New to Ulaanbaatar June 2019

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: April 2019 | December 2018 | August 2018October 2017June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | May 2014 | October 2013 | October 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category.

I’ve copied the 2014-19 lists here and am adding to it. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

What has arrived?

  • yoga
  • pet dogs on and off leashes
  • Sunday morning joggers and bikers
  • wheelchair accessibility (moved from “What Will Appear” category as ministries are now (meant to be) wheelchair-accessible)
  • the “#замчөлөөл” hastag, a city campaign to shame property owners about their infringement of public space. Seems – quietly – very successful when you look at many photos posted.
  • large-scale BBQ extravaganza on the banks of the Tuul river, particularly near the ASEM Road. On summer weekends, so many cars parked right on the riverside, BBQs planted right next to them, families camping out, some literally
  • Harley-Davidson (now seemingly endorsed by new PM U Khurelsukh)
  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • bike lanes and bike parking, being shooed off bike lanes by riders (though not in December!)
  • street names and signs in the city
  • fat tire bikes
  • home air filtration systems that everyone is talking about
  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass under construction just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads. While I dread the opening of the new airport, construction of the (real) highway out there is under way

  • Canadian cold weather brands, Canada Goose and Arc’teryx are everywhere, fake or not
  • fully electric cars, charging stations
  • electronic payment systems. There is the transit card and a number of apps issued by Mongolian banks. There are some QR-code based payment systems. Often credit card payment is approved via a fingerprint reader.
  • coffee roasting. Not only is instant coffee being beaten back (it obviously still reigns in the country-side), but beyond mass market chains, small roasters are now appearing in the market. Some Mongolians are speaking of a new coffee addiction.
  • surveillance cameras. I recall seeing these first at large intersections, presumably to monitor traffic. Now, every other buildings seems to have haphazardly attached a CCTV camera to its facade. I do wonder how many of these are operational and where the feeds lead and if any of them are monitored.

  • street art (several years now, but I hadn’t noted this before) and newly commissioned public art

  • many more food and agricultural products from Mongolian sources available now

  • in April there had been a lot of concern about the lack of snow in the winter and the likelihood of drought. June brought some heavy rains and Ulaanbaatar turned quite green, almost lush.

  • convertibles

  • streetlights in the ger/khashaa districts

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • stationary 80s-office-phone-looking old-granny cell phone booth
  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • free WiFi on Sukhbaatar, er Chinggis Khaan, er, Sukhbaatar Square, er, Chinggis Khaan Square
  • open gullys/missing manholes
  • street kids (they seem to come and go)
  • packs of dogs
  • smoking
  • hillside Chinggis visible from the city centre as more tall buildings are constructed
  • [reader suggestion from Dan M] stiletto heels
  • outdoor billiards tables. I should have noted this much earlier as I think they disappeared some years ago, but it occurred to me on this visit. Remember, for example, the tables that were on the south side of Peace Avenue just before the bridge over the Selbe River? Sadly, I don’t have a photo of outdoor billiards either, even though I recall being really impressed by it on one of first visits, i.e. mid-2000s

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • new airport, apparently opening in 2019. I drove by there in summer 2017. Oh my, it is far from the city!
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.)
  • road signs in the countryside (and not just the very random, very occasional ones that can be found now)
  • network of cross-country riding (bike and horse) trails (though not in central Ulaanbaatar)
  • parking (meters), electric charging in parking spots/lots
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep)
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • Mongolia-themed coffee travel mugs

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean around 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

  • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
  • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]
  • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]
  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings
Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Constitutional Amendments

By Julian Dierkes and Mendee Jargalsaikhan

Constitutional change has been discussed in Mongolia for some time. Despite the super-majority that the MPP holds in parliament at the moment, we were not expecting amendments to actually be proposed, but now they have been introduced into parliament.

Note that we are not constitutional experts nor are we aiming at providing an exact translation, but we did want to provide a quick overview over the changes under consideration and very brief initial comments.

The draft amendments were introduced on June 6 in a bill supported by 62 MPs.

We have grouped the proposals that seem most significant to us under three themes: judiciary, parliamentary power, and local governance.

Judiciary

Note that these amendments are a follow-up of some sorts to the changes to the judicial system this March that provoked a lot of concerns, especially in the international community.

In the bill these changes are presented as section “Three: Strengthening the Judiciary”.

  1. The Judicial General Council [Шүүхийн ерөнхий зөвлөл, see https://eng.judcouncil.mn/)], which consists of ten members, will play a key role in nominating and changing judges at all levels.  The Ten members would serve for a single, four-year term. Five of ten members (with ten years minimum of professional experience) would be appointed by the parliament. The other five would be elected from different judiciary organizations: one from the judges at the control level, one from judges at the appeal courts, three from lower level courts.

  2. A separate Judiciary Accountability Committee [Шүүгчийн хариуцлагын зөвлөл] will decide whether to relieve, abstain, and penalize judges.  The committee would consist of nine members: three experienced prosecutors, three legal scholars, and three citizens representatives. They will be elected for a single, six-year term.

  3. The constitutional court members will be appointed for a single, nine-year term.  The candidate should be professional lawyers with a minimum of 15 years of professional experience, and over 40 years old.

Our notes: A new committee (Judiciary Accountability Committee) was established to hold judges responsible. The General Judiciary Committee nominates and appoints whereas the Judiciary Accountability Committee removes and changes.  The President has no role in appointments to these committees. Only parliament has a partial role in the Judicial General Council. It appears that appointments from judges would still be made by the president but only upon nomination by the General Judicial Council. It is a bit unclear what would happen if a president refuses to appoint someone nominated by the Council.

Parliament and the Prime Minister

The hybrid nature of Mongolia’s constitution has long been considered to be an obstacle to smooth operation of government as the president seems to have some executive powers (judiciary and foreign affairs) and some ability to block initiatives by the prime minister (for example, the appointment of cabinet members). The proposed amendments are seeking to clarify this relationship.

  1. To limit the number of MPs serving as cabinet members. Only up to five cabinet posts, including the Prime Minister, can be filled by MPs. The Prime Minister has the right to change cabinet members, but s/he will introduce his/her decision to parliament and the president.

  2. To reduce parliamentary rights on state budgets and to streamline the independent auditing of the budgeting and implementation process.
  3. To increase the parliament’s investigative authority. A temporary (investigative) committee can be set up if ¼ of MPs voted in favour of investigation.

  4. To prohibit the parliament changing the election law a year prior to the election.

  5. The nominee for president should be over 55 years old.  The president will be elected for a six-year single term.

Our notes: The first change is addressing the so-called double deel “problem”, namely the fact that many members of cabinet are also MPs and that parliament thus cannot effectively control cabinet. Of course, many other countries also draw upon MPs as members of cabinet, but – so the argument – goes, the small size of the Mongolian parliament makes this problematic.

The second change is intended to prevent MPs from earmarking funds in the budget for their own riding or their own projects.

Special investigative committees have been called for in the past, and this change makes those possible.

The election law is currently set as of six months before an election, this extends that period to one year, presumably to prevent manipulation of the law as the election looms more closely

A concern that arises from proposals is the possibility of a vote-of-no-confidence  challenging the Prime Minister with only 19 members being able to demand such a vote.

The proposal to raise the minimum age to stand as a candidate for president to 55 is odd in a country that is demographically very young and the life expectancy for males is around 65 (at birth). This seems to be aimed at limiting the opportunity of former presidents to continue a political career (as N Enkhbayar and – potentially – Ts Elbegdorj are). The single six-year term will have presidents focusing on their tasks rather than re-election, presumably. It is unclear whether Pres. Battulga would be allowed to stand as a candidate in a 2025 election, arguing that this would be the first under the new constitutional structure and thus not a re-election.

Local Governance

  1. Change of the city status – this would provide opportunities for Erdenet, Darkhan, and Choir (Gobi Sumber) to regain status as cities.

  2. To authorize citizens’ representatives khural to impose local taxes within legal limits.

  3. Election of soum governors by soum assemblies.

Our notes: Giving Erdenet and Darkhan (possibly others later on) city status is primarily an administrative change that is meant to improve governability.

