Towards A Theory of Modal-Temporal Interaction

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Abstract: A compositional analysis is provided of temporal perspective and orientation (Condoravdi 2002) of modals in Dutch, English, Gitksan (Tsimshianic) and St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish). Modals interact freely with the tense-aspect architecture in each language. Temporal perspective is determined by an operator scoping over the modal, usually tense, while temporal orientation is determined by aspectual operators below it (and further restricted by the diversity condition). In contrast to much of the literature, it is argued that epistemic modals can scope under past tense. Modal-temporal interactions behave in predictable ways in Dutch, Gitksan and St’át’imcets, whereas the English system is more idiosyncratic and partly lexicalized.*

Keywords: Modals, tense, aspect, epistemic, Gitksan, St’át’imcets, Dutch

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1. INTRODUCTION.

1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. In the investigation of natural language modality, a perennial issue is the extent to which the interpretation of a modal is restricted by temporal factors. The basic problem is illustrated by the different readings of English *might have*, as discussed by Condoravdi (2002) (see also Huddleston & Pullum 2002:203-204, Ippolito 2003). On one reading, *might have* expresses present epistemic uncertainty about a past event.

(1) John *might have* won the game (but I’m not sure if he did).

The sentence in 1 asserts that it is consistent with the present epistemic state of the speaker (or some other salient agent) that John won the game at some time preceding the utterance time. A second reading of *might have*, exemplified in 2, says that at some past time it was metaphysically possible for the world to develop in such a way that John would win the game. The sentence is about the different ways in which history could have unfolded after some past time.

(2) John *might have* won the game (if he hadn’t been feeling sick that day).

These two readings of *might have* differ both in their modal flavour (epistemic vs. metaphysical) and their temporal profiles. Importantly, the available interpretations of the *might have* sentences represent a small subset of the logically possible combinations of modal flavour and temporal properties. We summarize the two attested combinations in Table 1, which also introduces some necessary terminology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODAL BASE</th>
<th>TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE</th>
<th>TEMPORAL ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>epistemic</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circumstantial</td>
<td>past</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Two readings of *might have* (based on Condoravdi 2002).

The MODAL BASE is a conversational background in the sense of Kratzer 1981, 1991, a function which narrows down the set of worlds a modal quantifies over. The modal base, together with a second conversational background, the ORDERING SOURCE (also due to Kratzer), determines the modal flavour. Again following Kratzer’s early work, we adopt a broad distinction between two types of modal bases: epistemic and circumstantial. All non-epistemic flavours of modality involve a circumstantial modal base; this includes what Condoravdi calls metaphysical modality, as well as – in the terminology of Portner (2009) – ‘priority’ modality (such as deontic) and ‘dynamic’ modality (such as ability). The TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE (henceforth TP) of a modal is the time at which its conversational background is evaluated (Condoravdi 2002). In 1, this is the utterance time/present, while in 2, the TP is some time in the past. A modal’s TEMPORAL
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ORIENTATION (henceforth TO, Condoravdi 2002) is the relation between its TP and the time of the prejacent event. In 1, the TO is past, because John’s potential winning precedes the utterance time. In 2, the TO is future, because John’s potential winning follows the past time at which it was still possible for him to win.

The restricted set of modal-temporal combinations in Table 1 raises the question of what constrains interactions between TP, TO and modal flavour. The answer to one part of the puzzle – the apparent restriction of the epistemic interpretation to present TP – has been argued by Condoravdi and others to follow from a general stipulation that epistemic modals cannot scope under either past tense or the perfect auxiliary. This is often argued to follow from a syntactic hierarchy whereby epistemic modals scope higher than non-epistemic ones (Brennan 1993, Cinque 1999, among many others).

In this paper, we propose a compositional theory of the interaction between modals and tense and aspect, which builds on previous analyses (in particular Condoravdi’s) but differs from them in a number of respects. As far as TP is concerned, we argue that it depends only on temporal operators scoping above the modal (in particular, tense), and that there are no restrictions of a grammatical nature on the possible combinations of TP and modal flavour. In particular we provide extensive empirical evidence for the existence of epistemic modals with past TP, which we analyze as involving a past tense. We also discuss pragmatic and discourse-based factors which may limit or enhance the availability of past-T tense readings. As for TO, we propose an analysis in which it is determined by aspectual operators scoping under the modal, in combination with the lexical aspect of the predicate and a general condition on the interpretation of modals that we adapt from Condoravdi (the DIVERSITY CONDITION). The aspectual operators we propose have general meanings that are motivated for independent reasons. Particular languages may differ from each other in whether these operators are overt or covert (phonologically null).

Crucially, in our analysis the modal itself is essentially atemporal. The temporal interpretation of the modal is derived from the way it interacts in a compositional fashion with independently-motivated temporal operators. In our view, this represents the null hypothesis. Our analysis is thus both simpler and more general than previous ones. And whereas other accounts have often focused only on English, the present paper presents evidence from three additional languages, including two non-Indo-European ones; see also Chen et al. 2017 for a discussion of a broader sample of languages from the same perspective.

1.2. MAIN CLAIMS OF THIS PAPER. Our discussion is based on data from four languages from three families: English, Dutch, Gitksan (Tsimshianic) and Stát’imcets (Salish). We make two proposals about the relation between conversational backgrounds and temporal properties. Our first and primary proposal is that a modal’s flavour does not depend on its temporal perspective. In contrast to a large body of literature (discussed below), we propose that all modals, including epistemic ones, scope under tense and therefore receive past TP if and only if the tense provides a past reference time. The relevant data include examples like 3.

\[(3)\] Context: Yesterday, my friend John was playing a game. At the time, I didn’t know if he won, but I bought a bottle of champagne just in case. I found out when I got home that John had lost. My spouse asked me why I had bought the champagne. I replied: Because John might have won the game.
Here the speaker is talking about a past epistemic state: at the utterance time she knows that John did not win the game, but at some point in the past she had considered it possible that he had won. The modal base is epistemic, but the TP is past. We argue, in line with a minority of authors including von Fintel and Gillies (2008), that the modal is simply scoping under past tense here. There is therefore no need to appeal to special pragmatic mechanisms to derive the attested interpretation.

Our proposal that there are no grammatical restrictions on the possible combinations of modal flavour and TP is supported by Dutch, which overtly encodes TP on modals (via tense marking), and in which TP is predictably determined by the tense morphology, regardless of modal flavour. It is also supported by Gitksan and St’át’imcets, which overtly encode modal flavour (via lexically distinct epistemic vs. circumstantial modals; Rullmann et al. 2008, Peterson 2010, Matthewson 2013). In the appropriate contexts, all flavours of modals in these languages allow for past TPs.

Our second proposal has to do with correlations between modal flavour and TO. Here, we provide cross-linguistic empirical support for a well-known correlation between a circumstantial modal base and future TO (Condoravdi 2002, Werner 2003, among others). We show that this correlation holds in all the four languages we investigate. While modals with a circumstantial modal base are restricted to future TO, epistemic modals are free to have any TO (past, present or future). We provide a compositional analysis of TO, according to which it is uniformly provided by aspectual operators located below the modal.

These proposals lead us to predict the set of possible modal base/TP/TO combinations in Table 2, as the null hypothesis for all languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAST TP</th>
<th>PRESENT TP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAST TO</td>
<td>epistemic</td>
<td>epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT TO</td>
<td>epistemic</td>
<td>epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURE TO</td>
<td>epistemic, circumstantial</td>
<td>epistemic, circumstantial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Predicted modal base/TP/TO combinations.**

This contrasts with Condoravdi’s (2002) more restricted set of predicted possible combinations summarized in Table 1 above, according to which epistemic modals do not allow past TPs, and therefore for example ‘there are no modals with a past perspective and a past [or present] orientation’ (Condoravdi 2002:5).

In terms of how TP and TO are compositionally derived, we argue for a potentially universal basic architecture, in which TP is provided by temporal operators above the modal, and TO by operators scoping below it. We assume that typically tense scopes above the modal and aspectual operators below it; but see Chen et al. 2017 for discussion of languages in which (at least some) epistemic modals, which appear to be adverbials syntactically, can scope above tense (SENĆOFEN (Salish), Hul’q’umi’num’ (Salish), Atayal (Formosan) and Blackfoot (Algonquian)). It should also be noted that in English perfect aspect can scope over semi-modals (as opposed to modal auxiliaries), as in *He has been able to dance*, and similarly for modal verbs
in Dutch.\(^1\) However, we leave such cases outside of the discussion; in the rest of the paper we will be making the simplifying assumption that tense always scope above the modal and aspect below it.

The paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of the introduction we provide background on the languages we discuss and our methodology (§1.3) and theoretical background (§1.4). In §2 we argue that a modal’s TP is provided by a higher tense. We show that this is the case for any flavour of modal; our core empirical argument for this is that epistemic modals with past TP exist in Dutch, Gitksan and St’át’imcets, and English. §3 provides evidence that lower temporal operators, typically aspects, restrict TO. Again we show that our architecture and semantic proposals are supported in the four languages. In §4 we show how our formal analysis applies to a representative range of data from Dutch, Gitksan and St’át’imcets. §5 addresses the lexical complexities of the English modal auxiliary system, including the differing behaviour of individual modals in sequence of tense and free indirect discourse environments. In §6 we compare our analysis to previous ones, and §7 summarizes and outlines avenues for future research.

1.3. LANGUAGES DISCUSSED AND METHODOLOGY. In addition to English and Dutch, we discuss two lesser-known languages, Gitksan and St’át’imcets. Gitksan is an Interior Tsimshianic language which is spoken along the upper drainage of the Skeena River in northwestern interior British Columbia, Canada. It comprises a chain of dialects and is very closely related to neighbouring Nisga’a, spoken in the Nass River Valley. Gitksan currently has fewer than 400 speakers (First Peoples’ Cultural Council 2014). Our data come from speakers of three dialects: Barbara Sennott, from Ansbayaxw (Kispiox), Vincent Gogag, from Git-anyaaw (Kitwancool), and Hector Hill, from Gijigyukwhla (Gitsegukla).

St’át’imcets (a.k.a. Lillooet) is a Northern Interior Salish language spoken in the southwest interior of British Columbia. The language has just over 100 first-language speakers according to First Peoples’ Cultural Council (2014), but that number is now smaller. Data come from speakers of both the Upper St’át’imcets dialect (Carl Alexander, the late Beverley Frank, the late Gertrude Ned, and the late Rose Agnes Whitley) and the Lower St’át’imcets dialect (Laura Thevarge).

For Gitksan and St’át’imcets, our data and generalizations are based on fieldwork. Fieldwork methodologies used include: translation tasks (both to and from the contact language, English), acceptability judgment tasks (in which the consultant evaluates a target language utterance in a particular discourse context), and storyboard tasks (in which targeted contexts are provided to the consultant by a series of pictures, in response to which the consultant tells a story). See Matthewson 2004, Burton & Matthewson 2015 and Tonhauser & Matthewson 2016 for further details.

For English and Dutch, our data sources are introspective native-speaker judgements by the authors, examples reported in the linguistic literature, attested examples gathered through informal corpus searches and encountered in general reading, and small informal questionnaire studies involving non-linguist native speakers.

1.4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND. We adopt the general framework of generative linguistics and compositional semantics (as outlined in Heim & Kratzer 1998, for instance), but beyond that, we stay as theoretically neutral as possible. As far as morphosyntax is concerned, we

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\(^1\) See footnote 27 for an example.
assume that tense is located in a head T that scopes over the clausal core consisting of the verb and its arguments, which for the sake of concreteness we call the VP, assuming the VP-internal subject hypothesis (abstracting away from the mechanism by which the subject ends up in its surface position).

Crucially, in our analysis tense also scopes over modals. In languages like Dutch, modal verbs behave in the same way as regular (main) verbs in that they inflect for tense, and this is true for English semi-modals, like have to, as well. That in such cases the tense scopes over the modal is obvious when it comes to non-epistemic interpretations. For instance, on the deontic reading of 4 and its English translation, the sentence clearly expresses a PAST obligation.²

(4)  Context (deontic): Jan wanted to go see a movie last night, but he couldn’t because he had to wait for the delivery of an important package.
Jan moest thuis blijven.
Jan NEC.PST.3SG at.home stay-INF
‘Jan had to stay at home.’ (Dutch)

A large part of this paper is devoted to arguing that this is true for epistemic modals as well. Thus, the sentence in 0 also has an epistemic reading, expressing a PAST epistemic state: it asserts that John was at home in every world compatible with some agent’s epistemic state at a time before the utterance time. This is illustrated by the example in 5; the particle wel often helps to bring out the epistemic reading but is not required.

(5)  Context (epistemic): I was looking for Jan last night. I had searched all his usual haunts except his house and hadn’t found him yet.
Jan moest (wel) thuis zijn.
Jan NEC.PST.3SG (PRT) at.home be-INF
‘Jan had to be at home.’ (Dutch)

Thus, one of our main claims is that, in general, past TP results from the modal being in the immediate scope of a past tense morpheme, irrespective of the flavour of the modal.

In English, however, modal auxiliaries don’t seem to be inflected for tense. Chomsky (1957) treated modal auxiliaries and tense as being in complementary distribution. But in §2.4 we will argue that English modals can have past TP, again irrespective of whether they are epistemic or not. In §5, we propose (based among other things on sequence of tense behaviour) that English modal auxiliaries include tense information as part of their lexical entry.

As for aspect, we argue that aspectual heads, such as perfect and (im)perfective, scope UNDER modals, determining the modal’s TO. Thus, we assume the basic syntactic hierarchy in 6

² We follow the conventions outlined in the Leipzig Glossing Rules (https://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php). Abbreviations not included in the Leipzig Glossing Rules are the following: I/II = series I/II pronoun, AUT = autonomous intransitivizer, CCNJ = clausal conjunction, CIRC = circumstantial modal, CN = common noun connective, CNTR = contrastive, COUNTER = counter to expectations, DEON = deontic modal, DIR = directive transitivizer, DM = determinate marker, EPIS = epistemic modal, EXIS = assertion of existence, NEC = necessity modal, PN = proper noun connective, POS = possibility modal, PROSP = prospective, PRT = particle, REDUP = reduplication, SPT = spatiotemporal.
as a null hypothesis; this is inherited from Condoravdi (2002), among others, and will be expanded below.

(6) \[ \text{tense} > \text{modal} > \text{aspect} > \text{VP} \quad \text{(to be revised)} \]

The semantics is built on this structure in a compositional fashion. The basic types we assume are \(e\) (entities), \(t\) (truth values), \(s\) (possible worlds), \(i\) (times, i.e. temporal intervals), and \(l\) (events). As is standard, propositions are sets of possible worlds, or more technically, functions from worlds to truth values, and are therefore of type \(\langle s,t \rangle\) (abbreviated as \(st\) when inside a more complex type). Following Kratzer (1998), we assume that VPs denote properties of events, of type \(\langle l,st \rangle\), and that aspect maps these onto properties of times (type \(\langle i,st \rangle\)). Modals denote functions from type \(\langle i,st \rangle\) to \(\langle i,st \rangle\). Finally, properties over times (of type \(\langle l,st \rangle\)) are turned into propositions (of type \(\langle s,t \rangle\)) by applying them to tense. Adopting a referential analysis of tense analogous to pronouns (Partee 1973, Heim 1994, Abusch 1997, Kratzer 1998), in a recent implementation by Bochnak (2016), we assume that reference times are provided by (covert) temporal variables (located in \(T\)), which bear indices and receive their values from the assignment function. Morphological tenses contribute features which place presuppositions on the potential values of the reference time but which otherwise denote the identity function.

We now provide sample denotations of the basic functional morphemes we will be using. Tense features for English and Dutch are given in 7 and 8, and for Gitksan and St’át’imcets in 9. See §2.3 for discussion of the Gitksan/St’át’imcets non-future tense. Throughout the paper, denotations are relativized to a variable assignment \(g\), time of utterance \(t_0\) and world of utterance \(w_0\). There also are two additional parameters of interpretation, namely the conversational backgrounds for modals argued for by Kratzer (1981, 1991): modal base \(f\), and ordering source \(h\). These will become relevant in a moment.

(7) \[
\begin{align*}
\text{PAST} & \quad g,t_0,w_0,f,h & = & \lambda t : t < t_0 . t
\end{align*}
\]

(8) \[
\begin{align*}
\text{PRESENT} & \quad g,t_0,w_0,f,h & = & \lambda t : t = t_0 . t
\end{align*}
\]

(9) \[
\begin{align*}
\text{NON-FUTURE} & \quad g,t_0,w_0,f,h & = & \lambda t : t \leq t_0 . t
\end{align*}
\]

In 10 we give language-neutral lexical entries for possibility and necessity modals. \textsc{pos} and \textsc{neq} are ‘pure’ modals, abstracting away from additional tense or aspect features that are encoded in specific modals in certain languages, which we will discuss below. The interpretation of modals depends on the modal base \(f\) and ordering source \(h\), which are functions from an evaluation world \(w\) and an evaluation time \(t\) to sets of propositions. The modal takes as its argument a prejacent tenseless proposition \(P\) of type \(\langle i,st \rangle\) and yields a function of the same type, relativized to the time and world of evaluation \((t,w)\) on which the conversational backgrounds also depend. The modal proposition asserts that the prejacent is true in some/all of the most highly-ranked worlds in the intersection of the propositions provided by the modal base,

\footnote{The ordering relation \(t_1 \leq t_2\) means that no part of \(t_1\) is later than any part of \(t_2\). See Heim and Kratzer 1998 for the use of the ‘colon’ notation in the lambda-terms to represent presuppositions.}

\footnote{For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we treat \(f\) and \(h\) as contextual parameters of interpretation, rather than as covert variables in the object language, but nothing crucial hinges on this decision.}
as evaluated at w and t. The value of t is constrained by tense higher up in the tree.\(^5,6\)

\[(10)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } \boxed{\text{POS}}_{g,t_0,w_0,f,h} &= \lambda P_{<i,st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \exists w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\cap f(w,t)) & \& P(t)(w')] \\
\text{b. } \boxed{\text{NEC}}_{g,t_0,w_0,f,h} &= \lambda P_{<i,st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \forall w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\cap f(w,t)) \rightarrow P(t)(w')]
\end{align*}
\]

The viewpoint aspects which apply below the modal include firstly perfective and imperfective. Simple standard denotations for these aspects are given in 11-12 (adapted from Kratzer 1998).

\[(11)\]
\[
\boxed{\text{PFV}}_{g,t_0,w_0,f,h} = \lambda P_{<i,st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \exists e [P(e)(w) & \tau(e) \subseteq t]
\]

\[(12)\]
\[
\boxed{\text{IPFV}}_{g,t_0,w_0,f,h} = \lambda P_{<i,st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \exists e [P(e)(w) & t \subseteq \tau(e)]
\]

In the perfective the event time \(\tau(e)\) is included in the reference time \(t\), whereas in the imperfective \(t\) is included in \(\tau(e)\) (Klein 1994, Kratzer 1998). Languages may differ in whether the perfective and imperfective heads are overt or not; see §2 and §3 for further discussion of individual languages.

