ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS

This handbook will serve as a standard reference guide to the subject of human security, which has grown greatly in importance over the past twenty years.

Human security has been part of academic and policy discourses since it was first promoted by the UNDP in its 1994 Human Development Report. Filling a clear gap in the current literature, this volume brings together some of the key scholars and policy-makers who have contributed to its emergence as a mainstream concept, including Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, who jointly chaired the 2001 Commission on Human Security. Drawing upon a range of theoretical and empirical analyses, the handbook provides examples of the use of human security in policies as diverse as disaster management, arms control and counter-terrorism, and in different geographic and institutional settings from Asia to Africa, and the UN. It also raises important questions about how the concept might be adapted and operationalised in the future.

Over the course of the book, the authors draw on three key aspects of human security thinking:

1. Theoretical issues to do with defining human security as a specific discourse
2. Human security from a policy and institutional perspective, and how it is operationalised in different policy and geographic contexts
3. Case studies and empirical work.

Featuring some of the leading scholars in the field, the *Routledge Handbook of Human Security* will be essential reading for all students of human security, critical security, conflict and development, peace and conflict studies, and of great interest to students of international security and IR in general.

Mary Martin is a Research Fellow at the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, London School of Economics, UK.

Taylor Owen is the Research Director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University, USA. Research and writing can be found at www.taylorowen.com.

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

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HUMAN SECURITY AND EAST ASIA

Paul Evans

Of the new approaches to security in East Asia in the past two decades, human security remains the most controversial. The idea that the individual must be at least one of the referent points in answering the eternal questions of security for whom, from what, and by what means has been criticized as an alien Western import, analytically problematic, vague, morally risky, unsustainable, and counterproductive. It is far less controversial when applied to development issues and has spawned a conceptual cousin, the idea of "non-traditional security" that has found wide acceptance.

The geo-politics of China's rise and regional responses overlap with unresolved territorial disputes, competitive arms acquisitions, cyber clashes, national rivalries, and intra-state conflicts to provide a full agenda of national security concerns for the region. But parallel to these concerns has been the recognition in academic, governmental, and civil society circles that disaster relief, communicable diseases, illegal migration, climate change, and environmental sustainability are legitimate and recurring security issues that need attention.

Asian debates at the intellectual and policy levels have revolved around two divergent streams of thought about human security – a broader one focusing on multiple dimensions of human well-being and a narrower one focusing on the specific threats of protection of individuals in situations of armed conflict. Both mirror debates, norms, and practices in other parts of the world. But while human security has global resonance, its development and future in East Asia have some distinctive characteristics.

Two meanings of human security

In East Asia as elsewhere there are frequent disagreements about the nature and meaning of human security – its what and how – but far fewer on its why and when. Advocates regularly point to changes in the post-Cold War security environment; the increasing significance of intra-state as compared to inter-state conflict; the emergence of a new form of diplomacy that connect states, international institutions, and civil society actors; and deepening globalization that brings with it new information networks and media capacity that highlight violence, natural disasters, and other human vulnerabilities in powerful ways.

At the core of human security approaches are three core assumptions:

1 that the individual (or the individual in a group or community, say, ethnic Karens in Myanmar) is one of the referent points (or in some formulations *the* referent point) for security;
2 that the security of the individual or the group is subject to a variety of threats of which military threats from outside the state are only one and often not the most significant;
3 that there is a possible tension between the security of the individual and that of the nation, the state, and the regime even recognizing the state has prime responsibility for the protection of the individual.

Framed this way, human security raises a challenge to traditional conceptions of national security by changing the referent point and introducing issues and means that extend beyond conventional security strategies. Philosophically, it raises hard issues of conscience, obligations beyond borders, development, and domestic legitimacy. Politically, it raises questions about sovereignty, intervention, the role of regional and global institutions, and the relationship between state and citizen. Insecure states almost always mean insecure citizens. But strong and secure states do not necessarily mean secure citizens. As noted in the *Human Security Report*, in the past century more people have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies.[1]

Human security thinking quickly fragmented into different approaches on how broadly to define the threats, how to prioritize them, and whether to emphasize the complementarity or tension between the state and the individual. If security is the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends, how many human anxieties need to be assuaged? And by what means? The answers to these questions have been bundled in several ways. Two were seminal.

Echoing the initial formulation of the 1994 Human Development Report, the most elaborate variant of the broad or holistic approach appeared in the work of the Commission on Human Security, supported by the Japanese government and co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. Its final report stated that the aim of human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment" and "protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations." This meant creating systems that "give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."[2]

The substantive chapters dealt with situations of violent conflict, refugees and internally displaced persons, recovery from violent conflict, economic security, health, knowledge, skills, and values. The report explicitly aimed to connect issues of protection, rights, development, and governance. And it conceived of human security in a comprehensive sense of dealing with situations of both violence and deprivation.

