

from: site-specific art: performance, place & documentation?
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Site

The site is a place where a piece should be but isn't.

(Smithson in Bear and Sharp 1996: 249-50)

Where minimalism's site-specificity is held *within* the gallery, the approaches to specific sites which emerged in its wake around land art, earth art, and conceptual art frequently played on the gallery as a vantage point from which the viewer might look *out* toward designated, mapped locations. Typically incorporating a mapping or documentation of places and events, these practices reflected upon and revised the impulse of earlier environmental art, happening performance, and Fluxus presentations, among others, to test the limits and discourses of the work of art by directing attention toward conventionally 'non-art' occurrences, locations, and acts. Here, the early work of Robert Smithson, Dennis Oppenheim, and Douglas Huebler, in particular, treated the gallery as a place to document or map interventions into inaccessible sites, a gesture which, Oppenheim argues, countered 'major canons of traditional art' through the fact that 'you can't see the art, you can't buy the art, you can't have the art' (Kaye 1996: 66). Reading the site in terms of its *absence*, and so focusing upon the elusiveness of the actual or 'real' site, this work articulated its specificity to site through means quite different from minimalism's engagement with 'the present tense of space' (Morris 1993c). In doing so, these strategies clarify relationships between the work and its site operating through a wide range of site-specific practices.

Mapping Site: Robert Smithson

Created in the year that the *Earthworks* exhibition at the Dwan Gallery, New York, first brought attention to land art or earth art as a genre of work, the late Robert Smithson's series of Non-Sites of 1968 present materials which have been collected from designated outdoor sites, deposited in bins whose construction echoes a simple, clean, minimalist aesthetic, and set in the gallery beside information tracing out the geographical or geological characteristics of the area from which they have been removed. Rather than evoke the properties of the particular place they evidence, however, the Non-Site's juxtaposition of 'undifferentiated' material and 'mapped' information reveals Smithson's incapacity, or reluctance, to simulate this location in the gallery. As the term itself suggests, the Non-Site asserts, first of all, that the site against which it claims definition is elsewhere. In the face of these 'large, abstract maps made into three dimensions' (Flam 1996: 181), Smithson argues, '[w]hat you are really confronted with [...] is the absence of the site [...] a very ponderous, weighty absence' (Lippard and Smithson 1996: 193).

Characterising his encounter with the 'specific site[s]' (Smithson 1996: 60) which he had been visiting and subsequently mapping since 1965 in terms of a 'suspension of boundaries' (Smithson 1996a: 103), a "de-architecturing" which 'takes place before the artist sets his limits' (Smithson 1996a: 104), Smithson describes his interest in looking beyond the white walls of the gallery in terms of a resistance to the closure of the conventional art object. 'Most of the better artists,' he writes, 'prefer processes that have not been idealised, or differentiated into "objective" meanings' (Smithson 1996a: 101). Setting his experience of these sites against the sculptor Tony Smith's celebrated 1966 account of his drive across the partly constructed New Jersey Turnpike, where the 'road and much of the landscape was artificial, and yet it couldn't be called a work of art,' Smithson argues that Smith

is talking about a sensation, not a finished work of art. [He] is describing the state of his mind in the 'primary process' of making contact with matter. This process is called by Anton Ehrenzweig 'dedifferentiation,' and it involves a suspended question regarding 'limitlessness'.

(Smithson 1996a: 102-3)

Rather than describe the site as a given topology or geography, Smithson recalls a particular kind of encounter, a certain perceptual exposure. Thus, he proposes, in returning from the site, '[t]he artist who is physically engulfed tries to give evidence of this experience through a limited (mapped) revision of the original unbounded state' (Smithson 1996a: 104).

In this context, it is in its function as a map, in its very attempt to present or point to the site, that the Non-Site asserts its antithetical relationship to these 'outdoor collections of undifferentiated material' (Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 221). Indeed, in its designation of a location's specific properties, its limits and boundaries, the Non-Site effects precisely the kind of imposition in whose suspension Smithson supposes the site is experienced. Even in so far as the Non-Site casts the very *idea* of a work over a specific site, then it threatens to efface precisely that unbounded state Smithson seeks to map. Here, in fact, the Non-Site reproduces the gallery's contradictory attempt to recollect, and so limit, the 'dedifferentiated' site. Thus, where the experience of site is one of a limitlessness, the Non-Site establishes itself as a limiting mechanism, a differentiation, whose effect is not so much to expose the site as to erase it. Smithson observes that '[t]he site has no seeming limits, but the Non-Site points to the site. In a sense the Non-Site, although it points to it, effaces this particular region' (Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 198).

As this suggests, however, Smithson's Non-Site points to the site, first of all, by exposing the limits and operation of the gallery itself. Indeed, Smithson polarises the relationship between Non-Site and site around the art object and the gallery's differentiating function. Stating

that '[a]ll legitimate art deals with limits' (Lippard and Smithson 1996: 194), Smithson repeatedly emphasises in his published writing and interviews that 'the [Non-Site] really comes out of a comprehension of limits' (Smithson and Toner: 234), stressing the abstract nature of its 'limited (mapped) revision' and subsequent removal from the site. Whereas the experience of site is of material *scattered*, Smithson notes, the 'bins or containers of my Non-Sites gather *in* the Fragments' (Smithson 1996a: 104), mirroring the gallery's confinement and effecting a 'containment within the containment of the room' (Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 204). The Non-Site, in fact, reproduces and works over the limits of the gallery, exposing the *absence* of the site in an exacerbation of the gallery's objectifying function.

In this respect, the Non-Site foregrounds its indexical function as a map, its mechanisms of referral, and deferral, over and above any claim to present the properties of a place. In his contribution to the definitive catalogue of Smithson's sculpture (Hobbs 1981), the critic Lawrence Alloway argues that the relation of Non-Site to site is 'like that of language to the world: it is a signifier and the Site is that which is signified. It is not the referent but the language system which is in the foreground' (Alloway 1981: 42). As signifier, however, the Non-Site functions in the absence of a stable signified. Indeed, in foregrounding the inability of the object or the gallery to present the site, the Non-Site reveals this *absence* as the condition of its own mapping.

In his own account of the origins and development of the Non-Site, Smithson emphasises precisely the link with his 'concerns for mapping' (Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 212). As its antithesis, Smithson suggests, the Non-Site prompts a dialectical reading of the site. Speaking at a Symposium at Cornell University in early 1969, Smithson recounted his development of 'a dialectic that involved what I call site and non-site' in which 'I would set limits in terms of this dialogue (it's a back and forth rhythm that goes between indoors and outdoors)' (Flan 1996: 178). Indeed, this prompt not only emphasises the Non-Sites' functioning as an index to the site, but in the site's absence, serves to trace

out the contradictions of mapping itself. In a footnote to his essay 'The Spiral Jetty' of 1972, Smithson tabulated this relationship:

Dialectic of Site and Non-Site

Site	Non-Site
1. Open limits	Closed limits
2. A Series of Points	An Array of Matter
3. Outer Coordinates	Inner Coordinates
4. Subtraction	Addition
5. Indeterminate (Certainty)	Determinate (Uncertainty)
6. Scattered (Information)	Contained (Information)
7. Reflection	Mirror
8. Edge	Centre
9. Some Place (physical)	No Place (abstract)
10. Many	One

(Smithson 1996b: 152-3)

As antithesis, Smithson argues, the closed limits of the Non-Site's singular, centred, material focus can, in fact, 'only be approached in terms of its own negation' (Lippard and Smithson 1996: 193). In this sense, the Non-Site points back toward the site as its point of origin. Yet it is also in this antithetical relationship to the site that the limits of the Non-Site are set.