In addition to perfective/imperfective (which we’ll refer to as \textsc{INCLUSION ASPECT} or \(\text{Asp}_{\text{inc}}\)), we assume that there is a second kind of viewpoint aspect, which encodes an ordering relation between \(\tau(e)\) and \(t\). The core cases of \textsc{ORDERING ASPECT} (\(\text{Asp}_{\text{ord}}\)) are perfect and prospective. These aspectual operators co-occur with (im)perfective, with the perfect/prospective head being higher than the (im)perfective head; witness constructions like \textit{He might have been waiting for you} (Chomsky 1957, Pancheva 2003, Liao 2005, Toews 2015). We therefore assume the expanded hierarchy in 13. The null hypothesis is that this hierarchical order of the two viewpoint aspects is universal, although of course this may be falsified by empirical testing in other languages.

\[(13)\]
\[
\text{tense} > \text{modal} > \text{ordering aspect} > \text{inclusion aspect} > \text{VP}
\]

Ordering aspects cannot have the same semantic type as inclusion aspects, but must denote functions from properties of times to properties of times (type \(<<i,st>><i,st>>\)). For reasons which will become clear below, we adopt slightly different ordering aspects for English and Dutch on the one hand, and Gitksan and St’át’imcets on the other. The denotations of the ordering aspects are given in 14-17. In each language, one of these is overt and one is covert. The perfect is the overt member of the pair in English and Dutch, and the prospective is the overt member in Gitksan and St’át’imcets.\(^7\) In both pairs of languages the non-overt aspect covers a

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5 The \textsc{BEST} operator picks out the most highly-ranked worlds. For a definition, see von Fintel and Heim 2011:61, Portner 2009:67; see Kratzer 1991 for an alternative treatment which doesn’t make use of the limit assumption.

6 As far as the types are concerned it is possible to stack modals; this happens in Dutch, and with English semi-modals. The fact that English modal auxiliaries can’t stack (in most dialects) is presumably due to morphosyntactic constraints.

7 We are adopting a simplified analysis of the English/Dutch perfect, according to which it only introduces anteriority. It has been pointed out that many of the properties typically attributed to the perfect are really properties of the \textsc{PRESENT} perfect, which are absent (or not obligatory) in other uses of the perfect, such as the pluperfect, the future perfect, and the infinitival perfect...
timespan that includes the reference time and that is the complement of the timespan covered by its overt counterpart. This means that the aspect that is morphologically marked is also semantically marked in the sense of having the more specific meaning, whereas the morphologically unmarked aspect represents the ‘elsewhere’ case.

(14) \[\text{PERF} \] \[g^{t_1},w_0,f,h\] = \[\lambda P_{<i,si>,\lambda t \lambda w} \exists t' [t' < t \& P(t')(w)]\] (English, Dutch)

(15) \[\text{NON-PERF} \] \[g^{t_1},w_0,f,h\] = \[\lambda P_{<i,si>,\lambda t \lambda w} \exists t' [t < t' \& P(t')(w)]\] (English, Dutch)

(16) \[\text{PROSP} \] \[g^{t_1},w_0,f,h\] = \[\lambda P_{<i,si>,\lambda t \lambda w} \exists t' [t < t' \& P(t')(w)]\] (Gitksan, Stát’át’imcets)

(17) \[\text{NON-PROSP} \] \[g^{t_1},w_0,f,h\] = \[\lambda P_{<i,si>,\lambda t \lambda w} \exists t' [t < t' \& P(t')(w)]\] (Gitksan, Stát’át’imcets)

We follow Condoravdi (2002) in assuming that the perfect plays a role in contributing TO; we will extend this to the claim that all ordering aspects perform this function.

The overall type structure we are adopting is summarized in 18. Syntactic node labels are included merely for illustrative purposes; we call the projection headed by tense TenseP instead of TP to avoid confusion with temporal perspective.

(18) TenseP
\[<s,t>\]

[FEATURE] T1
\[<i,i>\] i \[<i,si>,<i,si>\]

[FEATURE] Mod
\[<i,si>,<i,si>\]

[FEATURE] AspOrdP
\[<i,si>,<i,si>\]

AspOrd
\[<<i,si>,<i,si>>,<<i,si>,<i,si>>\]

AspIncP
\[<<i,si>,<i,si>>\]

AspInc
\[<<i,si>,<i,si>>,<<i,si>,<i,si>>\]

VP
\[<l,st>,<l,st>>\]

19 provides a simple denotation to illustrate the basics of our system. Supporting argumentation will be provided throughout §2 and §3, and in §4 we work through some examples in more detail.

(19) John had to be in his office.

\(\text{PAST TP, PRESENT TO}
\)

\[\lambda w . \forall w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,g(i))} \cap f(f(w,g(i))) \rightarrow \exists t' [g(i) \leq t' \& \exists e [\text{John . be . in . his . office}(e)(w') \& \tau(e) \subseteq t']]]\]

(where \(g(i) < t_0\))

(Portner 2011, Bohnemeyer 2014, among others). This is also true for the perfect appearing in the complement of a modal. So, for instance, while in English the present perfect cannot be combined with a definite time adverbial, this restriction does not hold for the modal perfect.

(i) *Mary has arrived yesterday.

(ii) Mary must have arrived yesterday.
Clauses (TensePs) like 19 denote propositions (i.e. functions from possible worlds to truth values); if the TenseP is a root clause that is uttered assertively by the speaker, this proposition is applied to the actual world w₀ to yield a truth value. Note that in the semantics T′ (consisting of the head T plus a tense feature) is treated as an argument of the modal, even though syntactically T′ scopes over (i.e. c-commands) Mod. This is simply a consequence of our decision to treat tense as representing a variable of type i rather than as a function of a more complex type. For the sake of clarity we will continue to speak informally of tense as having scope over the modal, in accordance with the hierarchy in 13. If we wanted to bring our formal semantics in line with this, it would be trivial to do so by type-raising T′ to type <<i,st>,st> (analogous to the standard raising of proper names from type e to <<e,t>,t>.

2. MODALS WITH ANY CONVERSATIONAL BACKGROUND CAN HAVE ANY TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE. In this section we argue that, in principle, modals with any type of conversational background can have either past or present temporal perspective. Since the most controversial aspect of this claim concerns epistemic modals, we devote the section mainly to demonstrating that epistemic modals with past TP (henceforth PAST EPISTEMICS) exist. Our findings will weaken the main argument behind the claim that epistemic modals always scope over tense (Hacquard 2011, among others). We begin with a brief overview of the debate about past epistemic modality. We then present evidence from Dutch, Gitksan and Stát'imcets for past epistemic readings, and finally we turn to English, whose lexical and morphological idiosyncrasies make it possibly the least ideal language in which to study the question (see e.g. Stowell 2004 for a summary of some of these idiosyncrasies). We conclude the section with some speculation about why the past epistemic readings, while possible, are dispreferred.

2.1. THE DEBATE ABOUT EPISTEMIC MODALS WITH PAST TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE. The existence of past epistemic readings has been a subject of lively debate. The question is whether sentences like 20a-c can make an assertion about what was epistemically possible or necessary at some past time.

(20) a. Jack’s wife couldn’t be rich. (Stowell 2004:625)
   b. There had to be a hundred people there. (Stowell 2004:626)
   c. There might have been ice cream in the freezer. (von Fintel & Gillies 2008:87)

The existence of past epistemic readings has frequently been denied in the literature, for a variety of languages (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1975, Cinque 1999, Drubig 2001, Condoravdi 2002, Stowell 2004, Hacquard 2006, 2011, Borgono & Cummins 2007, Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria 2008b, Laca 2008, among others). At least some authors frame the issue in terms of the relative scope of modals and tense: the claim is that (in English or universally) epistemic modals must scope over tense (Cinque 1999, Stowell 2004, Hacquard 2006, 2011). This is often accompanied by the observation that non-epistemic modals can scope under tense, something which we take to be uncontroversial.

Although the view that epistemic modals always scope over tense is widespread, some scholars have argued against it. Von Fintel and Gillies 2008:87 give the example in 21, noting that ‘It is possible for [the speaker] to have said something true, even though at the time of utterance she knows ... there is no ice cream in the freezer’ (see also Portner 2009, Abusch 2012 for discussion).
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(21) **Context:** Sophie is looking for some ice cream and checks the freezer. There is none in there. Asked why she opened the freezer, she replies:

There might have been ice cream in the freezer.

Other authors have argued for past epistemic readings on the basis of data from languages other than English, including Eide (2003, 2005) for Norwegian, and Homer (2010) and Martin (2011) for French.

**2.2. Dutch.** Since Dutch modals are just like any other verbs in that they inflect for tense, we assume that tense scopes over the modal. We therefore predict that the modal’s TP will be determined by its tense marking, which is exactly what we find. Just as in English, Dutch modals can have a range of different flavours, but here we will focus on epistemic readings. Our examples involve the universal modal *moeten* (‘must, have to’) and the existential modal *kunnen* (‘can, could, may, might’), both of which readily accept epistemic interpretations, as well as non-epistemic ones. (See Foolen & de Hoop 2009 for discussion of various factors determining the modal flavour of *moeten* and *kunnen*.)

When an epistemic modal is in the simple present tense, as in (22), the TP is present as well.

(22) De sleutel *moet* / *kan* (wel) ( eens) in de la *ligg-en.*

The key *NEC.PRS.3SG / POS.PRS.3SG* *(PRT) (PRT)* in the drawer *lie-INF*

‘The key must / might be in the drawer.’ *PRESENT TP, PRESENT TO*

In (22), the *moet* version contains the optional discourse particle *wel*, and the *kan* version contains *wel eens*; these particles often accompany epistemic modals in Dutch. They disambiguate the modal towards an epistemic interpretation and tend to make the sentences more colloquial, but an epistemic interpretation is also possible without them. The sentence in (22) asserts that at the speech time it is epistemically necessary/possible that the keys are in the drawer at that time. The TP is present because the modal is inflected for present tense. (For discussion of TO, see §3.)

Instead of with the simple modal verb *kan* as in (22), epistemic possibility with present TP can also be expressed by means of the double modal form *zou kunnen*, as in (23). 8

(23) De sleutel *zou* in de la *kunn-en* *ligg-en.*

The key *shall.PST.3SG* in the drawer *POS-INF* *lie-INF*

‘The key may/might be in the drawer.’ *PRESENT TP, PRESENT TO*

*zou kunnen* contains the past-tense form of the modal verb *zullen* ‘shall, will’ plus the infinitival form of *kunnen*. Semantically, it is a “weakened” form of *kunnen*, analogous to the use of subjunctive modals in other Indo-European languages (cf. von Fintel & Iatridou 2008). We will assume that *zou kunnen* can be treated as a single lexicalized present subjunctive form of *kunnen*, but we will refrain from analyzing this further in this paper.

Now let’s turn to epistemic modals with *PAST TP*. The past-tense counterparts of (22a,b) are

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8 For unknown reasons, the analogous form *zou moeten* can only express weak deontic necessity, and cannot be epistemic.
As pointed out by Boogaart (2007), moest and kon can have an epistemic interpretation, reflecting the epistemic state of some agent – most likely (but not necessarily) the speaker – at a past time. On this reading, the sentence asserts that at some (salient) time $t$ preceding the utterance time, it was epistemically necessary or possible that the key was in the drawer. This past epistemic reading is brought out by contexts such as the following.

(25) **Discourse context for a past epistemic reading of 24 with moest**
    ‘Yesterday, when I wanted to go to work, I couldn’t find my key anywhere. I tried to remember where I might have left it the previous night. I felt in the pocket of my pants, looked in my nightstand, and even searched the waste basket, but all in vain. Suddenly I knew. It **had to be in the kitchen drawer**.’

(26) **Discourse context for a past epistemic reading of 24 with kon**
    ‘When I arrived at work yesterday, I discovered that I didn’t have my key on me. I called my wife and asked if I had left it somewhere at home by any chance. She asked me where she should look. I tried to remember where I might have left it the previous evening. It **might have been in the kitchen drawer**, so I asked her to look there.’

In addition to the simple past form kon, Dutch has another way of expressing past epistemic possibility, namely with the pluperfect form *had kunnen*, as in 27.

(27) De sleutel **had** in de la **kunn-en** lieg-en.
    the key **have.PST.3SG** in the drawer **can-INF** lie-INF
    ‘The key might have been in the drawer.’

As van Gerrevink and de Hoop (2011) point out, in Dutch the pluperfect form of a modal (of any flavour) implies the falsity of its prejacent. Thus, 27 implies that the key was not actually in the drawer. This is not a coincidence. In Dutch, much as in English, the pluperfect serves a dual function: in addition to its purely temporal interpretation as the past tense of a perfect, it is used for expressing past counterfactuality, for example in conditionals (cf. Iatridou 2000, Ippolito 2003). In the latter role it has the same function that in some other Indo-European languages is

\[9\]

It should be pointed out that the simple past form kon can also have a weak-possibility interpretation with PRESENT TP, equivalent to the ‘subjunctive’ double modal *zou kunnen* in (23). Here the past-tense morphology is not a semantic tense but expresses ‘modal remoteness’ (Huddleston & Pullum 2002:148-151) or ‘non-reality’ (Geerts et al. 1984:466-472). We will not attempt to analyze this present-TP use of morphologically past modals in this paper. The possibility of having a present-TP, weak epistemic possibility reading may make it harder to detect the past-TP reading of kon outside of a context like 26.

\[10\]

Boogaart (2007) claims that this is restricted to free indirect discourse; see §6 for discussion.
fulfilled by the past subjunctive. What is important for our purposes is that a ‘past subjunctive’ possibility modal like in 27 does not have to be circumstantial, but can also be epistemic. On the latter reading, the pluperfect had kunnen is very close in meaning to the simple past kon (cf. 24). The only difference is that with the pluperfect, the event is viewed in hindsight; at the utterance time, the speaker knows that the prejacent was false (i.e. the key was not in the drawer). It is probably for this reason that in a context like that of von Fintel and Gillies’s ‘ice cream’ example 21, the pluperfect form had kunnen is strongly preferred over the simple past form kon, whereas a context like 26 requires kon. These complexities will not be part of our formal analysis. Our main goal here is simply to show that past epistemic readings are possible in Dutch.

In this section we have seen that, in accordance with one of the main empirical claims of this paper, Dutch modals can have past epistemic interpretations. Past TP is morphologically marked either by past tense on the modal or by the counterfactual pluperfect form.

2.3. Gitksan. We now turn to Gitksan, the first of two languages which provide a different kind of evidence for modals with past epistemic readings. The language has lexically dedicated epistemic modals, so there can be no doubt that the relevant examples are epistemic. However, Gitksan does not have explicit marking for tense, so we have to rely on context to make sure the temporal perspective is past.

We begin with some background on the Gitksan temporal system. Neither past nor present tense is overtly marked. Temporally unmarked predicates are compatible with events which are either fully in the past, or ongoing at the utterance time, depending on discourse context (Jóhannsdóttir & Matthewson 2007). This is illustrated for eventive and stative predicates in 28 and 29 respectively. Note that these examples are in the perfective aspect (indicated by the absence of the overt imperfective marker yukw).

(28)  
Baχ=t  
run=DM  
‘Yoko ran’ / ‘Yoko is running.’  
(Jóhannsdóttir & Matthewson 2007)

(29)  
Siipxw=t  
sick=DM  
‘James was sick (yesterday)’ / ‘James is sick.’  
(Matthewson 2013:357)

Future time reference is obligatorily marked by the marker dim, as illustrated in 30-31 (see Jóhannsdóttir & Matthewson 2007, Matthewson 2013).