The raising of local taxes is an interesting matter. It is somewhat contrary to the unitary nature of the Mongolian state, but this would extend a trend where differentials in industrial, especially mining, activity have been reflected in budget allocations. Presumably, this could be a tool (in addition to Local Level Agreements) for localities to negotiate agreements with large or even smaller mining projects. That would likely be interpreted as significantly raising uncertainty around investments for domestic and international investors. It’s also not clear whether this is meant to inspire some kind of competition and experimentation among soums. Ultimately, this proposal may be aimed at a larger and more ambitious re-organization of soums, reducing their total number in the name of administrative efficiency, but this tax proposal may well produce a LOT of unintended consequences while not necessarily leading to a discussion of regional organization.

The proposal for elected rather than appointed soum governors may be aimed at reducing the impact of partisanship on local politics by making soum governors more accountable.

Posted in Constitution, Governance, Judiciary, Law, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Security Cameras Everywhere

By Julian Dierkes

Maybe this will turn out to be a longterm series of posts on “contemporary Mongolia dissertations I wish someone was working on”. On visits to Mongolia, I see the streets and hills paved with dissertation topics, so maybe I’ll remember to share some of these on occasion.

Noticing Security Cameras

The first time I was struck by arguments for surveillance as an apparent cure-all against all kinds of undesirable behaviour was on a policy-making workshop with members of the MPP youth organization in a Western aimag. We ended the first day of the workshop by challenging small groups among the 30 or so participants to walk around the aimag centre and to take photographs of “policy problems” they observed. They brought these photos back to the discussion on the following morning. In this and other similar workshop there were pretty consistent patterns as to the problems participants identified: garbage, but also traffic. When it came to the discussion of a particular curve where cars were speeding right in front of a school, one “solution” that was proposed was: surveillance cameras. I was floored. How would a surveillance camera fix speeding? By issuing tickets on the basis of camera footage, by visibly threatening repercussions to speeding? And, is that the most obvious solution to a traffic issue in a provincial capital? It did seem obvious to the person who proposed this.

Fast forward 2019 this year when I happened to look out of the window of a second-floor restaurant in Ulaanbaatar and noticed that I was looking at three security cameras that had been attached to the building across the street (a ministry) in a pretty rickety fashion. I was beginning to wonder what was behind this appearance of CCTV, who is installing cameras, who monitors the feed, and were there more cameras elsewhere. Well, there are, lots of them. So, I added the appearance of security cameras to my evolving list of things new to Ulaanbaatar. When I returned to Ulaanbaatar some weeks later I kept looking.

Then I kept looking and found lots of cameras in Erdenet.

And…

Yes, really! Within less than a kilometer I found 23 security cameras filming the sidewalk and public spaces in the (otherwise) very pleasant Erdenet.

As that particular trip continued, I was shocked to find the security cameras equally omni-present in countryside settlements.

What is going on here?

Some quick observations…

About these Cameras

One might distinguish between those that are official in some way and others that have been installed privately.

In my first conscious encounter with cameras in Ulaanbaatar as well as in the three examples from Erdenet, these seem to be “official”, government or police-run.

The other 20 cameras I counted on my brief stroll through central Erdenet were almost certainly private, that is installed by a business and (presumably) monitored by that business. They appeared over the front doors or on facades of banks, loan sharks, convenience stores, but also of the city library.

Of course, I didn’t somehow pull on the cables that were attached to these cameras to find out where they lead, but it’s probably safe to assume that the cameras on government buildings are either monitored by building security (if it exists) or the police, while the cameras on shopfronts etc. likely feed to monitors/recorders in the store or business where they have been hung. They could also be operated by building owners, I imagine.

There does not seem to be any particular compunction about hanging cameras where they cover a large area of public space.

Some Specific Questions

  • How long have cameras like this been prevalent?
  • Do they monitor or do they also record?
  • Is anyone actually monitoring them?
  • Are any Mongolians concerned with this kind of monitoring/surveillance?
  • Are there any restrictions on filming public spaces?

Some Other Thoughts

The bigger question in my mind is: what is prompting Mongolians to think of surveillance as a solution to problems?

The heavily institutionalized response to policy challenges seems to be the threat of punishment. But is this a response to actual crime or misbehaviour? Are there any indications that the number of security cameras in Mongolia is reducing delinquency?

Could it be that increasing visits and other exposure to China – obviously a repressively surveilled society – is presenting surveillance as a viable policy tool to Mongolians?

What does the reaching for surveillance tell us about Mongolians’ perceptions of each others’ moral fibre? Should we interpret these cameras as rising social mistrust/declining trust?

An Anecdotal Aside

On a recent tour, we arrived in a ger camp near an aimag centre. It had been a hot day and we were looking forward to a cold beer, so since we had to get gas for our vehicle anyway, we thought we might pick up some beers in town. When we walked into a supermarket, we saw the large banner reproducing the law that this town was dry for one day a week and our mouths felt very dry suddenly. The first hope was that we might sweet talk the clerk somehow. Then we glanced around and found ourselves within range of 5, yes five!, security cameras and decided that all attempts to play a dumb, but thirsty out-of-towner would be futile. I guess cameras work!?

Posted in Crime, Dissertation Ideas, Morals, Research on Mongolia, Social Change, Social Issues | Tagged | Leave a comment

Roadmap for New Parties

By Julian Dierkes

Let’s imagine scenarios that could lead to real political change, not only a change in leadership and possibly the party landscape, but a re-orientation of Mongolian democracy, a change of political culture, that gives Mongolians more of a chance to have a say about their country’s future.

You can tell by the tone of that opening sentence that I am wandering from risk analysis into visions of a better future here. But let me dream for a moment… I am dreaming of a Mongolian democracy that provides Mongolians more of an opportunity to engage in substantive decisions about their future by changing the political culture toward one where it is substantive differences that win votes, not personality or patronage or populist promises. Here I sketch out how this might happen via newly-formed political movements.

United in Reform Goals, Competing Over Policy

Ideally, a new political movement would commit to shared goals, but also agree to develop policy differences in order to foster a new political culture built around substantive divisions. This would be important to prevent what has happened to the Democratic Party, namely formation around opposition to a system without a dedication to substantive goals. This origin of the DP has been at the centre of the failure of Mongolian democracy to provide voters with substantive choices, so I would hope for any new movement to avoid this trap.

Shared Commitments

A new political movement might thus be committed to:

  • political pluralism and a multi-party democracy
  • the constitution, obviously
  • recognition for the need for a truly independent state apparatus under parliamentary control
  • a disavowal of patronage politics
  • radical opposition to all forms of political corruption, starting with absolute financial transparency of parties, leaders, and office holders
  • a vision of a new political culture focused on substantive/principled/policy differences, combatting conspiracies and political innuendo as the dominant form of political discourse
  • acknowledgment that electoral victory is not the only, certainly not an immediate goal

If such a movement were to emerge, it might also commit to for working groups drafting political and policy goals with the express goal for the movement to split into at least two political directions before contesting any elections.

Diverging Ideology

From my perspective, any renewal of Mongolian democracy is dependent on a massive injection of patterned substantive disagreements into political debates. If political choices do not differ in the policies that they are advocating, they do not really represent a choice from my perspective.

Here, I do not think that a “traditional” left-right spectrum maps well onto the Mongolian landscape. That spectrum ultimately is rooted in a Marxist dialectic and working class struggle for representation. These roots seem to be fraying in many European countries. For North America, the dialectic is one that is centred on state intervention vs a free market. But those do not necessarily seem to be meaningful categories to build Mongolian political movements around.

Yes, there have been some efforts within the DP to build some kind of market-liberal platform just like there have been programmatic initiatives to pursue social democracy within the MPP, but they have not really taken root.

Any new political movements who are aiming to change the political culture and to reinvigorate democracy would thus have to commit to a process by which they might discover salient cleavages for the Mongolian context. Could this be some kind of statism vs economic liberalism? Or, the pursuit of gradual, slower growth, vs rapid economic development? Or, the preservation of nomadism and support for life in the countryside vs an embrace of dominance by Ulaanbaatar? Or, some kind of environmentalism vs economic growth?

