Reviving forgotten connections in North American teacher education: Klaus Mollenhauer and the pedagogical relation

NORM FRIESEN and TONE SÆVI

Despite the dominance of instrumental, psychological approaches to educational theory and practice in North America, a different understanding of the value and dynamics of education is often articulated informally in cultural representations (e.g. fiction and feature films) and in personal recollections. This alternative understanding is one in which the personal characteristics of a teacher or professor, and the relation between student and teacher are often paramount. Through reference to existing research and to examples drawn from real-life practice, this paper presents a broadly existential and explicitly relational way of understanding education, or, rather, pedagogy. It gives special emphasis to the way that such an understanding has been articulated in the text Vergessene Zusammenhänge: über Kultur und Erziehung [Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Education] by Klaus Mollenhauer. The paper describes how the insights of Mollenhauer and other writers regarding an existential and relational pedagogy were translated and adapted for a North American course in teacher education, and how such a course can serve as an important ingredient in nurturing undergraduate students who are becoming teachers.

Keywords: culture; educational philosophy; educational practices; Mollenhauer; pedagogical relation; teaching education

The humanistic European pedagogy at the core of this paper can perhaps be best introduced not through general historical or theoretical statements, but through a particular and vivid description. This paper begins, therefore, not with theory or even practical suggestions, but with a description of a pedagogical experience told by a mentally challenged student named Oda:

When my answer is wrong, I know it immediately because Per [the teacher] looks at me with this particular humourous glance and says, after just a tiny little pause: ‘Yes …?’ Then I understand that he wants me to give the question a second thought. He just leans back comfortably and waits. That’s why I like him so much. I feel relaxed and smart with him.

Norm Friesen is Canada Research Chair in E-Learning Practices at Thompson Rivers University, University Main Campus, Box 3010, Kamloops BC, Canada V2C 5N3; e-mail: nfriesen@tru.ca. He is the author of Re-thinking E-Learning Research: Foundations, Methods, and Practices (New York: Peter Lang, 2009).

Tone Sævi is a professor at the School of Education in the Norwegian Teachers’ Academy, Bergen, Norway. She teaches pedagogy and philosophy of education, and her research focuses on phenomenological pedagogy, the phenomenology of disability, and pedagogy and film.
This account is rich in significance: through the teacher’s patient and understanding gesture, Oda is granted the opportunity to rethink the question that has been asked of her. She experiences this glance as one that recognizes or ‘sees’ her as being capable and dependable. In this way, this kind gesture compensates for the recurrent experience of feeling less than capable, especially because Oda is among students who do not share her disability. One could say that the teacher sees Oda the way she wants and needs to be seen in order to grow towards her potential (Sævi 2005: 163).

Like a casual gesture of welcome or recognition between friends or peers, Per’s look recognizes and affirms the other in his or her uniqueness. This look, in other words, is only for Oda. However, unlike a thoughtful glance exchanged between friends, this look is not ‘exchanged’ in a manner that is reciprocal, or in which student and teacher are equals. Instead, it grants a kind of space and a set of possibilities for Oda without any expectation that these will be granted in return. At the same time, the glance is also significant in terms of what it sees and by what it does not see: it protectively avoids being directed at infirmity and disability, and strives to strengthen and enable the student (Sævi 2005: 164).

As pedagogy is understood in the humanistic European tradition, we may say that this look is an exemplary pedagogical act: it strengthens and builds the student’s confidence, trust, and competence, and does not draw attention to insecurity or inability. However, how is it possible to cultivate this kind of awareness, and the possibility for practising a look or glance of this kind? Is there a course design or curriculum for teaching this awareness? Or has such a curriculum and its priorities remained unrecognized or been forgotten?

In this paper we describe the contents and themes of a course for student teachers that seeks to examine precisely these kinds of questions. This course is based on fictional texts, feature films, and other cultural documents as well as on a small selection of classic and contemporary philosophical texts related to pedagogy in the humanistic European tradition.4 We begin by first discussing the notion of ‘forgotten connections’, and consider why these connections may have been forgotten. We then describe the outline and themes of the course, and provide some examples of student reflections and responses to these themes. In concluding, we use these examples as a basis for reflection on the cultivation of pedagogical practice in teacher education contexts in North America.

‘Forgotten connections’

The course that is the focus of this paper is based on Klaus Mollenhauer’s5 book, Vergessene Zusammenhänge: über Kultur und Erziehung (1983), [Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Education], which can also be translated as ‘forgotten contexts’ or ‘forgotten coherence’.6 The course was originally developed by Stein Wivestad7 and has been revised and taught for some ten years by Stein Wivestad and by Tone Sævi (one of this paper’s authors) for undergraduate and graduate students in Norway. The course was adapted in 2007 and taught as one of three required foundations courses in the
context of a 2-year Bachelor of Education course at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, Canada (Sævi et al. 2009). This course was offered in the students’ first term in the BEd programme, while students were also grappling with ‘real-life’ classroom experiences in practicum placement contexts. As already mentioned, the course made significant use of examples from arts, culture, and history (see Appendix). Although these areas of study were familiar to some of the students with backgrounds in the arts, every effort was made to contextualize them for students from other backgrounds (as is shown below in examples of student writing).

In this paper, we describe the adaptation of a course across curricular, cultural, and linguistic divides. This adaptation was all the more challenging given the fact that Vergessene Zusammenhänge has not been translated into English (although it is available in e.g. Dutch, Japanese, and Spanish). Several philosophical and even fictional texts used in the course have been out of print, in some cases for nearly a century.

What led to this neglect or forgetting? Lagemann (1989: 185), an historian of American educational research, has a simple if slightly unexpected answer: ‘one cannot understand the history of education in the United States’, she says, ‘unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey lost’. Thorndike was a psychologist who studied animal behaviour to understand human learning, and his work anticipated both Skinner on operant conditioning and current connectionist research in neuroscience and cognitive psychology. To him educators owe the now familiar terms ‘mental map’ and ‘learning curve’. Dewey, on the other hand, is counted as an important member of the pragmatic school of philosophy and a key writer in the American progressivist tradition in education. Dewey was keenly aware of the humanistic European tradition and its contemporaneous relevance to education. Although he has been ascribed the role of the ‘patron saint’ of American schools, it sometimes appears that this designation is more honorific than substantive. One recent historical overview of the field of educational psychology (Berliner 2006: 7–8) observes that ‘it is customary to attribute the paternity of educational psychology to E. L. Thorndike’, giving Dewey the rather obscure metaphorical position of ‘grand-uncle’. Lagemann (1989: 185) for her part comments that:

If Dewey has been revered among some educators and his thought has had influence across a greater range of scholarly domains—philosophy, sociology, politics, and social psychology, among them—Thorndike’s thought has been more influential within education. It helped to shape public school practice as well as scholarship about education.