If, as a material, quantifiable focus, the Non-Site must 'be approached in terms of its own negation', then its very antithetical definition of the site, as absent, immaterial, and unavailable, forces a continual return to the Non-Site. Characterising the Non-Sites as prompting 'mental disasters, convergences that couldn't converge, and polarities that never quite met' (Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 212), Smithson clearly understood this dialectical relationship to imply a convergence which is out of reach. The relationship of Non-Site to site, here, is not one of a simple or stable *opposition*, but dialectical *movement*. Qualifying the 'Dialectic of Site and Non-Site', he remarks that:

The range of convergence between Site and Non-Site consists of a course of hazards, a double path made up of signs, photographs and maps that belong to both sides of the dialectic at once. Both sides are present and absent at the same time [. . .] Two-dimensional and three-dimensional things trade places with each other in the range of convergence. Large scale becomes small. Small scale becomes large. A point on a map expands to the size of the land mass. A land mass contracts to a point.

(Smithson 1996b: 153)

The site, it follows, is not available as an 'object', for it is not static: the site is mobile, always in a process of appearance or disappearance, available only in a dialectical move which the Non-Site prompts and to which it always returns. The site, in fact, is an effect of mapping, yet always remains antithetical to the map. The Non-Site, then, prompts a dialectical move toward the site which cannot be resolved, and so a movement which calls into question the status and solidity of both Non-Site and site. It is a 'dialectic of place' (Flam 1996: 187), Smithson observes, which 'just goes on permuting itself into this endless doubling, so that you have the nonsite functioning as a mirror and the site functioning as a reflection. Existence becomes a doubtful thing' (Lippard and Smithson 1996: 193).

For the architect Peter Eisenman, in his questioning of 'traditional geometries and processes in architecture' (Eisenman 1986: 4), site is precisely a function of absence. Observing that 'absence is either the trace of a previous presence, it contains *memory*; or the trace of a possible presence, it contains *immanence*' (Eisenman 1986: 4-5), Eisenman reads site as complex and multiple, always subject to absence's processes of disappearance and appearance. Whereas in architecture '[a] presence is a physically real form, whether a solid, such as a building, or a void, such as a space between two buildings' (Eisenman 1986: 4-5), site 'can be thought of as non-static' (Eisenman 1986: 5-6). Thus, Eisenman emphasises, 'To privilege "the site" as the context is to repress the other possible contexts, is to become fixated on the presences of

"the site," is to believe that "the site" exists as a permanent knowable whole. Such a belief [he concludes] is untenable today' (Eisenman 1986: 5).

The Non-Site, in fact, marks this unavailability of site as 'presence' or 'object', prompting a rhythm of appearance and disappearance which challenges the concept of the site as a permanent knowable whole. Here the site is neither that which *it was*, a stable point of origin, nor that which *will be*, a specific, 'knowable' point of destination.

This mobility of the site, its capacity to elude resolution into a static object, is discovered even in the most literal address to the Non-Site as an index of the site. Smithson's selection of specific sites, their geography and physical characteristics, underwrites the effect of the Non-Site. Smithson's selection of sites seems to be linked to an attitude or frame of mind. In the determination of a particular site, he suggests, '[t]here is no wilful choice. A site at zero degree, where the material strikes the mind, where absences become apparent, appeals to me' (Lippard and Smithson 1996: 194).

Smithson's attitude echoes that described by Marcel Duchamp in his selection of 'Ready-mades', banal, largely unaltered, functional objects chosen by Duchamp, usually signed, and placed in the gallery as challenges to the conceptual frameworks defining the art object. Speaking 'Apropos of Ready-mades' in New York in 1961, at the time of his resurgent influence on art and performance, Duchamp argued that in the selection of such objects as *Bottle Dryer* (1914), a snow shovel under the title *In Advance of the Broken Arm* (1914) and an upturned urinal as *Fountain* (1917), his choice 'was never dictated by aesthetic delectation. This choice was based on a reaction of visual indifference with at the same time a total absence of good or bad taste [. . .] in fact a complete anaesthesia' (Sanouillet and Peterson 1975: 141). Smithson's account of his reasons for choosing specific sites strikes a similar chord, reflecting a sense of geographic and mental drift and aesthetic ambivalence. In determining which sites to map, he notes:

There is no hope for logic. If you try to come up with a logical reason then you might as well forget it, because it doesn't deal with any kind of nameable, measurable situation. All dimension seems to be lost in the process. In other words, you are really going from some place to some place, which is to say, nowhere in particular [. . .] There's a suspension of destination.

(Lippard and Smithson 1996: 194)

Indeed, despite his note on *A Nonsite, Franklin, New Jersey* (1968), and other such pieces, that 'Tours to sites are possible', these sites do not offer an effective point of destination in which to resolve the Non-Site's deferral of attention. The Non-Site, Smithson emphasises, 'is a map that will take you somewhere, but when you get there you won't really know where you are' (Bear and Sharp 1996: 249). For Smithson, clearly, his experience at these geographical sites is no less a sense of the absence of the site than that which confronts the viewer in the gallery. Thus, he suggests, while the Non-Site directs the viewer toward specific 'points of collection', these 'tend to be scattered throughout the site' such that

once you get there, there's no destination. Or if there is information, the information is so low level it doesn't focus on any particular spot . . . so the site is evading you all the while it's directing you to it [. . .] There is no object to go toward. In the very name 'Non-Site' you're really making a reference to a particular site but that particular site evades itself, or it's incognito [. . .] The location is held in suspense.

(Smithson and Wheeler 1996: 218)

Here, there is no authentic, original site to be grasped as that to which the Non-Site refers, or any 'permanent knowable whole' which can transcend its mapping function. Indeed, paradoxically, where the 'limited (mapped) revision' in the gallery threatens to efface the site, the site cannot be read, represented, or thought without mapping.

In the absence of the map, then, the site is in suspension, incognito. In fact, as its reflection, the site cannot even be seen without the Non-Site. It is in this context that the Non-Site traces out a more complex mapping, one that embraces the site's absences. Noting that '[m]aps are very elusive things' (Bear and Sharp 1996: 249), Smithson's emphasis upon the dialectical move prompted by the Non-Site echoes Edward Soja's more recent analysis of *Postmodern Geographies* (Soja 1989) in which he stresses the map's definition of 'a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings' (Soja 1989: 1), a simultaneity which language tends to betray. He continues:

What one sees when one looks at geographies is stubbornly simultaneous, but language dictates a sequential succession, a linear flow of sentential statements bound by the most spatial of earthly constraints, the impossibility of two objects (words) occupying the same precise place (as on a page).