All these strike me as possible divisions among Mongolians, but new political movements would have to explore these to build platforms around them to compete against established parties, and against other new movements.

Commitment to Change of Political Culture

Any new political movements would have to accept and embrace the fact that electoral success will be gradual and will require sacrifice and dedication. It would be preposterous to imagine that a new political movement might win the 2020 election or field a viable candidate for the 2021 presidential election.

Instead, these upcoming elections would be occasions for new movements to test their policy-offerings out with voters, but also to educate voters about the benefits of radical transparency and a principled or at least thematic stance on policy questions.

Campaigns should be centred on informing voters about policy choices and making the case for concrete differences between political parties and the reasons for those differences.

In this effort to inform voters, I see great opportunities for a different campaign style, incorporating much more social media interactions, but also in-person interactions, than the typical famous-politician-lectures-attentive-audience style. But such a difference in campaign style is not a necessary component for new political movements.

Campaigning and political communications cannot be focused on a never-ending stream of unsubstantiated allegations against other parties and politicians. If there are cases of corruption or fraud, these need to be brought to light with concrete evidence that can be used for formal prosecutions. Those prosecutions should be watched very carefully and commented on when decisions are unexplained or prosecutions dropped, but respect for the independence of the judiciary requires trust in institutions.

Conclusions

Given rising voter frustration and on-going commitment to democracy, it seems to me that the party landscape is urgently due for a renewal that nudges Mongolian political culture in a direction to enable more substantive debates. I have imagined a political movement that starts with common goals but then splits into two or multiple parties to pursue specific policy goals on the basis of the common commitment to a new political culture and political process.

Posted in Constitution, Democracy, Elections, Governance, Ikh Khural 2020, National Labor Party, Party Politics, Politics, Presidential 2021, Protest, Younger Mongolians | Tagged | Leave a comment

Addressing Meat Prices through Policy not Populism

By Julian Dierkes

A very curious spectacle recently to see meat warehouses raided by the General Intelligence Agency. I have seen little discussion of the legality of such raids which look a bit like the action taken against a mining company by a GIA SWAT team some months ago. Economic interest and populist pandering are not strong justification for action by security forces in countries where the rule of law governs.

But what about the meat market? What about price fluctuations and how can they be addressed?

Analyzing Meat Prices

Fortunately, Robert Ritz has provided a data-driven analysis of meat (beef and mutton) prices. One of the most obvious patterns that is visible across the different graphs he provides is the regularity of price fluctuations year-to-year. Basically, beef and mutton prices rise for the first half of every year to later take a dip again. As Ritz also argues, this is a cycle that most likely has its roots in herders strategies to maximize their herds. He writes

In the Fall before winter sets in herders will slaughter or sell those animals which are likely to die in the coming winter. Then in the Spring during breeding season herders often restrict the amount they sell so as not to limit their potential growth that year. In the Summer the productive animals are known and herders are more willing to sell or slaughter those animals that are not pregnant.

Underlying meat prices thus is a “natural” cycle that unfolds over the year and Ritz shows this quite convincingly in his analysis of past prices.

Ritz also provides indications that it is not exports nor losses due to dzud conditions that seem to be driving prices.

It is speculation about the impact of exports that is fuelling populist demands for price controls and actions like those taken by the GIA, purportedly directed at hoarding which I cannot imagine to be an illegal activity.

Building Infrastructure for a Meat Industry

Instead of simplistic and – given the annual cycle – ineffective populist measures, the government should pursue broader policies around the production of meat. This is an important area of policy-making because it has an outsized impact on countryside livelihoods and thus – directly and indirectly – on migration to Ulaanbaatar.

Meat production is mentioned regularly, of course, in the context of the diversification of the economy. Three aspects about the potential for meat exports stand out:

  • Plenty of potential supply in Mongolia
  • A nearby market in China with growing consumptions of meat
  • Branding opportunities around perception of Mongolia as remote, and thus isolated from pollution, etc.

The main obstacles seem to lie in the infrastructure for an industrialized meat business including distributed slaughter facilities, health inspections, shipping infrastructure.

If these infrastructure needs could be addressed, they might also lead to a flattening of the price cycle by increasing the overall volume of meat that is available for supplying Ulaanbaatar as well as for export.

Currently, it seems that most meat sold in Ulaanbaatar originates in nearby aimags. This has been an important aspect of migration to Ulaanbaatar and to surrounding Töv province in that herders have moved their animals closer to market centres, especially Ulaanbaatar but also aimag centres.

If meat production could thus be industrialized in the Western, Northern, and Eastern aimags, for example, that infrastructure would not only allow for exports to China (primarily), but also for shipment within Mongolia. While this might not address the seasonal calculus that herders make regarding their investment in animals, it might flatten the price fluctuations somewhat simply by making more of a supply available to Ulaanbaatar.

Posted in Agriculture, Countryside, Diversification, Employment, Herding, Public Policy | Tagged | Leave a comment

Dr. Bloggers

Our blog has always been rooted in academic research and in the training that regular bloggers have received.

We are all delighted that two of our regular crew (more or less active, at this point), have recently graduated to become Dr. Miliate and Dr. Mendee. Congratulations!

Our group is thus composed of 5 PhDs (2x Princeton, Hokkaido Univ, Indiana Univ, Univ of British Columbia) and an MASc (UBC). If that isn’t enough reason for you, Bulgan, to press on with your studies!

Dr. Mendee

Dr. Mendee

Mendee was there for the invention of this blog (with Byambajav and Julian) and has stayed with it all along.

Now, he has completed his PhD in Political Science focusing on democratization in Mongolia and the Kyrgyz Republic, examining the interplay of geopolitical interests around “small” countries of Asia and continuity in political parties.

As of September 2019, Dr. Mendee will take up an appointment as Post-graduate Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. With Julian and Byambajav, he continues to serve as a director of the Mongolian Institute for Innovative Policies.

Dr. Miliate

Brandon was quite focused on Mongolia for some of his undergraduate work as well as his Master of Arts Asia Pacific Policy Studies at the Univ of British Columbia. Since then, he has shifted his focus Southeast-ward and completed his dissertation in Political Science at Indiana Univ. The write-up of his defense provides a nice summary of the highlights of his dissertation.

Later this year, Brandon will take up his post as South and Southeast Asian Studies Librarian at Yale University.

Posted in Democracy, Mongolia and ..., Reflection, Research on Mongolia | Leave a comment

Mine Aesthetics and OT as National Symbol

By Julian Dierkes

{This post continues a series of posts based on a visit to Oyu Tolgoi at the invitation of the company.}

I think it’s fair to say that Mongolians have had an ambivalent relationship with Oyu Tolgoi ever since Robert Friedland’s infamous 2005 “t-shirt” speech that suggested to North American investors that Mongolians would be happy with a tiny share of profits generated by the mine. Whether or not suspicions about a fair share would have arisen without those comments, these suspicions are deep-seated. Repeated announcements by MPs that the 2009 Investment Agreement or its 2015 Dubai amendment needs to be re-negotiated are partly rooted in the ambivalence many Mongolians have felt toward the project. Rio Tinto’s standoffish attitude and long-time refusal to seriously engage Mongolia as a context for its operations has heightened this ambivalence.

Yet, there would be many things about the project that some Mongolians at least would embrace. Mongolia’s economic growth in the 2010s has been fuelled by OT construction. Employment targets are consistently surpassed and Mongolians are beginning to rise within the OT managerial ranks. Omno Gobi is being transformed into a noticeably better-off region…

Taking Pride in Oyu Tolgoi

Recently, Oyu Tolgoi does seem to be making efforts to address the Mongolian public more extensively and more directly.

They have launched an #OTProud campaign that frequently showcases Mongolian OT employees and they pride they take in their jobs and in the project. It remains to be seen whether this catches with the Mongolian public.

A recent tweet by Armando Torres, Oyu Tolgoi’s current CEO, suggests a similar theme.

On site, however, signs of the important of the OT project for the Mongolian nation abound. I was delighted to see the artistic and craft care that is taken with some of the signage during a recent underground visit. Frequently, as in the examples shown here, this artistry takes symbols of the nation as a motif, the soyombo as it also appears in Mongolia’s flag shows up with particularly regularity.

 

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Beautiful metal craft work at 1,400m below the Gobi.

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It would be very interesting to learn how employees perceive the project and the extent to which they perceive it as something to pride in and to discuss with others who are not involved in the project. I would not be surprised, however, if the pride, camaraderie and esprit de corps carried over from the site to employees’ lives.

 

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More artwork underground at OT, here with distinct national pride.

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Guest Post: Smart Air

By Nathan Hsieh

The Problem

The air quality of Ulaanbaatar has been a highly politicized topic that millions of aid dollars and institutions have deliberated on. Yet, if one were to approach any random Ulaanbaatarite and state that the air would be clean in five years, the response would likely be of shock. Simply put, there does not exist a quick, economic solution that can equitably provide clean air for all. Pollution will abate as Ger-district growth is curtailed, and consumers begin to earn wages that allow migration to apartments, where energy production for heating and cooking can be centralized and removed from the city.

For Mongolians, that roadmap unfortunately lays out a great sacrifice (and a terrible social bargain) for the short-term: a continual decline in life expectancy and an increased risk of respiratory and heart disease, to name a few. And so, upon careful consideration of this intractable problem, many are left with the question – is there anything that can be done in the short-term? containment? mitigation? The answer: yes.

Indoor air pollution represents the most significant share of exposure to harmful particulate matter, and air purifiers filter out that particulate matter – but the cost per unit ranges from US$5001500, with recurring annual costs anywhere from US$80250. For a country where the GDP per capita is roughly US$3,700, and the average income has hovered around US$200 per month since 2000 – the price of clean air is simply not feasible.

The Solution

Thankfully, there are those that believe it is possible to leverage their resources to create clean air pathways for the less fortunate. Back in 2013, Thomas Talhelm (at the time a Fulbright scholar) was living in Beijing. The air pollution was making him sick, and he wanted to know if he could protect himself. He soon found that air purifiers were exorbitantly priced, so he started researching how they work.

Tom found that purifier technology was shockingly simple. Air purifiers capture particulate pollution using cheap, unpatented technology – the HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Arrestance) filter. The primary function of every air purifier was simple: a fan pushes air through a HEPA filter, where particulate matter (PM) would stick to the fibers.

After buying a laser particle counter to test for microscopic particles in the air, Tom found that the ability of air purifiers to reduce PM could be mimicked by strapping a HEPA filter to the front of a fan (~US$30). He wanted to share this discovery as widely as possible, and the sincerity and resourcefulness of his solution inevitably snow-balled into what is now Smart Air.

I heard about Smart Air at a workshop in Ulaanbaatar and immediately understood the value it could provide to public health. Following a conversation with the leadership team, Tom agreed to provide a loan to begin operations in Mongolia. The first year was undoubtedly clunky and dependent entirely on the fire of a few people, but the ultimate question was how to ensure the initiative would continue after my time in Mongolia ran its course. It was decided that the best way to accomplish this indefinite end was incorporation as a Limited Liability Company.

The Roadblocks

Thus, began my forays into the legalese of corporate governance. I quickly found that the Mongolian government was highly protective of business opportunities. First of all, foreign nationals cannot own a for-profit enterprise in Mongolia unless they provide an up-front US$100,000 contribution towards share capital. The only way to waive this requirement is to fork over at least 75.6% of the business to one, or more, Mongolian nationals.

I understand the legitimacy of protecting key industries and their revenue streams. This makes particular sense in strategic industries, and it is a practice that has been enacted around the world for millennia: from the Chinese silk trade to American telecoms. But the prohibition of foreign ownership can stymie valuable intellectual capital, ideas that could be a boon for society.

As industry has developed across the US and Europe, more nuanced corporate structures have entered the fore to engender a more diverse array of business opportunities – different tax structures can, and should, be applied to different missions. Take, for example, the L3C (low-profit limited liability company) structure in the US, which was developed to facilitate investments in ventures that aim to be profitable but also socially beneficial. This relies on a consensus that profits and social good are not diametrically opposed – and I believe that is true: profits unite workforces regardless of their language or creed. But profits can also be limited by well-intended leaders. Smart Air’s stated objective is to minimize returns in order to maximize the availability of clean air. I would argue that, as a result, it should not be classified and taxed in the same way as a company that sells white t-shirts as surgical equipment.

Perhaps, nuanced systems of governance are a privilege. I don’t expect the Mongolian government to mimic the L3C as it stands; there are dangers of changing a system without knowing how entrepreneurs will navigate new loopholes. But the simple fact is that it significantly hindered Smart Air’s ability to operate and expand its reach, which directly translated to fewer clean breathes. Ultimately, the answer to how these issues can be resolved is for the shareholders – not those with fiduciary responsibilities, but the ones that breathe some of the worst air in the world and have the right, and chance, to be civically engaged.

About Me

Nathan Thomas Hsieh graduated from Duke University (’14) with a degree in Mathematics. He was a Princeton in Asia Fellow (’15-’17) and was placed in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, with the financial services firm, IARUDI. During his free time in Mongolia, he started a social enterprise called Smart Air Mongolia that has continued its operations to-date. Since departing Mongolia last September, he now works for The Mobility House as a Product Rollout Analyst, studying how to integrate the transportation and power sectors through the electric vehicle supply chain.

Posted in Air Pollution, Nathaniel Hsieh, Ulaanbaatar | Leave a comment

Biased How?

By Julian Dierkes

In 2016 I came back from a trip to Mongolia slightly puzzled and concerned. It seemed to me during meetings on that trip that there was a real concern with some interlocutors that I was some kind of spy. My interest in Mongolia as well as the independence of my analysis were questioned and it seemed like it was insinuated that I was somehow interested on behalf of someone else, most likely a government (agency). That’s what prompted me to draft a page explaining my curiosity about Mongolia as well as another making the case for why readers might be interested in my (and fellow bloggers’) analyses. Both of these pages are available in Mongolian (Яагаад |хараат бус байдал) as well as readers might ask very legitimate questions about these topics.

One aspect I found puzzling in 2016 was that similar questions were being raised by several different people from different angles.

The same thing has happened again.

Bias in 2019

Unlike in 2016 when the suspicion seemed to be that I was spying, now there seems to be a sense that I am somewhat “biased”. I wish I had been as smart as several people I discussed this with upon my return and had asked those accusing me of bias what exactly that bias was. I did not, unfortunately. This leaves me trying to understand this question and to provide a response in the abstract.

The accusations of bias all seemed to come from a blog post I wrote with Boldsaikhan Sambuu discussing the late-March legislation to give power to dismiss judges to the National Security Council. In a follow-up post, I included some more narratives of why this legislation was not a threat to democracy.

I have been surprised that no readers have ever engaged me on the transparency page in the past as I had intended this to be a starting point for discussions about my/our position not a definitive/final statement. If you have questions about my independence, read that page, and let me know which parts you do not understand, believe, or accept. But instead of making the positive case for my independence, let me here consider some possible sources of bias.

There’s Always Bias

Well, obviously! I am limited in the information I can gather, in my ability to process that information, and social and political analysis is not the kind of activity that produces a definite “yes” or “no” answer in the end. So yes, duh, I am biased. But there are different sources of bias and these have a differential impact on analyses.

“Someone” Is Directing Me

There seems to have been some sense that I wrote the March 27 post on behalf of “someone” else. My co-author, Bold, has also been subject to this suspicion. The “someone” in question seems to be former president, Ts Elbegdorj. The legislative changes introduced in late March were directed (or so the claim went) at un-doing some of the harm to the rule of law done by the former president. In a subsequent post, I have noted that this is a rationale that has been presented for the legislation.

But me? Writing on behalf of Elbegdorj? Unlike many other Mongolian politicians, I have never met Elbegdorj, nor have I had any direct interactions with him. I am curious as to how he is approaching his current quasi-retirement from politics and would be delighted to have a chance to discuss that with him, but that chance has not presented itself to me.

Why would I let a politician direct me to do anything? What could I gain by following that direction?

