Managing ANWR – Governance Framework and Practices
The question of whether ‘to drill or not to drill in ANWR’ is one that has been debated for over 30 years without resolution. Being a federally owned, protected and managed territory (Busenberg, 2013) ANWR is certainly bound to be governed under government-to-government deliberation. The key stakeholders accordingly are crucially the government of the United States and the state of Alaska and its inhabitants. However, due to the fauna present in the region, international non-governmental organizations and countries such as Canada are also shareholders of the ANWR debate. (Busenberg, 2013) Oil developers like Arctic Power are also undoubtedly present and interested in the dispute. (Schlosser, 2006) This transnational array of interest in ANWR’s management and future has created a dynamic and complex governance framework and practice. An examination of the key components of these two elements, which are crucial to ANWR policymaking, is the purpose of this work.
The ANWR debate is frequently said to have derived from the establishment of the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) with its 1002 Section; denoting the area of the refuge for potential oil development. (McMonagle, 2006; Schlosser, 2006) Just as ANILCA established the contemporary structure of ANWR, it also established the core of its governance framework – that of national jurisdiction. With ANILCA, the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) – just as it was the case for the 1960 Arctic National Wildlife Range (Corbisier, 2002) and based on the Congress’ amendment to the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act in the 1970s (McMonagle, 2006) – would be in charge of administering ANWR.
DOI’s administration of ANWR is orchestrated primarily via its Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) Bureau – duty-bound to periodically supply updated guide plans for the Refuge’s management. (McMonagle, 2006) DOI’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) also plays an important role in ANWR’s management, as it is in charge of promulgating informative propositions for developing the land – this way somewhat juxtaposing the former’s underlining duty of wildlife protection. (McMonagle, 2006) Arguably this creates a fairly balanced approach to ANWR management for future prospects – no embedded overarching favoured resolution.
This rooted federal responsibility over ANWR’s governance, breaches out onto government-to-government deliberation with ANILCA’s core binding to the laws of the U.S. constitution. In its Section 1003 “oil and natural gas production in the Refuge as a whole, and the leasing or other development leading to production of oil and natural gas from the range [is not permitted] unless authorized by an act of Congress.” (Corn, Ratner, & Alexander, 2015, p.7) Given ANWR’s national ownership, the Congress’s paramount role in ANWR’s future is one aspect of governance that arguably engenders good governance practice – since via the U.S. constitution the Congress allows for vertical and horizontal governmental accountability. (United States Senate, web.) This could therefore justify in good light the longevity of the debate – presumably all stakeholders’ values being taken into account does not allow for simple and speedy resolution. Furthermore, being subjugated to ANILCA, the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and the Service Planning Policy, the FWS must,
Ensure adequate and effective interagency coordination and public participation during [its revised management] planning process. Interested and affected parties such as State agencies, tribal governments, Native organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local and national residents who may be affected by decisions in the Plan must be provided meaningful opportunities to present their views. (Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service, 2015, p. 19678)
However, some suggest that transparency and participation is not as prominent as expected, or as desired given the breadth of stakeholders. For example, the Inupiat Eskimo and the Gwich’in Native American tribe (native inhabitants of Alaska) are not recognized to enjoy a prominent political voice in the debate. (Schlosser, 2006) Some have argued that this stems from malunderstanding of cultural differences in deliberation processes, which are not compatible to modern western structure but are subjugated when it comes to debates like ANWR. (Swensen, 2015) Further, even though a lot of information is readily accessible to the public with regards to the debate’s stakeholders and governmental data on results of studies on resources, very concerning uncertainty remains as to the real profitable prospects of development. An example of a transparency issue of high concern, is that the only test well drilled in ANWR territory has its results kept secret. (Yost, 2007) A consortium of companies lead by Chevron were allowed in by ANCSA Corporations in the mid-1980s (Jr. Bourne, 2015), and according to Mickey Driver – Chevron Public Affairs’ representative – the reason for the mystery is that the situation is a ‘tight whole’. (Yost, 2007).
We are not saying whether we found anything, we are not saying we didn’t find anything. A tight whole is information we pretty much keep to ourselves, because this is a highly competitive industry…very high risk. (Yost, 2007).
The implications of this goes beyond the scope of this work, but it is certainly one that needs to be taken into consideration when it comes to evaluating appropriate governance practice when going further with ANWR policy resolution.
The 1002-1003 sections of ANILCA are said to prompt a polarized geo-politics for ANWR. According to Schlosser, the debate has been engendered on preconceptions of spatial strategy toward certain geo-political ends based on differing notions of security. (2006, p.4) For each stakeholder ANWR represents a different important resourceful territory. This largely complicates the governance framework and practices due to the amalgamation of established national statutes and international agreements.