The second approach has emphasized a narrower band of issues, focusing on protection of individuals and communities in situations of armed conflict and other forms of organized violence. Sometimes labeled the freedom-from-fear approach, the focus is on human security *in extremis*, usually in the context of intra-state violence and occasionally in the context of state-directed violence. Adherents do not deny that there are multiple threats to human well-being but for reasons of analytical clarity and operational focus concentrate on one species of threat. They have argued that institutions and networks for addressing issues of development already exist and that what is needed is a concentration on a specific set of threats and the creation of political will and practical instruments for addressing them. Human security, it is claimed, can make the biggest difference in one of two ways: if it keeps squarely focused on issues like protection of refugees, women, and children in conflict zones, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, conflict management, prevention, and resolution, and lawless societies; or if it zeroes in on an even narrower set of issues including genocide and mass atrocities.

The seminal expression of the logic of the narrow approach was outlined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its October 2001 report, *The Responsibility to Protect* (often cited as R2P).[3] Against the background of contested humanitarian interventions (and non-interventions) in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Bosnia, and East Timor, the ICISS was a response to the request by Kofi Annan for the international community to forge a consensus on the principles and processes for using coercive action to protect people at risk.

The ICISS report explicitly eschewed the vocabulary of "humanitarian intervention" and "the right to intervene" and instead focused on the needs of people requiring assistance by framing the issues of sovereignty and intervention in terms of the responsibility to protect. It identified a series of core principles that connected state sovereignty, obligations under the UN Charter, existing legal obligations under international law, and the developing practice of states, regional organizations, and the Security Council. It extended the responsibility to protect to include the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild when faced with human protection claims in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibility. And it provided a precise definition of the just cause threshold as well as precautionary principles, right authority, and operational principles. It did allow for interventions without consent in extreme cases.

The report made a direct connection between R2P and the broader conception of human security. Treating human security as "indivisible," it argued that "issues of sovereignty and intervention are not just matters affecting the rights or prerogatives of states, but they deeply affect and involve individual human beings in fundamental ways." Focusing on the most vulnerable, it underlined that forces inside a country could often pose more significant threats on a daily basis to life, health, livelihood, personal safety, and human dignity than external aggression.

International reactions to R2P as a norm and policy framework have been varied and heated, with the main theaters of action being in Africa and in the United Nations. Kofi Annan's *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* declared "a collective international responsibility to protect" and characterized the R2P as "an emerging norm." His own report (*In Larger Freedom,* 2005) advanced the R2P as a component of collective action for shared development and governance, rather than as a global peace and security strategy.[4]

The effort to institutionalize the norm culminated at the UN World Summit of 2005. The Summit Outcome Document (A/Res/60/1, 2005), notably paragraphs 138 and 139, stated that it was the state that had the primary responsibility for providing for and protecting its own citizens. The international community's responsibilities, on the other hand, were substantially qualified, to focus upon assistance to states meeting their responsibilities to protect citizens. Should a state "manifestly fail" in its responsibilities, the international community has an obligation to undertake peaceful means to protect populations from the designated perils in Chapter VI, on a "case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations," and further to *consider* [italics added] military action should peaceful means be inadequate. This could only occur with UNSC approval and be restricted to four kinds of transgressions: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.[5]

In July 2009, Ban Ki-moon's report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" directed to the UN General Assembly focused heavily on prevention and capacity building. In practice, the Security Council has been reluctant to invoke the term when authorizing peacekeeping missions, though the recent success in Côte D'Ivoire may be a landmark development.

Asian reactions and formulations

While human security has a significant Asian pedigree – the initial UNDP report in 1994 was written by a Pakistani with an Asian audience in mind – it continues to receive a mixed welcome. In general terms, Japanese-led activities that have focused on the broad understanding of human security have been largely uncontested, though they were initially difficult to distinguish from conventional development issues. They did produce several regional champions including Tadashi Yamamoto, Kim Dae-jung, and Keizo Obuchi. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 underlined the reality that two decades of economic growth and state-building had not eliminated severe vulnerabilities for large numbers of Asians and the growing role of non-state actors as alternative service providers and participants in the policy process.

