A key argument of John Mearsheimer’s article, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” is that American and European policymakers in the 1990s and the 2000s were blinded by a liberal worldview that espouses the spread of Western values or “ideals” and have willfully ignored an entirely different “playbook” used by Putin and his regime – a doctrine that acts “according to realist dictates.” While the West views NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement as legitimate and democratic, Russia’s regime and large portions of its population believe that this expansion is aimed at damaging and removing its traditional sphere of influence. Rather than viewing this issue solely through a pure and narrow realist perspective, one that views the international system as anarchic and state/regime preservation as a premium objective, I would like to discuss the indelible mark that war, perceived civilizational values, and ethnic/cultural unity has had upon Russia’s society and state and why this has affected the Russian population’s and regime’s view of the Ukrainian issue.
Russia has had an intimate and longstanding relationship with foreign invasion. With an elderly population of over 5 million and a state-mandated policy to laud the Soviet Union’s role fighting Nazi Germany in the Second World War, the memory of invasion, occupation, and eventual resurgence has remained an important part of Russia’s culture, folklore and national narrative [1]. Few Russians are unaware of their country’s role and loss during this period. Casualty figures show that between 18 to 24 million Soviet citizens or 13.6-14.2% of the total population perished during the occupation of European Russia and the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe from 1941-1945 [2]. To imagine this kind of loss is almost impossible as an entire generation of Russians was nearly wiped out, creating a gaping cavity within the fabric of Russian society, and the enduring political and cultural response has been dramatic.
On the surface, this great human and material loss created a political and strategic imperative to secure Russia’s borders. Due to the enormity of the Russian domain and the absence of natural barriers, a constant theme for Russia’s rulers has been the palliation of both of these predicaments that had enabled the Western intrusion in 1941. By employing Russia’s harsh climate and ample landscape, strategic planning has been geared towards defence in depth. Therefore, a longstanding staple of Russia’s foreign policy has been the pursuit of a stable and defensible border. This has led to an expansion into Europe and an urge to gain access to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Yellow Sea, and the Persian Gulf to create a strong cordon sanitaire. Thus, a central pillar of the Soviet, and later Russian, defence policy has been the undermining of neighbouring states, such as Ukraine, with the intention to introduce regimes which would remain pliable towards Russia’s specific security concerns. From a strategic point of view, the Soviet Union and Russia’s role in countries to its West has been driven by a need to defend its centres of industry and population from Western incursions. However, this is only one piece of the puzzle as ethnic and cultural affinities with those populations to its immediate West and a sense of unified “civilization” and a strong war narrative have also played a role in Russia’s regime’s policy and its population’s perception towards its neighbours.
The Second World War left a lasting effect upon the population of Russia and its diaspora. Wars in memory serve to provide narratives that can be employed by nationalist ideologies. For example, Canadian soldiers’ assault on Vimy Ridge in the First World War became part of the national founding narrative of modern Canada. A similar narrative was fashioned by Russians during and after the Second World War. According to E.A. Wood, the experiences of the Second World War still “serve as a morality tale of suffering and redemption and a foundation myth” and it “creates a collective sense of belonging and redemption” that enables the entrenchment of Russian identity [3]. Thus, the Russian narrative surrounding this war is reliant upon the huge loss suffered by Russia and its redemptive role in liberating Europe from Fascism. While Russia’s regime, particularly under Putin and Medvedev, has repeatedly cashed in on this narrative to shore up its own legitimacy, it has also used this narrative to provide a sense of belonging for the Russian ‘nation’ and diaspora that is spread across the Eurasian landmass.
So what has this got to with Ukraine? Igor Zevelev explains that many Russians view their society as a “civilization,” or ‘nation’ rather than a Westphalian state and this construct crosses boundaries and links peoples across a vast region. Ukraine, especially the East and the Crimean peninsula, and other parts of Eastern Europe have long be viewed by Russian society as an extension of this civilization and this perspective has often been called pan-Slavism. Many of these territories hold substantial Russian diaspora populations; contain large groups who observe the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church; and share strong linguistic and cultural similarities. Importantly, it was the Red Army, during the Second World War, which fought a number of costly engagements, such as the Siege of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, to defend and later liberate these territories from the yolk of Nazism. Thus, Russia’s war narrative also plays a significant part in its claims to the area as countless Soviet citizens lost their lives to liberate this region. The cultural, ethnic, and historical ties of memory which bind Russia to these countries is incredibly powerful and states like Ukraine fit into Russia’s narrative of belonging, rooted in a shared appreciation of Russian values, and a collective rejection of occupation and liberation from foreign, notably Western, aggressors.
NATO’S and the EU’s encroachment into this region has been framed as not just as detriment to its strategic concerns but also as an attack upon Russia’s culture and its civilizational sphere of influence. Viatcheslav Morozov points out that both NATO and the EU, as Western institutions, are often perceived as Trojan horse devices of Westernization, believed by many be antithetical to the Russian values of the “individual being understood… as… belonging to a nation…[and]… a wider community,” which will subvert the cultural perimeter of Russia and eventually Russia itself [5]. Therefore, much of Russia’s reservations that surround Ukraine stems from the country’s perceived rejection of Russian values and its adoption of Western principles. Providing credence to Morozov’s claim, the Ukrainian government signed an agreement to cooperate with the EU in areas such as regulation, legislation, and justice in 2014 (Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement) [6]. This would effectively alter Ukraine’s political culture from a Russian set of values to a Western set. To further highlight this issue of Western cultural intrusion, the new government in Kiev has a number of Neofascist members who often use anti-Russian rhetoric. Fascism, like capitalism and liberal democracy, is a Western philosophy and the Russian state has made increasing attempts, especially in the newly acquired province of the Crimea, to equate the new Ukrainian government to the fascist regime of Nazi Germany and, in doing so, play upon the ties of pan- Slavic identity within this territory and upon Russia’s pervasive Second World War narrative.
In this blog I have attempted to provide both a realist, or strategic, and a constructivist rationale for Russia’s perceived role in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe. Personally, I believe that the realist perspective is slightly superficial since it only addresses the strategic rationales and does not address the concept of cultural and ethnic identification or the “civilizational” conflict stemming from Western encroachment. Furthermore, I wanted to emphasize the importance of memory in the formation of Russia’s perceived role in areas like Ukraine. I feel that only a constructivist approach, a paradigm that deals with the effects of historical and social constructs upon the international system, can come close to addressing the ‘human’ component to Russia’s relationship with Ukraine, it’s Eastern neighbors and the West.
See:
[1] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
[2] Michael Haynes, Counting Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: Europe Asia Studies Vol.55, No. 2, 2003, 300–309
[3] E.A Wood, Performing Memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of WWII in Russia*, history.mit.edu/sites/default/files/SPSR_038_02_06_Wood.pdf
[4] Igor Zevelev, NATO’s Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/zevelev.pdf
[5] Viatcheslav Morozov, Russian Identity Politics and NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Sea Region, http://www.nnss.org/Morozov2.doc
[6] EU-Ukraine Association Agreement -the complete texts, http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm