http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/

You may have heard the argument that capitalism is inherently undemocratic. I don’t think this is true, but I am prepared to argue that enfettered capitalism – if there were such a thing – is highly susceptible to undemocratic tendencies.

The usual argument behind this is simple: the more liberal capitalism becomes the greater will be the social wealth disparity. In turn, if we allow wealth to translate into votes through various processes, we wind up with a society where the wealthy have disproportionately more political sway then the poor – this I agree with.

But I would like to talk about another way in which capitalism can nullify democracy and it involves free speech. I have talked about this before, but again I will say that I believe free speech to be integral to democracy. What i would like to talk about is a new trend i have noticed in the American media that I see as a threat to democracy.

It’s called China Watch, and it’s the banner under which state-controlled Chinese communist propaganda has penetrated western media via, you guessed it, the free market. You may have seen it; it’s hard to miss, it dominates entire sections of the Washington Post and New York Times.

The complexity of the issue is not lost on me. I realize how ironic it would be to ask the state to limit free speech in the name of, err, preserving free speech…? But nonetheless it is an issue that needs to be addressed. As long as I have been a political science student I have ranted about the threat of media conglomerates. But this is new; a line needs to be drawn, and it needs to happen now. State Propaganda has no place in the free media.

For this weeks elective post I am going to have another stab at last week’s Comparative Measurements assignment. Now that I have a better idea of what it is that I am supposed to do, I will compare two methods of measuring the worldwide city cost of living index. One is conducted through the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the other is by Mercer. They are both conducted very similar but of the two I am partial to Mercer’s approach.

The Mercer Index measures the cost of living for expats living 214 of the world’s largest cities. It is geared to the needs multinational corporations that need to know the relative cost of living for employees living abroad. Because of this, the Mercer report only measures the cost of living for expats living in the city.  The index compares the prices of over 200 items including clothing, housing, entertainment, and transportation. The index uses New York City long with American currency as its baseline. The study is concerned primarily with two factors, currency fluctuation and price movement, both vis-à-vis New York City.

The EIU index is very similar it is also concerned with expats but only measures the largest 140 cities. The index measures the selling prices of 160 retail items from groceries to luxury goods and also includes a basic salary calculator to factor in taxation, accommodation and savings.

I like the Mercer index because it seems to be slightly more comprehensive. However the two indexes latest reports have produced different results. The EIU is vague on what exactly the “basic salary calculator” is and neither report goes into any detail of how much weight is given to each variable.

For my regional democracy report I plan to focus on South America Sur, a region that includes Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. I am drawn to this region for a number of reasons. For one, a few of these states already have a special place in my heart, so I do have a somewhat genuine concern with what is happening in the region. Also, all biases aside, I see a special blend of politics taking off in the region that is of real interest to me.

On the first day of class I expressed that I had an interest in power and oppression and left it at that. I realize that I could have left a few minds lingering on what exactly I meant so let me explain. The truth is, I am the farthest thing from a sadist, instead I just have a real problem with authority. I find the concepts of power and oppression fascinating, as I should, because as Sun Tzu said, “if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles…” The way I see it is that if I am going to spend a lifetime “fighting the power” I should at least get to know my enemy.

Lets have a look at the region to make sense of all of this. Specifically, in this blog, I will relay what little knowledge I have of the current heads of state in the region.

Argentina

Head of state – Cristina de Kirchner

• Former Peronist Youth in the 1970’s.
• Supports populist protectionist policies, Nationalization of industry, and tax increases for the wealthy.
• Opposed to IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs in the Argentina.
• Direct successor of husband, Nestor Kirchner.
  • The Argentinean constitution only allows for two successive terms in office. Between the two of them they have had three.
•  Both have been accused of crony capitalism, embezzlement, and fraud.

Brazil

Head of State – Dilma Rousseff

• A socialist
• Former member of a Brazilian Marxist Guerilla group that opposed Brazil’s right-winged military dictatorships.
• Former political prisoner of Brazil’s Military regime.
• Supports protectionist policies, Nationalization of industry, and tax increases for the wealthy.