In the context of regional governmental institutions, the phrase has been used intermittently by political leaders and bureaucrats, albeit with no agreed definition. It appeared in the final report of the East Asia Study Group[6] and has been used repeatedly in ASEAN circles (though never formally endorsed by ASEAN), usually in the context of the need to address a range of non-traditional security issues, including environmental degradation, illegal migration, piracy, communicable diseases, and transnational crime. In a politically understandable but intellectually confusing synthesis, it was used after 9/11 in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, with specific reference to dismantling terrorist groups, eliminating the danger of weapons of mass destruction, and confronting other direct threats to security including communicable diseases, protection of air travelers, and energy security.[7]

In track-two circles, the broader meaning is scarcely controversial but is most often framed around a variety of non-traditional security issues.[8] The MacArthur Foundation provided a major grant to the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the Centre has become a major hub for research and discussion. Other universities and think tanks have launched research projects and teaching programs with a similar focus.

The broader approach to human security is compatible with most formulations of comprehensive security, resonates with the needs-oriented approach of many Asian governments, is flexible in including both individuals and communities as the referent of security, and connects well to developmental issues and indigenous traditions of human dignity. The replacement of nationalism by performance is key to the legitimacy of most regimes and this puts more pressure on governments to address basic human needs and protection.[9] As argued by Rizal Sukma in the context of the fall of the Suharto government, "While it might be presumptuous to argue that the emphasis on human security will automatically ensure political and economic stability, one can make a reasonably strong claim that ignoring it will definitely serve as a recipe for disaster."[10]

The narrower approach continues to generate intense debate, much of it focused on R2P. The most important instrument for regional advocacy has been the Australia-based and funded Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. In 2010 the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific commissioned a study group on R2P that produced a significant report. As determined and persistent as its external and internal advocates have been, getting governmental and intellectual support for R2P continues to be an uphill battle. Unlike Africa, only two countries (Japan and Mongolia) have integrated human security as a key pillar of their foreign policy, and there is little indication that principal regional organizations, including ASEAN, will do so in the near future.[11]

Almost all Asian governments, India being a notable exception, showed a willingness to support the norm as it took form in the 2005 World Summit report and have been supporters of the protection of civilians agenda embedded in various peacekeeping operations around the

world. R2P had been vilified in the package presented by the ICISS because of sovereignty concerns and the prospect of intervention without consent. WS 2005 was a turning point in that it emphasized state responsibility for its citizens while guaranteeing that through a Security Council veto China could ensure domestic consent.

Asian states have been very reluctant to see R2P principles applied in their home countries or their region. They continue to believe that they are the best (and perhaps only) providers of security and tenaciously guard the principles of Westphalian absolute sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs. One analyst concludes that many states in Southeast Asia "still see the broader R2P norm as a potential threat to sovereignty and regime security, and as such have not internalized many of its key aspects," adding that "there is as yet no single government *inside* Southeast Asia that is a strong supporter of R2P" and only one country, the Philippines, can be seen as a consistent advocate.[12] Another argues that Southeast Asian governments are tacitly committed to a new conception of state sovereignty based on responsibility even as they are ambivalent about its application to Southeast Asia on the "assumption that conflicts in the region are not of the nature or intensity to warrant R2P's invocation."[13] Some believe that the mass atrocities and crimes that R2P addresses are not likely to occur in their own backyard.

It would be a mistake to view these regional norms and attitudes as static. Regional reactions to the genocide in Cambodia in the 1970s were very different than reactions to the violence in East Timor in 1998–1999. In the context of Cambodia, there was virtually no discussion within ASEAN of the need for external intervention and virtually no sympathy for occasional Vietnamese arguments that its intervention was motivated by humanitarian impulses. In the context of East Timor in 1999, while Indonesia and ASEAN insisted upon Indonesian consent before authorizing a military intervention, there were frequent demands for swift international action, including the use of military force, by citizens and top political leaders in several Southeast Asian capitals.

At the regional level, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum have not adopted R2P as regional doctrine or norm, though aspects of the broader conception of human security, especially non-traditional security issues, have been regular subjects of attention.

Thailand

Thailand was one of the first countries in Southeast Asia to give strong governmental support to human security in both its broad and narrow configurations. It set up a domestic Ministry of Development and Human Security, became an enthusiastic member of the Human Security Network, and participated in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations headed by the UN in Burundi, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sudan. Several of its leading Democrat politicians, especially Surin Pitsuwan who served as a member of ICISS and later became the Secretary General of ASEAN, were strong advocates of developing and applying the doctrine globally and regionally. The commitment was reversed with the change of government in 2005. Like Canada a year later under a new Conservative government, Thailand backed away from the concept and phrase, steadfastly maintaining that the insurgency in the southern part of the country and, later, the Red Shirt protests and their suppression in 2010 were domestic affairs outside the purview of the R2P. According to one recent assessment, domestic political turbulence combined with the unresolved conflict in the southern part of the country to reverse official thinking. The new emphasis was on non-interference in Thai domestic affairs and a shift from intervention to prevention in international settings.[14]

Officials and academics have criticized the initial ICISS report and the subsequent UN discussions from several angles ranging from its specific elements to underlying philosophy.

