As we have seen through the term on the Environmental Economics and Policy course, there are several policy mechanisms to regulate the exploitation of fisheries. Some of these focus on controlling the amount of fish captured or landed, others focus on the period of time or “season” when certain species can be captured and some others on the tools, technology or methods that can be utilized to operate the fisheries.
The mechanism I would like to focus this article is Individual Tradable Quotas. Commonly know as ITQ’s, Individual Tradable Quotas is a system for managing fisheries that focuses on assigning a share of an established total amount of catch to a party, which is usually an individual fisherman or the owner of a vessel. Once this quota is allocated and distributed, parties are allowed to sell, buy or trade their ITQ’s with other individual fisherman or vessel owners, including those who were not originally allocated any quota.[1]
ITQ’s are thought to be the best way of managing fisheries by many economist and policy makers. “Supporters of ITQ programs argue that compared with other fishery management options available, ITQs represent the most cost effective and socially beneficial means of promoting a sustainable fish industry”.
The concept of ITQ’s was first introduced in the 1960’s as pollution control quotas and was adopted for fisheries management in the 1980’s. New Zealand introduced the first major ITQ program in 1986 and today many countries have ITQ programs in place including the United States, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands and South Africa. [2]
For this blog we will analyze a particular ITQ system implemented by the United States in the state of Alaska to manage fisheries for halibut and sablefish. This program is defined as in individual fishing quota program (IFQ) for halibut and a Community Development Quota (CDQ) for sablefish and was developed and implemented in 1995 by the National Marine Fishery Service with aid from the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and the International Pacific Halibut Commission. The program was a response to declining quality of catch and low catch per unit of effort experienced by fisherman after a very high number of vessels had created a “race to fish”.[3]
This IFQ/CDQ program is considered to be one of the best ITQ programs in the world in terms of profitability and fish stock replenishment. The program regulates the fishery by gear, number of vessels and geographic areas. In terms of gear it includes all “fixed gear” fishing which is defined as all hook and line fishing such as longlines, jigs, handlines, and troll gear. The fishing area covers the entire Atlantic and Bering Sea coast of Alaska from the border with Canada to the Aleutian Islands and is divided in regulatory areas by species. Regulatory areas are geographically similar but yet, as seen in the following figures, they vary in area for both species [4].
Source: [6]
The program is composed quotas shares, and permits to operate them. A unit of Quota Share (QS) represents a percentage of the quantity determined by the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) to be harvested every year. As explained in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOOA) web page, “Quota Share (QS) was initially issued to persons who owned or leased vessels that made legal commercial fixed-gear landings of Pacific halibut or sablefish during 1988-1990 off Alaska”. Quota share can be bought, sold or transfer either to other owners of quota or to those approved by the NMFS.
A QS holder or recipient of a transfer should also obtain a permit to participate in the harvest of halibut on every regulatory area and for most regulatory areas in the case of sablefish. The permits are not assigned to vessels but rather to individuals operating the quota share. “Authorized pounds for annual IFQ permits are determined by the number of QS units held, the total number of QS units in the “pool” for a species and area, and the total amount of halibut or sablefish allocated for IFQ fisheries in a particular year”.
Another characteristic of this IFQ program is that is operates under seasonality. The fishing start and end dates are established jointly by the Pacific Halibut Commission in the case of halibut and by the NMFS in the case a sablefish. The season is typically established from March to November and operates halibut and sablefish simultaneously in order to discourage discarding.[5]
Regarding enforcement, the Alaska Enforcement Division of NOAA together with the U.S. Coast Guard have developed a strategy that includes sea monitoring as well as offload inspection and after hour surveillance. The U.S. coast guard constantly patrols fishing areas with patrol boats, buoy tenders and airplanes and helicopters. The AKD also independently patrols the waters with boats and develops compliance inspections as well as technical and compliance
assistance. Investigation regarding reports or complaints of violations are analyzed by the AKD and enforced by NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard or the State of Alaska Wildlife Troopers. In addition to enforcement activities the AKD provides information sessions and compliance assistance seminars and workshops to regulatory information is understood by quota holders and operators.[6]
The Alaska Halibut/Sablefish IFQ/CDQ has proven to be a good system to manage these fisheries, being its main advantage the reduction of the “race to fish” problem. Fisherman are now guaranteed a specific amount of landings, giving them flexibility to allocate their fishing times as most convenient while increasing safety for both the fisherman and the environment. However the advantages a program like this brings do not come without disadvantages. The main criticism the program has received is it creates an incentive for fishermen to “high grade” their catch, meaning they will discard the lowest value fish that goes against the quota to fill it with high value fish. Strong criticism also focuses on the monopoly this system creates as the high capital investment needed to obtain quota and participates deters new participants for entering the industry. The high cost of enforcement and compliance assistance is also a high criticism against the program [7].
Despite the criticism and the opportunities for improvement, the program has proven to be and effective way to manage this particular fisheries. Stocks have been maintained, the health and overall quality of fish seems to be improving and fisherman had been able to have stable year-to-year catches with increasing profits. Weak areas like the propensity to “high grade” catches should be addressed and new methods like value-based quotas should be explored in order to improve operations and the overall sustainability of the fisheries.
References
[1] The Red Snapper Fishery, Part Two. Standford Law School. Environmantal and Natural Resources Law and Policy Program.
http://media.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/enrlp/doc/slspublic/snapper-2.pdf
[2] [7] Buck, Eugene. Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management. CRS Report for Congress. National Library for the Environment. September 25, 1995.
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4515/fishery.pdf?sequence=1
[3] Catch Shares/Individual Transferable Quotas. The Fish Project. 2011.
http://thefishproject.weebly.com/catch-sharesindividual-transferable-quotas.html
[4] Muse, Ben. Schelle, Kurt. Dinneford, Elaine. Iverson, Kurt. Changes Under Alaska’s Sablefish IFQ Program. CFEC Report Number 96-11N. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission. September, 1996.
http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/RESEARCH/96_11n/SBTITLE.HTM
[5] Restricted Access Management Report. NOAA Fisheries (NMFS), Alaska Region. February 3, 2014.
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/ram/reports/ifq_cdq_seasons.pdf
[6] Pacific Halibut-Sablefish IFQ Report. Fishing Year 2012. NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Region. March 2014.