Searching for Cooperative Security 2.0

From Security Architecture to Security Order in the Asia Pacific

Paul Evans

Abstract: At a moment of strategic transition in Asia Pacific security, views differ widely on the inevitability of conflict and the prospects of a managed accommodation of great power relations. There is widespread agreement that economic integration is deep and valuable, that a power shift is underway, and that the new array of multilateral institutions are welcome but merely formative. At the end of the Cold War period, there was a creative moment in which key concepts like cooperative and comprehensive security underpinned an era of institution building. The essay argues that it is time to revisit these ideas and look at the fundamental

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elements of a security order appropriate to a diverse and increasingly interconnected region in the midst of a power transition. It examines some of the key ideas offered by security thinkers from several countries and pays particular attention to the concept of a consociational security order as an entree to constructive discussion. As important as the U.S.-China relationship is to a future security order, a G2 is neither likely nor desirable. The conclusion poses a series of questions that will need to be answered as a new version of cooperative security with 21st century characteristics is developed.

Keywords: Cooperative security; security order; security architecture; strategic transition.

In a period of strategic transition, opinions differ widely on the likelihood or inevitability of a downward spiral in political security relations in the wider Asia Pacific region that could lead to armed conflict involving major powers or a Cold War-like strategic rivalry. No one doubts that the region faces significant geopolitical uncertainties and a host of traditional and non-traditional security issues that remain unresolved and menacing.

There is broad consensus on four points. First, the region is increasingly integrated economically through trade, finance, production, and movements of people, money, and technology. This has benefited the region enormously and been an engine of global growth and shared prosperity.

Second, the region is undergoing a major power shift that reflects the economic dynamism, growing capabilities, and assertiveness of several Asian countries. In particular, China's multidimensional rise is having major impact. This is partly because of the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy as well as its growing diplomatic and military capabilities. It is not yet a peer competitor to the United States in many of the dimensions of national power and regional influence. Nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. But in the Xi Jinping era, it presents a palpable challenge to uncontested American primacy in the Western Pacific and Asia.

Third, the region employs a variety of mechanisms for maintaining peace and security. These include unilateral preparedness, bilateral alliances, and more recently a myriad of multilateral institutions and processes. The proliferation of multilateral institutions in the past 25 years has been significant. Diverse in purpose, membership, geographical scope,

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conception of the region, and leadership, they operate at formal governmental, second track, and civil society levels. ASEAN has been central to many but not all of them.

Fourth, as valuable as these new multilateral security institutions may be for purposes of dialogue, consultation, confidence building, and dealing with some issues related to humanitarian and disaster relief, they have made very limited progress in areas including preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. They have not supplanted self-help, *ad hoc* coalitions, and alliances as the foundations of defense and security policies.

From Architecture to Order

Regional security architecture in its narrow sense refers to the design, functions, and structures of more than a dozen different institutions now in operation including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM-plus) meetings, the East Asia Summit (EAS) Process, some of the non-ASEAN centered activities including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), and, on part of its agenda, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Each of them faces a similar set of questions. What can be done to strengthen organizational capabilities, improve efficiency, advance specific issues on their agendas, and move from talking about regional issues to introducing effective measures to address them? Viewed as a collectivity, they face a parallel set of questions. How can they avoid duplication and outright competition? Can and should ASEAN-centered institutions retain pride of place?

Important as these questions are, the region also needs to turn its attention to a broader strategic matter: what kind of security order does it need and want? Security order involves institutional architecture but is a larger concept that includes the values, norms, and organizing principles that regulate state-to-state interactions. It is not simply a codification of the balance of power and material capabilities. Rather, as Dr. Henry Kissinger observes, it is about the nature of just arrangements — goals, limits and methods that can only be cultivated, not imposed. It is not the by-product of interactions but a matter of conscious design.[1]

[1]Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), "Conclusion: World Order in Our Time?" pp. 365–367.