For many, the American intervention in Iraq and the NATO intervention in Libya diminished support for the doctrine of R2P.

Japan

The one major country in East Asia that has made human security a consistent mainstay of its foreign policy is Japan. Japanese intellectuals and policy makers proposed as early as 1979 the idea of "comprehensive security" that extended beyond military and defense issues and included economic well-being, natural disasters, and energy. In 1998 Prime Minister Obuchi used the term "human security" with particular emphasis on protecting vulnerable peoples. His government created the $200 million Trust Fund for Human Security at the UN, and his successors provided support for the Commission on Human Security.

Subsequent Japanese governments have continued to use the concept. A recent review of Japanese thinking and practice outlines its multiple strands and the close embrace of both the broader and narrower interpretations of the concept that now ranges from poverty alleviation and public health through to conflict prevention, post-conflict assistance, long-term peace efforts, and even military intervention in situations where other means fail. Japan did not join the Human Security Network championed by Canada and Norway but did take the initiative in 2006 in establishing the Friends of Human Security Forum in the UN which meets twice a year. In its aid programming, it used the concept to address freedom from fear and freedom from want, protection and empowerment of people and support for dealing with global risks, especially in the areas of health and medicine. And in the wake of the March 2011 triple disaster in Japan, it has been applied with increasing frequency inside Japan in the context of disaster response and relief.[15]

Japan has supported UN-led efforts to define and promote R2P along with other measures to protect civilians in situation of armed conflict. Japanese policy makers have been less concerned than other Asian states that R2P provides a pretext for unilateral intervention. They supported the World Summit declaration but on what one Japanese analyst describes as a "passive" basis. In Japan, as elsewhere, internal debates have been substantial, tied to alternative visions of Japanese foreign policy and international identity, factional politics, and calculations about advancing other Japanese priorities including a permanent seat on the Security Council and avoiding agonizing internal debates about dispatching the Self Defence Forces to conflict zones. Revisions under Ban Ki-moon to R2P that acknowledged the value of the broad Japanese approach opened up a window for Japanese participation without major troop commitments or lifting restrictions on the operations of Japanese troops overseas. "Thus Japan no longer views R2P as a threat to human security doctrine, but also sees little incentive to play a bigger role in mainstreaming R2P."[16]

China

Until the late 1990s the term human security was virtually unknown to Chinese academics and is still only rarely used by officials in formal meetings or by the media. The situation has changed in two main respects. First, some of the domestic aspects of human security, including environmental concerns, natural disasters, and social security, now receive frequent attention in official and online media. Second, human security overlaps with some of the key elements of China's "new security concept," issued in 1997, that promotes cooperative action to address pressing transnational issues. Preferring the idea of non-traditional security to human security, Chinese officials in November 2002 co-signed The Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China

on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues related to illegal drugs, people smuggling, trafficking in women and children, piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime, and cybercrime.[17]

Turning to the pointy end of human security – protection of individuals in situations of violent conflict – directly tied to the concepts of sovereignty and intervention, Chinese responses since 1997 have been increasingly fluid and complex. There remain vocal proponents of a strict interpretation of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, stressing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, emphasizing article 3(4) of the UN Charter, preferring humanitarian assistance to humanitarian intervention, advocating strict neutrality in peacekeeping, and seeing ulterior motives in the practice of intervention. They echo deeply embedded views in China about past humiliations; fears of potential interventions in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang; and a political philosophy that focuses on the nation rather than the individual and that separates human safety from what now is called human security.

Chu Shulong pointed out in 2002 that "the Chinese leadership will continue to defend fundamental national sovereignty rights, but at the same time, the pressure of global trends means they will become more flexible and accepting toward relatively new concepts of security, including human security," adding that "the Chinese recognize that in times of integration and globalization, nations and peoples around the world will gain more than they will lose from changing their traditional positions on national security."[18] In a 2002 report, Allen Carlson observed that "many Chinese elites have now come to accept the general legitimacy of multilateral intervention to resolve particularly prominent humanitarian crises" and that "China has become a reluctant participant in the international trend toward questioning the sanctity of state sovereignty and expanding the international community's right to intervene."[19]

A decade later the contradictions and complexity are even more apparent. In what one scholar identifies as a combination of acceptance and resistance to the R2P approach,

> China has adeptly avoided directly challenging what it perceives to be the Western normative order underpinning R2P in a manner that might repudiate China's self-professed responsible engagement in UN peacekeeping arrangements. At the same time, China has leveraged its relationship with like-minded states to limit the prospect of R2P directly undermining its resistance to nonconsensual intervention, or to utterly discredit its commitment to enhancing civilian protection through political negotiations rather than enforcement measures.

