehmann (1985: 307-309) calls “attrition”. However, the acquisition of more abstract meanings is better understood as a shift in meaning (Elizabeth Traugott, p.c.).

3.4.3. Predicative structure. I believe that the occurrence of generalized *have* with a verbal complement constitutes quite a different structure from the possessive one. The structure represented at this stage of development is one of “predicate formation” described by Goossens (1987: 119) as intermediate between “full predicate” and “operator”, or what Ramat (1987: 9) considers the second stage of auxiliation, the stage following full verb but preceding periphrastic form. In this structure, the infinitive functions as an objective complement, not an adjunct, and is obligatory, because if it is deleted, the meaning of the construction changes (cf. Ramat 1987: 9). *Have* and the infinitive do not select separate theta roles. The argument structure is determined by the infinitive, not *have*: the object is patient of the action expressed by the infinitive, and the subject of *have* is coreferential with the subject of the infinitive. Visser’s intuition (1969: 1477) that “the rest of the construction [becomes] semantically more weighty” than *have* thus seems valid. The meaning of the construction does not rest on the meaning of *have* alone, as it does in the possessive construction, but on the combination of generalized *have* with the meaning of the infinitival form: “The role of the copula or marker of possession is to attribute the infinitival predicate to the agent. This yields the sense of OBLIGATION ...” (Bybee—Pagliuca 1987: 111). While *have* plus the past participle creates the meaning of completed activity (i.e. the perfect), *have* plus infinitive creates the meaning of “non-completed” activity: “one ‘has’ a non-past activity, which means that one still has it to do, either as a necessity (with an internal source), or as an obligation (with an external, social source)” (Bybee—Pagliuca 1985: 73). We see here the source of the traditional claim that these constructions express a combination of



possession (in its most abstract and relational sense) and obligation. Finally, I will argue below that it is only these predicative structures, not the full verb structures, which are susceptible to grammaticalization and in which meanings of obligation or necessity can become predominant.

The predicative structure is usually indistinguishable from the possessive structure in word order; the object preferably precedes the infinitive, with end position of the object very rare. The Helsinki Corpus contains no examples with end position of the object in Old English (but see [21b] below). Therefore, earlier studies of the *have to* construction in Old English based their interpretation of any particular construction solely upon contextual information. There is some evidence, however, primarily in the nature of the object, for the existence of the predicative structure in Old English.<sup>22</sup> First, the object functions both as grammatical object of *habban* and as patient of the action expressed by the infinitive; that is, the argument structure seems to be determined by the infinitive, not by *habban*. For example, in the following, *þone calic* and *þone mete* are objects both of *have* and of the infinitive:

20. a. Mage gyt drincan þone calic þe ic **to** drincenne **hæbbe**?/ Potestis bibere calicem, quem ego bibiturus sum? (Mt [WSCp] 20.22; cited by van der Gaaf 1931: 182).  
‘Can you yet drink the chalice which I have to drink?’
- b. ic **hæbbe** þone mete **to** etene þe ge nyton (WSNEW 80; *HCET*).  
‘I have the food to eat which you do not need’

Second, in many cases, the nature of the nominal object rules out a meaning of pure possession. The object is frequently “factitive”, that is, it refers to something which has no prior existence but is brought about by the action denoted by the infinitive, and is hence impossible to possess. Many of the cited examples contain verbs of communication, in which the object denotes what is to be communicated, such as *longe spell*, *ures godes ærend*, *huothuoego*, or *fela* in the following:

21. a. nu ic longe spell **hæbbe to** secgenne (*Or* 2 8.94.16; cited by van der Gaaf 1931: 182).  
‘now I have a long story to tell’
- b. ic **hæbbe** ðe **to** secganne ures Godes ærend/ verbum dei habeo ad te (*Judg* 3.20; cited by Callaway 1913:43)  
‘I have to you to tell our God’s message’
- c. ic **hafo** ðe huothuoego **to** cuoeðanne (LkGl [Li] 7.40; cited by Visser 1969: 1481).  
‘I have to you something to say’
- d. Ic **hæbbe** fela be eow **to** sprecenne 7 **to** demenne (WSNEW 80; *HCET*).  
‘I have many things about you to speak and to judge’

A variety of other factitive objects are the following:

<sup>22</sup> The following conclusions are based on examples found in the Old English section of the Helsinki Corpus; Callaway 1913: 43, 71; van der Gaaf 1931: 180-182; and Visser 1969: 1475ff.

