The fisher sector of China has expanded fast since late 1970, and as the third largest country in the world, China’s fishing catching policy generates impacts both on its national economy and the global economy.  According to Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nation (FAO), China’s fishery output was ranked number one in the world from 1990 to 1996, contributing approximately 25% of the global output.  For the past two decades, the fisheries sector of China has been its fastest growing sub-sector, and the average annual growth rate is around 10% each year. Aiming to protect fisheries resources and to seek a sustainable development of the fisheries economy, the Fisheries Management Bureau of China (FMB) proposed a new policy named “Zero Growth of capture fishing” and started a new program to accomplish it in 1999.  The Zero Growth Policy has been implemented at all levels of governments in each coastal province, and appropriate measures have been taken based on local conditions.  The purpose of this policy is to control the catch industry as well as to let the local official aware that in term of the performance of fisheries, qualitative changes are more important than quantitative changes. The ultimate goal chosen by the government of China is to make the capture fisheries become zero growth.  In order to achieve this goal, the FMB imposes regulations on the number of fishing vessels by enhancing the distribution of fishing licenses (the fishing license system has already been established since 1980), and fishing is not allowed in major inland fishing area and coastal marines during closed seasons.

However, it seems that the Zero Growth policy did not work well in 1999, and the based on the data provided by FAO, although the rate of growth in marine capture sherry decreased from 8% to 0.006%, the goal of zero growth was not met. Thus, five new regulations were designed based on the new fishery structure adjustment guideline issued by the Ministry of Agriculture of PRC (MOA) to reduce fishing efforts:   no more permissions on building new vessels; clearing up all illegal boats; non-fishery labour not allowed to participate in the fishery sector; no fishing for foreign boats and establishment of vessel retirement systems. Apparently , the new adjustments worked towards the object of the Zero Growth policy, and it was reported by FMB that in 2000, the growth rate of marine capture fishery declined to negative 1.4%, and the inland capture fishery also experienced a growth rate of -2.3%.  Compared with the situation in the mid-1980, where capture fish production accounted for about 55% of the total production, in 2000, 60% of the total production was culture fish production and capture fish took approximately 40%.

The population of China accounts around 1/5 of the world population, and employment has always been its top priority. The fishery sector contributes not only to China’s economy but also to its employment. Based on the data from the National Oceanographic Data Centre (NOAA), in 1996, there were around 12.08 million of people in China participated in fisheries production, and almost 9 million new jobs were opened after 1979. It is estimated that the lives of around one fifth Chinese have been heavily relied on fishery production, both directly and indirectly.  Before the Zero Growth policy was issued, many worried that it would impact the national economy negatively. However, the official statistics provide us with positive evidences. In 1996, the per capita income of fishery population, on average, was $3826 RMB (approximately equivalent to $500 US dollars) while average income of rural population was only 1926 RMB (around $250 US dollars).  In 2000, the number of people directly employed in the fisheries sector was 13.1 million, and in total around 20.4 of people were associated with the industry at different degrees.  The export earnings generated by the fisheries sector in 2000 was $4.7 billion US dollars.  MOA points out that in 2002, the per capital income of fishermen increased to $8667 US dollars, and this value is more than 15 times of it in 1996. One reason behind this improvement in incomes is shifting the centre of fishery productions from capture fish to culture fish. FOA states out that the culture fish production had been continuously increasing since 1970. In 1990, 51% of the total fish production in China was contributed by culture fish productions, and this number rose to 60% in 2000.  This indicates that some fishermen who might be affected by the Zero Growth policy were able to relocate themselves in the culture fish industry. The Zero Growth policy might have worked in the way as the government of China initially claimed in 1999.

The FAO has always been questioning the data produced by the MOA, believing that local governments in China have been over-reporting their productions. The Zero Growth policy is often considered as the last response from China to FAO’s doubts. However, numbers described the consequences of this policy are largely produced by China’s authorizes; therefore, FOA still holds the creditability questionable.  While the government of China has concluded the Zero Growth policy as successful, several institutions still think that the fish stock of china has been continuously declining. Nevertheless, we cannot the effort that China has put on seeking solution for sustainable development in the fisheries sector, and the Zero Growth Policy is just the first action taken by the Chinese government.  So for, it is less than 15 years since the policy has been implemented, and the time phrase is not long enough for observing results in the long run. Further researches may be needed for deeper investigations on looking for more significant information. Making conclusion about the impact of this policy now could be misleading to readers.

Reference:

Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nation, Reports on China’s Fisheries sector, FOA,2013

Li, Luping and Jikun Huang, China’s accession to the WTO and its implications for the fishery and aquaculture sector, center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 2003

National Oceanographic Data Center, Importance of the Fishery Industry in China, NOAA, 1996

R.Wastom, L.Pang and D. Pauly, The Marine Fisheries of China Development and Reported Catches, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia,2001

Other resources:

Ministry of Agriculture of PRC

www.english.agri.gov.cn

As one of the only two provinces in Canada that have existing carbon taxes( the other one is Québec), British Columbia has been famous for its beautiful natural environment and consistently high gasoline price.  According to the GasBuddy.com, the average gas price in the great Vancouver area for this week is about $1.37 per liter while the average price in Toronto is only about $1.27 per liter. Some people in British Columbia think that they involuntarily pay a relatively higher price and blame this on the Carbon Tax implemented by the BC government since 2008.  The B.C government has been continuously claiming that the practice of the carbon tax has benefited not only the environment of B.C, helping reducing the greenhouse emission, but also the BC residents via tax reductions, which are guaranteed by the tax revenue generated by carbon taxes. However, the evaluation of the whole program is mixed.