The influence of Thorndike’s thought on educational research can be illustrated simply by tracing the trajectory of his own investigations. His studies, and their natural-scientific and quantitative impulses, can be said to delineate the overall path taken by research in North American educational psychology. This history is conventionally presented as a progression through at least two paradigms, both clearly pre-figured in Thorndike’s work. The first of these is the behaviourist paradigm, firmly grounding psychological research in the natural sciences, basing theories of learning in behaviour observable in both humans and animals. The second paradigm is
supplied by cognitivism, which understands mental function in terms of computational models, including connectionist ones.\textsuperscript{13}

Seeing psychology, configured as a quantitative natural science, as a cornerstone for education has particular and concrete implications for educational professionalization and practice: generalized psychological techniques of instruction, inducement, and (re)enforcement are prescribed to student teachers, and sometimes exist in uneasy relationship with challenges situated in the particularity of classroom practice. Phylogeny, the biological basis for learning and development, and the species characteristics shared by learners, takes precedence over ontogeny, the history and circumstances of the individual. Development, moreover, does not generally receive theoretical articulation as humanizing growth or personal self-realization, but is instead described in terms of a normative species-wide process adapted to social and economic exigencies. Educational practice becomes, following Thorndike, ‘a technique for matching individuals to existing social and economic roles’ (Lagemann 1989: 212).

These psychological and instrumental ways of thinking are given powerful expression in the psychologically dominated vocabulary commonplace in North American discussions of education and development. This is a vocabulary that has become ever more professionalized and instrumentalized, with the ‘non-specialized’ meanings of older terms either being gradually re-defined or replaced with terms or meanings that are specialized, and instrumentally or psychologically charged. The word ‘education’ itself provides a good example. Originally referring to the general ‘process of nourishing or rearing a child or young person’, this term has increasingly come to refer to what happens exclusively in the school, namely the ‘systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young’ (\textit{Oxford English Dictionary} (OED)). \textit{Erziehung}, the closest German equivalent to ‘education’, provides an alternative example. \textit{Erziehung} can be translated as ‘breeding’, ‘education’, or ‘upbringing’, blurring the boundary between school and home, personal and professional. (It also implies that the use of this term in the title of Mollenhauer’s book might be best translated as ‘Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing’)

The English term ‘development’ provides a second example. When used to refer to the nurture and growth of a child or young person, it connotes a progressive, teleological process—potentially both biological and cognitive in nature—corresponding to the collective processes of social and technological progress. ‘Development’ has words like ‘evolution’, ‘progress’, and ‘improvement’ as its similes, and among its many meanings is ‘gradual advancement through progressive stages …’ (OED).

The pervasive use of a term like ‘development’ can be contrasted with the German term \textit{Bildung}, a term with no direct equivalent in English, referring to the cultivation of the inner life or human soul of the child or the young person, and to the person’s inauguration to culture, tradition, and humanity.\textsuperscript{14} The meanings, availability, or unavailability of such words lead powerfully but almost imperceptibly to certain ways of thinking, speaking, and writing that can be difficult but valuable to retrace and reconsider. They also lead to ways of forgetting and, by implication, to the tasks of remembrance and revivification.
This kind of remembrance is the focus of the class described here. Especially early in the class, students struggled to find ways of thinking and expression in their comments and reflective writing that were adequate or appropriate to the questions and issues at the heart of Mollenhauer’s book. Just as it was a challenge for the course as a whole, one particular issue with which students grappled was the close interconnection of specialized educational vocabularies with those of psychology, biology, and means-ends rationality in general. Students were encouraged to avoid terms such as ‘mastery’, ‘classroom management’, ‘instinct’, ‘instruction’, ‘reinforcement’, ‘condition(ing)’, or ‘disorder’. The point in doing so was not so much to stop using the words themselves as to steer clear of the essentializing and instrumentalizing ways of thinking and acting to which they can lead.

The careful and reflective use of more ‘unspecialized’ language in discussing education (or upbringing) is an area of emphasis in the course in general and in Mollenhauer’s text in particular. In his introduction to *Vergessene Zusammenhänge*, Mollenhauer describes this task of recovery or recollection by saying that:

> Pedagogy must work at the task of cultural and biographical recollection; it must find through this recollection those principles which are of lasting value; pedagogy has to find a precise and suitable language for this task. (p. 10)

The ‘suitable language’ for which Mollenhauer and we as teachers search should be seen both as a literal language and vocabulary, and also as ‘language’ in the sense of visual, cinematic, and narrative or fictive languages. All these types of language are indispensable to both this paper and to the course we describe herein (Sævi *et al.* 2009).

**The course—five questions**

The ‘forgotten connections’ that Mollenhauer (and this course) works to bring to remembrance and relevance involve five basic questions. These questions are fundamentally historical and cultural in nature, and attempt to direct reflection to the relational and ethical qualities of pedagogical practice. Generally speaking, each question corresponds to a chapter in Mollenhauer’s *Vergessene Zusammenhänge*, and each flows from and builds on the previous one. Approximately two weeks in the course were devoted to the exploration of each question, and each is also associated with a keyword highlighted in the corresponding chapter of Mollenhauer’s book:

1. Why do we want to have children? (*Bildung* and *Erziehung*)
2. What way of life do I present to children by living with them? (*Presentation*)
3. What way of life ought to be systematically represented to children? (*Representation*)
4. How can I help children/young people to become self-starters and support their growth? (*Developmental preparedness*; ‘self-starting’)
5. Who am I? Who do I want to be, and how do I help others with their identity problems? (*Identity*)
These questions are intended to address the students both personally and collectively, and to prompt reflection, contemplation, and dialogue about their pre-understandings and orientations. In this sense, these questions are attempts to challenge students to grapple with educational issues in existential terms, in which experience and existence are prior to theory and to essence, and in which how one ‘is’ (ontology) is primary to what one knows (epistemology). Also, these questions are closely interrelated within the larger question of pedagogy, and what will be described below as the ‘pedagogical relation’.