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The problem is not just building a better institutional architecture or addressing crises and points of tension one-by-one, as fundamental and difficult as both might be. The bigger challenge is coming to an agreed definition of what kind of security order is appropriate to the economic, social, and political reality of a diverse region at a time of major rebalancing between rising and established powers.

Asia-Pacific countries need to reach a consensus on the future security order before defining its final architecture.

As the era of multilateral dialogue began in Asia Pacific at the end of the Cold War there was a brief but intensive discussion about the complex nature of the security environment and about what kind of security order fit with regional conditions. The Japanese diplomat Yukio Satoh summarized it best as a multi-tiered or multiplex system that included an untidy mix of national self-help, American-girded bilateral alliances, organizations like ASEAN, and a new brand of multilateral dialogue processes like the ARF that he and others were envisioning. The role they saw for the ARF was not to alter the multiplex order but to build confidence and trust within it. The implicit premises were continuing American primacy and that there would be no fundamental contradiction between the nascent multilateral processes and the alliance system that Japan and others saw as fundamental to their own security and a stabilizing force region-wide.[2]

The launch of the ARF resonated with the ideas of comprehensive security enshrined in ASEAN processes and the new ideas of cooperative security developed in Europe in the late 1980s and then being imported into Asia-Pacific discussions at events like ASEAN ISIS meetings and a series of intergovernmental meetings in 1993. Both comprehensive and cooperative security thinking were hardwired into the ARF's founding documents. The fusion had three important ingredients: a security philosophy based on building security with neighbors rather than against them; a commitment to building inclusive multilateral processes that included both the

[2]Yukio Satoh, "Asian Pacific Process for Stability and Security," paper presented at the "Conference on ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s," Manila, June 5–7, 1991; and "Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995).

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like-minded and the non-like-minded; and attention to a range of what were described as new or non-traditional security issues ranging from climate change and infectious diseases to terrorism, illegal migration, piracy, and disaster relief.[3]

As the ARF's promoters looked at the ideas that could underpin the institution, a host of track-two meetings and official discussions took place in 1995 and 1996. Russia organized meetings and produced a "Declaration of Principles of Security and Stability on the Asia-Pacific Region." The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific prepared a memorandum on "The Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security." The ASEAN-ISIS consortium produced "A Pacific Concord" statement building on previously accepted ASEAN and UN documents and outlining seven guidelines and thirteen principles.[4]

Viewed today, many of the aspirations of what might be called Cooperative Security 1.0 are alive, and flourishing. But they are no longer sufficient. In the early 1990s, America was dominant in both the economic and military domains. The rise of Asian economies in the past twenty years has changed this dominance through a diffusion of power. In 1990, China's economy was less than one third the size of the U.S. economy. Now they are roughly comparable in GDP and China is the largest trading partner of virtually every country in Asia. In the early 1990s, the aim was to bring a reluctant and suspicious China to the regional multilateral table. Within five years, Beijing moved from passive and defensive to active. Now China is proactive, engaged, and underwriting major initiatives. These are mainly in the areas of infrastructure finance but include security as well, through institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia. China is constructing an Asian-centered set of parallel institutions. Whether these will complement or supplant the Asia Pacific architecture built since the 1990s is not yet clear. But they certainly put it in a new light.

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[3]The usage and etymology of these terms is chronicle in David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2nd edition, 2007).

[4]The contents of the proposals are contained in a collection of essays edited by Mohamed Jawhar Hassan and Sheikh Ahmad Roffie, *Bringing Peace to the Pacific* (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1997).

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When Chinese leaders or decision-makers talk about a New Security Concept and a security order based on common, comprehensive, and cooperative security, they are using phrases that are genuinely regional ones, commonly used if not widely understood.[5] They have supplemented them with Xi Jinping's ideas about a New Model of Major Power Relations and rooted them in the language of UN principles and specific agreements including the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Nevertheless, they are received with suspicion and skepticism by many, in part because Chinese leaders are simultaneously criticizing an American and Japanese Cold War mentality, the alliance system, and discuss an Asia for Asians without a full American presence. American "rebalancing" and "new Chinese thinking" have a common interest in deepening multilateral institutions but they do so from different starting points. For the U.S. they are an adjunct to its alliance system; for the Chinese they are potential successors, at least in the long run.