(Soja 1989: 2)

The Non-Site's 'mapping' emerges, finally, in the *restlessness* of this relationship, in the *possibility* of the Non-Site's convergence with the 'Site', in the *implication* of one in the other, and so in the 'bipolar rhythm between mind and matter' (Flam 1996: 187) it produces. Here, 'the site is a place where the work should be but isn't' (Bear and Sharp 1996: 249–50): the site appears in the *promise* of its occupation by the Non-Site, where a recognition of the site assumes the absence of the work, yet the work is a necessary index to the site. Indeed, the Non-Site's site-specificity is an effect of this contradiction, in which the work and the site threaten to occupy, and be defined in, the same precise place.

Ummappable Spaces

(In working to expose the absence of the map's original, authentic referent, Smithson's Non-Sites engage with the paradoxes of mapping essentially unummappable spaces. Indeed, in this respect, the Non-Site reproduces the effect de Certeau ascribes to the 'symbolic (named)' (de Certeau 1984: 103), where representation *moves one on* from the site. It is in this context that the Non-Site's mapping is realised as always in process, always contingent, temporary, where the representation of site is always subject to being written over. Here, too, the Non-Site suggests a mapping which can be linked to various readings of the peculiarities of contemporary place and space, and which is symptomatic of approaches to site in performance.)

In his major study of *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Jameson 1991), Frederic Jameson identifies conceptual art with tactics closely aligned to those of Smithson's Non-Sites. Here, Jameson suggests, 'on the occasion of what first seems to be an encounter with a work of art of some kind, the categories of the mind itself – normally not conscious [...] are flexed, their structuring presence now felt laterally by the viewer like musculature or nerves of which we normally remain insensible' (Jameson 1991: 157). Emphasising '[t]he relationship between the vocation of such conceptual art and some of the classic texts of deconstruction' (Jameson 1991: 157), Jameson goes on to propose that certain manifestations of this 'dissolution of inherited form' (Jameson 1991: 157) may be extended toward a 'cognitive mapping' (Jameson 1991: 416) of contemporary spatial, social, or institutional relations and effects.)

(In defining cognitive mapping, Jameson draws on his reading of Kevin Lynch's celebrated study of *The Image of the City* (Lynch 1960). Proposing, Jameson tells us, that 'urban alienation is directly proportional to the mental unummappability of local cityscapes' (Jameson 1991: 415), Lynch's study addresses the individual's sense of disparity between the 'here and now of immediate perception and the imaginative or imaginary sense of the city as an absent totality' (Jameson 1991: 411).

In the context of de Certeau's later account of the realisation of place in spatial practices, Lynch's study can be understood as addressing the individual's capacity to resolve their own practice of the city into the order they imagine it implies. In this way, Jameson reports, in inviting his subjects 'to draw their city context from memory' in order that he might distinguish the differing effects of contrasting urban designs, Lynch concludes that

A city like Boston [...] with its monumental perspective, its markers and statuary, its combination of grand but simple spatial forms, including dramatic boundaries such as the Charles River, not only allows people to have, in their imaginations, a generally successful and continuous location to the rest of the city, but gives them something of the freedom and aesthetic gratification of [a] traditional city.

(Jameson 1991: 415)

In his approach to post-modernism, Jameson extends this address to a disparity between individual experience and an imagined 'absent totality'. Where Lynch engages with a phenomenology of the city, however, Jameson extends his analysis toward ideology's attempt to 'span or co-ordinate, to map' the gap between the 'local positioning of the individual subject' and an 'imaginary totality' (Jameson 1991: 416) characterised, in the post-modern, by a resistance to unified, clear and stable positions or systems of belief.

For Jameson, 'post-modernist' art and architecture are symptomatic of this contemporary dilemma, in which the resolution of the individual's practice into a 'known' spatial, social, or ideological totality has come under question. In this context, Jameson cites John Portman's Westin Bonaventure Hotel in the new Los Angeles downtown area as producing a specifically 'post-modernist space' (Jameson 1991: 45) where the individual's sense of location is radically undermined. Reading the Bonaventure as 'aspiring to being a total space, a complete world, a kind of miniature city' (Jameson 1991: 40), Jameson emphasises the

discontinuities in which these architectural spaces take their effect. First of all, he proposes, the building asserts a strongly discontinuous relationship to its city surroundings. The Bonaventure's reflective glass skin 'repels the city outside, a repulsion for which we have analogies in those reflector sunglasses which make it impossible for your interlocutor to see your own eyes' so achieving 'a peculiar and placeless dissociation' (Jameson 1991: 42). Where from the outside the building achieves 'a certain aggressivity toward and power over the Other' such that 'you cannot see the hotel itself but only the distorted images of everything that surrounds it' (Jameson 1991: 42), its internal architecture amplifies this difficulty of establishing one's *place*. On entering the building, Jameson notes, the pedestrian must negotiate the unpredictable relationships between the hotel's external structure and its internal spaces. In these spaces, the pedestrian becomes subject to 'a new collective practice, a new mode in which individuals move and congregate, something like the practice of a new and historically original kind of hypercrowd' (Jameson 1991: 40). In fact, Portman's building is defined not simply in the pedestrian's movement through it, but *in movement itself*, as if the architecture had usurped the visitor's capacity to negotiate its spaces. Here, Jameson tells us, 'escalators and elevators [...] replace movement but also, and above all, designate themselves as new reflexive signs and emblems of movement proper' such that 'the narrative stroll has been underscored, symbolized, reified, and replaced by a transportation machine' (Jameson 1991: 42). Amid this building's spatial discontinuities and appropriation and simulation of movement, the visitor cannot easily put these architectural spaces in their place. Instead, Jameson concludes, the visitor is confronted by 'a constant busyness' that 'gives the feeling that emptiness here is absolutely packed, that it is an element within which you yourself are immersed, without any of that distance that formerly enabled the perception of perspective or volume. You are in this hyperspace up to your eyes and your body' (Jameson 1991: 43).

For the pedestrian, this building works against the perspective and order mapping would install, exposing the gap between the visitor's

immediate spatial practice and their sense of an implied totality. Indeed, Jameson concludes that the Bonaventure offers a terrain in which it is simply 'quite impossible to get your bearings'. Recently, he continues, 'colour coding and directional signs have been added in a pitiful and revealing, rather desperate, attempt to restore the co-ordinates of an older space' (Jameson 1991: 44).