The one time I felt like I was being asked to speak on a politician’s behalf was when former president N Enkhbayar was arrested in 2012 and a PR firm subsequently sent out a package of “information” detailing his abuse. Needless to say, I did not write about that information. I actually contacted a number of newspapers that did write about Enkhbayar’s arrest in similar terms to caution them that information came from a particular angle. In fact, if anyone asked me to write on their behalf, I would be more likely than not to write the exact opposite, simply to demonstrate my independence. That would also hold for any other current or former president, prime minister or other politician.

As a researcher, I am always concerned about access to decision-makers. My days during visits to Ulaanbaatar are filled with meetings to give me a chance to get a more in-depth view of the current political mood than I can from Vancouver. To arrange these meetings, I have to rely on contacts and their willingness to speak with me. So yes, access is of some concern. Obviously there are politicians and other voices who have refused to meet with me in the past when I have requested meetings and that is totally fine. It is typically me asking for a meeting with the intention of asking questions to which I do not have answers, so I am dependent on the goodwill of contacts to give me some of their time to speak to me. In busy schedules, that time might not exist.

So yes, access is a currency that I understand and appreciate. But in my many years of visits to Mongolia, my access has never been curtailed in a way that suggested that a contact saw me as biased and therefore did not want to speak to me. In fact, if you thought I got an aspect of current developments wrong and you care about that, I hope you would want to specifically meet with me to explain to me what I have got wrong, as several contacts did during my recent and previous trips.

I have a Party/Person-Preference

I do not know how to put this any other way than simply, no!

As a researcher, I believe that evidence-informed policy-making is better than decisions that are not informed by available information.

Just as I prefer policies that are presented with reference to data, so I would prefer politicians who champion policies that are backed by analysis.

I also have some broader personal commitments/values that do lead me to prefer policies that produce outcomes that are more just and minimize the burden we place on the planet and its ecosystems. And I am certain that democracy is the most likely route to such outcomes. I also strongly believe that Mongolians have fought for and deserve opportunities to make genuine choices about the future trajectory of their country.

Do any of these commitments lead me to prefer one party over another or one politician over another in Mongolia? No, sadly. That is the case because policy-making (for a variety of reasons) is generally not evidence-informed and political parties have not articulated any themes that would lead me to understand that one party is more committed to values like (social) justice and sustainability than another. So, as a researcher, with a focus on substance, I do not see any basis to prefer one political actor over another.

I was trained as a sociologist and that does make me prone to certain methods, questions, and answers. But that would not point me toward any particular political actors, I think.

Someone Is Paying Me

Well, this is a funny thing, but no one has ever attempted to bribe me or pay me for adding any particular political slant to our blog posts. Most likely this is in recognition of our limited impact, but it might also be because anyone contemplating such a payment has probably had the impression of me and my fellow bloggers that such offers would not be welcome. Yes, of course, we are sometimes compensated for work that is based on our research as it also appears on the blog (through political risk or development consulting, for example), but that is not payment for a specific blog post or a specific direction to give to a post. Even the posts based on my recent visit  to Oyu  Tolgoi (which I have been marking with a disclosure that I visited at the invitation of the company) focus on topics that I have been interested in and are based on my observations.

If not financial renumeration, is there some other payment that is forthcoming? Not that I am aware. I have applied for research funding from the Mongolian government, but have never been successful with my applications. With the demise of the fund to support Mongolian Studies earlier this year, and its presumed resurrection as the Institute for Chinggis Khaan Studies (really?), I am fairly unlikely to be awarded any research funding in the near future.

I have long waged a tongue-in-cheek campaign to be appointed as Foreign Minister under the name of Dumbledorj or as (Foreign) Minister of Education as Dambadorj, but unfortunately, no one seems to be interested in my offer in this regard.

Do Get in Touch

So, if you do think I am biased in any way that I have not acknowledged here, please do let me know what source of bias I have not discussed here or which part of my discussion you do not find credible!

Posted in Politics, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

A Very Premature Outlook on the 2020 Parliamentary Election

By Julian Dierkes

Yes, the 2020 election is more than a year away, and, yes, many observers lament the fact that politics seems beholden to electoral cycles. But, discussions in Mongolia have started to revolve around the 2020 election, and I have already been asked to provide an outlook, so I want to provide some thematic notes that are obviously highly speculative in nature.

Here are some of the questions that I think will loom large in the election.

A (Re)Commitment to Democracy

Elections are fundamentally democratic structures, events, and activities. Given fears about a backsliding from democracy in Spring 2019, many electoral activities will be closely watched as to the integrity of various processes. For this, decisions about the electoral system itself will be crucial. By law, the electoral system has to be set in place six months before the election. In past practice, this has meant last minute passage of an election law at the end of December, an unfortunate habit that would be good to combat, but realistically I am not expecting anything different from this upcoming cycle.

Will it be a purely majoritarian election system again? Will the MPP put in place restrictions on new/small parties or on independents? Obviously, that will have a significant impact on the election results in terms of the performance of smaller parties and independents.

MPP

While a split seemed to be looming this past winter over the battle between the “City” faction of M Enkhbold and U Khurelsukh and others, this seems to have been avoided through an assertion of control by PM Khurelsukh and his allies. Any talk of a re-merger with the MPRP for the MPP or splinters thereof also seem to have been dropped from the agenda. It looks like a relatively calm election campaign coming up for the MPP.

DP

The DP seems in fratricidal decline, particularly with the rift that has emerged in parliament over Lu Bold and his allies’ departure from the party caucus and vows to contest the election as a separate party. It seems unclear what this spin-off is aiming at in political terms (beyond getting elected, perhaps), and so unclear what this might mean for coalitions that could emerge from various results.

Will the election bring a return of former president Ts Elbegdorj to active politics? Presumably, his chances in any kind of direct election would be good, but he might also increase divisions within the party further.

Small/New Parties/Independents

If small and new parties and independents will be allowed to compete fairly freely, what impact will they have?

MPRP

It seems likely that former president N Enkhbayar will, once again, assert himself and perhaps he will ultimately be allowed to stand as a candidate. If he is, than he seems likely to win a seat in most electoral system configurations. It’s unclear to me what this will mean for other MPRP candidates in the party.

New Parties

At the height of the SME Fund scandal, it seemed like the National Labour Party was gaining a lot of attention, but half a year later this doesn’t seem to have translated into any big political momentum. It seems like ХҮН will be hampered by any restrictions the MPP and the General Election Commission dominated by the MPP might devise, but it will also be unlikely to meet with any significant success if its ambition is restricted to election into a few, most likely very few seats, depending on star candidates that might be victorious in a majoritarian riding.

Who will Nominate Pres Battulga?

Pres Battulga will surely want to run for president again in 2021. To do so, he will have to be nominated by a party represented in parliament. His relations with the DP leadership do not seem very close and will be further strained if former president Elbegdorj decides to return to active politics. The MPP is also unlikely to nominate him for re-election, so he will be looking for a vehicle for his nomination and will likely throw his support behind that vehicle.

Any Chance at Substantive Debates?

Notice that I’ve already raised a number of questions, but have said nothing about policy or campaign platforms. This remains the big empty hole at the centre of Mongolian democracy. It would be quite surprising to see any real and principled debate appear in the election.

There may be some specific issues that will be raised, especially in a fashion to pander to popular opinions, but these will not aggregate to any kind of principled debates. Some issues that seem likely to come up:

  • Tavan Tolgoi, though it strikes me as very unlikely that the IPO will actually proceed before the election.
  • Corruption, but most likely as the time-proven mutual accusation and finger-pointing game.
  • State funds, other than the SME Fund, perhaps.
  • Air pollution, though interest will wane again in late Spring.
  • I don’t see that any deeper debates about employment generation will emerge, beyond the usual claims that all candidates will generate jobs.

Incumbency?

In the past, voters have tended to swing away from the party that  had dominated previous elections. This is part of the reasons for Pres. Battulga’s 2017 victory over M Enkhbold, but a similar pattern prevailed in earlier elections as well. For 2020 it is not clear yet that the DP will present a viable alternative. Not only did its previous government throw they country into a bit of a fiscal mess, but it might just continue its slow-motion implosion and simply not appear as a credible alternative.

