I believe that the West will never win a war again. Before I explain this statement, a brief explanation of what constitutes the ‘West’ and a review of the nature of ‘modern’ warfare is necessary so that I can explain why the West is fundamentally incompatible with the new face of contemporary warfare.

There are multiple definitions and perspectives of what defines the ‘West’, yet there appears to be consensus on a number of values and principles perceived to be intrinsic to Western identity. Samuel P. Huntington identifies Western ideas or values as “individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state.”[1] Unarticulated by Huntington but an important aspect of the ‘West’ is the concept of Freedom of Speech. The media in particular relies upon this right and plays an essential role in disseminating information and critiquing government policy. Roumeen Islam articulated the role of the media by explaining that it “potentially influence[s] political… outcomes” in that “media reporting can help garner support for government and for public policy…by raising awareness of potential benefits or costs associated with policy. Media reporting can increase the demand for change in public policy.”[2] Thus, we see in its power to influence public opinion, the media can set policy agendas by galvanizing the public to be for or against policies. Through its role as educator of the masses, the media plays an important role as a pillar of democracy – a perquisite required to be considered ‘Western’. For better or for worse, because a powerful media can be both harmful and beneficial, it is clear that in ‘Western’ societies, the media has an important role to play in public policy and opinion.

Another characteristic of most Western societies is found in the composition of its militaries and military doctrines. Using the United States as a prime example, we are able to understand the West’s doctrine, technological capacity, and overall ability to fight and win wars. During the Soviet-West confrontation, the United States’ military maintained over 2 million personnel in bases around the world and at home. [3] Early on, large formations of troops, machinery, and weaponry – including nuclear weapons- were held in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere as a doctrine of deterrence in regards to perceived Soviet aggression was maintained. [4] The lasting design of military hardware indicate a preponderance within American military doctrine towards grand battles, especially in contested areas like Germany, and massive confrontations.For example, the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank; the F16 Fighting Falcon; and the Los Angeles-class Nuclear Submarine are all pieces of hardware which were designed for a Cold War conflict, turned ‘hot’. Essentially, this hardware was primarily made for symmetric conflict i.e. a war with an opponent who is similarly equipped. With the exception of novel, and still unformed, modes of warfare such as cyber warfare and the use of drones, the United States’ military’s hardware remains basically the same as it was during the latter years of the Cold War.

There are two distinct trends in modern warfare in which this Western world must compete. First of all, according to Themner and Walensteen, intrastate conflicts or civil wars have steadily become the norm, replacing the inter-state wars of the previous centuries. [5] Furthermore, recurring, rather than new, intrastate conflicts have also become prevalent since the Cold War and the end of the anti-colonial struggles of the 20^th century. [6] This indicates that deep-rooted tensions and grievances remain despite the emphasis of post-Cold War scholars like Francis Fukuyama who claimed that the end of Soviet-West dichotomy was the beginning of an age of greater globalization which would lead to greater security. Many scholars have attempted to explain the increase in intrastate conflict. As argued by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, a vital feature of intrastate conflict is a weak state that facilitates the formation of an insurgency whose aim is the removal of that state. [7] Laitin and Fearon characterize an insurgency as “small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.” [8] However, another key aspect of insurgency is the use of asymmetrical warfare i.e. combat that enables those with few assets to damage a strong opponent. Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare and the use of terrorism is often favored by insurgencies. Acts like hostage taking; targeting of civilians; suicide attacks; use of human shields; and booby traps enable a weaker assailant to inflict serious injury upon a stronger opponent. [9] It is unsurprising that, in line with the increase of intrastate conflicts, all of the above forms of assault steadily increased after 1990 and have risen dramatically since 2001 around the world. [10]

Clearly, there is a structural mismatch between the hardware of the West’s military with asymmetrical conduct of insurgencies. Additionally, the role of the media in the ‘West’ has over-influenced the public’s opinion towards counterinsurgency operations. As previously stated, the equipment used by  forces in the last two counterinsurgency campaigns, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, was not designed for this kind of warfare. For example, the Canadian Forces used pre-1991 tanks to fight a running counterinsurgency battle with insurgents in Afghanistan. Although these forces eventually prevailed, the “punch” of this armor was severely hampered by the hit-and-run tactics of the insurgents and the terrain of Afghanistan which is crisscrossed by canals and irrigation systems that makes this kind of machinery difficult to operate. [11] Furthermore, the use of Western airpower as a tool of counterinsurgency has limited effectiveness, as evidenced by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) continued survival and growth despite months of heavy bombardment. Airpower is a valuable asset when attacking supply-lines or removing the leadership of an enemy. However, due to the often decentralized, secretive, and dispersed nature of insurgent groups, the effectiveness of this method is limited. [12] Overwhelming airpower, originally designed to combat armies and other air forces, can also have an adverse effect upon the friendly population, as targeting fighters in a heavily populated area is difficult without incurring collateral damage, as evidenced by the 2006 bombardment of the Iraqi town of Tikrit. [13] [14] Consequently, this indiscriminate method of warfare can also anger the local population and galvanize them against counterinsurgency. As we can see, the West’s weapons of the past, armor and airpower, may not be the right tools for today’s method of conflict.