(30)  
*(Dim)  
limx=t  
‘James will sing tomorrow.’  
(Matthewson 2013:357)

(31)  
*(Dim)  
siipxw=t  
‘James will be sick tomorrow.’  
(Matthewson 2013:357)

Following Jóhannsdóttir and Matthewson (2007), we assume that all finite clauses contain a phonologically null, non-future tense. In the formal implementation of Bochnak (2016), the non-
future restriction is modeled as a tense feature, whose denotation is given in 32 (repeated from 9).

\[
\text{⟦NON-FUTURE⟧}^{g, t_0, w_0, f, h} = \lambda t : t \leq t_0 . t
\]

We analyze \( \text{dim} \) as a prospective aspect; its denotation is repeated in 33.

\[
\text{⟦PROSP⟧}^{g, t_0, w_0, f, h} = \lambda P_{<i, st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \exists t' [t < t' & P(t')(w)]
\]

Just like Abusch’s (1985) WOLL morpheme, the Gitksan prospective co-occurs with tense. This analysis correctly predicts that if the time interval picked out by \( T \) is in the past, so-called ‘past future’ readings obtain, as shown in 34.

\[
\text{Gilbil}=hl\text{ ganuutxw}=hl\\\text{ hli}=\text{daa}=t \text{ mahl-i}=s \text{ Diana dim wil yee=t}\\\text{two}=\text{CN} \text{ week}=\text{CN} \text{ PRT=SPT=3.1} \text{ tell-TR}=\text{PN} \text{ Diana PROSP COMP go}=3.1\\\text{goo}=hl \text{ Winnipeg ji hlaa (am)} \text{ k'i'y}=hl \text{ ganuutxw.}\\\text{LOC}=\text{CN} \text{ Winnipeg IRR INCEP (only) one-CN week}\\\text{‘Diana said two weeks ago that she would go to Winnipeg after one week.’}\\\text{(adapted from Jóhannsdóttir & Matthewson 2007)}
\]

We also postulate a phonologically covert non-prospective ordering aspect, given in 35 (repeated from 17), which is always present when prospective \( \text{dim} \) is absent. In the absence of any modal, the non-prospective aspect would be essentially vacuous (replicating the non-futurity of the event time already captured by the non-future tense). When a modal is present, however, the non-prospective has detectable effects on temporal orientation (see §3.3 below).

\[
\text{⟦NON-PROSP⟧}^{g, t_0, w_0, f, h} = \lambda P_{<i, st>} \lambda t \lambda w . \exists t' [t \leq t' & P(t')(w)]
\]

An interesting and correct prediction of the temporal system proposed here is that due to the absence in the language of an instantaneous present tense morpheme, both eventive and stative perfective predicates can pick out eventualities which are ongoing at the utterance time, without the need for imperfective marking (see Bennett & Partee 1978 on the consequences of an instantaneous present tense). For example, 28-29 assert that there is an eventuality of running/sleeping within some non-future time interval. If that non-future time interval includes the utterance time, then the running/sleeping can be ongoing at the utterance time. It will, of course, likely continue for at least some moments into the future (cf. Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013). But since running and sleeping are cumulative (Krifka 1998), there can still be an event of the right type contained within the non-future time interval.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) This contrasts with the situation in a language like English, which has a present tense denoting an instantaneous moment (Bennett & Partee 1978). We assume that eventive predicates like \( \text{run} \), although they are cumulative, lack the subinterval property (Dowty 1986). This means that not every instantaneous subpart of a running event counts as a running event. Present perfectives are therefore unable to assert the existence of a running event inside the present moment (Bennett & Partee 1978). See section 3.2 for further discussion. We thank an anonymous reviewer for asking us to clarify these points.
Gitksan lexically distinguishes epistemic from circumstantial modals (Peterson 2010, Matthewson 2013). An epistemic example with present TP is shown in 36, and circumstantial modals with present TP are given in 37-38.

(36) \[\text{Limx} = \text{imaa} = t \quad \text{Bob.} \]
\[\text{sing} = \text{EPIS} = \text{DM} \quad \text{Bob} \]
‘Bob might be singing.’ (Matthewson 2013:359)

(37) \[\text{Da'akhlxw} - i = \text{hl} \quad \text{maa'y dim limx} = \text{t} \]
\[\text{CIRC.POS} - \text{TR} = \text{CN} \quad \text{berries PROSP grow.PL-3.II} \]
‘Berries could grow here.’ (Matthewson 2013:370)

(38) \[\text{Sgi dim (ap)} \quad \text{ha'w} = \text{s} \quad \text{Lisa.} \]
\[\text{CIRC.NEC PROSP (VERUM)} \quad \text{go.home} = \text{PN} \quad \text{Lisa} \]
‘Lisa should/must go home.’ (adapted from Matthewson 2013:380)

The three modals in 36-38 have different syntactic properties. Epistemic =imaa (also pronounced =ima', depending on dialect) is a second-position clitic. Da'akhlxw (also pronounced da'akxw) is a regular verb, and sgi is a predicative particle which introduces a dependent clause. For our argument that epistemic =imaa allows past TPs to go through, it is important to show that this modal does not induce a bi-clausal structure. The mono-clausal status of =imaa sentences is supported by the fact that they contain only a single set of agreement marking (e.g. the determinate marker =t in 36). Moreover, in Gitksan all subordinate clauses contain dependent marking (Rigsby 1986: ch. 4), and =imaa fails to induce dependent marking on the prejacent predicate.

With this background in place, we can now establish that both epistemic and circumstantial modals can be interpreted with past TP in Gitksan. Due to the absence of past tense marking, we do this by using discourse contexts to narrow down temporal reference possibilities. The possibility of past TP is demonstrated for epistemic modality in 39-40.

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12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

13 For example, in (i) the third person agreement marker ('nit) comes from Series III, signalling that the clause is independent. A dependent-clause third person would be marked with Series II -t, as shown in the minimally different (ii), where the aspectual auxiliary yukw induces dependent marking.

(i) \[\text{Siipxw} = \text{imaa} = \text{nit} \quad \text{k'yoots.} \]
\[\text{sick} = \text{EPIS} \quad \text{3.III} \quad \text{yesterday} \]
‘S/he might have been sick yesterday.’

(ii) \[\text{Yugw} = \text{imaa} = \text{hl} \quad \text{siipxw} = \text{t} \quad \text{k'yoots.} \]
\[\text{IPFV} = \text{EPIS} = \text{CN} \quad \text{sick} = \text{3.II} \quad \text{yesterday} \]
‘S/he might have been sick yesterday.’

14 The use of imperfective yukw with epistemic modals in 39-40 is not obligatory, and its presence vs. absence does not affect TP. For reasons which have yet to be explained, speakers prefer the presence of yukw in epistemic modal statements (regardless of whether the TP is present or past).
(39)  Context: Stacey bought food to feed Pat’s pet, but she didn’t know what kind of pet he had, so she bought all the wrong kinds of food. Later she finds out Pat’s pet is a snake. Pat asks ‘Why did you buy a carrot?’ Stacey replies:
Yugw=ìmaa=hl  gax-t.
IPFV=EPIS=CN  rabbit-3.II
‘He might have been a rabbit.’  (‘Feeding Fluffy’, www.totemfieldstoryboards.org)

(40)  Context: When you looked out your window earlier today, water was falling, so it looked like it was raining. But you found out later it was the gutters leaking.
Yugw=ìmaa=hl  wis  da’awhl.
IPFV=EPIS=CN  rain  then
‘It might have been raining earlier.’  (Matthewson 2013:363)

Given the contexts, both examples are clear cases of epistemic modality with past TP. The TO in these cases happens to be present – the time of the prejacent event overlaps with the TP. We will see examples in §3.3 with different temporal orientations.

Circumstantial modals with past TPs are illustrated in 41-42.

(41)  Context: You are talking about some land you used to have. I ask you ‘What was the soil like? Could berries have grown there?’
Da’aìkhlxw-i=hl  maa’y=hl  dim  limxb-t.
CIRC.POS-TR=CN  berries=CN  PROSP  grow.PL-3.II
‘Berries could have grown.’  (Matthewson 2013:375)

(42)  Context: Lisa’s son was all alone / he needed to see her.
Sgi  dim=t  sga-wa=s  Lisa=hl  hlguuhlxwim  gat-t.
CIRC.NEC  PROSP=3.1  across-get.to=PNLisa=CN  child  man-3.II
‘Lisa should have met her son.’  (Matthewson 2013:380)

These data show that all types of Gitksan modals allow both past and present TPs. This supports our proposal that past TP is not restricted to modals with certain flavours. On the basis of these data, we propose that the hierarchy of functional elements is the same in Gitksan as it is in Dutch. In both languages, a modal’s TP is determined by a higher tense morpheme. The only difference is that in Gitksan, there is no past/present tense distinction and the TP of a modal is restricted to whichever non-future reference time the phonologically covert tense picks out. We provide some worked-out examples in §4.2 below.

2.4. St’át’imcets. Just like Gitksan, St’át’imcets does not overtly encode a past/present tense distinction; see van Eijk 1997, Matthewson 2006, Davis 2010 for data. Following Matthewson (2006), we adopt for this language the same single, non-future tense feature as for Gitksan (see 32). Also just like Gitksan, St’át’imcets has overt prospective aspect marking, primarily either the aspectual auxiliary cuz’ ‘be going to’ or the modal clitic kelh ‘might, will’. Sample data are given in 43. (On the differences between cuz’ and kelh, which go beyond our concerns here, see Glougie 2007, Davis 2010, Matthewson & Davis 2016.)
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(43)  a. Say’sez’=lhkan.
     play=1SG.SBJ
     ‘I played / am playing.’  
     (Matthewson 2006:676)

b. Cúz’=lhkan say’sez’.
     PROSP=1SG.SBJ play
     ‘I’m going to play.’

c. Say’sez’=lhkán=kelh.
     play=1SG.SBJ=PROSP
     ‘I might/will play.’
     (Matthewson 2006:678)

The prospective aspects, which have the same denotation as was given in
33 for Gitksan, co-occur with the non-future tense, giving rise to possible ‘past-future’ readings, as illustrated in 44-45.

(44)  Cuz’ séna7 ka-tékw-a ti=sk’úk’wmi7t=a, t’u7 wenacw-ts-mín-em
     PROSP COUNTER CIRC-get.quiet-CIRC DET=child=EXIS but true-mouth-REL-PASS
     múta7 ti=skícza7-s=a.
     again DET=mother-3SG.POSS=EXIS
     ‘The child was going to stop crying, but her mother was talking loudly to her.’

(45)  Context: Mike Leech is currently chief of T’it’q’et. His (deceased) mother was called Julianne.

Zwát-en-as s=Julianne [k=wa=s kúkwpi7=kelh
     know-DIR-3ERG NMLZ=Julianne [DET=IPFV-3POS chief=PROSP
     ta=skúza7-s=a] i=kwís=as
     DET=child-3POS=EXIS] when.PAST=fall=3SBJV
     ‘Julianne knew when he was born that her child would become chief.’
     (Matthewson 2006:689)

We postulate that St’át’imcets has the same phonologically covert non-prospective aspect as in Gitksan (see 35), which is present whenever prospective cuz’ or kelh is absent.

Turning to modals, St’át’imcets lexically distinguishes epistemic from circumstantial modality (Matthewson et al. 2007, Rullmann et al. 2008, Davis et al. 2009). Epistemic and circumstantial modals with present TPs are illustrated in 46-47.

(46)  Wá7=k’a qelh-n-ás nilh kw=s=ts’aqw-an’-em lh=kalál=as.
     IPFV=EPIS put.away-DIR-3ERG FOC DET=NMLZ=eat-DIR-1PL.ERG COMP=soon=3SBJV
     ‘Maybe she put it away and we ate it later.’  (Matthewson 2005:58)

(47)  Lán=lhkacw=ka áts’x-en ti=kwtámts-sw=a.
     already=2SG.SBJ=CIRC see-DIR DET=husband-2SG.POSS=EXIS
     ‘You must / can / may see your husband now.’  (Rullmann et al. 2008:329-330)

48-49 show that both epistemic and circumstantial modals allow past TP. In 48, it is not
compatible with the speaker’s epistemic state at the utterance time that the Canucks were
winning.

(48) Context: The Canucks were playing last night. You weren’t watching the game, but you
heard your son sounding excited from the other room, where he was watching. You
thought the Canucks were winning, and you called up your friend and said: ‘Good sports
news!’ But after the game, you found out that the Canucks had actually lost, and your son
was excited about something his friend was telling him on his cellphone. Today, your
friend asks you why you had told him there was good sports news when the Canucks had
actually lost. You say:

Wá7=k’a  t’cum  i=Canucks=a.
IPFV=EPIS  win  DET.PL=Canucks=EXIS
‘The Canucks might have been winning.’

(Chen et al. 2017:250)

(49) Context: I don’t remember if we ate the rabbits or not ...
T’u7 wá7=ka  n-scwákwekw=a  ts’aqw-an’-em  nilh  s=pápt=s=a
just  IPFV=CIRC 1SG.POSS-heart=EXIS eat-DIR-1PL.ERG FOC  NMLZ=always=3POSS=EXIS
wa7  tecw-ecw=wít  lhas  kwis-alt  i=sqweyits=a.
IPFV  increase-REDUP=3PL  COMP(IPFV.3SBJV  fall-child  DET.PL=rabbit=EXIS
‘But I think we had to eat the rabbits because they were always having babies.’

(Matthewson 2005:98-99)

The data in this and the previous sub-section show that epistemic (as well as circumstantial)
modals can have past TPs in Gitksan and St’át’imctcets, languages in which epistemic modality is
lexically distinct from other types of modality. Similar facts obtain in a range of other languages
including Blackfoot, Atayal and Mandarin; see Chen et al. 2017 for further discussion.

2.5. ENGLISH. English is a language where modal auxiliaries carry only residual, lexically
idiosyncratic inflectional morphology. The semi-modals (have to, be allowed to, or be able to),
however, inflect for tense in a fully productive way, and their TP is determined by their overt
tense inflection, just as in Dutch. Among the semi-modals, we will focus on have to, which can
have an epistemic interpretation (unlike be allowed to or be able to).

Stowell (2004) claims that the simple past tense of have to cannot have an epistemic reading
in 50 (repeated from 20b).

(50) There had to be a hundred people there. (Stowell 2004:626)

We disagree with this judgment; we think 50 can have a reading where it describes a past
epistemic state. To back up our claim, we collected cases of past epistemic had to from the
Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008-). Representative examples are given
in 51-54. In each case, the TP of the epistemic modal seems to be clearly located at the past
narrative reference time.  

15 Stowell (p.c. 2014) has also since changed his opinion of this and similar examples.
16 It might be argued that these examples are somehow special because they represent free
indirect discourse. For our rebuttal, see §6.
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(51) And here in the bathroom off the hall they found Clorox bottles. Looked like someone tried to wash away evidence. This **had to** be more than just an injured dog. (COCA 2011; The Man Who Talked to Dogs; Dateline NBC)

(52) Petra went to the left through the crowd, her eyes searching for any signs of trouble. They were so close. This **had to** be it. Here they would uncover the information they needed. She was sure of it. (COCA 2011; The Silenced: A Novel; Battles, Brett, New York: Dell)

(53) A dim chemical light flickered on as we entered, revealing metal boxes of C-6 stacked to the ceiling. There **had to** be over a tonne of the stuff. (COCA 2010; Teaching the Pig to Sing; Levine, David D., Analog Science Fiction & Fact 130(5):71-80)

(54) **KEITH-MORRISON** His AR-15 Bushmaster. He fired a warning shot. **CHAD-WALLIN-REED** And then I just remember seeing some guy running away. … **KEITH-MORRISON** But would the warning be enough? These **had to** be the same men who came the night before. Now here they were a second time. These guys were bad news. (COCA 2015; Unidentified Man; NBC)

Let us now consider **might have**. The data in 55-60 show attested past epistemic readings of **might have**.

(55) I wasn’t worried about the guards. They knew we were neighbors. I mean, we **might have** been borrowing a cup of sugar, right? (COCA 2010; The Robots’ Girl; Cooper, Brenda; Analog Science Fiction & Fact 130(4):90-103)

(56) I stood near the entrance. The bar was so crowded, people were literally bursting out the doors onto the street. Music **might have** been playing, but you couldn’t hear it; it was completely drowned out by a huge human noise like a hive of bees, [...]. (David Leavitt, While England Sleeps, p. 188)

(57) ‘I have a brain tumour?’ asked Petunia. She saw a tiny flicker in the man which showed that he did in fact think it possible that was what she had; it **might even have** been the thing he thought likeliest. (John Lanchester, Capital, ch. 19)

(58) He turned and left the room. There **might have** been people in the corridor; he didn’t notice and he didn’t care. (John Lanchester, Capital, ch. 22)

(59) Aidid exchanged a sharp look with the Cobra. The two powerful men had been disgraced in public, rendered helpless in mere seconds, and that rough handling **might have** planted seeds of doubt among some of their fighters, who either had seen or would hear about the episode. Such a disgrace could not be tolerated. (COCA 2015; Night of the Cobra; Coughlin, Jack, New York: St. Martin’s Press)
She could make out the miners climbing up to the Buckbush and the Tiger for the morning shift. She saw a prospector with his burro make his way across the mountain, headed for somewhere along the Tenmile Range. He might have been Daniel, but Gracy knew he wasn’t. Daniel would be gone a week or two, maybe more, and he’d said the night before when she had been rousted from bed that he wouldn't go until she returned. (COCA 2015; The Last Midwife; Dallas, Sandra, New York: St. Martin’s Press)

Many cases of past-TP might have in COCA involve not only a shift to a past TP, but also a shift in the agent whose epistemic state is being accessed to someone other than the speaker. This is the case for example in 55. The tendency for the TP and the agent whose epistemic state is relevant to shift in tandem is quite common in narratives, but as we have seen above (e.g. in the ice cream example in 21), the shift to another agent’s epistemic state is not obligatory.17

To supplement our attested data we also elicited judgments on some constructed examples, in an informal questionnaire study with 11 (non-linguist) native-speaker participants. The following are examples of past epistemic readings which received very high acceptability ratings.18

This morning I opened my phone bill and was shocked when I saw that I owed $10,000. This had to be a mistake! Unfortunately, it turned out to be correct. My husband had used my phone on his latest trip to Papua New Guinea, forgetting about the roaming charges.

17 Some cases of past-TP epistemic might have have a further twist, in that they shift the epistemic agent to a hypothetical other observer who doesn’t know what the main protagonists know. The example in (i) is a case in point.

