**An animal who is permitted to promise: sovereign individual** (II.1-2)

LATE, RIPE FRUIT

**An animal who is capable of promising**

(comes out of 4 things below)

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| **(1) Memory**Comes from painthrough punishment inflicted by creditor on debtor if debt not paid (II.3). Causing pain compensates b/c it feels good for creditor (II.5-6)**Creditor/debtor relations**(see II.4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 15 for how the above originate in creditor/debtor relations) | **(2) Reason, thinking**Comes from:-- Calculating cause and effect (II.1)-- Weighing, measuring, comparing, determining equivalents (II.8) | **(3) Sense of duty, obligation, conscience*****Is this the same as BC (a)?*** Comes from punishment—if debts not paid as agreed (II.5-6)**(4) Becoming regular, calculable**Comes from:-- Morality of custom (II.2)-- Required to keep promises in creditor/debtor relations | **Bad conscience (b): moralized sense of guilt**Develops when bad conscience (a) becomes connected to idea of Christian God: it becomes guilt before God, a guilt that can never be paid off, except by God’s own sacrifice. A severe form of self-torture (II.21-22).**Bad conscience (a): internalization**Enclosure within society and peace leads to turning instincts for cruelty inwards (if no outward outlet). (II.16).This is developed in those who are subject to power of others (II.17). The weak (priests, slaves) who can’t vent their instincts on anyone else have to turn them inward (Owen 105). |

**Notes:**

•Arrows indicate earlier conditions leading to development of the capacity in question. It is likely that at least some of these should be double arrows, indicating that they affect one another.

• Complications with “bad conscience”:

(1) On the one hand, Nietzsche says that the bad conscience originates in creditor/debtor relations (acc. to II.4, II.8). But the bad conscience is also said to originate in the turning of the instincts for cruelty back upon the self when enclosed in society and peace (II.16), and involves “internalization” and self-denial, self-hatred and maltreatment. Do these need to occur as a result of creditor/debtor relations? Does the debtor need to feel a sense of self-hatred for not paying back his/her debts and getting punished for it? No, Nietzsche says—see II.14 and II.15. So these may be two different origins for the bad conscience, two things that contribute to it.

(2) Mattias Risse argues that N has two forms of the bad conscience in this Treatise: one that involves having a sense of memory, sense of duty and ability to promise that doesn’t have self-hatred involved, and one that does (“The Second Treatise in *On the Genealogy of Morality:* Nietzsche on the Origin of the Bad Conscience.” *European Journal of Philosophy* 9:1 (2001): 55-81). According to Risse, there is a “bad conscience” that emerges from creditor/debtor relations as a nonmoral sense of indebtedness, that one owes something to another and has failed in fulfilling one’s obligation. This bad conscience only becomes moralized later into a sense of deep devaluing of the self, of one’s natural instincts, coming to a fever pitch in the Christian belief that we humans are so completely indebted that we can never pay it off. Thus comes the deep sickness of self-loathing, of the hatred of the human as animal, that is now the meaning of “guilt.” So for Risse, the moral bad conscience is a later development than the earlier bad conscience. I put both of these on the chart.

(3) Owen suggests something similar on pp. 104-105: though the nobles, slaves and priests all are subject to social rules within the society, so would all have to be calculable, capable of promising, etc., the nobles are able to still express their instincts for cruelty both within the society (against the slaves) and outside it. Owen states that neither the priests nor the slaves can do this, so it’s *they* who turn their instincts inwards and develop the bad conscience. Thus we might say there’s a sense of conscience that the nobles have (memory, sense of duty, etc.), but not a bad conscience. Risse calls both of these “bad conscience” and Owen calls on the second one that.

(4) I wonder if the sense of conscience, obligation, duty that develops in the debtor through punishment for not paying his/her debts (II.5-6) is the same as the first bad conscience that Risse mentions, what I’m calling bad conscience (a). I’m not sure about that, but possibly so.

(5) I am not entirely sure if things like memory, regularity, sense of obligation are necessary conditions for the first form of bad conscience (a), or if BC (a) develops at the same time as these do. In other words, I’m not sure about the chronology there, nor, actually, if all of those things numbered (1)-(4) are needed for the bad conscience (a).