Question 1: Why do we want to have children?

Mollenhauer poses the first question, ‘Why do we want to have children?’, or more generally, ‘Why do we want to be with children?’ at the end of the introduction to his book. It served as a basis for dialogue in the first class, with answers from students including: ‘Because I love children’ or ‘Because I want to make a difference in children’s lives’. There is, of course, no single answer that is correct. Mollenhauer suggests, however, that the question has to do with passing on to children that which is good in our lives; and, in doing so, Mollenhauer highlights an important aspect of the humanistic European tradition: its emphasis on the inter-generational nature of pedagogy and upbringing. Accordingly, education is not principally about the efficient instruction of children and youth in order to equip them with appropriate skills for the economy or job market. It is not about ‘matching individuals to existing [or emerging] social and economic roles’. Instead, as Mollenhauer says, education is about the ‘longevity and reproduction’ of that in our culture ‘which is worth being sustained and reproduced’ (p. 18). In other words, it is about how each new generation inherits the culture that previous generations have left behind. It is a process, as Mollenhauer explains, in which ‘adults [in general serve as the] midwives in children’s development’ (p. 10) rather than one in which teachers in particular specialize in instructing children in specific skills or competencies. This process of inheritance, as we shall emphasize, is also one in which children or new generations are helped to negotiate their personalities, rather than being matched to predefined positions.

The idea of education as the ‘non-specialized’ passing on to children of the good in our lives also raises the question of what is good, and what will be ‘good for’ the future (Zukunftsfähig). There is, however, no way to distinguish with any absolute certainty between what is and will be good for the child now and in the future. Because pedagogy addresses the child in his or her personal and situational uniqueness, the question of what is good or best for the child is also always contingent and situationally dependent. The condition under which adults must live and act, in other words, is the condition of not really knowing what is good in an absolute sense, while still being sensitive to the ethical possibilities of a given situation (Sævi and Eilifsen 2008: 3).

The film that was shown to students to help them examine and reflect on these questions of children’s lives and the ‘pedagogical good’—My Life as
a Dog (Hallström 1985)—depicts Ingemar, a 12-year-old boy whose mother is dying. Ingemar moves in with his relatives in a small community in rural Sweden, where he is exposed to many well-meaning adults. However, these adults are typically too absorbed by that which is good for them to recognize the young boy’s pain and bereavement. Ingemar builds relationships with children at school and at play and also with others in the community—but none of the adults takes personal responsibility for Ingemar in a way that takes into account specifically what might be good for him as a unique child, in his concrete life-situation.

**Question 2: What way of life do I present to children by living with them?**

The second question and the term associated with it (‘presentation’) both emphasize the non-specialized nature of pedagogy by drawing attention to the unreflective nature of our participation as teachers in our everyday lives with children. According to this understanding, pedagogy has more to do with what is implicitly taught than with what is explicitly in the curriculum. Mollenhauer deals with this question largely from a cultural and historical perspective, through the analyses of several images from different historical periods. The first of these images is a woodcut from Europe during the Middle Ages depicting a child’s or infant’s direct or ‘un-obstructed’ exposure to everyday adult circumstances (p. 33). The picture shows an infant feeding at his (or her) mother’s breast. At the same time, though, the mother is also shown making yarn, and the father is clearly visible nearby working the land.

Adults in this context are simply ‘presenting’ to children their grown-up ‘way of life’ (Mollenhauer, Lebensform) in a manner that is unsystematic and unreflective. The essential structures of adult behaviour are there for children to see, and, as they grow, children are able to learn about a very wide range of grown-up behaviours simply by living with them. It is the child’s principal educational task to reproduce this image. This manner of upbringing is implicit and habitual, and generally not consciously controlled or reflected upon. It is in this way that human society by necessity has reproduced, evolved, and renewed itself for millennia. At the same time, this process continues today through the way in which we as teachers habitually ‘present’ ourselves to children in our most frequent but unintended and unreflected activities.

It should be noted that this process of presentation is not reducible to what is often referred to as a ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ knowledge (Polanyi 1966). It does not designate something that can be shared and instrumentalized by being explicated and codified via teaching or knowledge-management strategies. ‘Presentation’, instead, designates something much closer to what is described by Mannheim (1952) in ‘The problem of generations’: something that is ‘transmitted’ between generations as a matter of course, as a part of what could be called each generation’s human inheritance:

> The data transmitted by conscious teaching are of more limited importance, both quantitatively and qualitatively. All those attitudes and ideas which go on
functioning satisfactorily in the new situation and serve as the basic inventory of group life are unconsciously and unwittingly handed on and transmitted: they seep in without either the teacher or pupil knowing anything about it. (p. 299)

Mollenhauer emphasizes that this unintentional education or upbringing occurs between generations especially through language. Through the acquisition of the mother tongue, the child experiences the first ordering of his or her universe, and acquires a systematic and structured ability to understand and picture things. This experience then forms the basis for all later appropriation and learning. The presentation of a way of life through language and adult behaviour becomes specifically pedagogical in several ways; for example, when adults censor or ‘filter’ it for the sake of children. Mollenhauer describes this filtering in terms of ‘restrained reality’ (gebremmte Wirklichkeit). Adults and societies traditionally ‘filter’ or keep children away from that which is harmful or incomprehensible to them. We as teachers try not to let small children see obscene or violent images, or hear profane language; and such attempts to ‘restrain’ reality for children can be seen as a recognition of their vulnerability in an adult world in which they have little voice or control.