In opening this rift between immediate spatial experience and its location, this 'new post-modernist space' (Jameson 1991: 44) forces a continual rereading or rewriting of the order implied in spatial practice. Indeed, here, the visitor's effort to locate their practice is continually subject to a rewriting. In this context, cognitive mapping, a term, Jameson tells us, 'which was meant to have a kind of oxymoronic value and to transcend the limits of mapping altogether' (Jameson 1991: 416), characterises an address to precisely this gap, or disparity, this movement between practice and place. Here, Jameson considers a mapping which is constantly *in motion*, and which reflects the nature of post-modernist space. 'In this new machine,' he remarks, 'which does not, like the older modernist machinery of the locomotive or the aeroplane, represent motion, but which can only be represented *in motion*, something of the mystery of the new post-modernist space concentrated' (Jameson 1991: 45). Where post-modernist space exposes the inability of spatial practice to rest in the order it implies, so a cognitive mapping of the Bonaventure might direct attention toward an architectural terrain, or totality, which evades the co-ordinates mapping imposes upon it. Here, in fact, cognitive mapping functions in this very sense of *lacking a place*, as if tracing the co-ordinates of a terrain from which it is continually displaced.

This sense of a terrain which evades the co-ordinates of the map is also evident in site-specific work rehearsing a transitive definition of site. Here, where the site-specific work foregrounds site's elusiveness and mobility, the concept and features of the site which it articulates are continually annulled, displaced, or surpassed. In this context, one might read Forced Entertainment's exposure of the effect of the 'symbolic (named)', or Brith Gof's articulation of an incongruent and

'deeply fractured' (McLucaes, Morgan and Pearson 1995: 51) relationship between 'host' (the site) and 'ghost' (the work), as exposing the site's evasion of the specific co-ordinates in which the site-specific work would establish its location.

In Smithson's own work this sense of dislocation extends to the literal co-ordinates of a mapped place. In analysing Smithson's most celebrated work, *Spiral Jetty* (1970), in *Earthwards: Robert Smithson and Art After Babel* (Shapiro 1995), Gary Shapiro stresses not only the literal difficulty of approaching the Jetty, which, at an obscure point on the Great Salt Lake in Utah, projects 1,500 feet into its waters, but the difficulty of locating *Spiral Jetty* as a work at all. Arguing that 'the multiple referents of the title *Spiral Jetty*' suggest 'that there is no primary, authentic object' to which other expressions of the piece are 'ancillary' (Shapiro 1995: 7), Shapiro reads the piece across Smithson's arrangement of rocks in the Great Salt Lake, a film that recounts its making, and an essay in which Smithson 'discusses the spiral and the film in language ranging through mythopoetic, art historical and geological modes' (Shapiro 1995: 7). In doing so, Shapiro argues that this work is constituted as a series of texts, each of which implies but is displaced from a centre, and which have themselves then been reproduced and dispersed again (Shapiro 1995: 8–9). For Shapiro, this textual dispersal is reflected upon in the film, where Smithson's voice-over reveals the 'senselessness of the Jetty's centre', intoning:

From the centre of the Spiral Jetty
 North – Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water
 North by East – Mud, salt crystals,
 rocks, water
 Northeast by North – Mud, salt crystals,
 rocks, water
 Northeast by East – Mud, salt crystals,
 rocks, water

(Shapiro 1995: 16–17)

Far from making the *Spiral Jetty* available, Smithson's co-ordinates mimic the indexical function of a map but fail to locate, or state, its place. Instead, the *Spiral Jetty* is located in the inter-leaving and overlaying of texts, and so in a continual deferral from one point to another. Here, *Spiral Jetty*, as Shapiro suggests, exists, and is mapped, conceptually, in this process of deferral, in the gaps and disparities between texts and locations, where the real work and its real site evade the specific, mapped co-ordinates it presents. Here, in fact, Smithson's work indicates again something of the paradoxical nature of these approaches to site, where site-specific practice works against its own final or definitive location precisely in order to expose the unstable, evasive, and shifting nature of this place.

Performing Mapping: Allan Kaprow, Claes Oldenburg, Wolf Vostell

This functioning of the site-specific work is reflected in early entries into 'environmental' performance. For Allan Kaprow and Claes Oldenburg, working in New York in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the German artist Wolf Vostell, the approach to 'site' through performance closely linked phenomenological enquiries into art-viewing with a testing of the morphology and limits of the artwork. Here, performance provided a means through which the geography and events of 'found' sites could be approached outside the representational terms of painting and sculpture. Indeed, in approaching 'real' places (Oldenburg 1965: 200), Kaprow's happenings 'for performers only', Oldenburg's 'happenings of place' (Oldenburg 1973), and Vostell's 'dé-collage happenings' reflected on relationships between practice and place, and so work and site, fostering unpredictable, fluid exchanges between the frame of an artwork and its various contexts.

This address to the limits of the artwork emerged in the context of inter-disciplinary challenges to the conventional enclosure of the object

and a resultant series of moves from conventional visual art practices into performance. For the Fluxus artist Dick Higgins, identifying 'hybrid' forms between music and philosophy (John Cage), music and sculpture (Joe Jones), and poetry and sculpture (Robert Fillou) (Higgins 1969: 27), the 'intermedial' art practices of the early 1960s challenged the viewer's ability to resolve and stabilise identities and so effectively map the co-ordinates of a work. Reflecting on the early development of performance by artists, Higgins identified the difficulty of formally locating an object or practice as a key aspect of its effect, observing that '[t]he Happening developed as an intermedium, an uncharted land that lies between collage, music and theatre [...] The concept itself is best defined in terms of what it is not, rather than by what it is' (Higgins 1969: 25).

John Cage's untitled event at Black Mountain College of the Summer of 1952, which acted as a key precursor and influence on *Happening* performance, was defined in precisely such a challenge to the integrity of conventional forms. Organised around 'an empty centre' (Cage and Charles 1981: 165), this event brought Cage's own compositional methods to bear on the notion of a 'multi-dimensional theatre' (Cage and Charles 1981: 166) defined by the French visionary and poet Antonin Artaud. In an interview published in 1981, Cage recounted that 'we decided to divide the audience into four triangles whose peaks would be directed toward an empty centre. [...] the action wasn't supposed to occur in the centre, but everywhere around the audience. That is, in the four corners, in the gaps, and also from above' (Cage and Charles 1981: 165).

Following Merce Cunningham's interest 'in the problems of assembling heterogeneous facts' (Cage and Charles 1981: 164), Cage had sought to effect a 'co-existence of dissimilars' (Cage 1968: 12) and so create a situation in which conflicting aesthetic logics would be simultaneously in play and where none of the works constituting the event would be free from the noise, or interruptions, of others. As Cage read a forty-five minute lecture, poems by M.C. Richards and Charles Olsen, performed, like Cage's text, from various ladders positioned around the

room, were set alongside 'piano by David Tudor' and 'films projected on the walls' (Cage and Charles 1981: 165). Robert Rauschenberg's white canvases of 1952 could be seen hung from the ceiling. Rauschenberg himself 'played old records on an antique phonograph' (Cage 1981: 165). While these events unfolded and overlapped, the choreographer and dancer Merce Cunningham improvised freely around performers and spectators. Rather than establish 'a *finite temporal object* with a beginning, middle and an end' (Cage and Charles 1981: 51), Cage understood this overlaying of works to prompt the viewer's simultaneous perception of distinct and different spaces and perspectives. In such a situation, he argues, 'space arises out of the fact that the works are super-imposed and accumulate their own spaces. There is no single space, finally – there are several spaces and these spaces tend to multiply among themselves' (Cage and Charles 1981: 132).