22. a. gearwiað to mergen ðæt ge **to** gearwiænne **hæbbon**/ quodcumque operandum est, facite (*Exod* 16.23; cited by van der Gaaf 1931: 182).  
‘prepare tomorrow what you to prepare have’
- b. Uton we forþon geþencean hwylc handlean we him forþ **to** berenne **habban** (*HomS* 26 [*BlHom* 7] 148; cited by Visser 1969: 1477).  
‘let us therefore think which recompense we to him forth to bear have’
- c. þa estas ... þe he him **to** beodenne **hæfde** (*ApT* 12.16; cited by Visser 1969: 1475).  
‘the favors ... which he him to offer had’
- d. þe Sægeatas selran **næbban to** geceosenne cyning ænigne (*BEOW* 1850-1851; *HCET*)  
‘the Sea-Geats do not have to choose any better king’

The object is also frequently negative; the scope of the negative is the predication, that is, the action denoted by the infinitive along with the object, rather than the object alone:

23. a. Geswiga þu earmingc, ne **hæfst** ðu nan ðingc on me **to** donne (*LS* 14 [MargaretAss 15] 147; cited by Visser 1969: 1484).  
‘Be silent you poor wretch, you do not have anything to do for me’
- b. þeah he nu nanwuhht elles **næbbe** ymbe **to** sorgienne (*Bo* 11.24.15; cited by Visser 1969:1477).  
‘though he now nothing else has to worry about’

If *habban* but not the object is negated, what is expressed is negative obligation (see also [22d] above):

24. þa ofþuhte him þæt he þæt feoh **to** sellanne **næfde** his here (*Or* 3 7.116.14; cited by Visser 1969:1475).  
‘then it seemed to him that he did not have those goods to give to his army’

In all these cases, therefore, the meaning of pure possession is unlikely; rather, the structures express the subject’s having an obligation to perform an action.

The extent of grammaticalization of the *have to* construction in Old English is only partial: it has not undergone the processes Lehmann identifies as part of grammaticalization (see section 3.4.4). There is still some variability in word order within the construction and a fairly free choice of verbs, with *habban* alternating with *sculan* and *agan* in the meaning of duty or obligation.<sup>23</sup> The exclusive use of the inflected infinitive rather than the plain infinitive (found with the more fully auxiliated modals) is probably not highly significant, however, but reflects the later onset of

<sup>23</sup> See Visser (1969: 1585ff.) for examples of *sculan* and Callaway (1913: 80-81) and Visser (1969: 1814ff.) for examples of *agan* in the meaning of obligation. Mitchell (1969: 374ff.; 1985: 392-393) disputes this meaning of *agan*, arguing that like *habban* in the same construction, it means ‘to have, possess’. He believes that the meaning ‘to have as duty, obligation’ arises at the earliest in the late 11th century.

grammaticalization with *habban* (cf. Bolinger 1980: 285). This predicative structure meets some of Lehmann and Quesada's (1991) four tests for a verbal periphrasis, but not all: that is, the verbal functions as a complement and is non-optional, and subject identity holds, as one can see in Old English examples such as the following :

25. a. he þet **haueð** þet hors-hus **to** witene (*OE Hom.* [Morris] i, 85; cited by Visser 1969: 1481).  
 'he who has that horse barn to look after'
- b. **hæfst** ðu æceras **to** erigenne/ habes agros ad arandum (*ÆGram* BS.2; cited by van der Gaaf 1931: 182).  
 'you have acres to plow'