Preceding, and being the lead up to, ANILCA was the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971. “This statute permitted native villages and regional corporations to select 44 million acres of land… [simultaneously] empowering the Secretary of Interior to protect up to 80 million acres of land in Alaska.” (McMonagle, 2006, pp. 42-43) However, as per 1960’s jurisdiction, ANCSA did not grant rights to subsurface ownership of such lands. (Corbisier, 2002) In 1983, via the Chandler Lake Agreement “the Inupiat Eskimos in Kaktovik and the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation stood to gain mineral rights inside ANWR through a land exchange.” (Turner, 2012, p. 178) The development of the area nevertheless remains subjected to ANILCA’s Congress restriction. Nonetheless, this allowed for the Kaktovik Inupiat position to be forevermore in favour of energy exploration in ANWR, “deepening the split within the Native community.” (Turner, 2012, p.178)
The Gwich’in are far from alone on the other side of the debate as they are backed up by a vast array of international non-governmental agencies and nations which seek to promote conservation rather than exploration in ANWR. In fact, according to Busenberg,
The unprecedented scale of the ANILCA conservation actions constituted a landmark event for the international conservation movement. [ANILCA] was of particular international importance because some of the areas conserved contained habitats used by migratory wildlife, including birds migrating to and from many parts of the world. (2013, p. 75)
Extracted from Busenberg, J., G. (2013). Oil and Wilderness in Alaska. p.77
The Porcupine Caribou which migrates seasonally between ANWR and Canada prompted the creation of the 1987 international agreement protecting the specie. (Lovecraft, 2007) This allows for the cultural importance of the specie for the Gwich’in to be part of ANWR’s governance framework both nationally and internationally. Other international agreements includes The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears of 1973 and various Migratory Bird Conventions, among others. (Sovacool, 2007) Non-governmental agencies like the Sierra Club, the Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (Monaghan, 2009) among many others – also enforce this side of the debate and foster good governance practice.
On the other side of the debate lie the Inuit natives, the State Alaska and its senator (in history and contemporarily with Lisa Murkowski – also the U.S. Senate Chairman for the Committee on Energy & Natural Resources) and pro-development organizations such as Arctic Power and the Resource Development Council of Alaska, Inc., and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Schlosser, 2006).
All of these known agents are part of ANWR’s governance framework. Nevertheless the practice of such highly rests upon the U.S. governmental agencies as stated in ANILCA – as each coalition (pro- and against drilling) must contend with the Congress and the Executive Branch, they being those responsible for the territory and its resources’ management. (McMonagle, 2006)
Henceforth, it is due to the vast array of stakeholders and their respective interests in the management of the region, that a large variety of treaties and agreements (both national and international and via formal and informal, governmental and non-governmental institutions) that ANWR has a dynamic and extremely complex governance framework. Its practice accordingly is difficult to evaluate as research denotes particularities of governance pertaining to both positive and less favourable conclusions. Nevertheless, it is clear that this complexity in governance reaffirms this debate to be a wicked problem, and one which in compliance with ANILCA, is managed by the U.S. federal government and awaiting for its Congress’ final say.
Works Cited:
E-Books
Busenberg, J., G. (2013). Oil and Wilderness in Alaska: Natural Resources, Environmental Protection, and National Policy Dynamics. (Washington: Georgetown University Press). Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/books/9781589016637/
Turner, M. J. (2012), The Promise of Wilderness: American Environmental Politics Since 1964. (Seattle: University of Washington Press). Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780295804224
Governmental websites
Corn, M. L., Ratner, M., & Alexander, K.. (March 17, 2015). Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): A Primer for the 114th Congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33872.pdf
Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service. (2015) Record of Decision for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Final Comprehensive Conservation Plan/ Final Environmental Impact Statement. [FWS–R7–R–2015–N026; FXRS12650700000–134–FF07R06000], Fairbanks, Alaska. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-13/pdf/2015-08526.pdf
United States Senate. Constitution of the United States. Retrieved from http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Public Websites
Jr. Bourne, K., J. (February 05, 2015). What Obama’s Drilling Bans Mean for Alaska and the Arctic. National Geographic. Retrieved from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/02/150205-obama-alaska-oil-anwr-arctic-offshore-drilling/
Scholarly
Corbisier, R. W. (2002). Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Correlative Rights, and Sourdough: Not Just for Bread Anymore, The. Alaska L. Rev., 19, 393. Retrieved from http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1126&context=alr
Lovecraft, L. A. (2007). Transnational Environmental Management: U.S.-Canadian Institutions at the Interlocal Scale. The American Review of Canadian Studies [H.W. Wilson – SSA], 37.2, 218-245. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02722010709481856
McMonagle, R. J. (2006). Explaining policy and subsystem change for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): 1977 to 2005. Temple University, ProQuest Dissertations. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/304979726/fulltextPDF?accountid=14656
Monaghan, N. J. (2009) “Drill, Baby, Drill!”: The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and America’s Energy Reckoning. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 23.2 : 649-72. Retrieved from http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ndlep23&collection=journals&page=649
Schlosser. L., K. (2006). U.S. National Security Discourse and the Political Construction of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Society & Natural Resources, 19:1, 3-18. doi:10.1080/08941920500323096
Sovacool, K. B. (2007). Environmental Damage, Abandoned Treaties, And Fossil-Fuel Dependence: The Coming Costs Of Oil-And-Gas Exploration In The ‘‘1002 Area’’ Of The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Environment, Development and Sustainability 9:187–201. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10668-005-9013-4
Swensen, T. M. (2015). Of subjection and sovereignty: Alaska native corporations and tribal governments in the twenty-first century. Wicazo Sa Review, 30(1). Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wicazo_sa_review/v030/30.1.swensen.pdf
Visual
Yost, P. (Producer & Director). (2007). Alaska’s Last Oil. [Motion picture]. United States: A Pangloss Film production for National Geographic Television. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7ZyEJUnX74