Allan Kaprow's entry into performance from 1958 extended this address to disparate and discontinuous events and spaces. Indeed, in these contexts Kaprow's early performance looked toward the incursion of 'real space' and so 'real time' into the viewer's experience, in a breaking down of the frame of a work in favour of engagements with 'everyday' places and events. Here, though, Kaprow not only drew on Cage's concepts and procedures but also contemporary readings of Jackson Pollock's celebrated 'drip' or 'action' paintings and their implication for the creative process and relationships between 'literal space' and 'painted space' (Kaprow 1993a: 11).

In the mid-1950s, Pollock's 'drip' paintings became a focus of a critical valorisation of the artist's engagement in the creative act. For the abstract expressionist painter, the critic Harold Rosenberg famously argued, the canvas had come to offer 'an arena in which to act – rather than a space in which to reproduce, re-design' where '[w]hat was to go onto the canvas was not a picture but an event' (Rosenberg 1959: 40). In this context, Rosenberg concluded, the contemporary vitality of Pollock's paintings lay in their definition of a tension between object and event. Writing in 1958, E.C. Goossen proposed that this tension was amplified by the sheer size of Pollock's paintings. Crediting Pollock and Barnett Newman with

the introduction of a new scale in painting. Goossen read Pollock's work as exemplifying the effect of 'the Big Canvas' (Goossen 1973: 61), a canvas he defined as 'in both directions [...] larger than the comprehensive image the eye is capable of taking in' (Goossen 1973: 58). Denied the figure or perspective, he concluded, the viewer is left to negotiate this surface in relation to her own presence and definition of a perceptual field and so between its surfaces and the space she occupies. Writing of 'The Legacy of Jackson Pollock' in the same year, Kaprow looked from this tension toward performance, concluding that 'we do not enter a painting of Pollock's in any one place (or hundred places). Anywhere is everywhere [...] Pollock ignored the confines of the rectangular field in favour of a continuum going in all directions simultaneously, beyond the literal dimensions of any work' (Kaprow 1993: 5).

Here, Kaprow suggests, where the 'space' of the painting 'is not clearly palpable as such' (Kaprow 1993: 6), the artist might be prompted to move off the canvas, 'to give up the making of paintings entirely' (Kaprow 1993: 7) and so enter into the space before and around the canvas. Where Pollock 'left us at the point where we must become preoccupied with and even dazzled by the space and objects of our everyday life' (Kaprow 1993: 7), Kaprow concludes, a new art should look *outward*, toward imbrications of 'virtual' and 'real' spaces and so toward an 'environmental' art. In his 'Notes on the Creation of a Total Art' of 1958, Kaprow suggests that

if we join a literal space and a painted space, and these two spaces to a sound, we achieve the 'right' relationship by considering each component in quantity and quality on an imaginary scale [...]. The 'balance' (if one wants to call it that) is primarily an environmental one.

(Kaprow 1993a: 11)

It is in these contexts that Kaprow's Happenings 'for performers only' provide structures through which the viewer-participant acts out a tracing of a work over discontinuous spaces. Indeed, although Kaprow

developed performances for built and found environments from 1959, including *18 Happenings in 6 Parts** from which the term happening was coined, it is this form which he adopted from 1964 which fully develops the implications of this entry into an 'environmental' space. In the happenings for performers only, those who would be an audience to the happening are invited to participate in the performance of a set of programmed activities realised in unconventional or 'non-art' contexts and dispersed in space and time. Typically, for *Household* (1964), realised by participants in 'a lonesome dump out in the country' (Kaprow 1966a: 6), *Soap* (1965), played out over two mornings and evenings in public sites chosen by the performers (Kaprow 1966a: 8), and *Calling* (1965), in which activities were dispersed across New York City and subsequently in a farm in New Jersey (Kaprow 1995: 195), would-be participants meet in advance of their 'performance' to discuss the patterns and triggers for activities. Subsequently, Kaprow stresses, '[t]he happening is performed according to plan but without rehearsal, audience, or repetition' (Kaprow 1966a: 3). In this situation 'pre-knowledge of the Happening's cluster of events by all participants will allow each one to make his own connections' (Kaprow 1966: 191). In this way, individuals complete their tasks often in isolation or at one remove from activities occurring elsewhere or in relation to events at another time or actions subject to the choices, inclinations, and circumstances of other performers. In the score for *Soap*, then, where 'actions given in parentheses are alternatives given to the participant' (Kaprow 1966a: 10), Kaprow's plan states:

1st morning: clothes dirtied by urination
1st evening: clothes washed

(in the sea)
(in the laundromat)

* Kaprow's earliest performance work includes an untitled piece presented at Douglass College, New Brunswick, 15 April 1958, as well as an unperformed script entitled *The Demijugs* dated spring 1959 (Sohm 1970).

2nd morning: cars dirtied with jam

on a busy street

cars cleaned

(in a parking lot)

(in a car-wash)

2nd evening: bodies dirtied with jam

bodies buried in mounds

at the sea edge

bodies cleaned by the tide

(Kaprow 1966a: 10)

Soap is defined in a double movement, as Kaprow draws the participant into a network of related and often thematically linked activities yet disperses these activities in order to call its formal frame as a work into question. Indeed, the activities for *Soap* are not only dispersed, but are frequently embedded into everyday circumstances, where 'the work' might bleed out into the private associations of individual participants. The soiling of clothes, Kaprow suggests 'makes the cleansing of [...] clothes inescapably personal' (Kaprow 1966a: 11). Where cars are taken to a car wash, Kaprow instructs participants to disguise their performance in rituals of the everyday, noting that 'one should have this done as though nothing were out of the ordinary. Any questions should be answered in as noncommittal a way as possible' (Kaprow 1966a: 11). Here, in fact, Kaprow works to engage the viewer in a vacillation between places, as her performed practices are imbricated with *everyday* rituals, events, and circumstances.

Through these strategies, Kaprow works to transpose Higgins' concept of intermedia to the relationship between practice and place. Where, Higgins argues, the happening 'is best defined in terms of what

it is not' (Higgins 1969: 29), Kaprow's happenings 'for performers only' seek to position the viewer-participant's activities between an unfolding artwork and everyday activity. Thus, the viewer's activity in the work might force attention *outward*, pressing toward its dissolution into actions, contexts and encounters which constitute its site and cannot be contained, figured, or represented. Writing of 'The Education of the Un-Artist' in 1971, Kaprow remarked that

Intermedia implies fluidity and simultaneity of roles. Where art is only one of several possible functions a situation might have, it loses its privileged status and becomes, so to speak, a lowercase attribute. The intermedial response can be applied to anything.