The sense of the DP as not presenting a viable alternative might be heightened by the MPP’s legitimate claim at reasonably competent management of political issues over the past four years. Not that any of the real challenges (corruption, air pollution, country-side development strategies, etc.) have been addressed, but management of government has been somewhat successful. There are even some ministers that have lent an air of competency to the government. This is true for Finance Minister Ch Khurelbaatar who has brought some fiscal discipline to the government. More surprisingly, it’s also true for Minister of Mining D Sumiyabazar. While his appointment led to some doubts (“a former wrestler for the very important mining portfolio?”) and even mockery, he seems to have genuinely thrown himself into embracing his role as a minister, has been focused in his public appearances and has been dedicated in his service.

Policy Continuity

Given the lack of substantive competition between the main parties, the election result currently would look to be relatively irrelevant in understanding how policy-making might develop. There are no specific expectations that a DP-dominated government – should that turn out to be possible – would change direction on specific topics. Yes, personnel will be rotated and institutional knowledge will – once again – be lost, but no radical reorientation would be expected as it also has not occurred in previous changes of government.

Other Issues

More issues will surely arise, possibly in the context of the Khentii by-election. We will certainly try to keep up-to-date on these developments.

Posted in Democratic Party, Ikh Khural 2020, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, National Labor Party, Party Politics, Politics, Populism, Public Opinion | Tagged | Leave a comment

OT Data Applications

By Julian Dierkes

{Disclosure: As previously mentioned, I was delighted to be invited to Oyu Tolgoi by the company’s communications department.}

In addition to the pervasive focus on safety, the utilization of data is visible throughout Oyu Tolgoi. The kind of control room that centralizes information and decision-making over the chemical processes as in the photo below is not unique to Oyu Tolgoi of course.

Yet, data appears to be collected everywhere throughout the mine operations and to be displayed to inform safe and efficient operations.

I was constantly reminded of the promise of the “management information systems” wave in corporations that aimed to provide dashboards to management that would allow them to control operations in real time and on the basis of constant data, whether that data be from or about production, efficiencies or market conditions. Some of that promise appears to be realized at OT in more extensive fashion than I have seen elsewhere.

Managing Maintenance and Faulty Equipment

Take the maintenance of machinery and equipment as an example.

In visiting underground and open pit operations, as well as the concentrator, screens documenting the state of repair of equipment could be found everywhere.

Here’s the example of a screen providing information about the personnel cage that serves as an elevator to the operations 1,400m underground.

Not only does it display the schedule of arrivals and departures, but it also shows a delay due to unscheduled maintenance.

Everywhere else in operations, monitors showed similar information.

In the open pit, for example, the giant 300t trucks that move ore out of the pit were all traced on a screen, showing the state of their operations, where exactly they were and what maintenance issues may have arisen.

The incident reports that I mentioned as an element in the focus on safety, also included information of the cost incurred by incidents or malfunctions.

This is where the tracking of equipment goes beyond attention to safety and appears to allow operators to also manage efficiency. In the case of the giant trucks, the weight of their load is not only shown on a large display on the side of the truck, but it is also tracked as data. Other screens thus showed how close operators had come to the maximum load of 300t, presumably striving to consistently reach that maximum but not surpass it given the time from the open pit to destination and the constantly repeated processes that make this time matter in cumulation. Different crews were also compared as to their efficiency in this regard on the same screen as were day-to-day and week-to-week trends.

Spill-Over of Focus on Data

Some of this focus on data is surely driven by the scale of operations at OT. Given the number of truck movements per shift, it makes sense to try to maximize these movements down to the final ton near the maximum pay load in repeated activities. With the focus on safety, I see a clear trajectory by which this focus might “spill over” (not in an, er,  accidental fashion of course) from OT to other Mongolian activities. With data-driven efficiency, I am not so sure. Obviously, this data utilization requires planning and investment resources that might make it cost-effective only on a large scale and not applicably to many business contexts in Mongolia. What does seem applicable, however, is the deliberateness with which processes are designed and monitored.

Posted in Oyu Tolgoi | Tagged | Leave a comment

New to Ulaanbaatar April 2019

By Julian Dierkes

I’ve been keeping lists of things that are arriving to/disappearing from central Ulaanbaatar: December 2018 | August 2018October 2017June 2017 | May 2016 | December 2015 | May 2015 | May 2014 | October 2013 | October 2011. More informal versions of these observations also appear in the /ulaanbaatar/change/ category.

I’ve copied the 2014-18 lists here and am adding to it. New items since previous posts appear in italics. Since this list has been growing, I’m also beginning to delete some items that I’ve had on the list for some time. Strikethrough means that these items will be off the next list.

What has arrived?

  • sadly: Louis Vuitton, KFC, Burberry Kids, Ugg and a Porsche dealership
  • child seats
  • sidewalks
  • parks
  • farmers’ markets
  • yoga
  • pet dogs on and off leashes

  • Sunday morning joggers and bikers
  • organic shopping
  • gated communities (virtually all the new developments towards and in Zaisan)
  • wheelchair accessibility (moved from “What Will Appear” category as ministries are now (meant to be) wheelchair-accessible)
  • the “#замчөлөөл” hastag, a city campaign to shame property owners about their infringement of public space. Seems – quietly – very successful when you look at many photos posted.
  • large-scale BBQ extravaganza on the banks of the Tuul river, particularly near the ASEM Road. On summer weekends, so many cars parked right on the riverside, BBQs planted right next to them, families camping out, some literally
  • Harley-Davidson (now seemingly endorsed by new PM U Khurelsukh)
  • drive-home service for drivers who have been drinking. You call the service, they drop off a driver who drives you home in your car and is then picked up again. Given – fortunately – much stricter enforcement of drunk driving laws, a great service!
  • bike lanes and bike parking, being shooed off bike lanes by riders (though not in December!)
  • street names and signs in the city
  • fat tire bikes
  • home air filtration systems that everyone is talking about
  • airport road is getting ever fancier, now there’s a giant overpass under construction just before crossing the Tuul on the way into town. Lots of fancy on/off-ramps popping up everywhere on roads.
  • Canadian cold weather brands, Canada Goose and Arc’teryx are everywhere, fake or not
  • fully electric cars (though I don’t know where they charge)
  • electronic payment systems. There are a number of apps issued by Mongolian banks. There are some QR-code based payment systems. Often credit card payment is approved via a fingerprint reader.
  • coffee roasting. Not only is instant coffee being beaten back (it obviously still reigns in the country-side), but beyond mass market chains, small roasteries are now appearing in the market. Some Mongolians are speaking of a new coffee addiction.
  • surveillance cameras. I recall seeing these first at large intersections, presumably to monitor traffic. Now, every other buildings seems to have haphazardly attached a CCTV camera to its facade. I do wonder how many of these are operational and where the feeds lead and if any of them are monitored.

What has disappeared, or at least nearly?

  • stationary 80s-office-phone-looking old-granny cell phone booth
  • for-pay scales (actually, they seem to be hanging on)
  • free WiFi on Sukhbaatar, er Chinggis Khaan, er, Sukhbaatar Square, er, Chinggis Khaan Square
  • open gullys/missing manholes
  • street kids (they seem to come and go. In summer 2017 there were very few of them again.)
  • packs of dogs
  • smoking
  • hillside Chinggis visible from the city centre as more tall buildings are constructed

What will appear in the future

  • navigation systems
  • mental maps shifting to street names/addresses instead of landmarks
  • new airport, apparently opening in 2019. I drove by there in summer 2017. Oh my, it is far from the city!
  • subway (really, I wish they had selected light rail instead, but who knows whether either will come)
  • urban renewal and historical restorations embracing district north of government house (National University of Mongolia, German embassy, etc.)
  • road signs in the countryside (and not just the very random, very occasional ones that can be found now)
  • network of cross-country riding (bike and horse) trails (though not in central Ulaanbaatar)
  • parking (meters), electric charging in parking spots/lots
  • Combined Heat and Power Plant #5 (yeah, right!)
  • hipsters discovering УАЗ (minivan and jeep)
  • giant hole blown into Bogd Khaan mountain to “drain” polluted air out of the valley (that actually is a proposal, but it will not appear! There also seems to be a proposal to blast away mountains on either end of the valley to let bad air escape!)
  • some kind of traffic routing system with overhead displays
  • tap payment system, perhaps using the transit card
  • Mongolia-themed coffee travel mugs

What will disappear in the medium-term future

I’m going out on a predictive limb here… 2-3 years is what I mean by “near future”.