(i) ‘What do you think?’ asked Dumbledore. He might have been asking Harry’s opinion on whether it was a good site for a picnic. (J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, p. 519)

As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, (i) might be paraphrased as ‘It was as if he was asking Harry’s opinion’, rather than ‘Harry (genuinely) thought that it was possible that Dumbledore was asking his opinion’. We leave analysis of these cases for future research.

18 Participants judged acceptability on a three-point scale, with 1 the best and 3 the worst. Control items were included, of straightforwardly acceptable or unacceptable modal claims. 61 and 63 were judged as ‘1’ by ten and eight participants respectively. While we were preparing the final revisions for this paper, we happened to come across an attested example that is almost identical to 61:

(i) Context: A Canadian has to go to the hospital during a visit to the US, and upon return to Canada is confronted with a large hospital bill. Later it turns out that the bill is actually correct.

A month later, I got a bill for (drum roll, please) $14,000. It came with a whack of paperwork to back it up. I almost laughed out loud (it was either that or cry). It had to be a mistake. (Globe & Mail, April 20, 2017)
Context: Mary is a school principal and at her school there is a policy that if there is even a possibility that a teacher has abused a student, the teacher will be fired. Five years ago, Mary fired one of her teachers because he was accused of abusing a student. This morning, the accuser recanted the accusation and conclusive proof was brought forward that the accuser had lied and the teacher was innocent. Mary is now being interviewed by a reporter.

Reporter: How do you feel about the news today that the teacher you fired was in fact innocent?
Mary: Very upset. It is most unfortunate.
Reporter: So why did you fire him at the time, when you did not have conclusive proof that he was guilty?
Mary: Because he might have been guilty.

The example from Stowell in 50 above received a relatively high average score\(^{19}\) when embedded in the discourse context in 63.

(63) When Susan arrived at Bob’s house, she saw that the place was packed. There had to be at least a hundred people there. But she found out later that actually, there were only 60.

This questionnaire study suggests that epistemic modals with past TP, while perhaps not as readily accessible as those with present TP, are far from ruled out, and are often judged as essentially perfect by native speakers.\(^{20}\)

2.6. Why are past epistemic readings often dispreferred? One possible objection to what we have proposed so far is that, for English modal auxiliaries, past-TP epistemic readings often seem more difficult to get out of context than present-TP epistemic readings. If, as we argue, epistemic modals scope under tense, wouldn’t we expect past-TP readings of modals to be just as easily available as present-TP readings? We believe that several factors explain why this is not always the case.

First of all, arguably, the default epistemic perspective of any sentence is that of the speaker at the time of utterance, if only because this is the perspective that is always freely available and is not in need of any special contextual support. In order to shift to a past epistemic perspective (either that of the speaker at a past time, or that of some other agent in the past), the context needs to make another temporal perspective sufficiently salient. As we have seen in the naturally occurring examples given in §2.5, when the context supports the presence of a salient past epistemic perspective, the past-TP readings are unproblematic. In narrative prose, this is especially the case in so-called free indirect discourse (FID; see Eckardt 2015 for a thorough recent study and analysis), where discourse is explicitly presented as representing the thoughts or speech of a protagonist of the story. FID is the kind of discourse in which a past epistemic perspective is maximally salient, hence it pragmatically supports past-TP readings which might

\(^{19}\) 1.5 on the scale between 1 and 3.

\(^{20}\) As suggested by Portner (2009:227), the cases with stative predicates were generally judged as better by our participants than those with eventive verbs (not shown here). This effect may relate to claims by Sbardolini (2016) about the correlation between epistemic interpretations and atelicity, but further investigation is required.
be difficult to obtain out of context. This explains why many (but not all!) examples of past-TP epistemics discussed in this paper occur in FID or FID-like narrative contexts.

In support of this idea, an interesting contrast (pointed out by a reviewer) arises between epistemic modal auxiliaries on the one hand, and main verbs and adjectives which express similar epistemic meanings on the other. The latter are much more free in allowing past TP, even in the absence of contextual support. This is illustrated by the contrast in the data in 64. Past TP is easy – in fact, obligatory – in 64a,b, but the reading is not immediately obvious out of the blue in 64c.

(64)  
a.  It **seemed** that Mary was the murderer.  
b.  We **knew** that Mary was the murderer.  
c.  Mary **might have** been the murderer.

This contrast arises for three reasons. First, the matrix verbs in 64a,b are overtly inflected for past tense, thereby unambiguously forcing a shift to a past perspective. This contrasts with the string **might have** in 64c, which is ambiguous and has a competing present-TP reading. This reason for the dispreferred status of past epistemic readings is specific to English modal auxiliaries, which are not overtly marked for tense. Modals like **might, could,** and **must** can be either present or past (see §5 for more discussion and examples). This means that English modal auxiliaries are in need of contextual support to bring out the non-default, past-TP epistemic interpretation. This particular problem does not arise for English semi-modals or for languages like Dutch, where modal verbs are freely inflected for tense.22

Second, for the main verbs the relevant epistemic perspective is that of a grammatical argument of the verb (the subject of **knew** in 64b and the implicit goal argument of **seem** in 64a). Plausibly the presence of this grammatical argument facilitates the processing of the interpretation in which the relevant past epistemic perspective is the one belonging to this argument rather than the speaker.

Thirdly and most importantly, with an epistemic modal, the conversational backgrounds which encode the agent’s epistemic perspective are part of the backgrounded, not-at-issue content of the sentence (after all, they are called conversational **BACKGROUNDS** for a reason!). By

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21 See §6 for arguments against analyzing FID in terms of syntactic processes which reduce it to embedding under an elided matrix propositional attitude verb.

22 One striking example of this difference is the opening sentence of Kafka’s *The Trial*. In the German original (i) as well as its Dutch equivalent (ii), the past-inflected modal can only have past TP and as such represents the epistemic state of the protagonist, Josef K. This has the effect of narrating the story from his point of view right from the start. In the English translation in (iii) this is much less clear, as **must have** is ambiguous between representing Josef K.’s point of view (past TP) or the narrator’s (present TP), with the latter interpretation probably being the default one.

(i)   Jemand   muss-te   Josef K.   verleumd-et   hab-en.  
(ii)  Iemand   moest   Josef K.   belaster-d   hebb-en.  
      someone   must-PST.3SG   Josef K.   slander-PTCP   have-INF  
      (Dutch translation by Alice van Nahuys, Querido, 1977)
(iii) Someone **must have** slandered Josef K.  
      (English translation by Breon Mitchell, Schocken Books, 1998)
contrast, propositional attitude verbs contribute to the at-issue content. So for instance, if someone says I believe that John is the murderer, it’s possible to object by saying No, that’s false – you don’t believe that at all!, but such a response would be infelicitous to an utterance with an epistemic modal like John must be the murderer. In our formal analysis, the not-at-issue status of the conversational backgrounds is implemented by treating them as contextual parameters of interpretation. Because of their not-at-issue status, it is very difficult to switch conversational backgrounds without signalling this explicitly by means of overt, at-issue material, such as a propositional attitude verb with a grammatically represented attitude holder.23

Our explanation for why epistemic past-TP readings are often dispreferred for English modal auxiliaries raises a question about semi-modals like have to, which do inflect for tense and therefore are not subject to the first of the three arguments just given. An anonymous reviewer claims in this regard that past tense inflection fails to force past TP for epistemic had to, as it does for seem or know, and even for had to itself when it is interpreted deontically. If it is correct that had to allows present TP, this fact is not predicted by our analysis and must be addressed in future research. However, we are not convinced that had to allows present TP. Consider 65. The discourse context here makes a present TP unambiguous. For six out of seven native speakers we consulted, had to is infelicitous or marginal in 65b. We return to the issue of present TP for epistemic had to in section 7.

(65) Context: A mother is wondering what her son got up to at a party last night. He emerges from his room holding his head and looking green. She says:
   a. You must have {been drunk} / {drunk too much} last night.
   b. # You had to {be drunk} / {drink too much} / {have drunk too much} last night.

2.7. SUMMARY SO FAR. So far we have seen that in Dutch, Gitksan, St’át’imcets and English, epistemic modals can have past temporal perspectives. This evidence supports our core proposal that a modal’s TP is independent of the flavour of its conversational background. TP is provided by a higher-scoping temporal element, typically tense, which may freely provide either a present or past time interval, regardless of modal flavour.

3. TEMPORAL ORIENTATION AND ASPECT. We turn now to the less empirically controversial of our two main claims: that temporal orientation is restricted both by modal flavour and by aspect (viewpoint and lexical). In this section we show that in all our four languages, the predictions inherited from the literature are upheld. We begin by introducing the expected TO/flavour correlations, and then we present the relevant data.

3.1. TO AND CONVERSATIONAL BACKGROUND: THE DIVERSITY CONDITION. As pointed out in §1.2, there is a correlation between non-future TO and epistemic interpretations. For example, 66 and 67 can only be understood epistemically.

(66) She must have left.  PAST TO

If we had chosen to represent the modal base and ordering source as pronoun-like implicit variables in the object language, essentially the same point would apply. Unstressed pronouns (especially null ones) refer to contextually salient entities or discourse topics; it is very difficult to use them to pick out a non-salient entity or to switch to a different topic.
He might be in his office right now.

Condoravdi captured the interaction between TO and modal flavour via her diversity condition (see also Werner 2003, 2006, Kaufmann 2005, Copley 2006, Laca 2008, Portner 2009, Giannakidou & Mari 2016, among others). This condition is based on a branching-futures model of time, in which the past and the present are ‘settled’: up until the TP, the same facts hold in all metaphysically accessible worlds. After the TP, the accessible worlds diverge, so the future is metaphysically unsettled. We give our adaptation of Condoravdi’s diversity condition in 68; it requires that for any (occurrence of a) modal, there be at least one world in the modal base in which the prejacent is true, and one in which it is false.\(^\text{24,25}\)

\[ \text{The diversity condition} \quad \text{(adapted from Condoravdi 2002:25)} \]

For any modal Mod, prejacent P of type \(<i,st>\), and world w and time t,

\[ \llbracket \text{Mod}(P)(t)(w) \rrbracket^{68,w,t,h} \text{ is defined only if} \]

\[ \exists w',w'' [w',w'' \in \cap f(w,t) & P(t)(w') & \neg P(t)(w'')] \]

This condition is satisfied by an epistemic modal with a non-future TO (since an epistemic modal base can simultaneously contain worlds in which a non-future prejacent is true, and worlds in which it is false). Condoravdi argues that the condition is violated by a METAPHYSICAL modal with a non-future TO, since all worlds in a metaphysical modal base share the same truth value for propositions about past or present events.\(^\text{26}\)

\[\text{24 As Chris Kennedy (p.c.) points out, this is really just a special case of a more general informativity constraint on assertion: it rules out vacuous uses of modals.}\]

\[\text{25 Klecha (2016:27) argues that the diversity condition has difficulties with necessity modals when the ordering source is empty, such as in \textit{It logically must be the case that }1+1=2. Diversity fails here, yet the modal is fine. Klecha offers an alternative proposal which we do not have space to go into here, but in principle any account which derives the future-orientation of circumstantial modals suffices for our purposes.}\]

\[\text{26 As pointed out by a reviewer, this condition is falsified (at least under some analyses) by circumstantial modals in the perfective aspect which give rise to actuality entailments. A French example is given in (i); this sentence asserts that it was possible at a (past) time t for John to leave at t, and he did leave at time t. See Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006 and much subsequent research.}\]

(i) John a pu partir.

\text{John could-PFV leave} ‘John was able to leave.’

A parallel Dutch example involving the present perfect is given in (ii); this likewise carries an actuality entailment.

(ii) Hij heeft kunn-en vertrekken.

\text{he have.PRS.3SG POS-INF leave-INF} ‘He was able to leave.’

The reviewer’s point is a good one, but an analysis of actuality entailments and their interaction with temporal orientation goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our purpose in this section is simply to provide cross-linguistic support for basic diversity condition effects. (For discussion of actuality entailments in Stát’ámicets, see Davis et al. 2010, and for Gitksan, see Matthewson}
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Condoravdi assumes that the relevant non-epistemic readings all involve metaphysical modal bases, and therefore that the diversity condition suffices to derive the restriction of non-future TO to epistemic modals. However, the TO restrictions actually extend beyond metaphysical modals proper, to other modals with circumstantial modal bases. We will see this below for our four languages, and the problem has been discussed by for example Abusch (2012), Thomas (2014). It is not our main purpose here to explain the correlation between non-future TO and epistemic interpretations. We will simply assume (following Abusch 2012) that what Condoravdi calls ‘metaphysical’ modality is actually circumstantial modality with a past TP, and that some restriction along the lines of the diversity condition suffices to derive the modal flavour/TO restrictions.

In the following sub-sections we will see evidence from all four languages which supports the prediction that circumstantial modals are restricted to future TO. We will also see that in all four languages, TO in addition depends on lower-scoping temporal operators, namely ordering and inclusion aspects. The evidence supports our proposed universal architecture in which modals scope under TP-restricting operators and over TO-restricting operators.

3.2. DUTCH AND ENGLISH. In Dutch and English, a modal’s TO is determined by the viewpoint and lexical aspect of the prejacent clause, and its modal flavour is restricted by the diversity condition. We go through each of the main factors in turn.

PERFECT. In Dutch, the perfect is marked by means of the auxiliary hebben ‘have’ or zijn ‘be’ (depending on the verb), combined with a past participle. This is also possible in the complement of a modal. In that case, the perfect determines TO while TP is unaffected. This is illustrated in 69a, which has present TP (because the modals are in the simple present) and past TO (because the complement of the modals has perfect aspect). The counterpart of 69a with the modals in the simple past is 69b; here we have past TP and past TO. Due to the diversity condition, the modal flavour of such past-TO sentences can only be epistemic.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(69) a. } & \text{ Hij moet / kan hebb-en ge-wonn-en.} \\
& \text{ he NEC.PRS.SG / POS.PRS.SG have-INF PTCP-won-PTCP} \\
& \text{ ‘He must/may have won’ / ‘It is possible that he (has) won.’} \quad \text{PRESENT TP, PAST TO} \\
\text{ b. } & \text{ Hij moest / kon hebb-en ge-wonn-en.} \\
& \text{ he NEC.PST.SG / POS.PST.SG have-INF PTCP-won-PTCP} \\
& \text{ ‘He had to have won’ / ‘It was possible that he (had) won.’} \quad \text{PAST TP, PAST TO}
\end{align*}
\]

With respect to perfect prejacents, English behaves exactly the same way as Dutch, except for complications caused by the inability of English modal auxiliaries to express past TP by means of tense inflection. To compensate for this gap in expressability, English has recruited combinations like might have and could have to encode past TP rather than past TO, rendering these expressions ambiguous. We return to this issue in §5.

LEXICAL ASPECT: STATIVE VS. EVENTIVE. In Dutch and English, prejacents which are unmarked for overt viewpoint aspect show a stative/eventive split with respect to possible TOs. Stative prejacents allow present TO (or future, in the right discourse context), as shown in 70.

2012.)
This is true whether the TP is present or past.

(70) De sleutel moet / kan / moest / kon

the key NEC.PRS.3SG / POS.PRS.3SG / NEC.PST.3SG / POS.PST.3SG

in de la ligg-en.
in the drawer lie-INF

‘The key must be / might be / had to be / might have been in the drawer.’ PRESENT TO

When the prejacent contains an eventive verb, however, the TO can only be future, both in English and Dutch (unless the verb has an imperfective interpretation; see below for details). Again this is independent of whether the TP is present or past; see 71.

(71) Ze moet / kan / moest / kon winn-en.

She NEC.PRS.3SG / POS.PRS.3SG / NEC.PST.3SG / POS.PST.3SG win-INF

‘She must / might / had to win / was able to win.’ FUTURE TO

(IM)PERFECTIVE AND NON-PERFECT. Dutch and English do not have any overt morpheme dedicated to marking simple perfective or imperfective aspect. Progressive morphology, which typically appears only on eventive verbs, is a subtype of imperfective. We assume that statives receive an imperfective interpretation by default.

In English, any eventive verb must be in the progressive when the event time includes the reference time. This is shown for past and present tense in 72a,b respectively.

(72) a. She # {sings} / {is singing} right now.
    b. She # {sang} / {was singing} when he entered the room.

(Under the interpretation: her singing began before he entered the room.)

In 72a,b, the perfective versions yield interpretations other than one where the event time includes the reference time. In the present tense case in 72a, the bare (perfective) verb must be interpreted as habitual (or as a ‘reporter’s present’). Bennett and Partee (1978) attribute the requirement for progressive with episodic eventive verbs in the present tense to the instantaneous nature of the English present tense. Eventive verbs lack the SUBINTERVAL PROPERTY (Dowty 1986) and therefore cannot fit inside the instantaneous utterance time; present perfective is therefore not an option for these predicates. The past-tense reflex of the same effect is seen in the fact that 72b with sang and an instantaneous reference time adverbial can only be interpreted as inchoative, rather than as ongoing: she began to sing when he entered the room.

We see a parallel effect with modals. 73 shows that overt progressive marking is obligatory in English with a present TP, present TO modal and an eventive verb. 73a can only have future TO; to express present TO, the progressive is required as in 73b.

(73) a. She must /might sing. ONLY FUTURE TO
    b. She must /might be singing. PRESENT OR FUTURE TO

In many analyses, this future TO effect for eventive verbs is derived from an inherent futurity within the modal’s lexical entry (for example, Condoravdi 2002). In our analysis, the future TO of eventive verbs in English follows instead from a separate non-perfect aspect, which is
phonologically covert; its denotation is repeated in 74.

(74) \[[\text{NON-PERF}]_{g_{\text{t0,w0,f,h}}} = \lambda P_{<_{\text{st}}}. \lambda t \lambda w . \exists t' [t \leq t' \& P(t')(w)]\]

In Dutch, the facts are similar but slightly more complicated. This language has a progressive-like construction (the \textit{aan het}-construction), but unlike in English it is not obligatory. For example, 75 is perfectly fine both with and without \textit{aan het}.