(Kaprow 1993c: 105)

It follows that in this ambiguity, where the relationship between 'virtual' and 'real' spaces is continually under review, Kaprow strives to produce a crisis for the limits and borders of the work. Indeed, here, Kaprow actively seeks to break down the specifics of his own work in favour of that which its *abolition* might reveal. Thus, writing on 'Impurity' in 1963, Kaprow remarks that 'Not only the painter's means but also the art object itself should evaporate through a process of mutual annihilation. From this destruction of particulars something of considerably greater importance would be unlocked' (Kaprow 1993b: 30).

It is in this context that Kaprow's well-known 'rules of thumb' for the creation of a happening, first published in 1966, work to exacerbate the problem of locating and so defining and resolving the work. Where, Kaprow states, 'audiences should be eliminated entirely' (Kaprow 1966: 195), these rubrics are designed to work against the viewer-participant's capacity to establish firm or fixed oppositions between the performance and its contexts. Positioning the participant as arbiter of the work's limits, Kaprow states that, in determining the basis of the happening, 'the source of themes, materials, actions, and the relationships between them are to be derived from any place or period except from the

arts, their derivatives, and their milieu? (Kaprow 1966: 189). It is this impulse, too, that leads Kaprow to sites outside the conventional places of art viewing. He states that:

The performance of a Happening should take place over several widely spaced, sometimes moving and changing locales [...] by gradually widening the distances between the events within a Happening. [...] in several rooms or floors of an apartment house where some of the activities are out of touch with each other; then on more than one street; then in different but proximate cities; finally all round the globe.

(Kaprow 1966: 190)

Under these strictures, Kaprow's happenings approach specific sites in a series of challenges to the frames in which its limits would be established. Indeed, it is by stretching the perceptual frame of a work to breaking point, and permitting an incursion and ritualising of everyday activity in *performance*, that Kaprow attempts to provoke a situation in which 'art and life are not simply commingled' and where 'the identity of each is uncertain' (Kaprow 1966: 189). At this point, Kaprow supposes, where the limits and so the formal identity of the work are *undefined*, then 'the very materials, the environment, the activity of the people in the environment, are the primary images, not the secondary ones [...] there is an absolute flow between event and environment' (Kaprow and Schechner 1968: 154).

Here, then, Kaprow attempts to open the work of art to its own erasure and so to a breaking down towards *site*. It is this effort that Kaprow signals, finally, in these rubrics, stressing that throughout the performance, '[*the line between art and life should be kept as fluid, and perhaps indistinct, as possible.*] [...] Something will always happen at this juncture' (Kaprow 1966: 188-9).

Where Kaprow's happenings 'for performers only' work toward a collapse of the opposition between an abstract framework and the everyday activities in which the work is acted out, Claes Oldenburg's

treatment of a "real" place' as if it were 'itself an object' (Oldenburg 1965: 200) worked to mediate one specific site through another. For *The Store* (1961-2), Oldenburg established a 'real store' at 107 East Second Street, New York, between December 1961 and January 1962, where he kept a stock of approximately 120 everyday objects of all kinds recast in a variety of materials and offered for sale. Here, Oldenburg suggests, *The Store*, as 'artwork', derives its form from the imperatives of the 'real store' it inhabits. Indeed, in this respect, Oldenburg draws attention to his affinity with Kaprow, emphasising that 'the only reason I have taken up Happenings is because I wanted to experiment with total space or surrounding space' (Oldenburg, Lichtenstein and Warhol 1966: 22). Stressing *The Store's* form, as distinct from its commercial function, Oldenburg argues that his arrangement of elements may be 'called a store because like a store it is a collection of objects randomly placed in space' (Oldenburg 1967: 51). Furthermore, in installing these objects in a *functioning*, ostensibly 'non-art' space, Oldenburg suggests,

I have wanted to imitate my act of perceiving them, which is why they are shown as fragments (in the field of seeing), in different scale to one another, in a form surrounding me (and the spectator), and in accumulation rather than in some imposed design. And the effect is: I have made my own Store.

(Oldenburg 1967: 26)

As a result of this dispersal, Oldenburg concludes, the form of *The Store* 'is not so much environmental as fragmental [...] You are to imagine the missing, that is, what is called negative space or absent material, counts for something' (Oldenburg 1967: 49). Here, Oldenburg characterises *The Store* as an incursion into precisely that space which, Kaprow suggests, 'is not palpable as such' (Kaprow 1993: 6), where the viewer will encounter the object's occupation of, and uses in, 'real' space.

In *The Store*, then, as Oldenburg suggests of his other site-specific work, '*The gallery becomes a specific place*' (Oldenburg 1973: 9), a place which, Oldenburg argues in its documentation, 'tries to overcome the

sense of guilt connected with money' and where there is 'no separation between commerce and art' (Oldenburg 1967: 52). In its operation as a 'real store', however, 'The Store will be constantly supplied with new objects' (Oldenburg 1967: 16), and, in this respect, not only does the gallery *act out* the store, but the store *acts out* the gallery. Indeed, *The Store* plays on and through the *difference* between these sites. Thus, Oldenburg emphasises, '[t]he aim of putting the store in an actual neighbourhood is to *contrast* it to the actual object [...] not as might be thought in neorealist terms to point up similarities' (*sic*) (Oldenburg 1967: 81). Indeed, where *The Store* functions in this relationship of *difference*, so the practices in which it is defined come to operate in *more than one specific place*. It follows that where *The Store* acts as a 'real' (functioning) store *and* a 'real' (functioning) gallery, so Oldenburg becomes salesman *and* artist, the visitor customer *and* viewer, and the object commercial product *and* artwork. Indeed, Oldenburg extends this duality toward everyday incidents and events at *The Store*, which in turn enter into performance. Alongside an 'Inventory of the Store' for December 1961 listing 107 objects for sale, Oldenburg specifies '13 Incidents at the Store', including:

- A customer enters
 - Something is bought
 - Something is returned
 - It costs too much
 - A bargain!
 - Someone is hired. (someone is fired.)
 - The founders. How they struggled.
 - Inventory
 - Fire sale
 - Store closed on acct of death in family
- (*sic*) (Oldenburg 1967: 19)

The re-framing of such events reflects *The Store's* multiple function, not only as store and gallery, but also as the 'Ray Gun Theater' for a

series of events of January 1962, in which Oldenburg sought to define '[a] theatre of action or of things' which might 'present in events what the Store presents in objects' (Oldenburg 1967: 80). Here, Oldenburg suggests, like his other Happenings, the 'audience is considered an object and its behaviours as events, along with the rest' (Oldenburg 1965: 202), with the result that, after Kaprow, 'spectators are both in the "gallery" and in the work' (Oldenburg 1973: 146-7). Here *The Store* articulates its site as *restless* and *mobile*, in a mode of work which Oldenburg characterises as 'always on its way between one point and another' (Oldenburg 1967: 51). Finally, it is in this movement that *The Store* maps its sites, always deferring, in practice, from one place to another.