Bolivia

Head of State – Evo Morales

• Socialist
• Grassroots political activist who worked way up to head of state.
• Has mandate to empower the indigenous peoples of Bolivia through land and wealth redistribution.

Chile

Head of State – Sebastian Pinera

• The “George Bush” of South America.
• Billionaire investor and businessman.
• Supports privatization of industry.
• Was once on the lam for violating Chili’s banking laws.
• Former Chilean media mogul prior to presidency.

Paraguay

Head of state – Federica Franco

• A centralist
• Took over as head of state after a coup d’état expelled former president Fernando Lugo.
• His presidency is not recognized by neighboring Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil.

Uruguay

Head of State – Jose Mujica

• “The worlds poorest president”
  • Donates 90% of pay to charity
  • Former gorilla fighter against Uruguay’s former authoritarian rule.
  • Two time political prisoner under Uruguay’s military dictatorship.
  • Wants to legalize marijuana (for whatever its worth).

Although I don’t know much about actual democracy in the region I think this is a good start. In short, while most of the world seems to be heading in the direction of mass privatization and liberal fiscal policies, this region for the most part, seems to standing in opposition to this trend. In this regard South America Sur is a beacon of hope for a brighter future. Now lets get down to democracy.

I’ve been sitting here trying to figure out what my elective post should be for this week and I cant decide if I should talk about my experience with dental surgery in the third world, or how awesome the UBC sailing club is… I think I’ll go for the ladder.

Ok, UBC sailing club – I reckoned it to everybody. It’s amazing! $200 and you get unlimited access to sailboats all year round! I’m sure that if somebody is actually reading this they (you) are likely thinking that sailing is for pompous pricks, and you wouldn’t be wrong. Which means that the sport could use some decent human being like yourself! So get down to Jericho Yacht club and join!

If you have never sailed before, it’s no problem. Lessons turn out to be about $3 per hour! Shop around, you can’t beat this price! And you don’t have to compete or anything. Basically you pay the one time annual fee and you can go sailing anytime you want with no commitment. Last summer I was out there a few times a week. I had no idea I had so many friends until I started wearing deck shoes and went around blabbing about my new hobby.

So if you are like me and need some friends, just tell people you have a sailboat. Problem solved.

Both of these essays seek to identify the key mobilizers of Radical Right Populist Party success in Western Europe in recent decades. This first study conducts a cross-sectional analysis of every Western European national election in and around 2002, where a populist party received a minimum threshold of 5% of the national vote. The unit of analysis in this study is the Populist Party’s mandate. The hypothesis of the paper is that it is necessary for populist parties to mobilize grievances of immigration policy if these parties are to achieve electoral legitimacy.

The Independent variable of the study is, mobilization of the immigration grievance while the dependant variable is electoral success. The study seeks to measure the independent variable by breaking down Populist Party support into three variables: economic changes, political elitism/corruption, and immigration.

The study resorts to two tests. The first unite all qualifying Populist Parties. The second measures the strength of association between the three mobilizers. The findings of the test indicate that there have been instances of Populist Party success with the mobilization of only the immigration grievance variable and no others. Whereas there have been no instances of Populist Party success when the immigration grievance variable has not been mobilized. In light of this, the study concludes that a Western European Populist Party must mobilize the immigration grievance if it is to meet electoral success.

I argue that, based on these findings alone, this is a fallible conclusion. The study does not discuss the political and economic climates of the concerned states. It is possible that those Populist Parties that failed to address economic changes and political elitism/ corruption operated in states with robust economies and benevolent politicians. If this where the case, any proposed reform in these areas would likely have a negative value. Likewise, the study does not rule out the possibility that a Populist Party operating in a state with a weak economy and corrupt government could rise to power by focusing solely on reform in these areas while ignoring immigration grievances.

 The second study I have chosen­­­­ also measures the means to Populist Party success in Western Europe. It employs a time-series analysis over a three-year period and covering most of Western European Populist Party success.