**Question 3: What way of life ought to be systematically represented to children?**

The third question and the corresponding keyword (‘representation’) are illustrated by Mollenhauer in conjunction with a second engraving (see figure 1). Dated from the 16th century—during the rise of merchant capitalism and the attendant spread of literacy—this depiction of daily life contrasts sharply with the medieval woodcut described above. Children are no longer directly exposed to the everyday work of their parents. This feature is indicated not only in the increased distance that separates the mother and her children, but also by the work-a-day world of books, writing, and mathematical notation that are placed literally above the children’s heads. Mollenhauer points out that these children are being sent off to school (p. 49): they are being further separated from informal contact with everyday habitual activities of adults by being sequestered in a separate ‘pedagogical sphere’ in which they encounter a ‘socially construct[ed] pedagogical reality’ (pp. 68, 50). In this reality, lessons are deliberately and systematically represented, according to preconceived curricula, implying significant changes for children and upbringing generally:

the ground-rules through which reality is constructed for children are not simply transformed; instead, a whole new system of rules emerges. The culture is no longer presented to the child in its entirety, but only in part: namely, via [a kind of] pedagogical rehearsal or practice, as it would be for someone from a foreign land. This makes certain institutions necessary [such as] schools … orphanages … [and] kindergartens. (p. 50)

This institutionally-based, sequestered, specialized, deliberate, and systematic provision of depictions of culture to children distinguishes
modern pedagogy from less specialized, ‘pre-modern’ forms of pedagogical practice.

In this context, the relevance of the question ‘What way of life ought to be systematically represented to children?’ becomes clear. This question poses an ongoing challenge or problem for parents and teachers, and also for those involved in curriculum design and development:

The problem of representation that is to be addressed practically and theoretically has two sides: on the one hand, there is the question of the right way of life that is to be represented, and on the other, there is the question of the most suitable way of selecting representations of such a way of life from the ‘store-house’ of pedagogical and strategic possibilities. (p. 69)

The first question that Mollenhauer raises here regarding representation has already been discussed above in a different context. This is the issue of choosing that which is ‘good’ and is therefore to be passed on to the next generation, and of censoring or filtering that which might be harmfully
violent or obscene. However, in the case of representation, this selection process is much more deliberate and systematic. If a consensus about the subject-matter that is appropriate for representation can be reached, there remains the further practical issue as to the means by which this subject-matter should be represented and which aspects should be shown. For example: How do we teach children sensitivity and consideration toward others? How do we help them to learn to care for others and care also for themselves?

Mollenhauer uses the historical example of a child’s illustrated reader—specifically the exemplary and historically significant *Orbis Pictus* by Comenius (2007)—to show how the construction and selection of ‘representational’ teaching and curriculum materials can examine these kinds of questions. As Mollenhauer explains, materials of this kind can be seen to construct a coherent reality for the child by clearly showing ‘how each individual item in a given situation relates to the whole, so that its significance in life is consequently readily apparent’ (p. 58). The earliest readers (such as *Orbis Pictus*) tend to do this not only through elementary narratives, but also through simplified pictorial representations of the people, things, and events described, sometimes with accompanying textual labels and explanations, showing their use and interrelationship. In this context, Mollenhauer explains:

> the picture takes on an exemplary didactic function. It mediates between direct sensual perception and the order through which this perception attains its significance; when made in the right way, the picture can in this sense point in two directions at once, to the concrete and the abstract. (p. 59)

Whereas processes of presentation are implicit, habitual, and in this sense natural, those of representation are artificial, relying on forethought, planning, testing, refinement, and technical expertise. Systematic planning for processes of representation in schools (i.e. curriculum design and development) has become a correspondingly complex and specialized activity. The mistake, Mollenhauer points out, is to assume that this kind of technical specialization and problem-solving is essentially what education is about.

In everyday pedagogical practice, systematic and deliberate representation is inextricably mixed with reflective and habitual presentation. Indirect representations in textual, pictorial, and curricular form are inseparable from direct presentations of teachers’ and adults’ ways of life. It is this mixture of the presentational and representational that is emphasized in the course described here (Sævi *et al.* 2009), and that emerges from the discussion and interpretation of the films and texts comprising its content (see Appendix). It is this intersection of the presentational and representational, moreover, that can also be said to have been enacted in the course itself, not only in its content but in the tone and atmosphere cultivated through the course. This intersection also resonates in non-academic depictions and personal recollections of pedagogical excellence in the larger culture and in everyday life. The ‘presentational’, in other words, is a part of our often unreflective life with children, and is often memorable in our recollections of our own childhood.
This mixture can be illustrated here by considering again the description at the beginning of this paper: ‘Per looks at me with this particular humorous glance and says, after just a tiny little pause: “Yes …?”’. Then I understand that he wants me to give the question a second thought.’ Per the teacher may be working representationally with a systematic curriculum, but what is captured in the student’s response is presentational in the sense that it has to do with the way the teacher reveals something about himself, his habits, and his way of life that is unreflective and implicit: his particular humorous glance, and the way he says ‘Yes …?’ after ‘a tiny little pause’. These expressions, the tone and disposition that they convey, reveal the pedagogical potential of Mollenhauer’s notion of presentation in a way that is more subtle and nuanced than described earlier: the presentational dimension of Oda’s relation to Per is clearly essential to her understanding of her competency and capability. It thus plays an indispensable role in enabling her to work towards the right answer, in learning about the represented material currently at hand. Unlike its representational dimension, the presentational aspect of this relation, of course, is not something that is learned from a book, through rote imitation, or as a kind of instrumentalized ‘technique’. It is something that is not turned ‘on’ or ‘off’ when the teacher walks in or out of the classroom (students quickly see through presentation of this kind when it is only an ‘act.’)

Question 4: ‘How can I help children become self-starters and support their growth?’

Mollenhauer deals with the fourth question and the corresponding terms ‘developmental preparedness’ and ‘self-starting’ in two separate chapters (‘Developmental preparedness, or: trust that children will learn’ [Ch. 3] and ‘Self-starting, or: setting tasks for oneself’ [Ch. 4]). At the same time, however, the two ideas are intimately and dialectically inter-related; it is difficult in some ways to determine where one ends and where the other begins. Developmental preparedness refers to our experience of children as being, by their very nature, prepared to learn and develop. ‘Developmental preparedness’, as Mollenhauer puts it, ‘is a disposition that articulates itself’ in direct relationship to and sometimes in ‘opposition to’ adult ‘expectations’ (p. 103). Self-starting, on the other hand, refers to the fact that children actualize this preparedness for development by initiating their own projects and by working on their own problems. ‘Self-starting’, as Mollenhauer puts it, ‘shows itself in [the child’s] tackling of problems’ (pp. 153–154). Mollenhauer also speaks of self-starting consistently in terms of a ‘challenge’ or ‘problem’ that adults or the outside world present to the child. In each case, however, Mollenhauer emphasizes the personal initiative that is an essential part of the child’s response.

