이 책에 수록된 글은 저이름의 시기적으로 수년 전에 집필한 것으로 알고 있지만, 그림에 대해 불구하고 생각해 보자는 생각을 가진다. 이 글은 당시의 상황을 이해하는 데 큰 도움이 될 만한 아니다. 국내외 정치와 국제정치 분야에서의 관찰 및 분석이 서론을 초월하는 향구성과 보편성을 갖고 있기 때문이다.

문학적 내지 정치적 문화적 이해적 이사장

그룹 일인 시람들은 그가 2012년 7월 세상을 떠난 후 그를 지켜보고 이상적 인 예로자와 정당가 우리 사회의 가장 위대한 인물 중 일인. 정학적. 역사적. 제사적. 사회적 범위 넓은 여러 가지를 가졌으며 고대로는 그의 이해와 이해가 이 아버님 같은데 가득하다고 표현했다.

존 애더스. 보레아시움절비아대학교 교수

자유주의자의 고뇌와 소망
Agonies and Aspirations of a Liberal

고 김경원 박사 추모집
In Memory of Dr. Kim Kyang-Won

국제정책연구원 비평
International Policy Studies Institute

25,000원
4부 김경원이 말하다 Writings of Kim Kyung-Won

1장 탈냉전 시대 Post-Cold War Era

67 탈냉전 세계 속의 한국과 미국 (한미21C회의 논문, 1994, 2, 17)
74 전환시대의 국제체제 (전환시대의 생존전략, 87-110쪽)
109 포스트 냉전시대: 상황과 미래 전망 (지성의 현장 제6권 2호, 1996, 7, 15)
142 냉전 이후의 한국 안보—한반도의 미래를 생각하며 (한국발전연구원 발표)
166 Ending the Cold War in Asia: Personal Reflections on Korea and the Future of East Asia (April 28, 1993)

2장 한국외교와 북한 South Korea’s Diplomacy and Inter-Korea Relations

189 통일: 관점과 전망 (서울국제포럼 세미나 1992, 9, 7-8)
203 소련의 개혁과 대한정책 (동아일보, 스페인보기 아르카디에비치 아르바토프와 대담, 1989, 9, 11)
208 독일 통일에서 배운다 (조선일보 1990, 2, 22)
213 고르바초프의 남방정책 (부산메일신문 1991, 4, 21)
217 김일성 주석에게 (한국일보 1993, 3, 17)
221 제3의 북한 접근법 (동아일보 1994, 10, 18)
226 북에 개방 길 터 주자 (중앙일보 1995, 4, 24)
230 통일 시대의 안보문제 (중앙일보 1996, 1, 29)
234 북한 인권문제 접근법 (조선일보 1999, 12, 1)
237 북한은 과연 전쟁을? (중앙일보 1996, 4, 1)
241 신시계절시 대응법 (중앙일보 2002, 1, 7)
245 중심국 열등감서 벗어나라 (중앙일보 2003, 4, 7)

3부 추모의 글 Tributes to Kim Kyung-Won

49 국제정치 레铊은 ‘리얼리스트’…문·사·철에도 조예 (중앙일보 2012, 7, 23)
52 국제정치 이론 . 현실 점비 “한국의 카신저” (조선일보 2012, 7, 23)
55 김정원 전 주미대사: 5첫 외교정책 기획한 주역 (문화일보 2012, 7, 23)
58 파란색에서 만난 김정원(金鐘元) 박사 (순위권 2012, 7, 25)
3장 한미관계의 명암 Korea–U.S. Relations

271 미국은 아시아정책이 없다 (중앙일보 1995. 7. 10)
275 한국정기념비가 돼하는 것 (중앙일보 1995. 7. 31)
279 남한, 북한, 미국 사이관계 (조선일보 2001. 3. 22)
283 반미주의, 외 문제인가 (중앙일보 2002. 1. 21)
287 한미통령 부정이 문제인가 (중앙일보 2003. 3. 17)
290 ’تهم블 보다 테 الطل’의 중요하다 (중앙일보 2003. 9. 1)
294 Korea and the U.S. In the Post-Cold War World. Korea and World Affairs 18(2), Summer 1994

4장 평화, 자유, 그리고 이념 Peace, Freedom, and Ideology

329 새로운 세계질서와 문화의 역사를 (월간중앙 1973. 4)
358 자유에 대하여—미키아베릴을 중심으로 『문학과 지성』 제3권 제3호, 1972년 가을
373 자유주의자의 고뇌와 소망 『전환시대의 생존전략』

부록: DVD (회전, 좌담 및 강연)
한 사상가였고, 현실주의, 자유주의, 실용주의 및 사해통포주의를 결합했던 국제주의자였다.