Rather than designating party mandate as the unit of analysis as has the study above, this study has chosen to instead analyze individual voter preferences via national public surveys.  The hypothesis of this study is that dissatisfaction with politics is the main mobilizer behind Populist Party support in Western Europe.

The study surveys consist of six indices measuring, exclusion, Euro-skepticism, satisfaction with politics, attitudes towards redistribution, attitudes towards environmental protection, and attitudes towards public sector size. All of which have a value range form 1 to 5 indicating level of importance.

The data pulled form the surveys have been used to demonstrate that the hypothesis of the study to be indeed correct.

However, there is a potential flaw in the data. This is because the survey was not conducted at the international level. Rather, each individual aggregate state was given its own tailored survey to compensate for any social / political variance between states. Although this approach does hove its merit, it means that the data cannot be directly compared, which, under some circumstances could discredit the findings of the study.

I thoroughly enjoy this article. The author, Rafe Mair does a good job of encapsulating some of my concerns with Canada’s Parliamentary system. One of his propositions is for Canada to abandon our archaic first-past-the-post electoral in place of a proportional representation system. This is something I have advocated since I took the introductory course on the Canadian Parliament.

His arguments for and against a PR system are really nothing new, he just runs through the usual pros and cons. What I did find refreshing was some of his original thought (for me anyway) concerning potential reforms that could be made to our standing parliamentary system.

For instance, one proposition he brings forth is to have the major parliamentary votes done by secret ballot. This, he claims, would be an effective check to the dictatorial power exercised by the Prime Minister. He argues that were the executive authority to know that draconian style bills had a reasonable chance of being rejected by independent minded MPs, the executives would likely resort to open dialogue with their MPs – our direct representatives – before drafting such bills. This would invite more civilian input, via our MPs, in the governance of our country.

There are, however, two very reasonable rejections to this reform. One is that if we increase the probability that bills will be rejected in the commons, they will. And when this happens convention dictates that parliament is dissolved and elections are held. Unless this convention is changed, introducing the anonymous ballet could have a negative value for Canadian democracy.

The second objection to the secret ballot arises because constituents want to know what their elected MPs are up to in Ottawa. If the House of Commons is not transparent, we the citizenry will have no way to gauge the responsiveness of our elected officials. Both of these concerns are very relevant. For the ladder, Mair offers a simple reform of convention. He proposes that if a government bill fails the government should not be compelled to resign. This sounds simple enough, and from my understanding, it is.

As for the former concern, Mair does not have such a clear-cut solution, instead he refers back to the stark reality inline party voting. As he rightly points out, the citizens aren’t the only ones watching the ballot; “Big Brother” is watching too.  The stark reality of Canadian federal politics is that if an MP wishes to advance in his/her career, they must fit with the protocol, or else.  All MPs know that Prime Ministers have a habit of frowning on voting deviance from within their party.

The crux is, that as Canadians, we need to decide what is more of a threat to our democracy: MPs that are protected from the wrath of the citizenry or MPs that are protected from the wrath of the Prime Minister. As Mair says, “we mustn’t let perfection be the enemy of improvement.”

As I churn through these readings one thing that is becoming increasingly clear is that democracy is an incredibly difficult concept to define, let alone measure.  We have all been able to identify basic components of democracy, but when it comes time to draft an encompassing definition of the term, there seems to be little unison. Take for instance our readings for this week: all four of them have one common denominator in their definitions of democracy – the expressed need for free and fair elections. Beyond this, the papers seem to loose cohesion, with one paper, Conceptualizing a New Democracy, even claiming it to be impossible to reach a “universally accepted measure of democracy” (248). I think there may be some truth in the assertion; furthermore, even if this assumption is wrong, I am not entirely convinced of the need to get down the nitty-gritty of the concept. Perhaps our only concern should be the very minimalist definition: opportunity for reasonable competition for public office. Beyond this, it is inevitable that varying societies will operate differently. The question I am wondering is to where do we set the benchmark?

This is a convoluted issue for me because, while many see democracy as the antidote to tyranny, I see its essence as the means to tyranny, a tyranny of the majority. This means that at some level, the will of the people must be checked – but when?