Lack of subject identity in the above examples would result in a possessive or a causative meaning (e.g. *he has a man to look after that horse barn* 'a man who looks, or can look, after that horse barn', or *he has a man look after that horse barn* 'he makes a man look after that horse barn'). Omission of the infinitive would likewise yield a purely possessive reading (e.g. *you have fields* 'you possess fields'). Neither a causative nor a possessive meaning is intended here. The infinitive functions as a complement to the nominal object, predicating a future action to be carried out upon the object, either the cleaning of the horse barn or the plowing of the fields; the actions are not yet accomplished. The objects are (future) patients of the action denoted by the infinitives. However, the predicative structures do not unequivocally meet Lehmann—Quesada's (1991) fourth test of [-implicature]; in the examples in (25), for instance, possession of the horse barn or fields may or may not be assumed here. Generally, it seems, a [+implicature] is assumed.

I would argue that the construction has a combined possessive and modal sense resulting from the generalized meaning of *habban* and the syntactic function of the predicative structure. The degree to which the meaning of possession remains, since the two meanings can coexist, is impossible to determine. But clearly the modal meaning predominates. Whether the modal meaning is best translated by Modern English *have to* /*be obliged to*, as in the examples above, or *can/be able to*, as in the example below, seems to depend on context:

26. gif he **hæbbe** ealle on foðre **to** agifanne (*LawsIne* 60; cited by Visser 1969: 1476).<sup>24</sup>  
 'if he has all in fodder to pay' = 'can pay, is able to pay'

As Pinkster points out for Latin, where he identifies both an ability sense equivalent to *posse* and an obligation/necessity sense equivalent to *debere* (1985: 198-199; 1987: 206, 208), it is best not to consider the *have to* construction to be synonymous with either of these modal meanings, but simply paraphraseable by them.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Even Mitchell (1985: 402) admits that this example and another might have the meaning of ability, while insisting on a meaning of possession for all of the other examples.

<sup>25</sup> Pinkster warns against trying to limit the construction to any one of its possible interpretations: "It may be that the wish or necessity to select one of the interpretations as basic (both historically and

While the predicative structure is not fully grammaticalized as a verbal periphrasis, it is, unlike the adjunct structure, open to further grammaticalization. As Bolinger observes (1980: 297), “the moment a verb is given an infinitive complement, that verb starts down the road of auxiliariness”. He admits that we cannot know whether the verb will even start down the road or how far it will travel, only that such travel is possible.

3.4.4. Periphrastic structure. A true verbal periphrasis develops from the predicative structure by a number of changes occurring gradually over the Middle English period. The sequence of these events is difficult to establish, but they culminate in the syntactic and semantic differentiation of the predicative and periphrastic structures in Early Modern English.

There is gradual relaxing of the selectional restrictions so that the *have to* construction begins to appear with intransitive infinitives in the Middle English period. Lehmann (1985: 308-309) would classify this change as “condensation”, a process where the constituent with which an item combines becomes less complex; the result is that the item comes to modify a word rather than to predicate something of an object. Despite the much later dates proposed by a number of scholars for the appearance of intransitive infinitives (section 3.1), there are quite clear examples of intransitive infinitives from the entire Middle English period (see van der Gaaf 1931: 183-184; Visser 1969: 1486; *MED*, s.v. *haven*, def. 11b), though they are still quite rare (6% of the total in the Middle English section of the Helsinki Corpus; 2% of the total in the Malory corpus). The inclusion of intransitive infinitives could have proceeded via a number of avenues: intransitives accompanied by adverbial phrases (27a) or prepositional objects (27b), or elliptical structures with an understood (indefinite) object such as *something* or *enough* (27c):<sup>26</sup>

- 27. a. He **hade** ferrest **to** fare (*Will. of Palerne* 5079; cited by Visser 1969: 1486)
- b. To yow **have** I **to** speke of o matere (Chaucer, *TC* 2.1694).  
    ‘To you have I to speak of one matter’
- c. for þe sculleð **habben to** drinken (*Layamon* 19056; cited by Visser 1969: 1476).  
    ‘for you shall have (something) to drink’