각자 자기 조국의 국익을 이해하고 중진시켰지만, 또한 그 이상을 보는 철학적 시각을 지녔던 특수한 형태의 민족주의자인 애국자였다. 세 사람 모두 다자적 과정이 아시아에서 뿌리내릴 수 있기 를 희망하였지만 당면한 장애물에도 유념하고 있었다. 세 사람 모두 국익과 권력 추구, 그리고 때때로 생존을 위한 투쟁이 국제관계에서 수행하는 역할을 잘 이해했다. 그러면서도 세 명 모두 국제협력이 심화하는 동시에 분쟁 가능성이 줄어들 수 있는 시기와 기회를 모색했다.

한반도에서 긴장이 높아지고 있고, 세력전이의 시대에 전략적 경쟁관계가 체제화되고 있으며, 지도력 부족을 드러내고 있는 이 시기, 아시아 여러 지역에서 민족주의가 다시금 들썩이고 있다.

정부와 학계의 후계자들이 전임자의 경험으로부터 교훈을 얻고, 국제정치의 생존과 경쟁의 고통스런 제약 요인을 이해하면서, 협력과 유럽식의 조월성이란 가능성이 곧을 놓치지 않을 수 있을 지는 앞으로 두고 볼 일이다.


Paul Evans

The word “liberal” is not the only one that comes to mind in remembering the thought and career of one of Korea’s most gifted and influential thinker–practitioners in international affairs. Some remember him as a realist and conservative, the adviser and emissary for two authoritarian presidents, more than a little skeptical about idealistic prescriptions, and deeply rooted in a sense of tragic possibilities in political life and international politics.

Yet Kim Kyung Won had a quality of mind and philosophic complexity that make labeling hazardous. He grew up in the tumult of mid-20th century Korea and benefited from a first-class liberal

8) Paul Evans is Professor of Asia Pacific international relations at the University of British Columbia. Like Kim Kyung Won he began his teaching career at York University in Toronto. He first met Dr. Kim in 1990 and worked with him to found the Canada–Korea Forum in 1995. He is grateful to several of Dr. Kim’s colleagues and friends who contributed recollections as this essay was being written.
education in the United States. Through intellect, ambition, and fortune, he played multiple roles as scholar, teacher, foreign policy advisor, diplomat, columnist, and public intellectual. If the noun—liberal or conservative—is difficult, perhaps the best adjectives are "cosmopolitan" and "reflective."

This volume assembles some of his more than four hundred essays, columns and speeches in Korean and more than a hundred in English. Though tempted, he did not write a memoir, claiming that it was difficult to revisit his experiences in government service while any of the political masters he served were still living. And his writings (at least the ones in English) have virtually no autobiographical content. The inner story remains untold. It is as important to a future generation of Koreans and students of trans-Pacific affairs as the story of his Harvard mentor Henry Kissinger is to Americans. While remembered and often revered by a senior generation of foreign policy professionals, he is scarcely known by a new generation of students or emerging leaders. One friend has commented that he is only known by those who knew him. This needs to be remedied.

Those who did know him described him after his death from Parkinson's disease in June 2012 as wise, rational and articulate, a patriot and strategist, one of the greats of our generation, a penetrating mind of broad philosophical and historical scope, strongly ethical, humorous, and one of the best story tellers in Korea. A later Blue House advisor and prominent academic recalled that “He made me feel intellectually mediocre."

To say that Kim lived in what Chinese writers call “interesting times” is an understatement. His life spanned a turbulent period in Korean history and regional affairs—civil war, division and enduring enmity on the peninsula, tumultuous economic and social transformation in South Korea, transition in the South from authoritarian to democratic rule, and the emergence of middle-power Korea as a player on a global stage.

Born in 1936 in Jinnampo, South Pyongan Province, in what is now North Korea, Kim was the son a business man, who died when Kim was in early middle school, and was raised by a mother who supported the family by teaching piano. She and her two sons escaped to Seoul by a small boat on 4 January 1951, entering a city ravaged by war and hardship. Kim completed studies at the Seoul High School along with many others who had escaped to the south. After two years of study at Seoul National University, he received a scholarship at Williams College, a private liberal arts college in
Massachusetts, where he graduated magna cum laude in Political
Science in 1959. A fellow student remembered him as studious,
remarkable in his English-language capabilities, and constantly
immersed in Western political philosophy.

