In this blog, I want to discuss Waltz’ article in Foreign Affairs titled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” (2012). This article brought forward many relevant themes in regards to our international relations theory course, but I want to concentrate on two themes: the security dilemma and structural realism.
The security dilemma refers to the fear that every state is self interested and as a result, there is a belief that there is nothing preventing Iran from destroying its adversaries to ensure its own self preservation once they acquire nuclear weapons. Waltz disagrees and asserts that Iran having nuclear weapons can, in fact, be stabilizing for the global community. As long as there is a balance of powers, through mutually having the capability to destroy, all states are safer for it. If the states that control the power continue to communicate, the ability to destroy will prevent any large scale attacks from happening and thus, we are safer if every power is balanced with a check. Waltz’ paper highlights this as the main idea for why Israel and American should “allow” Iran to pursue nuclear weapons without international sanctions. I say “allow” with air quotes because as Waltz says, “the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so” (Waltz, 2). All America can really do is create economic sanctions that only create suffering among the average citizen. Whereas, Israel can retaliate in response to what they perceive as a growing threat, however, this might motivate Iran to pursue the nuclear weapons as opposed to dissuade them. Either way, Iran obtaining nuclear weapons cannot be prevented by the US or Israel if Iran chooses to live with the consequences regardless.
This is a logical fallacy for Waltz, as he repeatedly gives reasons why this is not a rational thought. Waltz is a structural realist and thus, takes a more rigorous and scientific approach to international relations theory than classical realists. Waltz uses prior historical events as evidence to support his theory. All of his ideas as to why Iran should be able to obtain nuclear weapons are based on past events. For example, Waltz says that there is a fear among the US and Israel that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons will lead to a nuclear arms race in the middle east. However, the evidence has shown that when Israel first got nuclear weapons, others states did not feel the need to race to compete with them. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that other states would do so now in response to Iran. Unlike classical realists, Waltz does not base his theory on subjective valuations. His reasoning is firmly based on an international system that shows repeatedly the same historical evidence as it always has.
I believe that Waltz has made a very convincing argument because the evidence he presents is undeniable in many ways. In fact, for the most part, Waltz presents a strong argument for the idea that nuclear weapons are globally stabilizing, and I agree with most of his assertions, but I have a few concerns with his theory.
Firstly, the security dilemma is seen as a problem because we can never know when another person (or state) is willing to take the offensive, thus, in theory it is better to take the offensive first. Waltz is unconvinced by this argument because he believes that a rationally self interested state/person will know that is is not in their best interest to take the offensive knowing that retaliation is certain. I wonder if this policy opens itself up to the possibility that the nuclear powers of the world will appease each other on “small” issues in an attempt to essentially maintain the security of the world. For example, if North Korea destroys South Korea in a rain of missiles, we assume that retaliation is certain. However, retaliation on a nuclear scale could literally decimate the planet. Therefore, exactly how much retaliation is certain to happen upon “small” acts of destruction? In 1969, North Korea shot down a US spy plane flying over the coast of the Korean peninsula. Although it was debated for months about the correct course of action for the US, we know that it did not result in a nuclear war. So although nuclear weapons make the world more stable in terms of a global destructive war, it does little to aid us in terms of figuring out the best course of action for smaller dilemmas.
Secondly, Waltz repeatedly says in his article that rational agents do not act like “X” because they know that “Y” will occur and that historical evidence has proved that every time “X” happens, “Y” happens. However, it only takes one exception to this narrative to completely derail this theory. As Professor Crawford has said previously, if there is one discipline that is susceptible to the changing events of the world, it is international relations. I am sure there was always a period in time when people believed “this has never happened before, why would it happen now?,” yet can we ever be sure of singularity of this statement? This is a philosophical problem of induction. The classic “all swans are white” fallacy; all swans we’ve seen are white, therefore, all swans are white. Until we discover one black swan and the statement is no longer true. Every state that has gained nuclear weapon has not used it in a destructive manner, thus any state who ever gains nuclear weapons will not use it in a destructive manner? It remains true, for now, but only time can tell us if it will remain true indefinitely.