(75) Ze \{zing-t op dit moment\} / \{is op dit moment aan het zing-en\}. \\
    she \{sing-PRS.3SG at this moment\} / \{be.PRS.3SG at this moment at the sing-INF\} \\
    ‘She is singing at this moment.’

There are a couple of ways to interpret these facts. It could be that in Dutch, at least some eventive verbs can be interpreted as imperfective without overtly occurring in the progressive (see de Vuyst 1985 for an analysis which in spirit is similar to this). Alternatively, it could be that the Dutch perfective does not enforce a strict inclusion relation between the reference time and the event time, but rather a weaker relation whereby the two times merely need to overlap (Klein 1994). For concreteness and simplicity we adopt the former explanation. The fact that eventive verbs can sometimes be interpreted imperfectively also accounts for the fact that (at least in some cases) Dutch modals with eventive prejacent verbs can have a present TO reading either with or without progressive marking. However, often they prefer the progressive to receive present TO, much as in English, and without the progressive they are biased toward future TO (cf. Foolen & de Hoop 2009).

(76) Ze \textit{kan} (wel eens) \{zing-en\} / \{aan het zing-en zijn\}. \\
    she \textit{POS.PRS.3SG} (PRT PRT) \{sing-INF\} / \{at the sing-INF be\} \\
    ‘She might be singing.’

We do not attempt to account for exactly when eventive verbs in the complement of a modal require progressive marking in order to obtain a present-TO reading in Dutch.

3.3. Gitksan and St’át’imcets. Recall from §2.3 and §2.4 that Gitksan and St’át’imcets possess a single covert non-future tense feature; we have also postulated that in the absence of overt prospective marking, there is a covert non-prospective aspect. Our null hypothesis that temporal orientation is provided by temporal operators below the modal predicts that in Gitksan and St’át’imcets, TO will be future if and only if overt prospective marking is present. In the absence of prospective marking, TO will be either present or past. Crucially, we predict no restrictions on TO based on the eventive/stative distinction in these languages, unlike in English and Dutch. We saw above that in English and Dutch, present-TP modal sentences with eventive predicates in the (non-perfect) perfective must have future TO (cf. 73a). Present TO is disallowed for these predicates because events cannot fit inside the instantaneous present reference time. Since Gitksan and St’át’imcets lack an instantaneous present tense, this restriction on TO should be absent in these languages.

\[\text{There are some restrictions on the use of the } \textit{aan het}-\text{construction which we don’t fully understand; for instance, using it with a non-agentive verb like } \textit{regenen} \text{ ‘rain’ would be odd.}\]
These predictions are upheld. Turning to Gitksan first, we observe that a prejacent which is unmarked for viewpoint aspect (and therefore is interpreted as perfective) and contains no overt prospective marker allows either past or present TO. This is shown in 77-78. The TP here is present – the speaker is talking about their utterance-time evidence. (The two forms of the modal in these examples represent dialect differences.)

(77)  Yugw=imaa/ima’=hl wis.
       IPFV=EPIS=CN rain
       ‘It might have rained.’ / ‘It might be raining.’ / ‘It might rain (in the future).’
       √ Past TO context: You see puddles, and the flowers looking fresh and damp.
       √ Present TO context: You hear pattering on the roof.
       # Future TO context: You hear thunder, so you think it might rain soon.
       (Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:364-365)

(78)  Yugw=imaa/ima’=hl siipxw-t.
       IPFV=EPIS=CN sick-3.II
       ‘He might have been sick.’ / ‘He might be sick (now).’ / ‘He might be sick (in future).’
       √ Past TO context: Why wasn’t Joe at the meeting yesterday?
       √ Present TO context: Why isn’t Joe here?
       # Future TO context: He’s wearing no coat in the rain, he might get sick.
       (Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:365)

Examples 79-80 show that the prospective aspect marker dim is necessary and sufficient for a future TO, for both eventive and stative prejacent predicates.

(79)  Yugw=imaa/ima’=hl dim wis.
       IPFV=EPIS=CN PROSP rain
       ‘It might have rained.’ / ‘It might be raining.’ / ‘It might rain (in the future).’
       # Past TO context
       # Present TO context
       √ Future TO context
       (Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:365)

(80)  Yugw=imaa/ima’=hl dim siipxw-t.
       IPFV=EPIS=CN PROSP sick-3.II
       ‘He might have been sick.’ / ‘He might be sick (now).’ / ‘He might be sick (in future).’
       # Past TO context
       # Present TO context
       √ Future TO context
       (Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:365)

81-84 contain past-TP epistemics. Again we see that past TO is achieved without any overt aspectual marking, for both eventive and stative prejacents, but future TO is marked by obligatory prospective aspect.
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(81) **Context:** When you looked out your window earlier today, the ground was wet, so it looked like it might have rained. But you found out later that the sprinklers had been watering the ground.

Yugw=imaa=hl wis da'a'whl.
IPFV=EPIS=CN rain then
‘It might have rained.’ [based on my evidence earlier]
(Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:366)

(82) **Context:** Joe left the meeting looking really green in the face and sweaty. Someone asks you why he left.

Yugw=imaa=hl siipxw-t.
IPFV=EPIS=CN sick-3.II
‘He must have been sick.’
(Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:360)

(83) **Context:** This morning you looked out your window and judging by the clouds, it looked like it might have been going to rain, so you took your raincoat. Later you’re explaining to me why you did that.

Yugw=imaa=hl dim wis.
IPFV=EPIS=CN PROSP rain
‘It might have been going to rain.’
(Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:366)

(84) **Context:** You saw your granddaughter going out into the pouring rain without any coat and you thought she might get sick from that. So you told her to take her coat. Later you’re explaining to me why you did that.

Yugw=imaa=hl #(dim) siipxw-t.
IPFV=EPIS=CN #(PROSP) sick-3.II
‘She might have been going to get sick.’
(Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:366-367)

The same pattern holds for circumstantial modals, as shown in 85-87: future TO is obligatorily marked by prospective aspect. The difference here is that, following the diversity condition, circumstantial modals are restricted to future TO. Given the overt marking of prospective in this language, the result is that circumstantial modals are ungrammatical without a following *dim.*

(85) Da'akhlxw-i-s Henry *(dim) jam-t.
CIRC.POS-TR-PN Henry *(PROSP) cook-3.II
‘Henry is able to cook.’ / ‘Henry was able to cook.’ PAST OR PRESENT TP, FUTURE TO
(Gitksan; adapted from Matthewson 2013:371)

(86) **Context:** You were watching the Canucks and at one point in the first period they were up 2-1. At that point, they might have still won (but they didn’t in the end).

K'ay da'akxw-diit *(dim) xsdaa-diit, ii ap nee=diit xsdaa-diit.
still CIRC.POS-3PL.II *(PROSP) win-3PL.II CCNJ VERUM NEG=FOC win-3PL.II
‘They still could have won, but they didn’t win.’ PAST TP, FUTURE TO
(Gitksan; adapted from Matthewson 2013:375)
The data in 77-87 show that (whether the predicate is stative or eventive, and regardless of modal flavour) TO in Gitksan is determined by viewpoint aspect: prospective marking appears if and only if the TO is future.

We now turn to Stʼátʼimcets. Just like in Gitksan, epistemic modals in Stʼátʼimcets allow either past or present TO without any overt marking, but future TO is obligatorily overtly marked. Future TO can be marked either via the prospective auxiliary cuzʼ or the prospective clitic kelh. These generalizations are illustrated for modals with present TPs in 88-90.

(88)  
Context: Youʼve been watching the gold medal hockey game, in the middle of it the power went off, so you had no TV. My power is out too, so I call up and ask ‘Did the Canadians win?’
Tʼcúm=wit=kʼa,  cw7aoz  kw=s=átsʼx-en=an.
win=3PL=EPIS  NEG  DET=NMLZ=see-DIR=1SG.ERG
‘They might have won, I donʼt know.’  (Stʼátʼimcets)  PRESENT TP, PAST TO

(89)  
Wá7=kʼa  séna7  qwenúxw.
ipfV=EPIS  COUNTER  sick
‘He may be sick.’ (Context: Maybe thatʼs why heʼs not here.)  PRESENT TP, PRESENT TO
(Stʼátʼimcets; Rullmann et al. 2008:321)

(90)  
Context: Your grandson is celebrating a Canadian victory, but the game is only half over and so you say ‘The Americans might win.’
Sxek  tʼcúm#(=kelh)=tu7  i=tlh7álqw-emc=a.
EPIS  win#(=PROSP)=then  DET.PL=border-person=EXIS
‘The Americans might win.’  (Stʼátʼimcets)  PRESENT TP, FUTURE TO

The same facts about temporal orientation hold if the temporal perspective is past, as in 91-93.

(91)  
Context: As in 81: you looked out of your window earlier today the ground was wet, so it looked like it might have rained. But you find out later that sprinklers had been watering the ground.
Kwis=kʼa=tu7.
rain=EPIS=then
‘It might have rained.’  (Stʼátʼimcets)  PAST TP, PAST TO
(92) Context: As in (48): The Canucks were playing last night ... Today, your friend asks you why you had told him there was good sports news when the Canucks had actually lost. You say:

\[ \text{Wá7=k’a t’cum i=Canucks=a.} \]
\[ \text{IPFV=EPIS win DET.PL=Canucks=EXIS} \]

‘The Canucks might have been winning.’ (St’át’imcets) PAST TP, PRESENT TO

(93) Context: When you looked out of your window earlier today it was cloudy, so it looked like it must have been going to rain. So you took your raincoat, but in the end it cleared up and the weather was sunny. Someone asks you later why you have your coat, and you say:

\[ \text{Cúz’=k’a(=tu7) séna7 kwis.} \]
\[ \text{PROSP=EPIS(=then) COUNTER rain} \]

‘It might have been going to rain.’ (St’át’imcets) PAST TP, FUTURE TO

Circumstantial data are shown in 94-95. St’át’imcets patterns similarly to Gitksan in that there is a strict diversity condition effect whereby circumstantial modals are future-oriented. However, St’át’imcets manifests this effect in an opposite way to Gitksan: rather than having obligatory overt marking of prospective aspect, in St’át’imcets the circumstantial modals convey their own inherent futurity, and overt prospective marking does not appear.

(94) Ts’ex-ts’x-ilc=kacw(*=kelh)=ka(*=kelh).
\[ \text{clean-REDUP-UT=2SG.SBJ(*=PROSP)=DEON(*=PROSP)} \]

‘You should clean up.’ (St’át’imcets) PRESENT TP, FUTURE TO

(95) Wá7=lhkan ka-cát-s-a ta=k’ét’h=a.
\[ \text{IPFV=1SG.SBJ CIRC-lift-CAUS-CIRC DET=rock=EXIS} \]

‘I can lift the rock.’ (St’át’imcets) PRESENT TP, FUTURE TO

3.4. SUMMARY. Epistemic and circumstantial modals behave differently with respect to TO, unlike with TP. For epistemic TOs, the four languages divide into two pairs. In Dutch and English, modals co-occurring with a perfect operator necessarily have past TO, and modals with covert non-perfect allow either present or future TO. In Gitksan and St’át’imcets, modals co-occurring with prospective aspect allow only future TO, and modals with (covert) non-prospective allow either past or present TO.

Circumstantial modals in all four languages (and any language, assuming the diversity condition generalizes) can only be future-oriented. They are thus incompatible with a real perfect aspect which scopes under the modal. The languages in our sample differ in whether they overtly mark the prospective (or non-perfect) aspect which circumstantial modals require: Gitksan is the only language which has overt prospective under circumstantial.

---

28 Recall that modals which in English surface with have do not necessarily contain a real perfect operator scoping under the modal; combinations like might have can have past TP and non-past TO. See discussion above and in §5.

29 An outstanding question is why in St’át’imcets, epistemic modals allow overt marking of prospective (as shown in 90 above), but circumstantial modals do not.
Our proposal that in English and Dutch, there is a separate, phonologically null, non-perfect aspect which gives present or future TO (rather than assigning the modal itself some inherent futurity; cf. discussion in §3.2) is not a crucial feature of our analysis. However, the overt manifestation of PROSP below the modal in Gitksan, and in St’át’imcets for epistemic modals, provides indirect cross-linguistic support for the analysis. Moreover, Kratzer (2011) argues on independent grounds that English possesses a null prospective which co-occurs with modals (we would call this a ‘non-perfect’), and Louie (2015) motivates a null prospective in some Blackfoot modal constructions.

In summary, the same basic architecture can be applied in all four languages, with independent differences in the tense and aspect systems deriving surface differences in modal-temporal interactions. Many of the cross-linguistic differences have to do merely with phonological (co)overtness. The non-perfect is phonologically null in English and Dutch under modals, but the prospective is spelled out as dim in Gitksan, and as kelh in St’át’imcets under epistemic modals.

4. EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE FORMAL ANALYSIS. In this section we apply the analysis to a representative range of examples to show that it derives the right truth conditions. We discuss Dutch first, then Gitksan and St’át’imcets. English works mostly the same as Dutch, but has various complications. For that reason, we postpone a fuller discussion of English to §5.

4.1. DUTCH. Because Dutch modals generally do not have lexical restrictions on their modal flavour, the examples in this section in principle allow for both epistemic and non-epistemic readings, modulo diversity condition effects. Since our focus is on accounting for TP and TO, we will not usually comment on whether particular examples are biased towards any particular modal flavour. To illustrate our account, we use the modal verb kunnen, which is the closest analogue of English might.

In 96 we have present tense, an eventive predicate, and perfective inclusion aspect. In the absence of the perfect, the (covert) ordering aspect is non-perfect.

(96) Jan kan dans-en.
    Jan POS.PRS.3SG dance-INF
‘Jan can/might dance.’

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\lambda w . \exists w' \left[ w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t_0)}(\cap f(w,t_0)) \& \exists t' \left[ t_0 \leq t' \& \exists e \left[ \text{Jan.dance}(e)(w') \& \tau(e) \subseteq t' \right] \right] \right]
\end{array}
\]

96 expresses the proposition which is true in an evaluation world w iff there is a world w’ which is accessible from w at the utterance time t₀ (according to modal base f and ordering source h), in which there is an event e of Jan dancing, whose run-time is contained within some interval t’ which starts no earlier than t₀. This correctly predicts (as in Condoravdi’s system) that Jan’s potential dancing is in the future.

Modal sentences containing stative predicates or imperfective viewpoint aspect are correctly predicted to allow either present or future TO. This is illustrated in 97.
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(97) Jan kan {ziek} / {aan het zing-en} zijn.
Jan POS.PRS.3SG {sick} / {at the sing-INF} be.INF
‘Jan might be sick / singing.’ PRESENT TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO

[
\[\text{POS(NON-PERF(IPFV(Jan ziek zijn/zingen))))(PRESENT(t_i)) \] g,t0,w0,f,h =
\[\lambda w . \exists w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{t_0}(w, t_0) \land \exists t' [t_0 \leq t' \land \exists e [\text{Jan.be.sick/Jan.sing(e)(w')} \land t' \subseteq \tau(e)]]\]
]

97 is true in w iff there is a world w′ accessible from <w,t0>, in which there is an event e of Jan being sick/singing, whose run-time contains some interval t′ which starts no earlier than t0. This means that Jan’s sickness/singing can begin before, at, or after the utterance time; the requirement is that Jan’s sickness/singing must contain a non-past interval, that is the event cannot be entirely located in the past.

Next we turn to sentences containing perfect aspect in the modal’s prejacent. The surface scope ordering of the perfect auxiliary and the modal leads to the analysis in 98 for an eventive predicate. This is the reading which corresponds to English might have with present TP and past TO. For Dutch kunnen with a perfect complement this is the only available reading.

(98) Jan kan zijn vertrokk-en.
Jan POS.PRS.3SG be.INF leave-PTCP
‘Jan may/might have left.’ PRESENT TP, PAST TO

[
\[\text{POS(PERF(PFV(Jan vertrekken))))(PRESENT(t_i)) \] g,t0,w0,f,h =
\[\lambda w . \exists w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{t_0}(w, t_0) \land \exists t' [t' < t_0 \land \exists e [\text{Jan.leave(e)(w')} \land t' \subseteq \tau(e)]]\]
]

98 denotes the proposition which is true in w iff there is a world w′ which is (epistemically) accessible from <w,t0>, in which there is an event of Jan leaving, whose run-time is contained within some interval t′ which precedes t0. This correctly derives present TP and past TO. In 99, the perfect auxiliary combines with either a stative predicate or an overt imperfective (progressive). Both these combinations derive present TP and past TO.

(99) Jan kan {ziek} / {aan het zing-en} zijn ge-wees-t
Jan POS.PRS.3SG {sick} / {at the sing-INF} be.INF PTCP-be-PTCP
‘Jan may/might have been sick / singing.’ PRESENT TP, PAST TO

[
\[\text{POS(PERF(IPFV(Jan ziek zijn/zingen))))(PRESENT(t_i)) \] g,t0,w0,f,h =
\[\lambda w . \exists w' [w' \in \text{BEST}_{t_0}(w, t_0) \land \exists t' [t' < t_0 \land \exists e [\text{Jan.be.sick/Jan.sing(e)(w')} \land t' \subseteq \tau(e)]]\]
]

We have illustrated the analysis for examples with present TP here. Past-TP cases are exactly analogous, differing only in that the temporal perspective is not t0, but instead is a past time interval given by the assignment function. We work through one example in 100, which is the past-tense counterpart of 98. Recall from §1 that these readings cannot be generated within Condoravdi’s system.
It was possible that Jan (had) left.

\[
\lambda w . \exists w' \left[ w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\cap f(w,t)) \land \exists t' \left[ t' < g(i) \land \exists e [\text{Jan.leave}(e)(w') \land \tau(e) \subseteq t'] \right] \right]
\]

(100)  
\[
\text{Jan kon zijn vertrokken.}
\]
\text{Jan can.PST.3SG be.INF leave-PTCP}

This proposition is true in \( w \) iff there is a world \( w' \) which is (epistemically) accessible from a contextually salient past time \( g(i) \), in which there is an event of Jan leaving, whose run-time is contained within some interval \( t' \) which precedes \( g(i) \).