Actually, since I have been predicting this as “near future” change for some years now, I guess I was wrong with all these predictions, and have changed the listing to medium-term future.

  • stray dogs
  • stretched-out hand to signal for a car ride
  • that awkward extra half-step on most stairs
  • whitening make-up.

What will disappear in the long-term future

I mean around 7 years or so. None of these seems to be coming true quite yet, so I’ve changed the name of this category from medium-term to long-term.

    • new (to Mongolia) cars that are right-hand drive
    • the neo-classical Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, with its Stalinist (if that’s an architectural style) spire [Tough call to make as the MFA building is now dwarfed by its own annex]
    • deels in the city [actually, they seem to be making a bit of a fashion comeback among young people]

  • some of the downtown university campuses
  • buildings of 4 floors or less in the urban core
  • Russian minivans (УАЗ452)
  • the Winter Palace. It won’t disappear entirely, but it is more-and-more surrounded by a very urban and very tall landscape making it look somewhat forlorn, a fate it shares with many other buildings

Posted in Change, Curios, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Cybersecurity or Cybercensorship?

By Otgonpurev M

According to an article by ikon.mn policymakers in the Mongolian parliament perceive fake news that appear on social networks as a cyber attack.  Officials have responded to the demand to combat cyber harassment and the spread of fake news with a proposal for a Cybersecurity Law.  The response included measures like the establishment of a National Cyber Incident Response Center (probably CERT) and mandatory registration for social media accounts using national identity number and mandatory ownership assignment for mobile subscribers.

I personally agree that the spread of fake news is becoming a threat to our national security by manipulating the uninformed public and influencing the politics and policies. As an ex-vice minister of Justice mentioned in an interview, the primary information source for a majority of the people already became online news sources according to the research done during the beginning of 2019. The so-called trolls or fake social media accounts spreading hoax or controversial news against politicians or disseminating hate content against specific ethnic groups (such as Chinese) are the primary examples of fake news in Mongolia. But I don’t believe that the proposed Cybersecurity Law would be an effective tool to fight this battle. My reasons are:

  1. Basically there is no effective and 100% foolproof solution to control the attribute and ownership of identity on online space. Even if there was one, it is just a matter of time to find a work-around in this age of rapid technological development. And if you can’t impose a control that covers everyone, then that control could be selectively applied and potentially misused for malicious purposes and might become a tool to silence whistleblowers and political opponents.
  2. It is true that Mongolia is in need of cybersecurity legislation. Apart from a sentence that has been included in the National Security Directive of 2010, there is no regulation whatsoever in terms of cybersecurity. The authority and mandate who would respond and prevent to national-level cyber threats is still not yet clear and no specific policies for inter-agency cooperation or handling of critical infrastructure exist.
    The proposal for a cybersecurity law has been circulating for a while but has never reached the stage of an actual bill. I’ve participated in public discussion of the proposal in September 2018. From that discussion it was clear that online censorship was primary objective of the bill. For example, the proposal version of September 2018 states that the National CERT who is supposed to be the responder to national-level cyber threats has the duty to limit and remove what authorities determine to be fake news. Conceptually, the tasks of security engineer or security institution would include preserving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information no matter the contents of the information.
  3. The proposal mentioned mandatory registration using National Identification Number (NIN) to use social media in Mongolia effectively undermining the anonymity of the users. Even though there has not been a case of a successful anonymous whistleblower in Mongolia, I personally believe that preserving online anonymity is a fundamental human right and UN, U.S. Supreme Court and organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) agree. Having a traceable attribute to an online identity could potentially become a tool to harass socially vulnerable groups and limit the freedom of expression.
  4. The technical details and solutions of these controls are not clear as of now. The national identification number (NIN) is confidential only in theory and there are publicly available records of personal information that includes names, NIN, date of birth etc. Additionally the NIN itself is not fully random and could be derived as a function of a person’s birthdate, birthplace and gender etc. Thus having a mandatory registration using NIN does not guarantee the non-repudiation requirement of the security. In other words if your personal information is compromised, how would you prove your authenticity that you are not the person who spread the fake news? There are similar problems with the solutions of using authentic mobile subscription numbers to register for social network.

Therefore I believe that even though we are in dire need of cybersecurity legislation it should not be aimed at censoring online contents and undermining the anonymity of the users. An attempt to regulate online identity would potentially harm our democracy. Rather, I believe the soft controls such as educating and campaigning for online literacy would be more effective tools to prevent from spread of fake news and online harassment.

About Otgonpurev

Otgonpurev Mendsaikhan is a security engineer and board member of Mongolian Cyber Emergency Response Team (MNCERT/CC).

Posted in Law, Media and Press, Otgonpurev Mendsaikhan, Security Apparatus, Social Change, Social Media | Leave a comment

The Likelihood of Political Renewal

By  Julian Dierkes

Why I am generally optimistic about Mongolian developments, Mongolian politics presents a lot of challenges and the current state of affairs causes more despair than it has in the previous 12+ years that I’ve been paying attention.

The recent SME Fund corruption scandal mobilized a lot of protest online, but did not lead to large scale demonstrations. Neither did the dismissal of УИХ speaker M Enkhbold, or legislative changes to judicial appointments.

Posts in this series so far:

Now, let me consider the rebirth of political parties and thus the party system that will further institutionalize democracy in Mongolia.

A Process Toward Political Renewal

My guess is that political renewal might come either from within the powerful parties (unlikely in the medium term, unclear in the long term), revolution (always risky in terms of outcomes, unlikely in the short, medium and long term) or new political forces (attempts at establishment very likely in medium term, success less clear).

MAHAH: The Foggy Old Parties

Judging by the past several years, the two large parties appear to be unable to reform themselves. Corruption has become systemic, brief spurts of attempts to define a policy platform that would distinguish one party from the other, flounder, the leadership of both parties sees little turnover. Recently, Damdinnyam and I pointed to the various ways in which both parties have been involved in the long-term corruption of the political system. The Democratic Party seems paralyzed by the combination of the failures of its time in government until 2016, a lack of turnover in its leadership, and the apparent division between the party and its highest elected official, Pres Battulga (who, of course, formally is no longer a party member). PM Khurelsukh seems to have won the power struggle against Enkhbold’s “city” faction, but that has been just that, a power struggle, not a movement for renewal or reform, or any political substance.

The inability to reform themselves seems deeply embedded in both MAHAH parties, and there are real structural obstacles to reform, particularly around patronage relations and factions that have emerged over many years now. While party schisms are constantly a threat, even more so for the divided DP than the MPP, ultimately, few actors really want to spin off from the two parties as they offer significant political resources and infrastructure. This is what gives MAHAH its staying power.

Yet, there is always a chance that some actors within the two dominant parties see political opportunities in widespread dissatisfaction with the parties. Anyone who can make a credible case for real reform or, sadly, anyone who can appear to be making a credible case probably has a chance to rally some discontent around him- or herself to build a power base within either party. In the contest of demonstrations, I have asked how we might recognize genuine vs. paid-for protests; this would be no easier in the case of party reform.

The political opportunities associated with discontent do hold the possibility of real and maybe even radical party reform in the long term.

Revolution?

What are the chances that protests somehow build up into some kind of gentle revolution, leading to a radical shift, for example through a constitutional assembly or something like that? Low, I think.

To be sure, I think that the chances that we’ll see a violent revolution of sorts are very low, fortunately. The military or any other formal elements of the security apparatus are extremely unlikely to get themselves involved. We have seen almost no history of political violence in Mongolia with some exceptions like the murder of S Zorig in 1998, the violent protests following the 2008 parliamentary election, or the death of L Bolormaa in 2015.