Although many Cooperative Security 1.0 measures are still alive, they do not meet the needs of today's geopolitical reality.

Ideas in Play

In a region coming to terms with a new strategic equation, it is not surprising that a number of ideas have been floated about the need for a fresh look at a regional security order with the intention of devicing principles and institutions that fit with these new circumstances. If uncertainty was the fear that stimulated the first wave of cooperative security in the 1990s, twenty years later it is the fear of a changing balance of power that poses new risks of inadvertent incidents and the possibility of zero-sum strategic competition.

Kevin Rudd has framed the challenge as the unsustainability of Pax Americana and the unacceptability of Pax Sinica, instead favoring what he

[5]See particularly Xi Jinping's "New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation," remarks presented at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, May 21, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml.

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has called a Pax Pacifica built on the basis of an Asia-Pacific Community. In a recent report on the U.S.-China relationship, he makes the case that the institution that may be best suited to usher in a new order is the East Asia Summit.[6]

Hugh White, echoing an earlier call by Susan Shirk, has made the case for a Concert of Power system, "an agreement among a group of great powers not to try to dominate one another, but to accept one another as great powers and seek to resolve differences by negotiation. . .Competition among them must not threaten their status as an independent and equal member of the concert. Within this limit, they can compete fiercely." At the center he sees U.S.-China collaboration and "shared primacy" that accommodates the core strategic interests of both.[7]

Peter Hayes has outlined four different possibilities: (1) continuation of the present order that mixes rules-based cooperation and quiet competition within a regional framework structured around existing alignments sustained by U.S. leadership; (2) a balance-of-power order of unconstrained great power competition fueled by dynamic shifts in relative power and a reduced U.S. role; (3) a consolidated regional order in which an East Asian community develops like the lines of Europe's democratic peace, with China's political liberalization as a precondition for such a regional evolution; and (4) a Sino-centric order centered on Beijing that sustains a different kind of East Asian community on the basis of China's extension of a sphere of influence across the region.[8]

In Asia, echoing the earlier thinking of Yukio Satoh, Marty Natalagewa as Indonesian's Minister of Foreign Affairs called for something less adversarial than a balance of power: a "dynamic equilibrium" that seeks to involve all the major relevant powers within a more cooperative framework as a basis for the development of an inclusive regional architecture and "a

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[6]Kevin Rudd, *U.S.-China 21, The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, Toward a Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose*, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015, p. 2, http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21_English.pdf.

[7]Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 136.

[8]Peter Hayes, "Building a New Security Architecture in Northeast Asia," Nautilus Peace and Security Policy Forum, May 29, 2014, http://us4.campaign-archive1.com/?u=0de7e0e84dc3aff619f936a70&id=a310872784&e=9890554749.

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new kind of international relations with an emphasis on common security, common prosperity and common stability."[9]

Shin Kak-Soo, the former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in South Korea, has addressed the need for a "new strategic vision" for East Asia based upon a continuing role for the United States as balancer, appropriate accommodation of the rise of China, strengthening the regional economic and security architecture, and the build-up of strategic trust. "Self-interest dictates," he argues, "that all stakeholders in East Asia work together to achieve strategic stability founded on a rules-based, equitable, open and peaceful regional order."[10]

There are a plethora of ideas about what kind of security order best fits the future demands of the Asia-Pacific.