This outline of our formal analysis confirms that in Dutch, TP is determined fully compositionally via the tense inflection on the modal, and TO is determined by aspect.

4.2. Gitksan and St’át’imcets. As shown in §2.3, Gitksan and St’át’imcets lexically distinguish epistemic from circumstantial modals, there is just one non-future tense, and both epistemic and circumstantial modals can have past TPs in these languages. The only relevant difference between the systems is that in Gitksan, future TO is obligatorily overtly marked by prospective aspect, while in St’át’imcets, this is the case only for epistemic modals. For St’át’imcets circumstantial modals, future TO is enforced by the diversity condition. These independent differences in the temporal systems of Gitksan and St’át’imcets as opposed to Dutch and English will correctly derive the different surface patterns of modal-temporal interactions, even though there is an identical hierarchy of elements, system of semantic types, and the same general architecture whereby tense provides TP and aspect TO.

Before working through some concrete examples in these languages, we present lexical entries for the modals which incorporate the lexicalized modal flavour. These are given in 101-103, following ideas in Matthewson et al. 2007, Rullmann et al. 2008, Davis et al. 2009, Peterson 2010, and Matthewson 2013. We are setting aside differences in the precise types of modal base and ordering source the modals require; these include evidential restrictions, which are not relevant for current concerns.\(^{30}\)

(101)  
\[
\text{\[ k'a (St’át’imcets) / imaa (Gitksan) \] is only defined if f is an epistemic modal base.}
\]
If defined, \( \llbracket k'a / imaa \rrbracket^{g,i0,w,0,f,h} = \lambda P_{<i,st>}. \lambda t. \lambda w . \forall w' \left[ w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\cap f(w,t)) \rightarrow P(t(w')) \right] \)

(102)  
\[
\text{\[ ka (St’át’imcets) / sgi (Gitksan) \] is only defined if f is a circumstantial modal base.}
\]
If defined, \( \llbracket ka / sgi \rrbracket^{g,i0,w,0,f,h} = \lambda P_{<i,st>}. \lambda t. \lambda w . \forall w' \left[ w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\cap f(w,t)) \rightarrow P(t(w')) \right] \)

\(^{30}\) The modals in 101-102 are translated as universal quantifiers, but all of them except \( sgi \) are felicitous both in contexts which support necessity claims, and in contexts which support possibility claims. For detailed discussion, see Rullmann et al. 2008, Peterson 2010 and Matthewson 2013.
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(103) $\llbracket da'akxw \ (\text{Gitksan}) \rrbracket^{g,0,w,f,h}$ is only defined if $f$ is a circumstantial modal base.

If defined, $\llbracket da'akxw \rrbracket^{g,0,w,f,h} = \lambda P_{<i,st> \lambda t \lambda w} \exists w' \ [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,t)}(\bigcap f(w,t)) \& P(t)(w')]$

We work through just two representative examples here. 104 is from St’át’imcets and contains an epistemic modal with a present TP and a past TO. The example parallels the Dutch case in 98, except that St’át’imcets has a covert non-prospective aspect rather than an overt perfect one.31 The other difference between this example and the two Germanic languages is due to the non-future tense. The discourse context here enforces present TP, so the value of $g(i)$ is $t_0$. In a different discourse context, the same modal could have past TP without any additional marking. We thus see that although Gitksan and St’át’imcets have neither obligatory tense marking nor a past/present distinction, our analysis still involves tense providing the TP in these languages.

(104) Context: You’ve been watching the gold medal hockey game, in the middle of it the power went off, so you had no TV. My power is out too, so I call up and ask ‘Did the Canadians win?’

T’cúm=wit=k’a.

win=3PL=EPIS

‘They might have won.’ (St’át’imcets) NON-FUTURE TP, PAST TO

$\llbracket \ [k'a(\text{NON-PROSP}(PFV(t'cúmwit)))](\text{NON-FUTURE}(t_i)) \rrbracket^{g,0,w,f,h} =$

$\lambda w . \ \forall w' \ [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,g(i))}(\bigcap f(w,g(i))) \rightarrow \exists t' \ [t' \leq g(i) \& \exists e \ [\text{they.win(e)}(w') \& \tau(e) \subseteq t']]$ (where $f$ is an epistemic modal base and $g(i) \leq t_0$)

This expresses the proposition which is true in a world $w$ iff in all worlds $w'$ which are epistemically accessible from $w$ at some non-future time $g(i)$, there is an event of the Canadians winning, whose run-time is contained within some interval $t'$ which is no later than $g(i)$.

The Gitksan example in 105 contains a circumstantial modal with past TP and future TO. Here, the discourse context ensures that the value given to the non-future tense is in the past, giving past TP.

(105) K’ay da’akxw-diit dim xsdaa-diit, ii ap née=dii xsdaa-diit.

still CIRC.POS-3PL.II PROSP win-3PL.II CCNJ VERUM NEG=FOC win-3PL.II

‘They still could have won, but they didn’t win.’ PAST TP, FUTURE TO

(Gitksan; Matthewson 2013:375)

$\llbracket [da'akxw(\text{PROSP}(PFV(xsdaadiit)))](\text{NON-FUTURE}(t_i)) \rrbracket^{g,0,w,f,h} =$

$\lambda w . \ \exists w' \ [w' \in \text{BEST}_{h(w,g(i))}(\bigcap f(w,g(i))) \& \exists t' \ [g(i) < t' \& \exists e \ [\text{they.win(e)}(w') \& \tau(e) \subseteq t']]$ (where $f$ is a circumstantial modal base and $g(i) \leq t_0$)

31 There is a potential candidate for an overt perfect morpheme in St’át’imcets: plan (Davis 2010, Matthewson 2013). However, it is not clear whether this is a perfect or simply a lexical item meaning ‘already’ (cf. Vander Klok & Matthewson 2015). Importantly, plan does not function to give past TO under modals.
**5. PAST TP IN ENGLISH.**

**5.1. VARIATION IN THE ENGLISH MODAL SYSTEM.**

“There is another set of data where we find that for a certain modal meaning, English chooses a designated lexical item, while other languages choose a “transparent” way of conveying that meaning. This seems to support the view that it is English that is weird.” (von Fintel & Iatridou 2008:18)

Compared to the other three languages discussed in this paper, the modal-temporal system of English is complex and messy. Presumably, this is due in large part to a purely morphosyntactic constraint prohibiting the co-occurrence of overt tense marking with a modal auxiliary. English has to resort to ‘patches’ in its grammar in order to express past TP readings of modals, resulting among other things in the ambiguity of *might have*.

Looking beyond *might*, it becomes clear that English modals don’t all behave the same way. For instance, *may* differs from *might* in that *may have* is unambiguous; it can only have a present TP, past TO reading (at least in the ‘standard’ dialect; see §5.4 for discussion of cross-speaker variation).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRESENT TP, PAST TO</th>
<th>PAST TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO</th>
<th>PAST TP, PAST TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mary might have left</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mary may have left</em></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Interpretations of *might have* vs. *may have*.**

In this section we will explore the different subclasses of English modals, which are defined in terms of their temporal interpretation, taking into account not only their interaction with *have*, but also their behaviour with respect to the sequence of tense (SOT) phenomenon. The SOT data show that some English modals include the specification of tense in their lexical entry whereas others don’t. We implement this in our formal framework by analyzing individual modal auxiliaries as spelling out different parts of the tree given in 18 above. In particular, English modals realize the combination of the T head plus the Mod head, with some modals always including the tense feature [PRESENT] whereas others can also have a [ZERO] tense feature. As for the interaction with *have*, we argue that the combination *might have* (and similarly for other modals in the same subclass) has an additional lexicalized interpretation, in which it functions as a single lexical item with past TP.

**5.2. SEMI-MODALS.** Before we discuss the English modal auxiliaries proper, we’ll have a brief look at semi-modals such as *have to*, *be able to*, *be allowed to*, and *be possible*. These behave exactly as our analysis predicts, and essentially the same way as the Dutch modal verbs do. TP is determined by tense scoping above the modal, and TO is determined by aspect scoping.
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below it and the Aktionsart of the prejacent predicate. The modal flavour is constrained by the diversity condition in the usual way. This is illustrated for *have to* in Table 4.32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sue has to leave.</td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>FUTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue has to be sick.</td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>PRESENT/FUTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue had to leave.</td>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>FUTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue had to be sick.</td>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>PRESENT/FUTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue has to have left.</td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>PAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue had to have left.</td>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>PAST</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TP</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sue has to leave.</td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>FUTURE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>PRESENT/FUTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue had to leave.</td>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>FUTURE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PAST</td>
<td>PRESENT/FUTURE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sue has to have left.</td>
<td>PRESENT</td>
<td>PAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue had to have left.</td>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>PAST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. TP and TO for the semi-modal *have to*.

5.3. Three Classes of Modal Auxiliaries.

*Not the least use in the world for him to say he could be better. Might, could, would – they are contemptible auxiliaries.* (George Eliot, *Middlemarch*, ch. XIV)

When not followed by *have* and when not in a free indirect discourse (FID) environment, the modal auxiliaries *may*, *must* and *might* allow only present TP in matrix clauses. (In the rest of this section, we ignore FID; see §6.)

(106) Mary *may* / *must* / *might* {leave} / {be home}.
- only *PRESENT TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO*

However, these and other modal auxiliaries fall into into (at least) three distinct classes depending on whether they can have past TP when followed by *have*, and whether they can have a simultaneous reading in SOT contexts (see also Huddleston & Pullum 2002:196ff, Portner 2009:223ff for related discussion). The simultaneous reading is illustrated in 107a for a non-modal sentence: the event time of the embedded past-tense stative predicate coincides with that of the matrix verb. This contrasts with the so-called double-access reading in 107b, where the event time of the embedded present-tense stative predicate overlaps with both the utterance time and the event time of the matrix verb (see Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997, among others). When a modal appears in an embedded clause under a past-tense matrix verb, the simultaneous reading corresponds to past TP, and the double-access reading to present TP (see examples below).

32 A reviewer suggests that *Sue had to be sick* allows present, as well as past, TP. As noted above, most of the speakers we consulted rejected the use of *had to* with present TP in 65b. Future research may determine whether there is speaker variation in this area.
The three classes of modal auxiliaries are as follows; the information is summarized in Table 5.\textsuperscript{33}

I. Modals which always have present TP: \textit{may, can, shall, will}.

II. Modals which can behave as if inflected for past tense in SOT contexts (i.e. allow the simultaneous reading when in the scope of a matrix past-tense verb): \textit{must}.

III. Modals which can have the simultaneous reading in SOT contexts, and which additionally allow a past-TP interpretation when their complement is morphosyntactically in the perfect: \textit{might, could, should, would}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textit{past TP when followed by have} & \textit{simultaneous reading with SOT} & \\
\hline
$-$ & Class I (e.g. \textit{may}) & Class II (\textit{must}) \\
$+$ & Class III (e.g. \textit{might}) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Classification of English modals.}
\end{table}

In the rest of this section we present data that support the classification in Table 5 and then propose an analysis in the theoretical framework developed above.

\textbf{Class I: \textit{may, can, shall, will}.} We use \textit{may} to illustrate the behaviour of class I modals. The other modals in this class behave essentially the same way when it comes to TP and TO, but have idiosyncratic restrictions involving modal flavour and things like register. For instance, \textit{can} resists epistemic readings (except when negated), \textit{will} expresses futurity, and \textit{shall} is archaic.

When embedded under a past-tense matrix verb, class I modals cannot have the simultaneous reading, and only allow for the double-access interpretation (although see §5.4 for discussion of variation concerning \textit{may}).\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} This table raises the question of why there are no English modals that can have past TP with \textit{have} but reject the simultaneous reading in SOT contexts. This might just be an accidental gap; we leave the question for further research.

\textsuperscript{34} The following is a contextualized example showing that \textit{may} cannot have the simultaneous reading whereas \textit{must} and \textit{might} can.

\begin{itemize}
\item [(i)] Context: Yesterday, I was looking for my supervisor, Mary. I couldn’t find her anywhere, so I asked my colleague John, who said that he thought she was away on a business trip. Today, I ran into Mary, who told me that she had been at a doctor’s appointment. John said that Mary \textbf{must/might/#may} be out of town.
\end{itemize}

Here the (hypothetical) state of Mary’s being out of town obtains (according to John) at the time of John’s utterance (yesterday), but not at the utterance time (today). An example demonstrating
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(108) John said that Mary may {leave}/{be home}.
- only double-access reading (PRESENT TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)
- no simultaneous reading (*PAST TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)

When followed by have, class I modals can only express present TP and past TO; this is not only true in main clauses (as in 109), but also when embedded in a past-tense matrix clause, where again only the double-access reading is possible (110).

(109) Mary may have {left}/{been home since 7 pm}.
- only PRESENT TP, PAST TO

(110) John said that Mary may have {left}/{been home since 7 pm}.
- only double-access reading (PRESENT TP, PAST TO)
- no simultaneous reading (*PAST TP, PAST TO)

CLASS II: MUST. Unlike class I modals, must can have the simultaneous reading when embedded under a past-tense verb, as in 111. The naturally-occurring examples in 112 involve simultaneous readings for must.

(111) John said that Mary must {leave}/{be home}.
- simultaneous (PAST TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)
- double-access (PRESENT TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)

(112) a. Charlie never wrote of his health, so I supposed he must be all right. (Robertson Davies, The Cunning Man, p. 174)
    b. They dutifully supported him in office until a conflict-of-interest commissioner [...] told Vander Zalm he must go. (Christopher Moore, 1867, p. 223)

However, when it occurs in a matrix clause and is followed by have, must behaves just like the class I modals in that it can only have a present TP/past TO reading.

(113) Mary must have {left}/{been home since 7 pm}
- only PRESENT TP, PAST TO

As expected, when must have is embedded under a matrix past-tense verb, it is again ambiguous between the simultaneous and double-access readings (so the TP is either past or present), but this time the TO is past, as shown in 114; some attested examples of the simultaneous (i.e. past TP) reading with must have are given in 115.


that all three modals allow the double-access reading is given in (ii); in this case, the state of Mary (supposedly) being from Quebec applies both at the time of John’s saying and at the utterance time.

(ii) Context: Yesterday, I was introduced to a new co-worker, Mary. I couldn’t quite place her accent, so I wondered where she was from. According to my colleague, John, she sounded like a Quebec francophone.
John said that Mary must/might/may be from Quebec.
John said that Mary must have {left}/been home since 7pm
- double-access (PRESENT TP, PAST TO)
- simultaneous (PAST TP, PAST TO)

(115) a. I thought someone must have given him my name to divert attention from the others. (Robertson Davies, Fifth Business, p. 38)
b. We knew your Ma must have sent you. (Robertson Davies, Fifth Business, p. 96)

CLASS III: MIGHT, COULD, SHOULD, WOULD. We use might as our paradigm case for class III modals; the other members of the class behave largely the same way with respect to TO (although they are sometimes more limited or idiosyncratic in other ways).^{35}

Class III modals behave like must in that they can have the simultaneous, past TP reading when embedded under a past-tense verb (cf. Abusch 1997).

John said that Mary might {leave}/be home.
- double-access (PRESENT TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)
- simultaneous (PAST TP, PRESENT/FUTURE TO)

However, class III modals differ from must in allowing past-TP readings when they are non-embedded but followed by have. This results in the famous ambiguity of might have that was the focus of Condoravdi 2002. As we have argued in this paper, these past-TP readings can not only be circumstantial, but also epistemic.

The past-TP readings of might have allow not only present or future TO (as in the cases discussed in the literature), but also past TO, as shown by the following variant of von Fintel and Gillies’s (2008) ice cream example (cf. 21).

A: Why did you look in the freezer?
B: Somebody might have put the ice cream in there. PAST TP, PAST TO

Here B is talking about a past epistemic state (past TP) concerning a hypothetical event (the putting of the ice cream in the freezer) that is located before the epistemic perspective time (past TO).

Again, we see the same pattern in embedded clauses as in main clauses, as shown in 118-119.

Mary might have {left}/been home
- PAST TP, PAST/PRESENT/FUTURE TO
- PRESENT TP, PAST TO

(119) John said that Mary might have {left}/been home
- simultaneous (PAST TP, PAST/PRESENT/FUTURE TO)
- double-access (PRESENT TP, PAST TO)

---

^{35} Our classification may need further refinement, since some class III modals (would and could) can have past TP in main clauses, unlike might. See §5.4 for discussion.
5.4. A PARTIALLY LEXICAL ANALYSIS. How can this classification of English modals be accounted for in our theory of modal/temporal interaction? Let’s start with class I modals (*may, can, shall, will*). These behave exactly the same way as Dutch modal verbs and English semi-modals when they are inflected for present tense. We therefore analyze class I modals as including an inherent present tense feature on T in their lexical entry, similar to Abusch’s (1985) decomposition of *will* into a present tense and an atemporal modal *WOLL*. This means that class I modals spell out the subtree in 120 (the details of how this spell-out works will depend on one’s theory of the syntax-morphology interface).

\[ \text{(120)} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{TenseP} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{T'} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{ModP} \\
\downarrow \\
[\text{PRESENT}] \quad \text{T}_1 \\
\downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
\text{Mod} \quad \text{AspOrdP} \\
\end{array}
\]

*may*

Giving a full analysis of SOT goes beyond the scope of this paper; for concreteness, we will follow Kratzer’s (1998) ‘zero tense’ approach. (However, in principle our account should be equally compatible with a deletion approach to SOT, as in Ogihara 1989 or von Stechow 1995, for instance.) We assume that the simultaneous reading involves a [ZERO] tense feature, which simply denotes the identity function (in other words, it is just a presupposition-less counterpart of the non-zero tense features defined in 7-9). The simultaneous reading of 108 is ruled out since *may* requires a [PRESENT] tense feature on T and is incompatible with [ZERO] tense.