What is central to both developmental preparedness and self-starting is the tension between the child’s inherent qualities on the one hand, and the understandings and expectations of the adult world on the other. This tension and its dynamics are an important part of the humanistic European tradition in pedagogy, and are described in a range of sources. For example
in Bollnow’s (1989) classic essay, ‘The pedagogical atmosphere’—one of the philosophical texts used in the course—this tension and dynamic is described as follows:

human development cannot be externally forced on the child; rather, there must be something present in the child which is oriented toward development and which asks for the help. This means that it is in the nature of the child to want to grow. (p. 24)

The impetus for growth, in other words, is not something guaranteed through effective or expert technique; rather, it is something that is provided in significant part by the child, and for which the child seeks adult help. St. Augustine (1998), one of the earliest representatives of the humanistic European tradition, refers to this seeking as ‘the call of the child’. Both Bollnow and Mollenhauer emphasize that the adult responsibility in this situation is to cultivate an ‘attitude or disposition’ (Mollenhauer, pp. 141–142) that is sensitive and receptive to the often unarticulated call of the child. Bollnow uses the term ‘atmosphere’ to describe this dispositional quality, and emphasizes that it arises between adult and child, rather than being controlled exclusively by the one or the other:

In this general atmosphere in which the bringing up of children occurs, two important interdependent and reciprocal directions are discernible. One is the affective or emotional disposition of the child toward the adult, the other, the corresponding orientation which the adult brings toward the child. This suggests a double-sided perspective from which to observe the relationship. (Bollnow 1989: 9)

Mollenhauer for his part expresses something similar in terms of the disposition that adults bring to their involvement with children. Children, as Mollenhauer explains, are ‘beings whose inner and outer form (mind and action) gradually develop through interaction with adults’ (p. 94). This kind of interaction, however, is not understood only in terms of overtly ‘active’ practice; it also refers to adult decisions not to act, or to act only insofar as one is providing the child with space for his or her own action. For example, in the description of Oda and Per provided above, it is not any overt intervention on the part of Per that is significant; rather, it is Per’s glance that, in effect, grants to Oda the space and freedom she needs to try to answer her own questions and solve her own problems.

Action and interaction of this kind are also marked by their orientation to the child in his or her uniqueness, and also to that same child’s growth, potential, and future. To again refer to the example of Per and Oda, the significance of Per’s kind glance is not simply about helping Oda answer correctly in the present, it is also about giving her confidence to respond similarly in the future to questions and requests posed by others, possibly in quite different circumstances. Using the terms ‘experiment’ and ‘hypothesis’ metaphorically to refer to these kinds of ‘future-oriented’ actions and interactions, Mollenhauer explains:

Pedagogical action has the form of an experiment that is guided by a hypothesis and is always open to the future of the child. This hypothesis—or the image that the teacher paints of the child’s potential—is necessarily a part of
This reference to the threat of extinguishing of the child’s own preparedness
to develop can be seen as a part of a general critique of highly expert and
technical forms of education that is articulated by Mollenhauer at points
throughout Vergessene Zusammenhänge.

Aspects of developmental preparedness and self-starting were explored
in the course through the Hollywood movie Good Will Hunting (van Sant
1997). In this film, Will Hunting, a mathematical savant from a rough
Boston neighbourhood, encounters Sean McGuire, a counselling psycholo-
gist who tries to help Will sort out some of the many contradictions
and conflicts in his life. It is worth noting that as a counsellor, Sean McGuire
is not given the specific and specialized role of a teacher. Instead, the film
makes it clear that his contribution to Will’s future takes the form of a more
generalized kind of adult mentorship. A scene between the two that is partic-
ularly illustrative of this fact (and also of qualities of developmental
preparedness and self-starting) is presented by Will’s third session or hour of
therapy with Sean. The previous two sessions had both come to abrupt
conclusions, with very direct and personal engagement by the two, but with-
out any implicit or explicit affirmation from Will of his openness to receiving
Sean’s help. Consequently, the third session is spent in silence, with Sean
essentially waiting for Will to say something. The point, as Sean explains
later to a friend, is for Will ‘to show … that he doesn’t have to talk to me if
he doesn’t want to’. The point, in other words, is that Sean has the adult
responsibility of actively granting Will the freedom to make this decision for
himself. Sean demonstrates this ‘dispositionally’, through a kind of patient
and supportive but silent waiting that is expressive of an intention to invite
Will to talk and engage with him. Will cannot be forced to accept an
opportunity for development; he must be prepared to ‘start’ it himself.

Question 5: Who am I? Who do I want to be, and how do I help others
with their identity problems?

The last question, of identity, is treated by Mollenhauer in a relatively short
chapter, entitled ‘To conclude: difficulties with identity’. Identity for
Mollenhauer is not principally about one’s class, race, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation; he does not understand it in principally political, psychological,
or psychoanalytic terms. Identity is instead something that is seen to emerge
from the dynamics of developmental preparedness and self-starting, in the
tension between the self’s intrinsic qualities, and the challenges and expec-
tations presented from the outside. Identity develops, in other words,
through the responses of the child or young person to the challenges of self-
starting, and in terms of the child’s preparedness to initiate and to work in
sustaining his or her own growth.

Mollenhauer describes identity specifically in terms of the relationship of
the self to itself: the self as it is presently perceived and understood as it
relates to the self that the person can or will become. ‘The relationship that goes by the name of “identity”’, Mollenhauer explains, ‘is constituted from the difference between that which is the case empirically [in “reality”] and that which is possible’ (p. 158). The relationship that constitutes identity for Mollenhauer is, of course, gradually and constantly changing, rather than something that is ultimately fixed or finalized.

Much of Mollenhauer’s discussion of the question of identity focuses on its historical and cultural dimensions, specifically on the way that ‘identity’ as an issue has developed over time. Identity, in other words, is something that not only changes over a person’s lifetime, it also changes historically for a culture. Again, Mollenhauer explores this change through the interpretation of visual representations from various time periods, focusing specifically on famous self portraits. He begins this exploration in 1500 with a painting by a young Albrecht Dürer, in which the young artist confidently portrays himself in a Christ-like pose (figure 2):

The painter that is depicted not only looks at us, the observers of the image, but in the act of painting, he also sees himself. ... This ‘preliminary design’

that Dürer makes of himself is suspended between [a firm confidence in] his own capabilities and [the more humble position of] a follower of Christ. ... The general and public [self portrayed by Dürer] is not yet separate from that which is particular and private. (pp. 161–162)

As a relationship between the actual and the possible, the question of identity emerges here as an ambitious project with clear goals and purposes. Greatness and success, but also a willingness to be humble and to serve, are all a part of Dürer's 'preliminary design'—a possible future for his identity—that he so skilfully puts forward in this painting. In addition, as Mollenhauer emphasizes, no aspect of either the present or the future self intimated in this portrait is hidden from the viewer or the public; inner and outer selves are in this sense identical.