One example of each of the structures in (27a) and (27c) can be found in Old English:

- 28. a. nu ge **habbað** hwonlice **to** swicenne (*ÆCHom* ii.78.12; cited by Callaway 1913:43).<sup>27</sup>

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synchronically) is inevitable outcome if one starts by distinguishing different interpretations in the first place. Saying that in a specific context *habere* can be interpreted as more or less equivalent to *posse* or *debere* in a similar context does not mean that *habere* is synonymous with one of them or that they could be exchanged in any context” (1987: 201-202).

<sup>26</sup> For examples of elliptical structures, see Visser (1969:1476). Frequently, *not* appears to serve as a kind of direct object, equivalent to nothing: *Seynt Ihon hadde nat to ȝyue hem alle* (Rob. of Brunne, *Handl. Synne* 6928; cited by Visser 1969: 1476) ‘Saint John had nothing to give them all’.

<sup>27</sup> While van der Gaaf (1931: 185) and Visser (1969: 1485) interpret the infinitive in (28a) as intransitive and attribute a meaning of ‘obligation’ to *habbað*, Jespersen (1940: 205) and Mitchell (1985: 401) both interpret the structure as possessive, meaning ‘you have a short time (to live and) to work’, not ‘you ought

- ‘now you have very little (time) to toil (= live)’
- b. þa cwæð æðelstan he **næfde** him **to** syllanne (ROB44 90; *HCET*).  
 ‘then Æðelstan said he did not have (anything) to sell’

Another possible route of development is an analogical extension from instances of the infinitive *to do with*. In fact, of the ten intransitive examples in Chaucer cited by Kenyon (1909: 110), seven contain *to do (one) with*, and six of the seven examples in the Middle English section of the Helsinki Corpus do as well. The percentage of examples with *to do with* in the *MED* (s.v. *haven*, def. 11b) and Visser (1969: 1486-1487) is also very high:

29. a. by God I **have to** doone With you (Chaucer, *TC* 2.213-214).  
 ‘by God, I have to deal with you’
- b. I haue nought **had to** do with þe seyð John (WPASTON1 5; *HCET*).  
 ‘I have not had to deal with the said John’

In Early Modern English *to have to do/deal with* constructions are still very common (10 of the 25 intransitives in the Milton corpus; 8 or the 15 intransitives in the relevant section of the Helsinki Corpus); the idiom is still found in Modern English meaning ‘to have some connection with, pertain to’ (Jespersen 1940: 207). Whatever the course of development, true intransitive *have to* constructions appear in Middle English for the first time:

30. a. ne **hast** you nat **to** faste (CTMEL 219.C2; *HCET*).  
 ‘you do not have to fast’
- b. I moot go thider as I **haue to** go (Chaucer, *CT.Pard.C.749*).  
 ‘I must go thither as I have to go’

The types of objects occurring in the *have to* construction also increase during the Middle English period. Significantly, the nature of all these types further militates against a possessive interpretation. They include “quasi-objects” expressing time (31a) and space (31b), reflexive objects (31c), *it* objects (31d), and clausal objects (31e):

31. a. For zeit **haue** we bi-fore **to** bide Fiue zere of þis hungry tyde (*Curs.M.* [Gött.] 5093; cited by Visser 1969: 1409).  
 ‘For yet have we before to endure five years of this hungry time’
- b. He, that **hath** a longe journey **to** do (Tr. Boccaccio’s *De Claris Mulieribus* [ed. Schleich] 1779; cited by Visser 1969: 1481).  
 ‘He, who has a long journey to do’
- c. as I myght **have to** save myself (Malory 07,05,0299,13,C,B; Kato 1974: 494).  
 ‘as I might have to save myself’
- d. we **haue** it not **to** lose (*TowneleyPl.* 138/673; *MED*, s.v. *haven*, def. 11b).  
 ‘we have it not to lose’ = ‘we cannot lose it’

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to work for a short time’. Furthermore, Mitchell claims (1985: 401), the adverb is functionally equivalent to a direct object: “if *hwonlice* is not grammatically the object of *habban*, it is logically.” I believe we can consider this example as a precursor of the intransitive infinitives of Middle English.