The class II modal is a bit more mysterious. At first sight, *must* appears to be ambiguous between a present-TP interpretation (in main clauses like 106 and 113) and a past-TP interpretation (when embedded under a past-tense matrix verb, as in 111 and 114). One possibility might be to assume that *must* is ambiguous between having an inherent [PRESENT] feature or an inherent [PAST] feature (with the latter option being unavailable in main clauses for some reason). However, the facts are more complicated (and interesting) when *must* is in embedded clauses. As is well-known from the literature on SOT, (non-modal) past-tense verbs embedded under a past-tense matrix verb not only allow the simultaneous interpretation, they also have a BACKSHIFTED reading.

\[ \text{(121)} \]

Mary said that Jane was angry.

a. Mary said last week that Jane was angry last week. (simultaneous)
b. Mary said last week that Jane was angry a year ago. (backshifted)

In the backshifted reading, the past tense in the embedded clause moves the evaluation time backward relative to the (past) evaluation time of the matrix clause. Past-tense forms of semi-modals allow the backshifted reading, as we expect since they are ordinary verbs (the same holds in Dutch). By contrast, the class II modal *must* cannot have the backshifted reading (Boogaart
Mary said last week that Jane had to / # must be angry a year ago.
backshifted reading OK for had to, bad for must

These data show that although must can count as past tense for the purposes of SOT, it does not have a semantically active past tense morpheme that can shift the evaluation time backward. We conclude that must can have either a [PRESENT] or a [ZERO] tense feature on T. The [PRESENT] feature occurs when must appears in a main clause, or when it has the double-access reading as in 111, and the [ZERO] feature appears in the simultaneous reading. We assume that a T head with the [ZERO] feature is uninterpretable in matrix clauses, or that by default it refers to the utterance time $t_0$ (except in FID contexts – see §6).

36 Here is a context showing that had to allows backshifting, but must and might don’t.
(i) Context: Last week, Mary told me a story about her cousin, Jane. About a year ago, Jane’s chihuahua was attacked by a vicious pitbull terrier. Jane took a stick and chased away the pitbull.
Mary said that Jane had to/#must/#might be very angry, because she wasn’t even afraid of the pitbull.
It is possible to obtain something like the backshifted reading by adding perfect have to the modal.
(ii) Mary said that Jane must have / might have been very angry. But in that case, it is the past TO caused by have that is responsible for the apparent backshifting.

37 A reviewer pointed out a potential problem with our analysis. Suppose that the SOT rule involves wholesale replacement of the [ZERO] feature by a [PAST] feature copied from the T in the matrix clause. Assuming that this feature-replacement takes places at PF (the representation that is the input to the phonology) and that lexical insertion can only ‘see’ the PF and not the LF (the representation that is the input to the semantics), then lexical insertion will be unable to distinguish between a real past tense (which has the [PAST] feature in both PF and LF, resulting in the backshifted-reading) and a ‘fake’ one (which has [PAST] in PF but [ZERO] in LF, yielding the simultaneous reading). This is not a problem for non-modal verbs (such as in 121) or semi-modals (such as the version of 122 with had to), because these allow both the simultaneous and the backshifted reading. However, for modals like must and might, this is problematic, because they only allow the simultaneous reading, so insertion of the modal should only be allowed if there is a [ZERO] feature on T in the LF. To solve this problem, we tentatively suggest an approach to SOT inspired by Klecha (2016). In his analysis, morphological tense marking is a kind of agreement between a (main or auxiliary) verb and a c-commanding T head. The (interpretable) tense feature carried by T is copied onto the verb/auxiliary as an uninterpretable feature, which eventually gets spelled out as past-tense morphology. In the case of SOT, the uninterpretable tense feature on the embedded verb/auxiliary is copied not from the T in the embedded clause, but from the T in the matrix clause (see Klecha’s (49) for illustration). Under these assumptions, the SOT rule does not get rid of the [ZERO] feature on the embedded T, so it is still visible at the point when lexical insertion of the modal takes place. (Note also that modals actually do not show any overt tense inflection, so perhaps they don’t even need to get a tense feature from the matrix clause.) Working out the details of the morphosyntax of SOT is a very
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Summarizing, in our analysis *must* spells out the following configuration, where the [PRESENT] feature is optional.

(123) TenseP
    - T′
    - ModP
        - [PRESENT] T₁
    - [ZERO] Mod
    - AspOrdP
        - NEC

Finally, let’s consider class III modals (*might, could, would, should*). Recall that these are similar to *must* (class II) in allowing the simultaneous reading (116). They also behave like *must* in not allowing the backshifted reading, as shown in 124 (Abusch 1997).

(124) Mary said last week that Jane **might** be angry (#a year ago).
    - simultaneous
    - #backshifted

However, class III modals additionally allow a past-TP reading expressed by means of *have* following the modal. Condoravdi (2002) analyzed this ambiguity in terms of *have* being able to raise over the modal at LF so that it assigns past TP instead of past TO. Although this is an attractive idea because it offers a compositional way to derive the past-TP reading, it has several conceptual and empirical problems (see Arregui 2005, Hacquard 2006, Laca 2008 for discussion). First of all, raising the Asp head over the Mod head would violate the well-known head movement constraint of Travis 1984 (see Fălăuş & Laca 2016 for this point). Secondly, the raising account cannot explain why *have* following a modal can express a past-TP reading only for class III modals and not for Classes I or II. For class I this could perhaps be accounted for in terms of the inherent [PRESENT] blocking the raising of Asp, but no such explanation is available for *must* (class II), which is otherwise exactly like class III modals in having either an inherent [PRESENT] or [ZERO] tense feature. We conclude that the ability to allow a past-TP reading with *have* must be a lexical property, which class III modals have but which *must* lacks.

A third problem for the *have*-raising account (pointed out by Portner 2009:229) is that it cannot easily explain why it is possible for class III modals followed by *have* to have a past-TP/past-TO reading (as in 117 above), since *have* would have to do double duty: it would have to scope both over the modal (to explain the past TP) and under the modal (to explain the past TO)

complex matter, which would go far beyond the scope of this paper. We thank the reviewer for thoughtful discussion of this issue.

38 But as Portner (2009:224) points out, *could* (unlike *might*) does allow the backshifted reading in its ability interpretation. This suggests that ability *could* may have a [PAST] feature. See also section 5.5.

39 See Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (2008a) for support of the claim that the perfect scopes over the modal.
at the same time. A lexical analysis appears instead to be called for, in which *might have* forms a lexicalized unit which encodes both types of ‘pastness’ simultaneously.

We propose that class III modals with *have* are in fact ambiguous: in addition to the regular interpretation in 125 in which *might have* consists of two separate lexical items, *might* followed by *have*, there also is a single lexical item *might have* represented in 126.

\[(125)\]
\[
\text{TenseP} \quad \text{ModP} \\
\quad \text{[PRESENT]} \quad \text{T} \quad \text{Mod} \\
\quad \text{[ZERO]} \quad \text{POS} \\
\text{might} \quad \text{have} \\
\]
\[
\text{(PRESENT TP, PAST TO)}
\]

\[(126)\]
\[
\text{TenseP} \quad \text{ModP} \\
\quad \text{PAST} \quad \text{T} \quad \text{Mod} \\
\quad \text{POS} \quad \text{AspOrdP} \\
\quad \{\text{PERF} \text{, NON-PERF}\} \\
\text{might have} \\
\]
\[
\text{(PAST TP, PAST/PRESENT/FUTURE TO)}
\]

This single lexical item *might have* morphologically spells out the combination of the tense head \(T\) with a past tense feature, the possibility modal \(\text{POS}\), and the aspect head \(\text{AspOrd}\), which can be filled by either \(\text{PERF}\) or \(\text{NON-PERF}\).\(^4\) The result is that whereas the TP is past, the TO can be

\[^4\] An anonymous reviewer suggests that a simplification of our analysis might be achieved by adopting an old idea proposed by McCawley (1971). In his analysis, *have* is really an instantiation of past that occurs in non-finite environments; multiple occurrences of *have* can be generated, but only one is ever spelled out due to a haplology rule. On this view, in the past-TP, past-TO reading of *might have* there would actually be a second, ‘silent’, *have* in the AspO head of 126, which would not be part of the lexical entry for *might have* itself (i.e., the bracket in 126 would have its right edge just to the left of AspO). Such an analysis could account for the (apparent) double-duty of *have* in the past-TP, past-TO reading: there would actually be two *have*-s, an overt one expressing past TP, and a covert one (due to haplology) representing past-TO. Another advantage of this proposal would be that it could potentially allow for a unification of the two readings of *might have*: *might* is spelled out as *might have* whenever it either has past
either past, present, or future. That all three options are indeed attested can be seen in the following examples.

(127) Why did you set the freezer to the lowest temperature?
    a. Mary might have put the ice cream in there (and I didn’t want it to melt). (≈ 117)
       PAST TP, PAST TO
    b. The ice cream might have been in there (and I didn’t want it to melt). (≈ 21)
       PAST TP, PRESENT TO
    c. (I thought Mary just put the ice cream in there, and) it might have melted.
       PAST TP, FUTURE TO

It is important to note that our analysis of might have as a single lexical item does not entail that it consists of a single morphological word. As pointed out by Tim Stowell (p.c.), the lexicalized might have form allows other elements, such as negation, to intervene on the surface (might not have). In this respect it is like other multi-word lexical items which can also be discontinuous, including particle verbs like (I picked it up) and many idioms (It gives me pause).

Our account makes the past-TP readings of class III modals a purely lexical property, which is appropriate given the fact that such readings are only possible for some modals and not others. In particular, the fact that must have lacks past-TP readings is telling, because in all other respects, must behaves the same way as the class III modals.

Before concluding this section, we return to the issue of backshifting, since this has received attention in the literature on epistemic modals. In our account, might have should have the lexicalized meaning in 126 also in embedded clauses. In other words, we predict that when it occurs in the scope of a matrix past tense, might have (as opposed to plain might) should allow backshifting. Moreover, this should in principle be independent of modal flavour (epistemic or non-epistemic). And in fact, although backshifted readings for epistemic modals may be difficult to get (Iatridou 1990, Eide 2003, Boogaart 2007, among others), they are sometimes possible, as pointed out by Homer (2010) for French (see also Martin 2011, and Eide 2003 for Norwegian). For English might have, the generalization appears to be that backshifting is possible when it is embedded under an attitude verb which is not one of thinking or believing. This is shown in 128.

128a is compatible with a backshifted situation where yesterday, I no longer considered it possible that my bracelet was in my mother’s jewellery box. 128b, in contrast, can only mean that it was consistent with my epistemic state yesterday that the bracelet had been in the jewellery box the day before.

TO (as in 125) or past TP (as in 126). We thank the reviewer for this intriguing suggestion. Working out the ramifications of this idea in more detail (such as the mechanics of the haplology rule) goes beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.

Had to similarly allows backshifting in this context, supporting our claim to this effect in 122 above. As predicted, plain might without have here does not allow backshifting.
(128) Context: On Monday, I looked in my mother’s jewellery box for my bracelet, thinking it might have been put in there by mistake. On Tuesday, my mother asked me why I had looked in her jewellery box the day before, and I told her that for all I knew, my bracelet might have been in there. Now it’s Wednesday and I’m telling the whole story to a friend.

a. I told my mother (yesterday) that my bracelet might have been in her jewellery box.
b. I thought (yesterday) that my bracelet might have been in her jewellery box.

We argue that although epistemic modals with a [PAST] feature (i.e. semi-modals with past-tense inflection and class III modals followed by have) can in principle have backshifted readings, they are for pragmatic reasons unable to do so when the attitude is one of belief. This is because epistemic modals are closely tied to epistemic states – or at least, to bodies of evidence that support beliefs by agents. Expecting an epistemic modal to have a TP which differs from the contextually or overtly given belief-time would be akin to expecting the ‘judge’ (in the sense of Lasersohn 2005 and Stephenson 2007) in 129a to not be Mary, or the modal in 129b to rely on evidence available to someone other than Mary. While in principle possible, it would be for obvious reasons extremely pragmatically dispreferred. The same is true of 128b, which introduces my epistemic state yesterday, and therefore does not allow the modal to target my epistemic state the day before.

(129) a. According to Mary, Whiskas is tasty.
b. According to Mary, it might rain tomorrow.

5.5. CONSTRAINTS ON LEXICALIZATION? Our lexical analysis of class III modals with have raises the question of what the limits are (if any) on this sort of lexicalization. What parts of the tree can be spelled out as a single lexical item? Presumably, there are principled constraints, but what they are cannot be determined with certainty without further investigation. Given the idiosyncratic behaviour of the English modals we would caution against drawing hasty conclusions based on just a few lexical items. We have found evidence for this kind of lexicalization in only one of the four languages investigated here, and since the number of modal auxiliaries in English is quite small, it is impossible to decide whether any generalizations are robust and reflect semantic or morphosyntactic constraints of a more fundamental nature. For instance, is the absence of any modals that can have a (lexicalized) past TP in combination with have but which do not allow for simultaneous readings in SOT (i.e. the emptiness of the lower-left cell in Table 5 above) just an accidental gap or evidence of some more principled constraint? In this connection it is significant that class II has only a single member. If due to the diachronic vagaries of lexicalization must had had slightly different properties and behaved just like the class III modals, we might have been tempted to draw some far-reaching but incorrect conclusions about the lexicalization possibilities of English modals, in particular the (false) generalization that all modals that allow for the simultaneous reading in SOT contexts can have past-TP readings in combination with have.

Our lexical approach is further supported by the fact that there exists variation among speakers and dialects with respect to the behaviour of individual modals, which may indicate that the English modal system is still in a state of flux. We briefly discuss three such instances of variation here. The first concerns may. While may is clearly a class I modal in (what we consider to be) the standard dialect of English, many (younger?) speakers seem to treat it as a class III modal, that is, as equivalent to might. In the literature, it has been pointed out that it is not
uncommon to find *may have* used counterfactually, that is with a past TP in a situation in which it is known at the utterance time that the prejacent is false, as in 130 (Denison 1992, Huddleston & Pullum 2002:202-203). Attested examples of past-TP *may have* are given in 131.

(130) If our goalie had not been injured, we might / % may have won.

(131) a. “An irrevocable catastrophe *may have* occurred if a worker or visitor had been in this location,” wrote Thomas Quasney […] (Ubyssey, March 1, 2012)
   b. Had Roosevelt not died an untimely death […], the world *may well* have been spared the agonies of the cold war. (NYRB LX(5):24, March 21, 2013)
   c. If he had thought about it, he *may have* reasoned it was somewhere near midnight. (Richard Flanagan, *The Narrow Road to the Deep North*, p. 239)

We also have come across examples where *may* behaves just like *might* for the purposes of SOT.

(132) A woman who was last seen in Surrey in 1961 has been found alive in the Yukon. […] Lucy Ann Johnson was originally reported missing on May 14, 1965. […] Police believed she *may have* met with foul play and conducted a thorough investigation into her disappearance, but they never solved the case. (globalnews.ca, retrieved July 19, 2013)

(133) She had not felt sorry for the child. Instead, holding that tiny warm body, she had felt a conscious serendipity, a sense that this *may* not *have* been planned but had become, the minute it happened, what was meant to be. (Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, *Half of a Yellow Sun*, p. 314)

In all these cases, speakers of the ‘standard’ dialect would have to use *might* instead of *may*. We speculate (without having any real evidence at this point) that there is a link between the variation we see with respect to counterfactuals in examples like 130-131 and the variation in SOT behaviour in 132-133, and that they are both reflexes of a single ongoing process of lexical change, namely the shift of *may* from class I to class III.

A second example of lexical variation and/or change involves *must have* in counterfactual conditionals, which we take to be impossible in the current standard dialect. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002:109), there are ‘rare and marginal’ examples such as *If he had stayed in the army, he must surely have become a colonel*. The following are two attested cases from George Eliot’s *Middlemarch*.

(134) a. […] and if she had written a book she *must have* done it as Saint Theresa did, under the command of an authority that constrained her conscience. (ch. X)
   b. Under any other name than “pleasure” the society of Messieurs Bambridge and Horrock *must* certainly *have* been regarded as monotonous; […] (ch. XXIII)

Our last example of lexical variation among English modals involves class III. As Huddleston and Pullum (2002:196-197) point out, non-epistemic *could* and *would* can sometimes have past-TP readings in main clauses, as in their examples given in 135a-c, unlike *might* and *should* (see also Portner 2009:224ff).
In those days we could borrow as many books as we wished. Water could still get in. Only a few months later their love would change to hate.

This suggests that a further refinement of our classification may be in order, in that some (but not all) class III modals can have an inherent [PAST] tense feature in their lexical entry, but apparently only for their non-epistemic readings.

We conclude that the English modal system is rather complex and variable, and probably still in flux. It seems likely that diachronically this instability is the result of the loss of productive (overt) tense inflection on the modal auxiliaries, which caused the tense feature to be lexicalized as part of the modals themselves. The lack of an overt way of marking past TP on modals may have led to the recruitment of the perfect *have*, which ordinarily marks past TO, as a way of marking past TP instead, encoded in the lexical entries for class III modals such as 126. We suspect that this is a peripheral and exceptional phenomenon, which is probably rare cross-linguistically and subject to idiosyncratic lexical variation.