At Harvard, he studied in the Government Department and
later recalled the influence of four professors in particular. Henry
Kissinger co-supervised his dissertation and embodied a form of
enlightened realism and a curiosity about the diplomacy of 19th
century Europe that was reflected in Kim's dissertation and the
book that followed from it, Revolution and International System
published in 1970, based on his doctoral dissertation on the
upheavals of 19th century Europe. Kissinger's intellect, personae
and reputation were useful to a Kim who did not resist media
references to him as Korea's Kissinger or "Kimsinger" when pulled
into the service of two strong-willed Presidents.

Kim appreciated Adam Ulam's thinking on the nature of the
communist power and the Cold War and John Fairbank's approach
to understanding the civilizational forces that shaped East Asia as
well as his appreciation of how urgent it was for Asian students like
himself to succeed. Kim spoke with special respect and affection for
Stanley Hoffmann. Hoffmann's urbane, his life style and multi-
dimensional appreciation of European politics and diplomacy had
a major influence. One friend noted that he "admired Hoffmann
but acted like Kissinger." He read widely in European political
theory, with his essays including far more references to Hobbes,
Kant, Rousseau, Comte, Marx, Weber and Schumpeter, than to
any American or Asian thinkers. And his passion for the music
of Wagner was legendary. His sense of history and politics was as
much shaped by the European experience he only knew from a
distance as the East Asian from which he came.

Kim taught at York University in Toronto from 1963–66, at
New York University from 1966–71, and then as Professor of
Political Science at Korea University from 1971 to 1975. Some of
his early writings focused on the social foundations of ideology and
nationalism in contemporary Korea. He tried to explain why South
Korean elites had little of either, save for anti-communism. In a
1965 essay he chastised the Park administration for an absolutist
perspective that failed to distinguish between different forms of
progressive politics, some of them desirable. 94 In 1972 at Korea
University he penned an essay that gave a clear and conventional

94 "Ideology and Political Development In South Korea," Pacific Affairs, 36(2), Summer 1963, p. 175.
realist account of balance of power politics and American interests as America re-shaped its Asia policy in the Kissinger–Nixon era of détente. And again he took subtle aim at the administration in Korea that was founded on an ideology of modernization but in preferring manipulation of society rather than institution building was "digging its own grave."  

In 1975 he accepted an invitation he could not refuse to serve as an advisor in that government. Friends recall that he did not hesitate to accept, partly out of personal ambition and partly out of an instinctive gravitation pull to power and national service.

Unfortunately there is no written record in memos, diaries, or interviews about Kim's role in the Blue House during five years with President Park, the transition to Chun Doo Hwan after the assassination in December 1979, and later when he served as Ambassador and Permanent Observer at the UN from 1981 to 1985 and then Ambassador to the United States from 1985 to 1988.

During his time as Presidential adviser, there are two English-language essays that give a sense of his views at the time. In 1977, he assessed the commonalities of interest and the differences in Korean and U.S. values and world views. He aimed to dismiss American conceptions of Korea as pathologically fearful or ideologically obsessed and instead underlined the immediate threat to survival presented by North Korea. "We are a country surrounded by the major powers of the world. We are also a nation whose fate historically has been inescapably linked to the rivalries and conflicts among the powers that surround us. And today, we are threatened by a regime that is not only unique in today's world in terms of its total regimentation, absolute personal autocracy and sheer craziness, but also happen to be run by the same autocrat who launched the invasion in the summer of 1950." 11 Imagine if the U.S. civil war had ended in a draw and the southern forces, armed to the teeth, were deployed around Dulles airport. In 1978, he wrote a sharp critique of American thinking of the time, the so-called Brookings Formula, for American disengagement from the peninsula. 12

Later he provided a glimpse into his Blue House experience in a


presentation he gave in November 1994 to his former colleagues in the Department of Political Science at York University where he began his teaching career 30 years earlier. Working from a single page of scratched notes, he reviewed several instances of American efforts to promote democracy in Korea. With his characteristic precision and deliberate cadence, body twisted to the right as he spoke, eyes occasionally twinkling, he argued that there was no single road to democracy in Asia, no recurring pattern. Japan came to it through American occupation, India through colonial experience, South Korea and Taiwan after a period of industrialization and modernization.