- e. They **haue for to** sene that his rentes and revenues and such other auantages rightwysly to be lyfte (*Pylgremage of the Sowle* [Caxton 1483] IV, xxxiii, 81; cited by Visser 1969: 1479).  
‘they have to see that his rents and revenues and such other advantages are left in the right way’

A large number of examples of the *have to* construction in Middle English include objects with degree words (such as *many, much, more, enough*, etc.) (32) as well as negative objects (see Visser 1969: 1484-1485) (33), in which the scope of the quantifier or negative appears to be the entire predicate, the object and infinitive, rather than the object alone:

32. a. He **hap** so muche **to** done (*SLeg.Pass*[Pep] 16; *MED*, s.v. *haven*, def. 11b).  
‘He has so much to do’  
b. Thou **hast** many þinges 3it **to** forsake (*Imit.Chr.*107/29; *MED*, s.v. *haven*, def. 11a).  
‘You have many things yet to forsake’  
c. and more I **haue** nought hadde **to** do (WPASTON1 5; *HCET*).  
‘and more I have not had to do’  
d. for I **have** had inowghe **to** do (Malory, 10,01,0560,12C,B; Kato 1974: 496).  
‘for I have had enough to do’  
33. a. We **han** naught elles **for to** don, ywis (Chaucer, *TC* 5.1156).  
‘we have nothing else to do, certainly’  
b. thai **haf** na bodily thyng **to** offire til god: for oure lord couaytis lufe and louynge of vs, and nocht elles (*RPSAL* 179; *HCET*).  
‘they have no bodily thing to offer to God, for our Lord covets love and loving from us, and nothing else’

When the negative modifies *have* rather than the object, however, it is the modal which is negated:

34. a trewe man ... **hath** nat **to** parten with a theves dede (Chaucer, *LGW* 465).  
‘a true man does not have to participate in a thief’s deeds’

A further extension of the *have to* construction is the occurrence of nonanimate subjects. While these are still very rare, both in Middle English (35) and Early Modern English (36), they suggest a rather early shift from a deontic meaning of obligation to an epistemic meaning of logical necessity:

35. a. My cours, that **hath** so wyde **for to** turne (Chaucer, *CT.Kn.* A2454).  
‘My course, which has so wide to turn’  
b. Style as hit **had** be a plumpe of woode (Malory, 01,16,0035,33,A; Kato 1974: 476).<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> This example and one other that I have found contain *have* with a plain infinitive: *Wenden we wel that it hadde be right so* (Chaucer, *CT.Cl.* E.751) ‘They thought well that it had (to) be right’. I do not believe

- ‘still as it had (to) be a clump of woods’
36. a. it **had to** suffer accidentally the hard heartednes of bad men (Milton, *T.2.632.30*; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985: 588).
- b. as oft as the cause can **have to** doe with reconcilment (Milton, *T.2.680.14*; Sterne—Kollmeier 1985: 615).
- c. habundance of blod ymynusched, weche **happ to** repressse þe efecte of drynes (PHLEB 49; *HCET*).

The development of epistemic meanings in the *have to* construction is entirely consistent with the observed progression in modal auxiliaries and other forms from deontic to epistemic meaning (see, e.g., Goossens 1987: 118); Bybee and Pagliuca (1985: 73) explain the change in meaning as a process of metaphorical extension, whereas Traugott (1989: 43; 1990: 509ff.) sees it as a matter of pragmatic inferencing.