Bilahari Kausikan, a Singaporean diplomat, makes the case that the EAS in particular has the goal of promoting a new kind of balance. This is "not balance in the Cold War sense of being directed against one power or another, but balance conceived of us an omni-directional state of equilibrium in which the ASEAN countries can enjoy good relations with all the major powers without choosing between them and thus preserve autonomy." Like Shin, he argues that the U.S. role remains a vital condition for stability but that it must be supplemented by new architecture to preserve stability for continued growth.

> At its center must be a new *modus vivendi* between the U.S. and China. This is a complex relationship, characterized by profound interdependence coexisting with no less profound strategic distrust. The U.S. and China know they must work together. Neither wants conflict. Both nevertheless find it difficult to reach a new accommodation. The U.S. now needs help to maintain order, but is uncertain how much help to ask for and what price to pay.

[9]See for example his statement at the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 2011, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/ID_en.pdf.

[10]Shin Kak-Soo, "East Asia's Murky Strategic Situation Needs Stabilizing," *Straits Times*, February 25, 2015.

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> China regards the current order as heir to the system that led to what it calls `a hundred years of humiliation', but has also benefited from it, at least over the past four decades. So Beijing is uncertain how much help to offer and what price to ask. From these uncertainties stem all the ambiguities and complexities of our time.[11]

Chen Dongxiao, the President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, has outlined the elements of China's approach to Beijing's diplomatic efforts with its neighboring countries including the newly-created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. He emphasizes that "there is not yet a consensus on what kind of security order is appropriate for the Asia-Pacific region at a time when there is a major rebalancing between rising and established powers." In turn, "The lack of agreement over the regional security order will hamper security cooperation in the long run."[12] In other words, settling individual disputes may lower the temperature of competition but will not bring stability.

All of these voices make it clear that something further is needed. What might it look like?

Cooperative Security 2.0

In ways similar to the projects and meetings twenty years ago, several groups are now looking again at the regional architecture and kind of security order new circumstances require. In 2014 CSCAP produced a memorandum on "Towards Effective Regional Security Architecture for the Asia Pacific" that produced some incremental recommendations on process but without developing new principles or mechanisms.[13]

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[11]Bilahari Kausikan, "ASEAN Centrality and Regional Security," presentation at the Conference of Regional Integration in the Indo-Pacific: Prospects and Challenges, New Delhi, December 24–25, 2014.

[12]Chen Dongxiao, "China Aims to Set the regional Cooperation Agenda," *East Asia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April–June 2015), p. 35.

[13]CSCAP Study Group on Regional Security Architecture, "Towards Effective Regional Security Architecture for the Asia Pacific,"CSCAP, June 2014, http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/Memorandums/CSCAP%20Memorandum%20No.26%20-%20Towards%20an%20Effective%20Regional%20Security%20Architecture%20for%20the%20AP.pdf.

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More ambitiously, the Asia Society Policy Institute has recently launched a six-person Policy Commission, chaired by Kevin Rudd, intended to generate ideas about how to strengthen regional institutions and potentially create new ones for managing tensions and security threats. It will also be examining the agenda of the East Asia Summit and the possible evolution of an Asia-Pacific Community.[14]

A Canada-China project is holding a series of bilateral and regional meetings focused on the elements of Cooperative Security 2.0. It includes a close look at the evolution and applicability of several concepts that might be supportive of it including self-restraint, reassurance, trust, trust-building measures, and empathy building measures, as well as some of the recent Chinese ideas including "Community of Human Destiny," "National Core Interests," "New Model of Major Country Relations," and "Opportunity Engineering."

More conceptual clarity is necessary for collective efforts to foster a new security order in the Asia-Pacific.

It is also looking at alternative models of core principles and instruments of a regional order, among them hegemony, concert, and security community. Drawing on some of the work of Amitav Acharya, it is examining the idea of a "Consociational Security Order" (CSO). Adapting the concept used to explain domestic political systems, Acharya makes the case for building a distinctive "political-security order of a culturally diverse region that rests on economic interconnectedness, balances of power, cooperative action by elites and leaders to avoid and manage conflicts for the sake of their common survival and well-being. In this order, highly interdependent states ensure systemic stability with the help of both balance of power mechanisms and cooperative institutions."[15]

Its central argument is that states cooperate not from altruism but because, first, cooperation is in their interest and, second, because of the high costs of non-cooperation. Conflict is avoided initially not because group

[14]"Securing Peace in Asia," Asia Society Policy Institute, http://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/securing-peace-asia.