However, we would like to conclude this section on a more positive (though speculative) note. All the cases of idiosyncratic lexicalization we have seen involve TP, not TO. Even in English, TO is determined in a completely predictable way by the interaction between Aktionsart, aspectual marking (both ordering and inclusion aspect), and the diversity condition. We have not found any cases in our (very small!) language sample in which a modal is idiosyncratically specified in the lexicon as having, say, past TO. Whether this is a generalization that will be upheld if we inspect a much wider range of languages is a question we will leave for future research.

6. COMPARISON WITH OTHER ANALYSES. In this section, we discuss research which challenges the ideas on which our analysis is based. The focus is once again on epistemic modals with past TPs.

Although the majority of the literature has assumed that epistemic modals cannot take past TP, some researchers have argued that these readings do exist, usually in languages other than English (see for example Eide 2003, 2005, Kratzer 2009, Soare 2009, Homer 2010, Mari 2010, and Martin 2011). Even when the existence of the past-TP readings is admitted, authors often try to explain the readings away, denying that they reflect the simple ability of an epistemic modal to scope under past tense. For example, it has been proposed that the readings involve an elided embedding attitude verb (Hacquard 2006, 2011), or that they are felicitous only in contexts of FID (Fagan 2001, Boogaart 2007). See also Portner 2009:222-236.

The researcher who has most systematically addressed the complexities of the data in this area is Hacquard (2006, 2010, 2011). Hacquard’s claim for English is that the TP of an epistemic modal is always the local time of evaluation, which is the utterance time in a main clause. Although epistemic modals do allow past TP in some contexts, according to Hacquard this is never due to the modal simply being able to scope under a clause-mate past tense. Rather, the readings are licensed by a range of mitigating factors, and are usually not cases of ‘real’ semantic past. Our position is that although Hacquard is right about the types of contexts which favour past TPs for epistemic modals, the mitigating contexts are not necessary for the relevant readings. Moreover, there are empirical and theoretical problems with some of the individual proposals about mitigating factors.

Hacquard’s empirical claim is that epistemic modals can have past TPs only in a restricted
set of circumstances: either (a) when embedded under an attitude verb, (b) in an FID environment, (c) when an adverbial specifies an overt conversational background with a past TP, or (d) when there is an elided because. In earlier work (2006), Hacquard also allowed for the possibility of (e) elision of a matrix attitude verb. These options are illustrated in 136a-e respectively.

(136) a. Two days ago, Poirot thought that Mary had to be the murderer.  
(Hacquard 2011:1501)  
b. This didn’t make sense, thought Poirot ... Mary had to be the murderer.  
(Hacquard 2011:1501)  
c. Given what we knew then, Mary had to be the murderer.  
(Hacquard 2011:1501)  
d. A: Why did you look in the drawer?  
B: (I looked in the drawer because) my keys might have been in there.  
(adapted from von Fintel and Gillies 2008; cf. discussion in Hacquard 2011:1501)  
e. A: Why did you look in the drawer?  
B: (I thought that) my keys might have been in there.  
(Hacquard 2006:159, adapted from von Fintel and Gillies 2008)

The first thing to note is that these data involve either had to (136a-c) or might have (136d-e), but as we showed in the preceding section, English modals fall into different classes with respect to their behaviour in past-TP contexts. A full assessment of Hacquard’s proposals would require a detailed look at each of these classes in each of the five environments in 136. Here we will limit ourselves to pointing out some places where Hacquard’s analysis either under- or over-generates readings.

With respect to cases like 136a, Hacquard argues that past TP arises here because the TP of the embedded modal is set to the internal ‘now’ of the attitude verb. One piece of evidence for this is that the apparent past interpretation of the modal ‘lacks the characteristic backshifting of a true semantic past tense. For instance in [136a], the modal’s time of evaluation must be Poirot’s thinking time; it cannot precede it’ (Hacquard 2011:1501). Hacquard therefore argues that apparent past tense on epistemic modals is actually sequence of tense; there is morphological agreement, but no real past semantics (Hacquard 2011:1501; see also Iatridou 1990).

However, as we argued in §5, some classes of English modals do allow backshifted readings under attitude verbs when interpreted epistemically. For must, or for plain might without have, Hacquard’s claim that backshifted readings do not exist is upheld, but had to and might have do allow backshifting (see 122, 128a). Hacquard’s analysis therefore under-generates the available readings here.

The next environment which Hacquard argues licenses past epistemic readings is FID. The general phenomenon of FID is illustrated in 137. The adverb tomorrow is interpreted with respect to an earlier time at which a character in the story had the relevant thought. Temporal adverb shifting is a diagnostic for FID interpretations (Banfield 1982, Doron 1991, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2015).

(137) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!  
(Schlenker 2004; originally from D.H. Lawrence, Women in Love)

FID certainly facilitates past-TP readings for epistemic modals. The class II modal must and
class III modals like might allow past-TP readings in FID environments, as revealed by a mini-corpus search of one English novel (John Lanchester 2012, *Capital*). Two of many instances in this novel of past-TP *must/might* in FID environments are given in 138.

(138) a. Today, turning the corner of Pepys Road, she caught the smell of burning wood, of hot ash, and was suddenly back on the outskirts of Harare [...]. An odd time for someone to be burning wood in London; it must be a fire someone had held back because of the terrible weather. (ch. 73)

b. Patrick had not wanted to betray his own anxieties by asking too many questions about what Freddy really felt. The end result was that now; [...] he had no reliable idea about Freddy’s state of mind. He might be panicking, just as Patrick was. (ch. 16)

Providing a full analysis of FID would go far beyond the scope of this paper, but we offer a brief sketch of how our analysis might account for the facts. The first important point is that in English the licensing of past TP by FID is only possible with modals belonging to classes II and III; if we substitute a class I modal such as *may* in 138, a past TP reading is completely impossible. The inability of class I modals to undergo shifting to a past TP follows from the inherent present tense feature we have postulated for these modals; see 120 above.

The class II modal (*must*) and class III modals like *might* were analyzed above as allowing an interpretation involving a zero tense (see 123 and 125), which does not carry any presupposition about the location of the reference time relative to the utterance time. Under this interpretation, we assume that an FID discourse context is capable of providing a value for the reference time. As predicted, this possibility is not restricted to epistemic modals; non-epistemic readings, such as deontics, are equally possible.

(139) I suppose this is what they call denial, thought Mary. Except it didn’t seem to her that she was denying anything; what she was mainly felt was numb. Anaesthetised. She must call Alan. (*Capital*, ch. 57)

However, outside of the restricted narrative contexts supporting FID, English plain modals with zero tense (classes II and III) cannot have past TP in main clauses. This distinguishes them from the past-tense forms of semi-modals, and also from the lexicalized have-forms of class III modals (e.g. *might have*). Thus, although we agree with Hacquard that FID plays a role in some cases of epistemic modals with past TP, the special narrative contexts required for FID are not in general a necessary condition for past-TP epistemic readings.

Another proponent of the idea that epistemic modals can have past TPs only in FID contexts is Boogaart (2007). While Boogaart argues that the past TP of Dutch epistemic modals reflects a real past tense (rejecting a sequence of tense analysis), he nevertheless claims that the relevant readings arise only when there has been a perspective shift away from the speaker. (See Fagan 2001 for a similar claim for German.) However, as pointed out by Homer (2010), (some) epistemic modals can have past TPs in non-narrative contexts without perspective shift away from the speaker, as in von Fintel and Gillies’s (2008) ice cream example. Homer (2010) also points out that in French, (some) epistemic modals can occur with past TP even when they do not

42 See also de Hoop & Lestrade (2015) for examples of *might* in FID.
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correlate with the prime diagnostic for FID, the shifting of indexicals like *today* or *tomorrow*. Compare 140, where *today* picks out the day of Betty’s attitude, with 141, where *today* cannot refer to the day on which B held the relevant epistemic state.

(140) Betty woke up feeling nervous. *Today* was going to be awful.

(141) A (talking about what B did yesterday): Why did you look in the freezer?
    B: The ice cream *might have* been / *had* to be in there (#*today*).

Data like these show that *might have* and *had to* can have past TP even in contexts where temporal adverbs cannot shift, and which therefore cannot be instances of FID.\(^{43}\)

The next method by which Hacquard aims to explain past TP for epistemic modals without recourse to past tense is overt conversational backgrounds (as in 136c). The fact that an overt conversational background facilitates the relevant reading is not surprising, but it is not required, as shown by the data presented throughout §3 and §5.

Turning finally to the proposal that elision is involved in cases like 136d,e, we observe that there is an empirical problem with the attitude verb cases, illustrated in 142-143. 142a-b are fine for the elision analysis, since they have equivalent temporal properties, as the elision account predicts. But 143a-b are problematic. 143a allows past TP, indicating that the presence of *have* is not crucial for the past-TP reading in an SOT environment (cf. Abusch 1997:21-22, and §5). But then 143b is incorrectly also predicted to allow a past TP.

(142) a. I thought the ice cream *might have* been in there. \hspace{1cm} \text{PAST TP}
    b. *I thought* the ice cream *might have* been in there. \hspace{1cm} \text{PAST TP}

(143) a. I thought the ice cream *might be* in there. \hspace{1cm} \text{PAST TP}
    b. *I thought* the ice cream *might be* in there. \hspace{1cm} * \text{PAST TP}

Under our proposal, no elision is involved. We have argued that the different classes of modals differ with respect to whether they allow past TP in the absence of a higher past-tense attitude verb. Semi-modals and *might have* allow these readings, but plain *might, must* or *may* do not. The only cases in which plain *might* (without *have*) and *must* can have past TP is when they occur under a matrix past-tense verb (as in 143a), or in FID, which is only possible in very specific kinds of narrative contexts, such as 138. The issue for Hacquard’s account is that it doesn’t distinguish between the behaviour of *might* and *might have* (and ignores *must*).

What about the cases of elided matrix clauses plus *because*? Hacquard’s idea here builds on Stephenson’s (2007) proposal that epistemic modals have a judge parameter, representing the agent whose knowledge or beliefs are relevant. Stephenson proposes (2007:506) that ‘in *because*-clauses which express a person’s conscious reasoning or rationale, the judge parameter is shifted to the person whose reasoning is involved.’ However, although *because* may shift the judge to being a different epistemic agent, there is no independent evidence that *because* shifts the TIME at which the judging takes place. In fact, *because* does NOT shift the judging time to the

\(^{43}\) Plain *might* or *must* would be unacceptable in B’s answer in 141 (either with or without *today*); cf. 143b. This is predicted by our analysis because the zero tense of these class II/III modals is not able to backshift the TP in a main clause outside of an FID context.
past in the absence of other elements with past semantics. In 144, for example, the judge of the taste predicate *tasty* shifts to Fido, but there is no effect of the perceived tastiness being in the past.

(144) Fido always eats Whiskas because it’s tasty.

Similarly, *because* does not induce pastness for modals in the absence of either a real past tense inflection on the modal, *have*, or a higher attitude verb. For example, 145 does not allow past TP. Our analysis correctly predicts this, since *might* cannot have past TP without the help of *have*.

(145) I looked in the freezer because the ice cream *might* be in there.

We have now considered the main ways in which authors explain away past TPs for epistemic modals. We have argued that while past-TP readings are certainly facilitated by higher attitude verbs, FID, and overt conversational backgrounds, none of these conditions are necessary for the past-TP readings to arise. We have thus argued that past-TP readings are more generally possible than is often assumed. Conversely, we have shown that none of these environments produce past TPs by themselves; instead, only certain classes of epistemic modals allow these readings, either because they accept past tense morphology (as with semi-modals in English or all modal verbs in Dutch), because they allow a zero tense which can receive its value from a matrix past-tense verb (SOT) or a narrative discourse context (FID), or because they have special lexicalized forms with past TP (such as English *might have*).

7. **Concluding Remarks.** This paper has provided a compositional analysis of modal-temporal interactions in Dutch, English, Gitksan and St’át’imcets. The analysis allows modals to interact freely with the tense-aspect architecture in each language. The analysis includes no extra restrictions on possible combinations of modal flavour and temporal perspective. It freely allows epistemic modals to have past TPs, a result which we have argued is empirically correct for at least the four languages discussed here. Our basic compositional architecture straightforwardly accounts for the cross-linguistically more transparent systems (Dutch, Gitksan and St’át’imcets). It allows language-specific features of each tense-aspect system to influence modal-temporal interactions in predictable ways, and it correctly casts English as an idiosyncratic and (partly) lexicalized system.

Our main proposals – which rely in part on insights of prior literature, in particular on Condoravdi 2002 – are that a modal’s TP is determined by a higher operator, usually tense, while TO is determined by lower operators, usually aspect (and further restricted by the diversity condition). In contrast to some previous research, we have argued that epistemic past-TP readings should not be stipulated to be unavailable, and are not always dependent on free indirect discourse or other special licensing environments. Also in contrast to much previous research, we have pointed out that English modal auxiliaries cannot be treated as a single class, but fall into at least three classes with different temporal idiosyncracies. Our analysis contrasts with a theory like that of Condoravdi (2002) in which aspect is partly built into the meaning of the modal itself (see also Enç 1996), and in which there is an added restriction against past tense or perfect aspect scoping over an epistemic modal. However, our analysis does allow for the possibility of individual modals or classes of modals in a language to have lexicalized
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interpretations which potentially include certain temporal operators. In particular, some English modals are argued to contain an inherent past tense in their lexical entry. But such cases are exceptions which are probably driven by a reorganization of the morphosyntax of the modal system (in the case of English, the loss of productive tense inflection on modal auxiliaries).

Further research is clearly required on a range of issues. We have not discussed other languages for which there is literature on modal-temporal interactions, such as French (Hacquard 2006, Laca 2008, Homer 2010, Mari 2010, Martin 2011, among others). Our proposals also need to be tested on languages for which there has as yet been little or no work in this area. For preliminary research of this type on 12 languages, see Chen et al. 2017.

A major question left open by the current paper is whether there is a need to assume ANY restrictions on the scope of epistemic modals. The literature has investigated the scopal relations of epistemic modals not only with respect to tense, but also with respect to co-occurring non-epistemic modals, quantifiers, negation, and adverbs (see, among others, Groenendijk & Stokhof 1975, Picallo 1990, Brennan 1993, Cinque 1999, Drubig 2001, von Fintel & Iatridou 2003, Hacquard 2006, 2011, Huitink 2008, Portner 2009). Results are not fully conclusive, but there is at least a general tendency for epistemic modals to prefer higher scope than non-epistemic ones. We have little to add to that debate at this time, beyond our core proposal that there is no general restriction against epistemic modals appearing in the scope of tense. As pointed out by Chen and colleagues (2017), some epistemic modals in some languages DO necessarily scope over tense. In the languages discussed by Chen and colleagues, these are syntactically analyzable as adverbials. Notice that the same phenomenon is evident in English, where epistemic modal auxiliaries and semi-modals scope under tense, but epistemic adverbials like maybe do not (witness the absence of a past TP reading for Maybe there was ice cream in the freezer). See also Hacquard 2013 for relevant discussion of the relation between the grammatical category of a modal element and its scope possibilities.

There is one potential outstanding empirical issue for our analysis, brought to our attention by a reviewer (and mentioned already at the end of §2.6 and in footnote 32). The issue is that past-inflected semi-modals in English sometimes, for some speakers, appear to allow present TP. Two examples are given in 146-147.

(146) Context: Up until just now, all of the evidence pointed to Mary being home last night. But now, fresh evidence proves that Mary’s home was empty last night. Mary had to be out last night.

(147) Context: You are telling someone about how many people were at a party that was held last night. You were at the party and while it was going on, you thought there were only about 50 people there. But now it’s the next day and you are cleaning up, and based on the number of dirty glasses and other evidence, you realize it must have been more like 100 people. You say: There had to be a hundred people here.

As noted above, the problematic interpretations are (at best) marginal for many speakers. In an informal survey of eight native speakers of English, three viewed 146 as marginal, and only three speakers accepted 147, with four viewing it as marginal and one rejecting it. The responses to
65b above were even more negative. Nevertheless, we briefly address here how we might account for the speakers for whom *had to* seems to allow present TP. (Note that these speakers’ judgments would be problematic not only for our proposal, but for any proposal which does anything more than stipulate that TP is completely free for English past-inflected semi-modal).

We see two different possible approaches. One is to claim that *had to* exceptionally allows past tense to scope under the modal, therefore supplying past TO rather than past TP in such cases. In our framework this could be achieved by giving *had to* a lexicalized interpretation in which it consists of a constellation of present tense, the necessity modal, and perfect ordering aspect.

The other approach would be a pragmatic one. In many contexts, there is a certain amount of vagueness or ‘slack’ in the temporal perspective of an epistemic modal. For instance, in 147 it seems that the relevant evidence for the modal claim involves not just facts that are available at the utterance time, but also things that were observed earlier (such as the fact that there was a party at all, that there were many guests, that it was hard to tell exactly how many there were, etc.). Moreover, even the crucial evidence of the number of dirty glasses already existed well before the utterance time. It is therefore conceivable that for speakers who accept the sentence in this context the epistemic vantage point includes an interval located some time before (and maybe up to) the speech time. The vagueness in determining the exact location of the TP may be an important factor in the acceptability of such examples for some speakers. (For related discussion concerning similar facts in French, see also Homer 2010 and Pasternak 2016.)

A major avenue for future investigation raised by our analysis concerns our proposal that in each of the four languages, there is one overt and one covert ordering aspect (perfect vs. non-perfect in English/Dutch, and prospective vs. non-prospective in Gitksan/St’át’imcets). The two systems are essentially inverses of each other: in both the overt aspect is more specific (excluding the utterance time, or more generally the evaluation time), while the covert aspect covers the rest of the timeline. We have shown that our analysis captures the facts in these four languages both in non-modal and modal sentences. The question arises of whether similar systems exist in other languages, and of what other ordering aspect systems might be possible. Further cross-linguistic research will have to determine the answer.

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