As we now progress from Nietzsche to Foucault I am going to be very curious in regards to the manner in which Foucault expands upon, or tinkers with, Nietzsche’s philosophical method, or even genre, of genealogy. What ingredients get added? Which get discarded. Will Foucault maintain the sense of ominousness that Nietzsche offered in his discourse when he pointed directly to certain things (such as the Testaments of the Bible or the “genius” of Christianity), and in doing so, simultaneously insinuated other, perhaps deeper things? Will Foucault’s descriptive presence transcend the individual, specific topics that he discusses in the three books we will read by him? Is Foucault’s primary purpose simply to try to reenact Nietzsche in a later era (the late twentieth century)? Will Foucault be as adamant as Nietzsche in ensuring that he uneasily interpreted? How will Foucault go about analyzing the origins of things? Will he be as sharp-tongued in bringing to our attention perhaps the “flukes”, the minor cough ups, the windiest parts of the road, the incorrect reasoning, that initiated the things that now continue to exist, the things that we see as valuable? How closely does Foucault follow Nietzsche in holding the view of the link between power and knowledge? What I’m going to be really interested in is how much time Foucault will spend articulating the nature of the force wielding the “will to power” versus articulating the nature of the process how this wielding is conducted. Will Foucault make more of a concerted effort than Nietzsche in attempting to tell history from a more objective viewpoint? Or is he, like Nietzsche, interested in making a new mythology with his quasi-historical story telling? It is surely the case that Foucault will dig deeper into some of our contemporary institutions and customs. It will surely be fascinating to note where his priorities lie in relation to Nietzsche.
I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself, and am I only by being not presupposed but posited, and again, posited only in the moment when I posit myself; that is, I am creator and creature [Schöpfer und Geschöpf] in one.
Max Stirner, 1844. (The Ego and Its Own. Ed. David Leopold. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.)
In human beings, creature and creator are combined: in humans there is material, fragments, abundance, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in humans there is also creator, maker, hammer- hardness, spectator-divinity and seventh day:—do you understand this contrast?
Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886. (Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Judith Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.)
October of 1844 was quite the interesting month for births in the Saxon city of Leipzig and surrounding area. On the 15th of that month just outside of the city in the village of Röcken-bei-Lützen Freidrich Nietzsche was born into the word by mama Fransizka and papa Carl. Also that same month in the city itself there was born into the world the work Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum by papa Max Stirner, known most-often in English as The Ego and Its Own.
There is much constroversy and debate around the extent to which Nietzsche was aware of Stirner and his magnum opus, and even if he plagiarized his predecessor. Since I brought up Stirner in seminar and no one outside of Lee seemed to have even heard of him, I feel obliged to provide at least a brief run-down of Stirner’s work and connect it to Nietzsche since even if Freidrich did not plagiarize Max, The Ego and Its Own is still highly relevant to any study of Nietzsche in general and our looking at genealogy in particular.
Max Stirner was a student of G.W.F. Hegel and one of the group of Left or Young Hegelians that included the likes of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels (the latter two of whom would seek to skewer ‘Saint Max’ in the third chapter their German Ideology).
Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own covers much of the same ground that the infant Nietzsche would also cover later in life, and acts to foreshadow greatly Nietzche’s work. The book is divided into two parts, the first of which is simply titled ‘MAN’ and has Stirner tracing his own genealogy of human ‘self-discoveries’. For Stirner, to be born is to be thrust into the world as a physical entity – into the combat of self-assertion with other physical entities of the natural world. As children, we seek out the weaknesses of our ‘enemies’ (the punishment rod of our parents, for example), in order to ‘get behind’ and conquer them. This search leads us to our first ‘self-discovery’, that of our ‘obduracy’, or more generally the discovery of the intellect, spirit, or geist. With this discovery, the youth now recognizes ‘spirit’ as the dominant force over the natural/bodily world, and seeks to align itself with the purity of ‘spirit’ and concern itself only with intellectual or ‘spiritual’ matters. However, ultimately the youth must come to terms with the fact that due to its embodied nature it will never be able to achieve purity of ‘spirit’. This leads to the second ‘self-discovery’, whereby man ‘gets behind’ this ‘spirit’ and discovers his corporeality. At this point, man is concerned to live egoistically and according to its own interests. Finally, as to the question of what becomes of man later in life when he becomes an old man, Stirner says only, “When I become one, there will still be time enough to speak of that.”
Following this same evolving, dialectical movement of physical-ideational-egoistical, Stirner drafts a similar genealogy of the devolpment of humankind as a whole (read: the Western world). For ‘the Ancients’ (Greeks, Romans) the natural world was their primary concern and they were ‘enslaved by existing things’. However, between the work of the Sophists and Socrates there began a process of ‘self-discovery’ and ultimately self-denial in the world of the ‘Ancients’ that culminated with the work of the Skeptics. From here, Stirner sees Judeo-Christianity and the figure of Christ in particular as key in initiating the transition to ‘Modernity’ and the complete denial of bodily self for the sake of purified spirit, i.e., God. Then, Stirner departs from mirroring his earlier genealogy of personal/psychological/moral development by suggesting that his liberal, post-Christian contemporaries are not ‘the Free’ as they like to think of themselves, but rather are really only “the more modern and most modern amongst the ‘moderns’”. Although they may have ‘gotten behind’ God, they have not truly ‘gotten behind’ the spirit of the age, and instead have only replaced the Christian God with their own Modern, secular gods of liberalism, humanism, and socialism whereby one is still required to deny one’s corporeal, egoistic self for the sake of some ideational/spiritual ‘other’ (pure morality, humanity, the state, etc.). This is where the first part of the book and Stirner’s genealogy ends. The second part of the book, ‘I’, consists of Stirner’s extended character treatment of the egoistic ‘unique one’ who, unlike Stirner’s contemporaries, goes beyond simply seeking to ‘brush away’ the ‘other world outside us‘, to also to ‘brushing away’ the ‘other world in us‘ as well; to remove not only God, but Man as well from the ‘Modern’ picture of self as ‘God-man’. Here too Stirner briefly sketches out the ‘egoistic future’ of these ‘unique ones’ as ‘creative nothings’.
So, there is much to be made of comparing Nietzsche to Stirner on their use of genealogy. Like Stirner before him, Nietzsche begins his genealogy of morality with a take on the ‘ancient’ world of nobles, knights, and noble morality as one concerned primarily with the natural world, physicality, and action. Like Stirner’s first ‘self-discovery’, Nietzsche too sees the physical powers and prowess of this ancient/noble/knightly morality overcome by the ideational/spiritual/otherworldly slave revolt in morality brought on by the priestly class, most typified by the dominance of Christianity and its attendant self-denying obedience to a supernatural god. And as Stirner sees his contemporaries as still bound up with the very ‘Modern’ need for some external other even after the ‘death of God’, so too does Nietzsche view post-Christian modernity. Finally, as Stirner enigmatically points to a sort of quasi-achieved, quasi-yet-to-be-achieved ‘unique one’ as the ‘creative nothing’, we see Nietzsche enigmatically pontificating about his quasi-achieved, quasi-yet-to-be-achieved Sovereign Individual.
As quick and dirty as this run-down of a fairly obscure and esoteric precursor to Nietzsche has been, hopefully it has shown the distinct possibility that along with Nietzsche’s more well-known influences of Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer and Paul Rée, the Übermensch was also was reacting to, and building off of, the legacy of Max Stirner.
Free online copies of Stirner’s works:
The Ego and Its Own: http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/max-stirner-the-ego-and-his-own
Stirner’s other works: http://theanarchistlibrary.org/authors/max-stirner