Where Kaprow and Oldenburg approach the site by testing the work's location, limits, and stability, Wolf Vostell developed his 'dé-coll/age happenings' toward a collapse of the terms of the work into the viewer's encounter with its site. Vostell's performance derived its form from his early 'dé-coll/age' presentations: images derived from a dé-coll/age process, which Vostell defines as to 'unpaste, tear off' (Vostell 1966: 90), applied to 'found', commercially produced posters. In this respect, Vostell's early work had a clear affinity with *affichiste* and junk art by artists such as Raymond Hains and John Chamberlain, where found images and materials, including 'collages from the street' and torn posters, were presented in ways informed by Abstract Expressionist and tachiste painting (Hapgood 1994: 45). In Vostell's dé-coll/age, however, the image is produced in a degrading or destruction, rather than juxtaposition, of found materials. Where, like Kaprow, Vostell positioned his audience as 'participants and performers instead of spectators' (Vostell 1968: 2), the dé-coll/age process extended formal and thematic concerns with processes of destruction, and in doing so became an instrument in the viewer's encounter with 'everyday' events. In setting out the 'Genesis and Iconography of my Happenings' in an 'action-lecture' given at the university of Heidelberg in June 1967, Vostell recalled that, in this development,

I felt a growing necessity to incorporate whatever I saw/heard/felt/ into my paintings [...] what fascinated me were the symptoms & radiations of a development in my environment in which destruction, decomposition & change were the strongest elements – I realized that constructive elements don't exist in life at all, they are all intermediate phases of destruction – life is *dé-coll/age* – as the body builds up and grows, it wears out at the same time – permanent destruction.

(*sic*) (Vostell 1968: 4)

Here the *dé-coll/age* happening effects an opening to its sites by calling its own framework and identity into question. Emphasising 'no retreat from but *into* reality' (Vostell 1968: 1), Vostell stresses that in the *dé-coll/age* happening 'I use the actual locations where the events would normally occur: airports/highways/car dumps/slaughter houses/multilevel garages/supermarkets etc.' (Vostell 1968: 14). In this effort 'to erase in order to see and let others see clearly' (Vostell 1966: 40), Vostell concludes, 'my happenings and events are frames of reference for experiencing the present' (Vostell 1966: 2). Here, then, the boundary between the happening and its location, between the work and its place, threatens to disappear. In *Cityrama 1* (1961) in Cologne, for example, Vostell organised 'a walk through the city with the audience, to bombed sites/backyards/scrapyards/etc. where I declared as art found objects, or the particular condition of a site or building, or an event, or an entire environment' (Vostell 1968: 12).

In this 'permanent realistic demonstration [...] at 26 sites' (Vostell 1966: 15–16), Vostell's tour directed attention toward 'life and realistic actions and occurrences declared to be *dé-coll/age* works of art' (Vostell 1966: 15), prompting the participant-viewers to:

- walk listen speak
 1 – ruin at maximinen strasse
 (entrance on dom strasse)
 2 – ruin at maximinen strasse

- (entrance on dom strasse)
 3 – ruin at maximinen strasse
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 4 – ruin at maximinen strasse
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(Vostell 1966: 15)

Defined, Vostell suggests, in 'the sum total of events and the distance between the single events' (Vostell 1968: 1), and prompting 'chaotic situations', which, Vostell states, 'cannot always be resolved' (Vostell 1966: 2), the *dé-coll/age* happening confronts the viewer with actions, events, sites, or instructions, whose place *within* a work is uncertain. Indeed, here, on being invited to be 'actively engaged in a series of events that have not been rehearsed' (Vostell 1968: 14), in a mode of work in which 'each happening exposes itself to the banality of the viewer or participant' (Vostell 1968: 7), the participant may simply find themselves, under the frame of Vostell's work, *at* a given place.

These attempts to displace the viewer-participant *into* the site have strong affinities to the Situationist International's attempts to map the 'psychogeographical relief' of the city in a technique adopted from Dadaist practice (Plant 1992: 58). Thus, writing of 'The Theory of the Dérive' in 1956, Guy Debord announced that '[a]mong the various situationist methods is the *dérive* [literally: 'drifting'], a technique of transient passage through various ambiances' (Debord 1981: 50). Here, 'one or more persons during a certain period drop their usual motives for movement and action, their relations, their leisure and work activities, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there' (Debord 1981: 50). Among the means of provoking a sensitivity, openness, or sense of *dérive*, Debord suggests, is the 'possible rendezvous' where

The subject is invited to come alone to a specified place at a specified time. He is freed from the bothersome obligations of the ordinary rendezvous since there is no-one to wait for. But

since this 'possible rendezvous' has brought him without warning to a place he may or may not know, he observes the surroundings. It may be that the same spot has been specified for a 'possible rendezvous' for someone else whose identity he has no way of knowing. Since he may never have even seen the other person before, he will be incited to start up conversations with various passers-by. He may meet no-one, or he may by chance meet the person who has arranged the 'possible rendezvous.' In any case, particularly if the time and place have been well chosen, the subject's use of time will take an unexpected turn. He may even telephone someone else who doesn't know where the first 'possible rendezvous' has taken him, in order to ask for another one to be specified.

(Debord 1981: 53)

For Vostell, approaching the complexities of maintaining a work while *being in* the site, the dé-collage happening may embrace an event analogous to the possible rendezvous, where the invitation to act out the work displaces the viewer's place and purpose, in favour of a heightened attention to 'found' events and sites. In this respect, these happenings look toward the 'pre-cartographic' (Jameson 1991: 51) experience Jameson identifies with Lynch's phenomenological mapping of the city: an *acting out* of the site, a mapping caught in the moment of its *being performed*.

These approaches to site elaborate a position consistent with Smithson's proposal that 'the site is a place where the piece should be but isn't' (Bear and Sharp 1996: 249–50). Yet where Smithson's Non-Sites foreground the site's *absence*, these prompts toward phenomenological engagements with found sites look toward another possibility. Thus, these works by Kaprow, Oldenburg, and Vostell prompt exchanges between an artwork and its site in a which a specificity to site arises in the promise that the viewer's own engagement with *this place* might leave the work behind.