The 19th-century self-portrait of Vincent van Gogh (figure 3) tells a very different story. The viewer of this portrait is not met by the painter's confident gaze, and there is no self-assured identification with a recognizable cultural or spiritual personage or precursor. Mollenhauer takes this much further, saying that the van Gogh portrait:

allow[s] for no identification [of the viewer] with the self that is represented. What is dominant is the gesture of self-exclusion. ... The observing self directs its gaze at a kind of vanishing point ... [T]he [outward] conventional self is separated from and placed in opposition to the [inner] self, and the present is
Similarly, the question of identity in modern pedagogy is also to be understood as a challenge and a problem. Just as the confident and authentic depiction of oneself in aesthetic terms has become increasingly difficult, so too has identity—as the anticipatory imagining of one’s future self—become increasingly challenging as a project or process: the ‘anticipation or shaping of … a preliminary design of the self’, Mollenhauer observes, is ‘an act that is becoming ever more risky’ (p. 158). Consequently, Mollenhauer continues, for pedagogy ‘there are no such things as identities, there are only identity problems’ (p. 159). As a further result, our task as pedagogues is to help children with this challenge and problem, and simultaneously to recognize it as an ongoing, unresolved issue for our own selves.

The pedagogical relation

One basic question, presupposition, or pre-understanding that saturates and interpenetrates all five questions and parts of Mollenhauer’s book—and of the course developed from it—is the issue of the pedagogical relation. The idea that pedagogy is fundamentally relational and that it is based on a special kind of relationship between adult and child is an important part of the humanistic European pedagogical tradition in which Mollenhauer’s work is steeped. In fact, Mollenhauer stands in a direct line of inheritance from this tradition—one that begins with Friedrich Schleiermacher in the 18th century and Wilhelm Dilthey in the 19th. Dilthey (1971), for example, described the pedagogical relation as the only possible starting point for education: ‘The discipline of pedagogy’, he says, ‘can depart only from a description of the educator in relation to the child’ (p. 43). Dilthey’s student Herman Nohl, in turn, developed a more specific understanding of this filiation, characterizing it as ‘the loving relationship of a mature person with a “developing” person, entered into for the sake of child so that he can discover his own life and form’ (cited in Spiecker 1984: 203–204). Nohl’s understanding of this relationship had a considerable influence on Mollenhauer, who studied under one of Nohl’s students (Erich Weniger), and at an educational institution founded by Nohl. Although these German scholars each understood this relationship in a different way, with the help of several introductory English language texts (Spiecker 1984, van Manen 1991, 2002), it is possible to summarize a few essential characteristics of this special relationship.

The pedagogical relation of the adult and child, first of all, is one that is unique or *sui generis*. Unlike many other relationships, it is asymmetrical (Skjervheim 1996). For example, the recognition and affirmation communicated by Per’s supportive glance at Oda is provided without expectation that it will be reciprocated. The same is the case in Sean McGuire’s patient responses to Will’s aggression or sullen silence in *Good Will Hunting*. In each instance, the adult’s intentions and actions are directed toward the personal life of the child or young person, and these actions are expressive of an
intention on the part of the adult to do what is best for the child or young person who is being cared for.

This relationship is also unique in that, as Nohl (cited in Spiecker 1984: 204) explains, by its very nature it ‘gradually ceases to exist…. The pedagogical relationship [eventually] tries to make itself superfluous and to dissolve—a characteristic that no other relationship possesses’. The grown child may still maintain a relationship with an adult who has acted pedagogically in the past, but this relationship will (or should) no longer be asymmetrical, existing for the sake of the person who is now fully grown. It is or should instead be mutual and reciprocal, meaning that the pedagogical relation has dissolved and been replaced by one of friendship or mutual attachment.

In keeping with the existential emphasis of this approach to education—with its prioritization of concrete existence over abstract essence—the pedagogical relation can be described as situationally and ethically normative rather than developmentally and socially normative. Another way of putting this is to agree with Hertwig Blankertz (also a student of Nohl’s, who articulated his own understanding of the pedagogical relation) that ‘the whole of pedagogy, of upbringing, has a meaning that resists scientific categories’ (Blankertz 1982: 307).

In Good Will Hunting, for example, Sean McGuire’s pedagogical relationship to Will is characterized by an emphasis on the person in his or her current challenges and predicaments, not in terms of particular expert diagnoses or determination of a ‘phylogenetic’ late-adolescent developmental stage.

**Pedagogy as being and having: student reflections**

The notion of education or pedagogy as an unspecialized practice, as a way of simply and authentically ‘being with’ children, means that it is not principally a matter of an enumerable set of skills and competencies are (or are not) in one’s possession. Pedagogy is instead a question of who and how one *is*. It is a matter of one’s disposition, one’s personal, physical, and emotional presence or presentation, of one’s personal relationship with *this* particular child. Describing and illustrating such an understanding of pedagogy is not easy for students of education. Asking student teachers to articulate these understandings in their own words, and in vocabularies that are expressive, descriptive, and interpretive (rather than specialized, analytic, and instrumental) is to ask a great deal. Many students in the class, however, learned to interpret meaningfully the complexities, challenges, and opportunities of relational pedagogy through this kind of reflective writing. All showed gradually increasing sensitivity towards and awareness of significant pedagogical questions in their written reflections. These reflections, which were produced approximately once every second week throughout the course, were oriented towards the films, philosophical texts, fiction, and images that were presented in the course. These written reflections were read and reviewed carefully, and were used as an opportunity to provide detailed personal and supportive
feedback. Reviewing a small part of their content here provides some insight into the dynamics of the course and into its influence on student teachers.