[15]Amitav Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order," *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 58, No. 1 (March 2014).

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members are bound by deeply shared values and a collective identity, but because actors see conflict avoidance as a necessary precondition for material growth and development. Institutions play a critical role in engaging all actors and inducing restraint as the vehicles for conflict resolution. But these institutions operate through mutual restraint and accommodation, not through integration or supranational bureaucracies, European style.

A CSO does not assume the presence of a deep social bond, similar basic values or a collective identity. Unlike a security community, it does not make war unthinkable, just far less likely. Unlike a hegemonic system it does not seek to exclude other great powers by establishing and enforcing a sphere of influence, as was the case with the U.S. Monroe Doctrine in the Western hemisphere. Unlike Concert systems which work to ensure a degree of self-restraint among great powers, it does not marginalize weaker ones.

Three key mechanisms of a CSO generate stability. The first in a multipolar structure is equilibrium in the balance of power. Unlike in a security community, security competition among actors does not disappear in a consociation. Moreover, because consociations are comprised of strong and weak actors, to be stable a consociation must create a "balanced disparity" in which different groups engage in coalitional politics that denies hegemony or dominance to any particular group.

The second mechanism is institutions that facilitate problem solving and engender cooperation. Under a consociational framework, actors cooperate not because they share a collective identity, but because they consider the price of non-cooperation to be too high under prevailing conditions of high security and economic interdependence.

Based on three stabilizing mechanisms, the "Consociational Security Order" is a promising vision of a future Asia-Pacific security.

The third mechanism is elite restraint. While the distribution of power in a consociation is asymmetrical, and hierarchy exists as an objective fact, more powerful actors do not marginalize less powerful ones, but respect the rights and interests of the weaker segments. Decisions are not made unilaterally or imposed by the powerful actors on the weak, but are made and implemented through

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consultations and consensus. A system of mutual or minority veto prevails, meaning the less powerful actors retain a say over collective decisions.

Framed in this way, a CSO has obvious resonance with material conditions including multipolarity and many of the existing arrangements in contemporary East Asia. In addressing U.S.-China strategic competition, the relationship is consistent with defensive realism, rather than an offensive realism that implies aggressive expansionism and power maximization by China and preemptive containment by the U.S. The principles of *consensus* decision-making have been an established feature of Asian regional institutions and key to their tradition of shared leadership. The politics of accommodation developed by ASEAN has diffused to form new and wider regional institutions in Asia. ASEAN's continued leadership survives by default because no great power — U.S., China, Japan or India — is in a position to develop a multilateral security institution under its own imprint.

From Here

A flurry of recent books, essays, and official statements from Chinese and American sources assesses the dynamics of U.S.-China relations in a context of strategic transition. While some see deeper strategic competition as already in place and certain to deepen,[16] others advance ideas about what can be done to manage relations and find common ground.[17] Orville Schell has suggested eleven areas in which both sides need to make concessions, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, suggesting that global issues like climate change are at least as high a priority as democracy and human rights. He

[16]Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, "Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China," Special Report No. 72 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2015).

[17]Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2012); James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014); Thomas Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015); and Lyle Goldstein, *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015).

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raises the possibility that China is "entitled to some kind of `sphere of influence' in the South China Sea."[18]

It is striking that they contain very little about regional institutions, architecture or order. Regional security order is addressed, if at all, as something that will accrue as the by-product of great power interactions rather than a force for shaping bilateral relations. They may be closing in on what shared primacy may look like but it is a shared primacy based on something akin to a two-power Concert.