Space as Map and Memory: Meredith Monk

The development of Meredith Monk's site-specific work, while grounded in her rigorous dance training (Koenig 1976: 52), was strongly shaped by the exchanges between music, dance and visual art defining the new performance emerging in New York from the early 1960s. During her dance studies at Sarah Lawrence College, Monk had participated in Merce Cunningham's first series of dance workshops in the summer of 1962 (Banes 1978: 72) and periodically attended performances of the Judson Dance Theatre in New York City. In 1964 she moved to Manhattan where, Sally Banes records, 'besides choreographing and dancing her own works, she performed in Happenings, off-Broadway plays, and other dance works' (Banes 1978: 4). Yet while drawing on the work of the Judson Dance Theatre, Monk also reacted against the formal austerity of these reactions against Modern American dance. Thus, Monk's early work engaged with the overt theatricality of Happenings by artists such as Robert Whitman, Al Hansen, and Carolee Schneemann, as well as the inter-disciplinary practices associated with Fluxus. In 1965 Monk collaborated with the Fluxus artists Dick Higgins, Alison Knowles and Ay-O on a realisation of the Dada performance *Relache* for the New York avant-garde festival of 1965 (Gowitt 1997: 4). In the same year, she performed in Higgins' *The Tart, or, Miss America* and *The Celestials* (Hansen 1965: 21) and in Al Hansen's *Steer City for Andy Warhol* (Koenig 1976: 12). Monk herself recalls working with the poet Jackson Mac Low (Bear and Monk 1997: 83) who had collaborated with Cage in the untitled event of 1952. For Monk, the exchanges between visual art, dance, theatre, poetry, and film which underpinned this work evidently provided the basis for her engagement in a new mode of performance, which she recalled as 'A nonlinear dramatic mosaic that incorporated film, dance, music, and image. The people who were closest to it formally were Whitman and [Robert] Morris' theatre pieces. They'd worked with images as a primary element, rather than a movement' (Bear and Monk 1997: 84).

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In this context, Monk's early choreographic concepts found their counterpart in her approach to specific sites. In her earliest published notes on her work, for the dance *Portable* realised at the Judson Church Theatre in May 1966, Monk characterises her choreographic concern for transition in terms of the map's absence from its object. Monk records that

I started thinking about the idea of residue. Something left behind or coming after a process has ended. [...] The past and present in one piece. A map. A map is always used as a guide, a reference *before* (sometimes during) travel. In this piece, the map would be a continuous process (during the piece) and a residue of the process of the entire piece.

(Jowitz 1997: 18)

It is a set of concerns elaborated explicitly in her major site-specific work, *Juice* of 1969, in which mapping provides a mechanism and metaphor for the work. Performed in three parts in three different locations over a period of a month and a half, the 'guiding concept' of *Juice*, Siri Engberg notes in Monk's documentation of this work, is the 'close-up' or zoom-lens. In Part One, then, realised by eighty-five performers in the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, Monk used 'the whole building as a kind of sculptural experience for the audience' (Bernhardt *et al.* 1994), deploying performers on the spiralling ramps defining the Museum's central gallery and, she later recalled, 'using the sound of that space, which has almost a half-second delay' (Strickland 1997: 137). At the same time, the Guggenheim performance provided for an intimacy between performers and audience. Monk's programme notes to the audience for Section II of the Guggenheim performance record:

Audience walking on ramps
Performers in the bays, alcoves,
stairways along the outside edge of

the ramps
This is a 45 minute interval consisting of
13 simultaneous events distributed on the
six ramp levels of the museum.

(Monk 1969)

While the audience are invited to move at will around the ramp levels, so these events play continuously, in the manner of an exhibition. Subsequently, Monk's notes conclude, the performance ends with the audience on the ramp looking down to the performers on the ground floor (Monk 1969). Part Two of *Juice* was realised one month later at Barnard College's Minor Latham Playhouse in a systematic translation of one site and event into another, yet a translation in which, Banes recalls,

everything had diminished. At the entrance to the theatre, a child sat on a rockinghorse – a smaller echo of the woman who rode a horse down Fifth Avenue as the audience waited outside the Guggenheim for part one. Inside the theatre [...] characters gave information about themselves in recitatives, and performed real-life actions [...] Many more elements from the first part were rearranged and shrunk in this presentation.

(Banes 1978: 5)

While the Minor Latham Playhouse provides an ostensibly more intimate space, its proscenium arch introduces a new kind of formality and distance. Part Three, realised one week later at Monk's loft in Manhattan, consisted of an exhibition of objects and costumes from the earlier parts of the piece. Amidst these objects, the four principal performers of *Juice* were framed in close-up on large television screens positioned on the floor, recounting on video-tape their experiences of working on the piece. Here, Banes recalls, 'though one could even smell the sweat of the costumes, the performers remained totally remote, once-removed by the video screen' (Banes 1978: 5–6).

As *Juice* plays out the 'close-up', so its three parts trace out a process in which one space and site acts as the map and memory of another. In doing so, the piece approaches its sites in a double movement, in which, as the elements of performance move into close-up, so the sites and events of which they are an index move farther away. Indeed, in the relationship between work and site, *Juice* plays out the terms Monk describes for *Portable*, where 'the map would be a continuous process (during the piece)' and in which 'material and transition would go on simultaneously' (Owitt 1997: 18). Furthermore, in its transitions from site to site, *Juice* traces out the map's paradoxical relationship to its object.

These concerns are reflected elsewhere in Monk's site-specific works which frequently unfold in a disjunctive mapping of one set of terms over another. For *Blueprint* of 1967, Banes recalls, 'spectators sat outside a building to view events in windows. Some of the events were live, some filmed, some a combination of projected film image on identical live action' (Banes 1978: 12). As the piece unfolded, 'the audience moved from place to place to view activities' (Banes 1978: 5), so extending the implicit invitation to negotiate between live and filmed activities and its sites. Subsequently, 'the audience returned a month after the first section was given, to see the second part' (Banes 1978: 5), so incorporating memory and residue into this negotiation. *Neddehain Lloyd and the Systems Kid* of 1970 extended this process in an explicit *writing over* of a large outdoor space through the conceits of film in order to produce 'a live movie'. In doing so, the piece sets an explicitly limiting mechanism against the 'limitlessness' (Bernhardt *et al.* 1994) of the space it attempts to organise, loosening the boundaries of the work as it displaces its own conventions. *Fessel*, originally performed in 1971, extends this opening up of the work to its sites again, as it plays out a reversal of the close-up underpinning *Juice*, progressing from Monk's loft, to the Performing Garage in SoHo, to the Wooster Street parking lot.

In these various ways, Monk's site-specific work consistently presents itself *in movement*, where the relationship between performance and its

places is a disjunctive one, is in transition, or calls on memory. Such concerns with process and transition reflect, again, Peter Eisenman's account of the effect of the site's *absence*. In understanding this effect, Eisenman suggests, we might consider

the difference between a *moving arrow* and a still arrow [...] if a picture of each were taken and compared, they would be virtually indistinguishable. What distinguishes the moving arrow from the still one is that it contains where it has been and where it is going, i.e., it has a memory and an immanence that are not present to the observer of the photograph; they are essential *absences*.*

(Eisenman 1986: 5-6)

In the rhythms of appearance and disappearance, anticipation and memory in which these various *mappings* of site are acted out, this site-specific work, from Smithson to Oldenburg to Monk, reflects on a contemporary space or place 'which can only be represented *in motion*' (Jamason 1991: 45). Indeed, these site-specific works can be characterised precisely in their *acting out* of a process, which, like its object, is continually 'on the way between one point and another' (Oldenburg 1967: 51).

* I am indebted to Gabriella Ciannachi for directing me toward this quotation.