Only a few examples, collected in 2007 from these reflections, can be considered in the confines of this paper. Those are all related to the film Étre et Avoir, or To Be and to Have (Philibert 2002), an unobtrusive documentary record of a year in a one-room schoolhouse in rural France. This film focuses on the interaction of the students (aged 4–11) with their dedicated teacher, Georges Lopez. The question for reflection posed by this film was the one implicated in its title: what is the meaning of the words ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ in terms of pedagogical practice? What, in other words, is the significance of being and having to the pedagogical relation (Sævi 2007)? One arts student, Anna, responded to the question of Georges Lopez’s ‘being’ and ‘having’ by interpreting his actions in the light of van Manen’s text The Tact of Teaching (chapters of which were included in the ‘theoretical texts’ in the course):

He is a teacher, he has come ‘to be’ a teacher but has come ‘to have’ the meaningful relationships with his students. Georges Lopez is the teacher, directing his classroom, but a pedagogical character is not taught to take on his/her role, rather it comes with experience and is earned. Just as the title of the film Étre et Avoir, Georges Lopez is a teacher ‘being’ in the classroom but does not automatically ‘have’ the respect of his students. Respect is not easily earned. … [P]edagogy is something that must be inspired rather than taught. van Manen writes ‘[i]t is possible to learn all the techniques of instruction but to remain pedagogically unfit as a teacher … to become a teacher includes something that cannot be taught formally’. (van Manen 1991: 9)

Technical excellence in teaching is not, in itself, a sufficient condition for being a good teacher or pedagogue. As Anna points out, pedagogy also requires that one is able to gain the respect of one’s students, and this respect is not something amassed through strategies of attainment and accumulation. Rather, it is something that is constantly renewed and strengthened with time and patience. Being a teacher in this sense is basically a question of being capable of a sensitive and thoughtful personal and relational practice with children. In this relation, and in interaction with the teacher and other adults who act pedagogically, the child can learn how to be and become a human being, recognized in his or her uniqueness.

These questions are explored somewhat differently by Linda, a science major, who describes the film as follows:

_To Be and to Have_ is a movie filled with sensitive moments between a teacher, students, and their families, and had it not been for Lopez’s deft hands, these situations could have been extremely uncomfortable for the viewer. We see a number of children crying on camera, relating personal, familial, and social difficulties, and through them all Lopez judges with amazing accuracy when he should speak and when he should be silent, when a joke is appropriate, and when sympathy is necessary. Mr Lopez consistently expresses the response that most honours who his students are.

Here Linda draws attention to aspects of pedagogy considered earlier in terms of ‘presentation’, ‘developmental preparedness’, and ‘self-starting’: it is the teacher’s disposition, and some of the most subtle aspects of his engagement with students that helps to provide them with the caring,
supportive atmosphere to simply ‘be’ who they ‘are’. Lopez is described as responding in a manner that is appropriate, concrete, and sensitive to the often unspoken ‘call’ of the child in his or her vulnerability. It is an appropriate, concrete, and sensitive response that, as Linda indicates, may be articulated by the teacher’s ‘being silent’ just as well as it might be expressed through any overt activity. Some of the same themes are also considered in the following passage by Anna (who was cited just above):

A skill that I recognize in Georges Lopez is the ability to keep his students on track without creating resentment. He sets a high learning prerogative but is able to have conversations with his students that create trust and respect. I have always found this challenging. When does one listen to a student’s story and when do they end it before it evolves into a test of endurance? Children know when an adult or teacher is truly engaged; most can read the level of interest. I confess I have at times talked with children hoping that they would finish their story quickly so that I could return to a task. Rarely does the child not notice my disinterest; many will begin to talk louder and more quickly and others will dismally walk away, leaving me feeling something terrible. Georges Lopez demonstrates a gift for tactfulness and is able to keep his students on track without discouraging their desire to explore.

Anna, like Linda, gives concrete expression to several themes and questions in the course, including ‘presentation’ more generally as a pedagogically practical and thoughtful act (‘Children know when an adult or teacher is truly engaged, most can read the level of interest’), and the themes of developmental preparedness and self-starting (‘keep[ing] his students on track without discouraging their desire to explore’). However, what is just as important as this concrete awareness and expression is the qualified and tentative way in which Anna describes her own involvement in these issues. She knows that authentic interest and listening are not things that one masters as part of a repertoire of teaching techniques. Being a sensitive teacher, and presenting this behavioural image to children, is something that is a challenge for her and for other teachers. It is necessarily something with which they struggle (and in which they also often fail). However, it is a necessary struggle if adults are to be sufficiently attentive to respond pedagogically to ‘the call of the child’.

**Conclusion: the aporia of pedagogy**

The ability and willingness of adults and teachers to reflect personally and ethically on their pedagogical practice and on their concrete experience with children is seen in this course as the starting point for pedagogical understanding. As a result, the course intentionally presented to students pedagogically-relevant situations through films, art, philosophical texts, and class discussion, in order to foster similarly consequential reflection among students. At the same time, while encouraging student teachers to reflect and write in these ways, the course also deprived students of the vocabulary in which personal and relational reflection and discussion is often undertaken: in the specialized and instrumental vocabulary of psychology and self-improvement.
There is no doubt that the exclusion of these specialized lexica initially made discussion and description challenging for this class of student teachers. Instead of being provided with pat answers and handy formulae for their practicum teaching, students were presented in this course with questions and uncertainties. However, as the examples from student reflections provided above begin to suggest, many if not all of the students were eventually able to find their footing and their voice, and to articulate in their own way many of the issues raised by Mollenhauer’s five questions and by the question of the pedagogical relation.

The ability of these North American students to grapple with these questions and issues can perhaps be best understood in terms of a pivotal passage from Mollenhauer’s text cited near the outset of this paper:

Pedagogy must work at the task of cultural and biographical recollection; it must find through this recollection those principles which are of lasting value; pedagogy has to find a precise and suitable language for this task. (p. 10)

This task of cultural and biographical recollection is by its very nature local, and culturally and linguistically specific. More than that, it is an inherently concrete task, involving tangible, specific, and situated events, settings and personalities. Finally, in the media-saturated world, this kind of personal, cultural, recuperative task is also inseparable from mediated depictions and representations that surround people. Understood in this way, the themes and contents of the course on Vergessene Zusammenhänge can be said to have an intrinsic portability or ‘translatability’ across cultures. Just as fiction and film address audiences personally and compellingly across cultures and languages, the literary and cinematic situations and representations made available in the course expressed to North American students mirror some of the same relational principles and practices that they communicated to student teachers in Norway. These situations, moreover, are not limited to the fictional depictions; they are also enacted in the course or classroom itself: in the tone, atmosphere, and relationships that are cultivated within it.

