Schedler’s judgment

In my last post, The Caterpillar vs. Democracy I mentioned how I thought altruism should be recognized as a cornerstone of democracy. When I said this I knew full well that a fuzzy concept like altruism is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure. But nonetheless, I see it is fundamental to democracy so I am not prepared to drop it simply because it is difficult to gauge quantitatively – it sounds like Schedler seconds this notion.

In his article, Judgment and Measurement in Political Science, Schedler argues against “the exclusive reliance on rules and observations” when conducting political analysis. As an alternative, he argues for a balance of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This argument resonates with me because, like Schedler, I recognize “the essential role judgment plays in, above all, the measurement of complex concepts.” Plus, I have a natural aversion to following rules.

I have always valued individual discretion so naturally I am attracted to Schedler’s argument. I agree with his notion that where intricate variables are a play, grey areas will inevitably follow. As he argues, when this happens, a standard quantitative analytical template will not suffice, leaving only individual discretion.

This relates back to my The Caterpillar vs. Democracy post. As I have mentioned, I believe altruism plays an integral role in a democracy, but I cant think of one template that could be used to measure altruism. This certainly shouldn’t omit altruism as a legitimate variable of democracy.

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