In identifying a destination and providing a road map, it is again time for creative regional thinking. This will involve connecting the bilateral U.S.-China dimension into a wider regional arena that includes perspectives from other countries, not as a courtesy but as a necessity. As with cooperative security in the early 1990s, Middle Powers such as Canada, Australia and South Korea plus ASEAN are likely to be incubators and champions of inclusive multilateral possibilities. They may again have the capacity to find a bridge between a multiplex order that is cracking at the seams and a successor that has not yet been articulated much less fully realized.

Future discussions will need to address several different kinds of issues. One cluster relates to whether existing institutions are the right foundation for or pathway to a new regional order. Even as some argue that a Concert of major powers is required, the existing architecture is underpinned by ASEAN in convening and facilitating dialogue and occasional action. This may be the best vehicle for a strong Middle Power role but it remains to be seen if ASEAN has the internal cohesion, machinery, and vision to move forward institutions like the ARF or EAS. What does it need to do differently to maintain its centrality? How to go beyond the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security that have been the sign posts for regional cooperation and multilateral institution building for the past two decades? How to move beyond measures to build confidence and transparency measures to build empathy, trust, and reassurance?

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[18]Orville Schell, "Can the U.S. and China Get Along," *New York Times*, July 9, 2015. This parallels a line of argument in Amitai Etzioni, "Spheres of Influence: A Reconceptualization," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 2015), that looks at ways to reconcile spheres of influence with a rule-based liberal international order in situations where countries like China "rely on economic and ideational means rather than force to build up their SOI," p. 126.

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Reassurance measures lead directly to the key structural issue of how alliances intersect with regional economic integration and multilateral processes. At the moment they are largely conceived by the U.S. and its allies as instruments for supporting alliance commitments in a credible way. On the other hand, reassurance measures are conceived by China as ways of allaying concerns about a China threat by deepening economic and other forms of cooperation. From the Chinese perspective it is not just they fear being contained militarily by the United States but that alliance dynamics limit the range of Asian integration.

Existing security institutions need regular adjustments to achieve Cooperative Security 2.0 in the region.

It is perfectly imaginable that a future regional security order, like the present one, will contain different layers of institutions and practices, bilateral as well as multilateral, strategic partnerships as well as military alliances. But can they be harmonized and the tensions reduced through joint exercises, joint operations in response to humanitarian emergencies, and tackling transnational issues ranging from pandemics and terrorism to climate change? Is the Australia-Japan alignment the kind of arrangement that can provide reassurance to both parties and the region simultaneously without identifying a specific third-party threat or imposing a zero-sum mindset on other issues?[19] Would it be possible that new forms of arms control and arms limitation treaties be negotiated on a regional basis?

Finally, if the aim is a rules-based system, what will be the rules and how can they be collectively sanctioned and enforced? What collection of regional principles and norms could build upon and go beyond agreements like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and discussions underway around Codes of Conduct and interpretations of international law in areas including freedom of navigation?

Cooperative security 2.0 is not a destination but a process. It is a way to manage existing tensions while taking account of multiple interests and the possibilities of deeper regional cooperation without the kind of political integration and supranational authority that has evolved in Europe.

[19]See Thomas Wilkins, "From Strategic partnership to Strategic Alliance? Australia-Japan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific," *Asia Policy*, No. 20 (July 2015).

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Recognizing the suspicions and sensitivities surround these issues, it is again in the world of academic and track-two settings that the discussion can develop.

Shaping a regional security order and advancing cooperative security 2.0 will not take place at a single bilateral summit or a grand regional one like those that produced the Congress of Vienna or the San Francisco Treaty system. Rather it will be a process over several years generated by a shared fear of the economic and military consequences of unchecked strategic rivalry and a shared interest in deeper economic integration. The starting point is understanding of the shifting balance of power and how it fits with evolving ideas about the legitimacy of the regional order and a deeper form of mutual accommodation.