Rather later, there is reduction in paradigmatic variability, what Lehmann (1985: 307-309) calls “obligatorification”. Possibly because of the diminishing frequency of *sculan* with the meaning of obligation (Visser 1969: 1585-1586), of present tense forms of *agan* (Visser 1969: 1814-1818), and of present tense forms of *motan* (Visser 1969: 1797-1798), both with obligative meaning, the choice of verbal forms becomes more restricted and as a consequence, *have* becomes increasingly obligatory; it is significant that the last citations for these three alternative forms cited by Visser date from the 16th century. However, obligatorification is not complete in Middle English, where, for example, there are a number of Middle English synonyms for ‘ought to’ to express obligation, such as *agan* (need) *þearfe*, *gebyreþ*, *behooveð*, *ben due to*, *been bounde to*, etc. plus the infinitive (see Visser 1969: 1827) and for ‘must’ to express necessity, such as *ben bound(en)*, *compelled*, *forced* and so on, or *haven* need plus infinitive (Visser 1969: 1431, 1812-1813).

Despite these changes leading to further grammaticalization of *have*, it does not reach full auxiliary status in Middle English. In fact, during this period it expands its range, occurring for the first time following a modal auxiliary (37a), in its nonfinite form (37b-c), and in the perfect (37d):<sup>29</sup>

37. a. I wol nat **han to** do of swich mateere (Chaucer, *CT.NP. B<sup>2</sup>.4441*).  
‘I will not have to deal with such a matter’
- b. I, **hauynge** no thinges **for to** wrijte to þou, wolde not bi parchemyn and ynke (WBible(1)2 John 12; *MED*, s.v. *haven*, def. 11a).  
‘I, having more things to write to you, do not wish (to do it) by parchment and ink’
- c. To **have** inough **to** doone (Chaucer, *TC 5.44*).  
‘to have enough to do’
- d. Hir maidenhod, which sche **to** kepe so longe **hath** had (Gower, *CA[Morley] IV*, p. 208; cited by Visser 1969: 1480).

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that this is significant, being part of the wide-spread variation between plain and *to*-infinitives in this period.

<sup>29</sup> Modal plus perfect *have to* constructions appear in Early Modern English, e.g. *that he woulde haue hadde to doe withall* (HARM 70; *HCET*).

‘her maidenhood, which she has had to keep so long’

More importantly, word order continues in Middle English to be an unreliable indicator of the meaning of the construction. Both the possessive and predicative structures, on one hand, and the more fully grammaticalized periphrastic structure, on the other hand, preferably show the order *have* + object + infinitive. Nonetheless, the order *have* + infinitive + object begins to become more frequent in the Middle English period. There are quite a few more instances of it than the five that van der Gaaf (1931: 184-185) was able to find (see Visser 1969: 1479, who gives an additional nine examples): *have* + infinitive + object constructions constitute 7% of the total in the Middle English section of the Helsinki Corpus and 3% in the Early Modern English section, 5% of the total in Malory, and 4% of the total in Milton. Examples from the eighteen Middle English cases that I have found include the following:

38. a. we **hauen** on ure þoht **to** shewen him ure sinnes (TRIN12 71; *HCET*).  
 ‘we have in our thought to shew him our sins’  
 b. we all xul **haue to** kepe councell (LUDUS 202; *HCET*).  
 ‘we all shall have to keep council’  
 c. For love and joy I **had to** se her (Malory, 08,30,0421,13,C,B; Kato 1974: 478).  
 d. Sir Launcelot **had to** endure hym (Malory, 20,21,1217,21,A; Kato 1974: 482).

While possessive meaning is expressed exclusively by the order *have* + object + infinitive, modal meaning (of ability or obligation) may be expressed by either order (see Visser 1969: 1476, 1477, 1481). It is significant that the new order, *have* + infinitive + object order, is exclusively modal in meaning. It is possible that the fronting of the object in *have to* constructions in relative clauses and questions (see Visser 1969: 1480-1481 for examples) may have contributed to the restriction of *have to* V to modal meaning. Of the examples with fronted objects in the Helsinki Corpus, 3 of 6 in Old English, 10 of 23 in Middle English, and 25 of 32 in Early Modern English are modal (or ambiguously modal) in meaning rather than possessive. In Milton, the figures are even higher: 29 of 41 are modal. Middle English and Early Modern English examples are the following:

39. a. A female sall þou **haue to** fere (YORK 59; *HCET*).  
 ‘a female you shall have to fear’  
 b. understand what it is that we **have to** say against their Religion (TILLOTS II:ii 450; *HCET*).