But Mongolia’s most recent revolution, in 1989/90 was also not violent yet it led to a radical change in the political system from one-party state-socialism to a multi-party democracy. So could there be another gentle revolution to reform democracy?

And, obviously, any kind of radical change like a non-violent revolution bears a lot of risks in terms of what outcomes might come from it. In Mongolia’s current situation, almost the whole spectrum of outcomes seems possible, from some kind of authoritarian rule to a renewed democracy.

New Parties

There are a lot of doubts among Mongolias regarding the chances of new political actors establishing themselves. Most of these doubts focus on the low chances a new actor might have in elections.

Some Barriers to New Parties

Party Registration

As a democracy, of course, the Mongolian political system is principally open to the formation of new parties. There are some practical hurdles in terms of the registration of a new party, but these are practical hurdles only, not principle obstacles.

Party Finance

Election campaigns have long been seen to be very expensive, mainly for the advertising costs they incur. Frankly, this has been a bit of a mystery to me, as a well-organized grass-roots effort relying on social media would likely have a decent chance at gaining some traction, given the level of online participation, certainly in Ulaanbaatar and other towns. Generally, however, most observers guess that new parties would have a very hard time raising the funds necessary to campaign. A reform of party finance has been proposed as part of new party legislation, but seems very unlikely in the run-up to the 2020 election.

Media Access

Media ownership by political actors is a feature that has been worrisome in past elections. For the chances of a new political actor, this is a significant aspect as the absence of media ownership might give such a new actor a significant disadvantage in mobilizing voters.

Electoral System

In past elections, Mongolians have experimented with a number of different electoral systems, most of them majoritarian in some form or another. While there are lots of discussions of different electoral systems, the election law has generally been passed at the very last moment and not benefitted from much public discussion. From my perspective, many Mongolians also attach way too much significance to that choice (as to the choice of parliamentary vs presidential systems generally), as many electoral systems work in terms of translating voters’ desires into a government, though different systems have different advantages or less attractive aspects. Majoritarian systems do make it difficult for new parties to gain a foothold, certainly in a single electoral cycle.

Posted in Constitution, Corruption, Democracy, Democratic Party, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Ikh Khural 2020, Inequality, Judiciary, Mining Governance, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Nationalism, Party Politics, Policy, Politics, Populism, Presidential 2021, Social Movements | Tagged | Leave a comment

Not the end of Democracy?

By Julian Dierkes

On March 27 2019, the Mongolian parliament passed legislation giving the National Security Council greater authority over judicial appointments and dismissals.

This very sudden decision has caused a great deal concern among international observers of Mongolia and some Mongolians themselves. Along with a number of media reports, I wrote about this decision in a previous blog post, c0-authored with Boldsaikhan S.

Since then I had the chance to travel to Mongolia which is always an opportunity to get a somewhat more complete picture of a situation  that from afar.

A General Disclaimer/Digression

Before I try to disentangle and complexify the current situation, let me mention that one of the on-going frustrations with tracking legislative decisions and parliamentary debates is that decisions are often very difficult to fully understand and/or to get accurate information on decisions. This has baffled me for some years. I will see a piece of news (most likely on Twitter, my main source for these kind of breaking news in Mongolia) and will take a stab at understanding what is going on. My Mongolian is generally not good enough for details/specifics of legislation for example, so I turn to contacts to try to understand. To my surprise, my contacts often respond with different, sometimes even contradictory information. Frequently, this leaves me very cautious in discussing a decision as I am uncertain of its details.

I should note that such uncertainty generally does not come with political news in Canada, Germany, or Japan, the other contexts where I pay close attention to current events. Why not? Because governments and political parties can be relied on to clearly communicate these kind of decisions and the media quickly and decisively analyze such communications. Neither is consistently the case with Mongolian legislation, at least in my experience.

Take the quasi-editorial that Mungunchimeg G wrote for the Mongol Messenger three weeks after the parliamentary vote as an English example.

This is much more of an editorial than reporting and it does not really clarify any questions one might have about the legislation.

In recent developments, the general lack of communication and analysis has been compounded by the fact that legislation was introduced, amended, and voted on very suddenly, virtually overnight. This has happened with several other very important pieces of legislation, going all the way back to the Windfall Profits Tax which was passed by a half-empty parliament on a Friday in 2006. This kind of overnight appearance of major legislation is not good parliamentary practice and certainly does not inspire much confidence in the intent of the legislation, particularly when other pieces of legislation linger for months before being added to parliamentary agendas.

Back to the Main Issue: Checks and Balances

Among the reasons why the recent legislation has prompted strong responses is that it is perceived by some to undermine one of the essential ingredients of a functioning democracy: the independence of the judiciary. As far as I can tell, the legislation gives the National Security Council (consisting of president, prime minister and speaker of the Ikh Khural) the power to dismiss judges and other appointed officials in the judicial system on request of the Judicial Council. The Judicial Council is appointed by the president, of course.

Proponents argue that a) the legislation is constitutional (as the constitution provides for judicial law to specify details, though the constitutional court will rule on that), b) the current situation (corruption, torture, lack of performance of the judicial system) is so bad that it called for drastic measures, and c) the increase of the power of the National Security Council strengthens democratic oversight by requiring ascent of its three members, rather than weakening democratic control over judiciary appointments as others have argued.

While appointments were previously controlled by the president (via nomination and the Judicial Council), dismissals are now possible, though only via the National Security Council, that is, with the agreement of at least the prime minister or the speaker of parliament.

Reactions

Many Mongolians seem to approve of this change having been convinced by the argument that the judicial system has become so corrupted that it needs to be “cleaned up” in a hurry and thoroughly. It is the cumulation of corruption cases that go seemingly un-prosecuted that has convinced many people of the need to reform. Add to this the appearance of video-taped evidence of corruption, and it seems that many Mongolians are eager for action to be taken on this issue.

By contrast, many foreign observers and some Mongolians emphasize that the power of dismissal is a dangerous power because it allows those in power to undercut investigations against themselves easily. While the appointment of an official might make someone hope that the appointed official will be grateful for their appointment and go easy on themselves, any appointed official could be seen as a threat to subsequently elected officials. Yet, this is the very essence of the independence of the judiciary, namely that it is able to also investigate those currently in power. To a limited extent, the judiciary “guards the guardians”. With the current changes, that guardianship does appear to be weakened.

Leap of Faith

Many observers worry that the current change places a significant measure of faith in current office holders to “clean up” the judiciary. While the case for these changes includes references to the presumed corruption of former president Elbegdorj and his appointees, it has to be taken on faith that the current president, prime minister and speaker will not be corrupt. Most constitutional structures are constructed precisely so that such faith is not required.

There is also a lot of faith placed in the current constellation of actors. In typical fashion, there was much discussion in Ulaanbaatar last week about the different alliances and coalitions that people see among politicians. But, constitutional structures should not be built around the question of whether President Battulga and Prime Minister Khurelsukh are primarily rivals (presumably turning the National Security Council’s involvement into judicial dismissals into a limit on the president’s power), or whether they are secretly collaborating. Constitutional checks and balances are precisely intended to be resilient in the face of different governing constellations.

One of the suppositions I heard most frequently in Ulaanbaatar was that Khurelsukh and his MPP traded support for the judicial dismissal bill for restrictions on presidential power that constitutional reform might propose. Constitutional reform has been discussed for some years now. I would have to guess that it is unlikely to come to parliament this year and would be caught up in electioneering if it is not introduced this year. However, just like the judicial dismissal legislation, who knows how suddenly constitutional amendments might be introduced.

Yet, I do recognize that these changes appear to have the support of many Mongolians and that ultimately it is up to Mongolian voters to determine whether they support the parties and individuals who have initiated these changes or to vote them out of office in the next election.

Thinking Out Loud

My recent visit points to a number of topics that I will try to address in subsequent posts:

  • Why did everyone accuse me of being biased, all of a sudden?
  • How to avoid emotional reactions to political developments?
  • What are “red lines” that should not be crossed to maintain Mongolian democracy?
  • Have I underestimated the important of the rule of law in past assessments of political developments?
Posted in Constitution, Governance, Judiciary, Law, Public Service | Tagged | Leave a comment