Almost as damaging as the antiquated Western style of warfare used abroad is the increasingly harmful effects of the media on Western populations in relation to conflict. Changes in Western media’s content and presentation have had an undue affect upon their populations. According to Jürgen Krönig, modern political journalism in the West has begun to “ignore context and complexity, presenting everything in black and white” and solicits demands for short-term solutions to issues of great complexity. [15] Furthermore, sensationalism and “disastertainment” have taken over, and journalists “present [the news] according to their own preferences and prejudices.”[16] Both of these changes are predicated on the need for greater ratings and circulation. In recent decades, the power of the media to shape the policy of the West towards this issue has only increased, often to the detriment of Western powers at war.

The West’s acceptance and understanding of war has changed since the dissemination of visceral imagery of conflict has risen. It is generally understood that the images of body bags, draped in American flags, and burned Vietnamese children brought home the brutal nature of the Vietnam War and caused public opinion to gradually oppose the war. Another example of this kind of power was the footage of American airmen’s bodies being paraded through the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia as this act has been identified as the cause for the United States’ withdrawal from Somalia, and their subsequent boycott of intervening in the Rwandan genocide. [17] Despite rebuilding and development being a key component of counterinsurgency, these kinds of positive acts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq were rarely depicted on television. [18] Instead, according to the Canadian Journalism Federation, acts of violence from this area were shown by broadcasters as they are more “exciting” to the viewer. [19] Conversely, scholars like Roger W. Barnett point to the West’s love of “fair play,” with the “underdog” being the preferred winner. In almost all cases of modern warfare, the character of the “underdog” would be personified by these insurgency groups, going up against a heavily armed nation-state [20]. This means that the ‘West’ can be portrayed, through the often biased imagery of the media, as the ‘bad-guy’ and this inevitably impacts the morale of the public. Through the Western media’s ‘sensational-ization’ of conflict, only the negative aspects of counterinsurgency are highlighted and this serves to undermine the West’s public’s willingness to fight the modern ‘medium’ of war. Today, even if the West had the military capabilities to fight effectively in the new arena of warfare, they would sorely lack the public support needed to sustain a successful campaign.

Insurgency groups have come to realize and use this to their advantage. By showing the ease in which it is able to target Western forces and undo its operations, insurgents are able to impose costs on the West’s public’s morale by depicting wars as unwinnable. [21] Conversely, the distribution of footage can be used as another tactic – to provoke an adversary into overreacting or overextending. [22] This would explain the actions of ISIL’s beheading of Americans and Europeans. The aim of this stark footage is intended to create shock and revulsion which can cause the Western public to either feel angry, necessitating a response, or evoke a sense of defeatism. Insurgency groups now have the capabilities to use the West’s own democratic process, freedom of the press, against them.

In sum, there are two primary reasons for why the Western world, as it stands, cannot be successful in today’s arena of war. Firstly, Western weaponry and military tactics fail to be effective against 21^st century opponents. What worked against the enemies of the 20^th century will not work against the newer, amorphous insurgencies that characterize the new face of conflict. Secondly, the media’s overwhelming presence in the West’s decision making regarding war/conflict is problematic, both because it can lead to a critical or apathetic public, but can also be used against themselves by insurgency groups. Due to how entrenched these values are in the Western psyche, there is little hope of them being able to salvage their reputation as a formidable military opponent in the foreseeable future.

For more information, see:-

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations.

[2]Roumeen Islam, Information and Public Choice: From Media Markets to Policy Making. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-7515-0.

[3] Edward F. Bruner, “Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States Military?” Report for U.S. Congress. http://fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf.

[4] Stephen J. Cimbala, US Military Strategy and the Cold War Endgame. Pg. 27.

[5] Lotta Themner and Peter Walensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011, Journal of Peace Research, 568. http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/49/4/565.full.pdf+html.

[6] Human Security Report 2012, Figure 6.2 New verus Recurring Intrastate Conflicts, 1950-2009. http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/Figures/2012Report_Fig_6_2_NewRecurringIntra.pdf.

[7] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, http://jstor.org/stable/3118222.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power. 2003, 18.

[10] University of Maryland, Global Terrorism Database, Browse by Attack Type. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/BrowseBy.aspx?category=attack

[11] Douglas F. Baker, The Relevance of Armor in Counterinsurgency Operations. www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA562878.

[12] Paul Staniland, Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence. http://www.mafhoum.com/press9/264P2.pdf.

[13] Ben Buley, The New American Way of War: Military Culture and Political Utility of Force. 2008, 130.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Jürgen Krönig, A crisis in the fourth estate, The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/aug/16/mondaymediasection.politicsandthemedia.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Glen Beck, Offensive Air Power in Counter Insurgency Operations: Putting Theory in Practice, Royal Australian Air force. http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Offensive%20Air%20Power%20in%20Counter-Insurgency.pdf.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Canadian Journalism Federation, Canadian’s Assess the Canadian Media and its Coverage of the Afghanistan Mission. http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/December2006/06/c4592.html.

[20] Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power. 2003, 87.

[21] Aden Dur-e-Aden, Class Lecture to Political Science 360. University of British Columbia. October 16, 2014.

[22] Ibid.