But the development of a clear distinction between the two orders *must* await the modern period.

3.4.5. Differentiation between *have to* V (+ object) and *have* + object + *to*. Three final steps in the formation of a verbal periphrasis occur in Early Modern English: “paradigmaticization”, “coalescence”, and “fixation” (Lehmann 1985: 307-309). The process of paradigmaticization begun in Middle English continues in Early Modern English as *have to* is integrated into the modal paradigm, acquiring epistemic meaning. Coalescence occurs as *have* is either contracted with *to* in the case of *have to* V (+



object), or with the subject pronoun in the case of *have* + object + *to* V (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). Fixation is a more complex process for the *have to* construction, involving not simply the loss of syntagmatic variability and fixing of the position of items, but more centrally the syntactic and semantic differentiation between two constructions, the predicative *have* + object + *to* V and the more fully grammaticalized *have to* V (+ object), both expressing obligation. Recall that the possessive *have* + object + *to* V structure is immune from grammaticalization.

In Early Modern English, the two word orders, which until this time have been undifferentiated, become established with different meanings, as I will argue below, one expressing the obligation to accomplish a result and the other expressing the obligation to perform an action. The semantic differentiation of these two orders is comparable to the contemporaneous differentiation of the perfect (*I have written a paper*) and the “conclusive perfect” (*I have a paper written*) (see Brinton 1990). While the perfect focuses on the past action of writing a paper, the conclusive perfect focuses on the resultant state, on the paper as written. Similarly, the infinitival structure with mid position of the infinitive (*I have to write a paper*) seems to emphasize the action, and the duty to perform that action, in this case, the writing of a paper. In contrast, the structure with end position of the infinitive (*I have a paper to write*) seems to emphasize the result, or the product, of the action, and the duty to accomplish that result, in this case, a written paper. It is highly significant, I believe, that the latter order occurs predominantly with factitive, or not yet realized, objects; in the Modern English examples given in Visser (1969: 1483-1484) expressing obligation, the objects do not have prior existence but are to come into being as a result of the action denoted by the infinitive: e.g. *letters to write, visits to make, favours to request, this thing to decide, something further to say, dinner to get, a long story to tell, some work to clear up, or a little proposition to put*; also in the Modern English examples Visser sees as expressing combined obligation and possession (1969: 1477), the objects are, for the most part, not yet realized: *secret to disclose, request to make, an affair of consequence to communicate, some questions to ask, many interesting particulars to tell, some message to deliver*. In contrast, when the infinitive precedes the object, the object is normally realized (Visser 1969: 1479): *to open this letter, to obey orders, to entertain these gentlemen and their ladies, to see you, to instruct the people, or to force himself*.

The fixing of the two orders is accompanied by a syntactic rebracketing. viz.:

I [have to write] [a paper]

I [have] [a paper to write]

That is, *have* + infinitive form a constituent in one instance, and the nominal object + infinitive form a constituent in the other. In the former, deriving from the periphrastic form, *have* comes to be a modifier of the infinitive, an “operator”, or modal marker; it is semantically restricted to the meaning of obligation. In the latter, deriving from the predicative form, *have* is less fully auxiliated, though it does not have the autonomy of a full verb (for example, it is not interchangeable with other verbs); its meaning is less restricted, encompassing meanings of possession as well as obligation. The different bracketing is apparent even when the object is fronted; while *There’s a paper I have to write* is ambiguous between the two readings, only the former allows contraction to *hafta* (cf. Bolinger 1980: 292). The behavior of these two structures under negation underscores the difference in meaning: *I don’t have to write a paper* = ‘not obliged to

perform the action of writing a paper’, while *I don’t have a paper to write* = ‘not obliged to produce a written paper’. In both cases, the modality, not the prediction, is negated, as not has within its scope either *have to write* or *have*, both expressing obligation. When negating the predication, only the second order is permitted: *I have no paper to write*; here no has within its scope *paper to write*, as the bracketing given above would suggest. Note that in *I have to write no paper*, neither the modality nor the predication, but only the object is negated; the obligation itself is positive. I would conclude, therefore, that the difference between the two orders is not determined by the different meanings of *have*; *have* expresses obligation or necessity in both structures. Rather, the different syntactic bracketing relates the obligation in the first case to the action denoted by the infinitive, and in the second case to the result of the action, which is denoted by the object: the subject is obliged either to perform an action or to accomplish a result.<sup>30</sup>

3.4.6. Reasons for the development of *have to*. Lightfoot (1979: 112) asserts that the quasimodals develop for morphosyntactic reasons as a consequence of the grammaticalization of the premodals. Plank refutes this reasoning, pointing out that quasimodals are not used exclusively in their nonfinite or past tense forms (1985: 322); in fact, *have to* is relatively rare in the past tense. While admitting suppletion as the primary reason, Goossens (1984: 153; 1987: 114) suggests that there may be a semantic reason: the quasimodals unambiguously express deontic meaning, whereas the modals are notoriously polysemic. While epistemic meanings have developed later in the quasimodals, the need for clear deontic meanings may explain the first rise of modal meanings in these verbs. Conradie’s suggestion (1987: 179) that indirectness, especially attempts to avoid invoking the authority of the speaker, motivates change in the modal auxiliaries might also explain the substitution of *have to* for *must*, since *have to* explicitly denies the speaker’s authority (see above, section 2.1). However, I think that the development of the quasimodals is best seen as part of the ongoing cycle of grammaticalization, in which grammaticalized forms develop gradually from autonomous words, are subsequently weakened or overextended, phonetically reduced or even lost, and tend to be renewed and replaced.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The development of quasimodals in English is part of an ongoing process of grammaticalization in which full verb constructions are developing into verbal

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<sup>30</sup> The development of *have got to*, since it is much more recent than the development of *have to*, supplies concrete support for the course of events merely postulated for *have to*. First, *have got* acquires both abstract and concrete possessive meanings in the late 16th century (Visser 1973: 2202; *OED*, s.v. *get*, def. 24), nearly two and a half centuries before it first combines with infinitival complements. Second, the appearance of both possessive and obligative meanings in the *have got* + infinitive constructions appears to be simultaneous (see the examples in Visser 1973: 1477-78, 1479): there is no attested development from a meaning of possession to one of obligation. Third, there is also no evidence for a transposition in word order traditionally assumed since, in fact, the order *have got to* V + object seems to predate the order *have got* + object + *to* V; Visser’s earliest example of the first is 1860 (1969: 1479), and of the second 1884 (1969: 1477). Finally, it seems likely that prepositional verbs and intransitives appear later in the infinitival structure than transitive verbs, though here the evidence is less certain since an 1869 from Twain includes the intransitive infinitive *go*: *but I suppose I’ve got to go and see her* (Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad*, 128; cited by Visser 1973: 2203).

periphrases. At any synchronic state of the language, then, one would expect to find verbal periphrases in various stages of development. The development of the *have to* construction is a particularly rich example of this process, because in Early Modern English the original construction seems to have split into two separate constructions, which have traveled different distances down the road towards verbal periphrasis. Of the two constructions with modal meaning, *have to* (+ object) is now almost fully grammaticalized, while *have* + object + infinitive is only partially grammaticalized. And the source for both of these constructions, the possessive *have* + object + infinitive construction, exists besides these grammaticalized forms in its original full verb state. The analysis proposed in this paper agrees with Lightfoot's (1979) analysis, then, only to the extent that it sees Early Modern English as a crucial period in the differentiation and grammaticalization of the different *have to* constructions.<sup>31</sup>

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