Based on the information provided by the recently updated Carbon Tax Review released by the BC Ministry of Finance earlier this year, the carbon tax, which is first introduced on July 1, 2008, is charged on every tonne of greenhouse gas emission (GHG) emitted. The original purpose of the carbon tax is to create incentive for BC households and firms to reduce their amount of fossil fuel consumption. Generally, this is no exceptions for any industries in British Columbia, as long as there is a need of purchasing fuel.  Another aim for this policy, stated by the B.C government, is to make lean energy relatively more attractive than fossil fuel. When the tax was initially imposed, the rate was considerably low, and it gradually increased over time. In July 2011, the tax rates was $25 per tonne of GHG, and the last time the tax rates were adjusted is July 2012. Since then, the rate has been $30 per tonne.  The B.C government makes it very clearly that the Carbon Tax is not designed in a way to meet the emission-reduction targets solely. Rather, they consider it as an important strategy and a complement of other emission-managing systems. The B.C government uses a data from a reported published by an independent consulting company, MK Jaccard and Associates, to demonstrate the potential of this policy: “in absence of all other GHG reduction strategies, the carbon tax alone could cause a reduction in B.C’s emissions in 2020 by up to three million tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually”.  Since the beginning of implementing the Carbon Tax, the B.C government has promised that it would be “revenue neutral”.  This means that all the tax revenue generated by the carbon taxes will be distributed back to B.C families via tax reduction programs, such as income tax credits and cutting some income tax rates. In the Carbon Tax Review, it states that the B.C government has returned $500 million more than what they have collected via the Carbon Tax to the public.

It has been more five years since the Carbon Tax has presented, and whether it has worked as well as suggested by the B.C government still remains datable. In August, 2013, an Ottawa-based think-tank, Sustainable Prosperity, issued a report, BC’s CARBON TAX SHIF AFTER FIVE YEARS; RESULT,   and concluded that the B.C carbon tax policy has produced a remarkable reduction in both fuel consumptions and emissions of greenhouse gases.  The report states that from 2008 to 2011, compared to other provinces/regions, the per capita consumption of fuels in BC has decreased approximately 19%, and this is largely due to the fact that the carbon taxes include almost 77% of the GHG emissions in BC.  The report also shows there has been any negative effected generated by the Carbon Tax on BC’s economy and the overall taxation has not changed much. For the year of 2011, GDP per captia of BC was increased by 1.92% while it was 1.38% for the rest of Canada.  However, some believe that the success in reducing   GHG emissions is actually on the cost of economic loss, and the policy may not very cost-effective. In 2013, the Vancouver Sun also hired a B.C local consulting firm to conduce a survey on similar topics. The results of this survey seem providing some evidence for the claim that the Carbon Tax has hurt the BC economy: around 5% of the gasoline retail price comes from the Carbon Tax in the great Vancouver area, and prices of other types of transportations fuels such as disables have been increased partly due to the implement of the Carbon Tax. Many business owners failed to contract their consumption on fossil fuels because they hardly found any relatively cheaper substitutes. Some of them even revealed that they would like to operate their business and make investments in places with lower emerge taxes. The Vancouver sun uses these results as evidences that the B.C government may need to rethink about the program. In the Carbon Tax review, the B.C government also points out that the Carbon Tax is a tool of redistributing income among BC residents: using the tax revenue to assistant the low income families, especially those in the northern and rural areas.  However, a 2011 report prepared by Canadian centre for Policy Alternatives(CCPA), Fair and Effective of Carbon Pricing, shows that the Carbon Tax has not performance well in term of distributional effects, and it claims that “Even after tax cuts and credits are figured in, the carbon tax has a disproportion­ate impact on low-income British Columbians, and most benefits the highest-income households that are also the biggest emitters”: about 54% of the tax revenue went to cooperate income tax cuts; low income credits in fact had decreased from 33% in 2008 to 19% in 2011; the poorest 10% households in BC spent around 1.3% of their incomes on carbon taxes while the richest 10% only used 0.3% of their incomes on carbon taxes.

The BC Carbon Tax policy has only been introduced to the public for less than six years, and complete evidence about its influence on the economy of BC has not been available. Therefore, it would too early and very incautious to make any conclusion or judgments on it. However, the Carbon Tax enables British Columbia holding a leading position of Climate Changes in the North American region.

References:

Finlayson, Jock. “B.C.’s carbon tax hurting businesses.” Vancouver Sun. Vacouver Sun, 1 Aug 2013. Web. 9 Mar 2014. <http://www.vancouversun.com/business/2035/carbon hurting businesses/8739247/story.html

Lee, Marc. “Fair and Effective Carbon Pricing .” CCPA. CCPA, n.d. Web. 9 Mar 2014. <https://www.policyalternatives.ca/…/CCPA-BC_Fair_Effective_Carbon_F>.

STEWART, ELGIE , and Jessica MCCLAY. “BC’S CARBON TAX SHIFT AFTER FIVE YEARS: RESULTS.” sustainable prosperity. sustainable prosperity, n.d. Web. 9 Mar 2014. <www.sustainableprosperity.ca/dl1026&display>.

Lee, Marc. “Fair and Effective Carbon Pricing .” CCPA. CCPA, n.d. Web. 9 Mar 2014. <https://www.policyalternatives.ca/…/CCPA-BC_Fair_Effective_Carbon_F>.