In the Korean case he spoke about how the Carter administration’s plans to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Korean and its criticisms of human right policies, while sincere, had the opposite effect. The Blue House took “merely cosmetic” steps to address human rights issues and used “native nationalisms” to distinguish Korean from U.S. interests. Alternatively, Ronald Reagan was not a champion of human rights but the quiet signals and gestures of his officials had maximum effect in constraining Chun’s response to the June 1987 pro-democracy demonstrations.

“I worked for the three authoritarian governments in South Korea that were certainly not headed by Jeffersonian democrats,” he said. “To understand these governments you need to either be a complete cynic or have a sense of history. Democracy comes only if the bricks are laid one at a time and are accompanied by economic modernization. Eventually, it becomes inevitable, the only possible choice. In South Korea, authoritarian government became untenable because the Korean bourgeoisie would no longer tolerate being treated like children. Democracy comes not for ethical, moral or idealistic reasons but rather for pragmatic and practical ones. The foreign role in the coming of democracy to South Korea was minimal.”

In a 2003 lecture at Stanford University he sharpened the argument. “Democracy is alive and well in Korea” and would have been difficult to achieve without the security provided by the alliance with the United States. 131

As a front-line player in the events of 1975 to 1988, there are stories of his admiration for the main lines of Park’s approach to Korea’s modernization, his role during the Gwangju democratic movement in 1980, his agonized relationship with Chun Doo

Hwan, his narrow escape from being part of the ill-fated delegation to Yangon in 1983, his speech at the UN Security Council in the aftermath of the shooting down of the KE007 civilian flight in 1983, his criticisms of the chaebols, his role in saving the life of Kim Dae-jung, and the management of relations with Washington.

After leaving government, he played several roles as columnist, commentator and public intellectual, writing frequently for several Korean papers, playing a leading role in the Seoul Forum for International Affairs and the Institute of Social Sciences, lecturing occasionally, attending dozens of international meetings, and taking on occasional assignments, including as head of the Commission on the Internationalization of Korea created by President Kim Young Sam.

He wrote voraciously and made dozens of speeches and presentations in Asia and internationally. A spellbinding speaker with a sense of gravitas combined with self-deprecating humor and sardonic wit, he was a major figure in business, governmental and track-two discussions of Korean domestic politics, foreign relations, North South relations, regional affairs and relations with the United States. He championed deterrence and bilateral diplomacy but also encouraged the nascent efforts to create regional institutions, all the while politely skeptical that they could be realized in the near future. Pressed to identify the path to peace, he turned to Kant and identified the creation of constitutional regimes founded on the rule of law and international institutions. In the meantime, Asia-Pacific was in “the extremely dangerous position of having to restructure old peace mechanisms, such as bilateral alliances and the Korean Armistice Agreement, while trying to develop multilateral institutions...which are still in their infancy.”

While Kim’s views were distinctive, he had common purpose and close affinity with two other practitioner-intellectuals, Lee Hong-koo and Han Sung-joo. Exactly who influenced who is uncertain, but their collective impact on Korean foreign policy and the international image of Korea continues to be formidable.

Kim also had a great deal in common with a handful of policy-minded intellectuals around the Pacific. In 2012, two of the most influential, Robert Scalapino in the United States and Tadashi Yamamoto in Japan, also passed away. All were men of ideas who had witnessed first-hand the carnage of war and were

internationalists who combined a mix of realism, liberalism, pragmatism and cosmopolitanism.

Each was a special form of nationalist and patriot who understood and advanced his country's national interests but who had a philosophic perspective to also look beyond it. All three were hopeful that multilateral processes could take root in Asia but mindful of the obstacles they faced. All three understood the role that national interests and the struggle for power and sometimes survival play in international affairs. Yet all three looked for moments and opportunities when international cooperation could be deepened, conflict made less likely.

At a moment when nationalism seems to be stirring again in several parts of Asia, when tensions on the Korean peninsula are rising, when strategic rivalries are sharpening in an era of power transition, and when leadership is in short supply, it remains to be seen if their successors in governments and the academy can draw lessons from their experiences and understand the painful constraints of the politics of survival and competition in international politics while not losing sight of its possibilities for cooperation and, European-style, transcendence.