Rather than obstructing R2P, China has contested and shaped its development. It no longer contends that humanitarian crises are strictly internal affairs of sovereign states but instead that "protection is best achieved through political settlements rather than coercive protection measures."[20]

After initial opposition to non-consensual and unauthorized interventions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Kosovo and to the ICISS report, Chinese officials endorsed the limited version of R2P agreed upon at the World Summit in 2005. Importantly, R2P, for China, was established as a concept, rather than a norm or a principle of international relations, and, therefore, in the words of two observers, had to "be interpreted and applied in a prudent and accurate manner, assessed in individual cases, not abused, and restricted to the four specific threats outlined in the World Summit document." China's response to the crises in Darfur, Burma, and, more recently Syria, has closely followed this logic.[21]

This amounts neither to outright acceptance nor rejection of the R2P. Currently, China only supports collective action against individual states that have failed to protect their populations in

extremely serious cases and when China's political interests coincide with the other members of the UNSC. China supported the establishment of UNAMID, the joint United Nations-African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Darfur, yet opposed the attempts to collectively address the situation in Myanmar. More recently, China supported a NATO mission to protect civilians in Libya, but later objected to authorizing one for Syria. China has been willing to use its influence in order to pressure governments for a solution to their humanitarian crises and secure their consent to intervention. And it has become one of the major contributors of troops to the UN peacekeeping operations including engineering units in Darfur, civilian police in East Timor, and military observers in Western Sahara.

China has shifted from being a norm taker to a norm maker in regional and global settings, attempting to make intervention and the use of force more compatible with its interests and preferences. It has operated as "a conservative force in the R2P debate," notes a recent study, but is not blocking discussion or trying to unravel the 2005 WSO consensus. It has thus found a way to continue supporting the norms of state sovereignty and non-interference at the same time that it supports international actions linked to humanitarian catastrophes and mass violence that can be interpreted as threats to peace and security.[22]

Though other East Asian countries may not have similar diplomatic influence, the basic pattern is similar. The normative underpinnings of human security have been largely accepted even as its application in specific contexts has not. This may sometimes align with Western interests and perspectives but rests on a different philosophic foundation. In the words of Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "China is interpreting Western Enlightenment principles through a Confucian lens of governance that stresses an essential unity between citizens and state, rather than giving primacy to human rights as claims against the state."[23]

Conclusion

The defining characteristic of East Asia is its diversity – in history, culture, religion, languages, civilizational underpinnings, levels of economic development, and regime types. Yet as a region, it is at the center of world economic growth, increasingly economically interdependent, linked to global supply and value chains, and slowly constructing a regional institutional architecture in a distinctive way that eschews political integration, diminution of sovereignty, and that is premised on the belief that high levels of cooperation can be achieved with low levels of institutionalization. It still is troubled by a significant number of intra-state conflicts and no shortage of flashpoints but has been successful in reducing the incidence and prospect of inter-state war and building increasingly effective states.

Security discourse and practice are shifting but not in ways that completely converge with the "Enlightenment" principles described by Thakur and Chin. Rigid concepts of sovereignty and non-interference have been softened but not jettisoned. It is no longer imaginable that Pol Pot-style genocide of the 1970s could be ignored or tolerated. Yet most Asian states have been very reluctant to focus regional and global attention on the dynamics of intra-state war. The instruments of preventive diplomacy developed and applied in Europe have been very slow to find acceptance. What has been accepted is that domestic instabilities and vulnerabilities need special attention by the states in which they are occurring. For many analysts, even a bad government can do this better than no government or a government imposed through outside intervention.

For all these reasons, East Asia is important in the future evolution of human security thinking and practice. It is significant as a brake on liberal-inspired conceptions of a well-functioning security order and at the same time is an incubator of creative ideas including non-traditional

security that focus on significant trans-national problems. Non-traditional security thinking is distinctive because it is intentionally ambiguous about whether the state is the primary or only force capable of addressing the human security problems of the region and whether there is a fundamental tension between states and their citizens. As the most vulnerable region in the world to a myriad of natural disasters, it may be that the biggest chapter in security cooperation will focus on environmental degradation and the adaptation to climate change.

Providing for the well-being and security of civilians is no longer controversial. How this is to be achieved is a work in progress.

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Notes

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