At the same time, it is the existential nature of these ideas and issues that can also be said to have prevented aspects of the course from being ‘lost in translation’ or obscured by the particularities of local, concrete situation. The emphasis of existentialism on ways of being or existing can be said to have kept the more theoretical aspects of the course focused on what is shared between the European humanistic tradition on the one hand, and the cultures and practices of education in North America on the other. This means that the tasks and responsibilities of teaching are no longer framed by essentialistic definitions of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic provided by psychology. Instead, these tasks and responsibilities are seen as emerging from a sustained encounter between generations, specifically between a particular adult or teacher and a particular child or student as persons.

This same existential emphasis, however, also entails an acute awareness of the limitations of this approach to pedagogy. Instead of the certainties and formulae, the course sought to impress upon the student the paradoxical or aporetic character of pedagogy. As Mollenhauer describes it:
Pedagogy is aporetic or paradoxical for Mollenhauer in that it tries to describe and strengthen that part of the child which is most fundamentally open and indefinite and about which nothing final or definitive can be said:

The child would essentially remain something more than that which is immediately accessible to us through understanding and explanation. Whoever would want to be an educator, especially in view of a future that cannot be reliably predicted, must attempt to enter into a relationship with this part of children’s lives which can only be intimated. (p. 89)

Instead of certainties and formulae, student teachers are given some understanding of pedagogy as a paradoxical task, one undertaken in the context of a profoundly personal relation that cannot be defined in specialized vocabularies, and in which each child’s growth towards humanity and selfhood is unique.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Diane Purvey and the students of the 2007–2009 cohort in the Bachelor of Education programme at Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, British Columbia, Canada.

Notes

1. Each of the co-authors has made an equal contribution to this paper; their names are listed here alphabetically. The works of art depicted in figures 2 and 3 and the reproductions thereof are in the public domain worldwide. The reproductions are drawn from a collection compiled by THE Yorck Project. The compilation copyright is held by Zenodot Verlagsgesellschaft mbH and licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.

2. The names of all students in this paper are pseudonyms.


4. The design of the course (fictional texts, feature films, cultural documents like paintings, autobiographic texts, etc.) is also documented in a paper by Wivestad and Andersen Sævi (1998). The particular class described in this paper was co-taught in 2007 by the authors as well as by Diane Purvey.

5. Klaus Mollenhauer (1928–1998) is one of the most important educational theorists of post-war Germany. His work has been especially influential in critical pedagogy and in social work education. Mollenhauer studied sociology, psychology, history, literature, and pedagogy at Hamburg and Göttingen and was strongly influenced by the humanist tradition in pedagogy and philosophy. He completed his doctorate on the origins of social-work education in industrial societies under Erich Weniger in 1958. Mollenhauer subsequently worked at universities in Berlin, Kiel, and Frankfurt, and received an honorary doctorate from the Free University in Berlin in 1993.

6. All quotes attributed to Mollenhauer in this paper are from this same source; all of these quotations are the authors’ translation.
7. Mollenhauer (1997) was translated into Norwegian by Stein Wivestad.
8. A complete syllabus for the course is available in Sævi et al. (2009), a selection of images, passages, and glosses from Mollenhauer in Friesen (2009), and a list of movies, readings, questions, and themes used to structure the course in the Appendix.
9. The themes developed by Mollenhauer and emphasized in the course have also been discussed in Sævi et al. (2005, 2007), Sævi and Eilifsen (2008, 2009), and Wivestad (2007, 2008), as well as by continental philosophers of education such as Biesta (2002, 2006), Gadamer (2001), Levie (2005), Levie et al. (2003), and Säfström (2003).
10. See e.g. Pestalozzi (1807) and Lageveld (1975).
11. See e.g. Edmondson (2006).
12. See Berliner (2006) for similar but more recent reflections on Dewey and Thorndike, specifically in the context of educational psychology and its history.
14. Biesta (2006: 100-101) offers a significant interpretation of Bildung as:

   an educational ideal that emerged in Greek society and that, through its adoption in Roman culture, humanism, neohumanism, and the Enlightenment, became one of the central notions of the modern Western educational tradition. Central to this tradition is the question of what constitutes an educated or cultivated human being. Generally, the answer to this question was not given in terms of discipline or socialization, that is, in terms of the adaptation to an existing external order. Bildung rather referred to the cultivation of the inner life, the cultivation of the human mind or human soul.

16. For more about unspecialized or ‘phronetic’ practices and their importance in creative, relational situations, see Galvin and Todres (2007). For the term phronesis, see Aristotle (1925), Book VI: 5.
17. Also cited in Mollenhauer (p. 7).

References


Hallström, L. (dir.) (1985) My Life as a Dog [Film] (Solna, Sweden: Svensk Filminustri). (In Swedish, with English subtitles)


Philibert, N. (dir.) (2002) Être et avoir [To Be and to Have] [Film] (Paris: Maia Films). (In French, with English subtitles)


Appendix: Questions, films,* and texts

(Bibliographic details of films and readings in this Appendix will be found in the references.)

(1)  Question: Why do we want to have children? (Bildung and Erziehung)

  Film: Hallström (1985) My Life as a Dog.

(2)  Question: What way of life do I present to children by living with them? ('Presentation')


(3)  Question: What way of life ought to be systematically represented to children? ('Representation')

  Film: Philibert (2002) Être et Avoir [To Be and to Have].

(4)  Question: How can I help children/young people to become self-starters and support their progress? ('Developmental preparedness'; ‘Self-starting’)

  Pedagogy: Pestalozzi (1807) Letter from Pestalozzi to a friend on his work at Stanz; Langeveld (1975) Personal Help for Children Growing Up.

(5)  Question: Who am I? Who do I want to be, and how do I help others with their identity problems? ('Identity')

  Fiction: Süskind (1993) Mr. Summer’s Story.
  Pedagogy: Van Manen (2002) Care-as-worry, or ‘don’t worry be happy’.

*Appropriate licensing should be in place prior to classroom viewing.