In light of this perceived threat of mine, I have a few concerns with Reich’s ranking of democratic regime types. For instance, he provides his own definitions of the terms, democracy and semi-democracy.  By and large I agree with his conceptions, but not thoroughly. For instance, he asserts that a democratic regime cannot exclude any social group from political participation. But what if this social group advocates tyranny? Wont this compromise democracy?

Alternatively, under his definition of semi-democracy he asserts, “some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves”(7). I agree that this does sound “semi-democratic”, but I also think this recourse is the only check against the degradation of democracy.

Now that I have made my point, I want to go back to my question of where do we set the benchmark of democratic affluence? I have argued why we should not strive for unfettered democracy (in whatever form that may take). So then where does this leave us? Should we all strive for “semi-democracy”? This seems kind of silly, but is still better than the former…

The mailman stopped by my house the other morning with some great news! For only $400,000 – $1,000,000 I can finally be a part of something special. Not to be confused with simply another condominium, it’s an “Endowment Land project” promising “a different take on life” and most special of all, its called “sail.” Isn’t that enchanting? Say it again softly: “saaaaiiilllll” I can imagine myself out on the open ocean. I’m on my yacht. The cool breeze and soft ocean mist is in my face. I’m making love to my beautiful young wife. Life is perfect.

Then my toaster pops, I snap out of it, and say WTF Adera!! What do you mean “near” campus? Its right smack dab in the middle. What a crock! I’m a student; I don’t need “sail.” I need “building 4-B” with 19 stories of red bricks and steel balconies. Hey Adera, how about you go sail your way down to Davy Jone’s locker. The only “different take in life” I need comes in affordable student housing.

Burma’s Civilian Government

I found a couple of articles to include in my assigned post for this week. The first one was published three weeks ago by BBC and is called, Burma: Moustache Brothers Keep Telling Jokes. It’s about three brothers aptly known as the Moustache Bros. The Piece begins with brother Par Par Lay’s comment, “All I did was crack some jokes. But for that, I was sentenced to hard labour.” Apparently Burma can be a tough crowd. But for these guys, 14 years in the system is just the cost of doing business, considering their business is political satire – military dictatorship or not.

Burma’s political landscape has loosened up a bit in the recent past, and as such, the bros are back in business; albeit, with limitations. As the article explains, Burma is in the transition to “civilian government” which sounds a lot like what Collier and Levitsky would call the diminished democratic subtype, “illiberal democracy.” But progress is progress, and it sounds like for these guys in particular, things have taken a turn for the better.

I say “civilian government” sounds like “illiberal democracy” because although Burma’s democratic mechanisms are improving, they ought not to be considered as fully democratic. Collier and Levitsky define diminished democratic subtypes as those that do not fully meet the “root definition” of democracy. I don’t believe they offer an explicit definition of “root democracy” but if left up to me, I would incorporate free speech into the basic template of democracy, something the Bros don’t entirely enjoy the privilege of.  This is because although they are allowed to carry on with the slapstick, they can only put on shows in their own home and, for what its worth, they cater entirely to tourists.

I think one of the Bros hits the nail on the head when he is paraphrased by BBC as comparing “the military government’s move toward civilian rule to a snake shedding its skin – in the end it’s still a snake.”

Muslim Democracy 

        This article was published in The Washington Post on January 27, 2013. I like this article for its objectivity. At first, when I read “Muslim democracy,” I thought “ok mass media, what it going to be this time” but I was pleasantly surprised the commending nature of this article. According to the author, Cesari, Muslim Democracy is good, but its young so still has a ling way to go. In fact, the author is quick to point out that the theocratic elements of the movement are not much unlike American democracy back in its youth. But as Cesari points out, it’s a far cry from Collier and Levitsky’s  notion of “root democracy.” In her words, the Muslim Democracy movement is “the rise of ‘illiberal’ democracies” – fitting jargon for Collier and Levitsky’s ladder of generality.

Ceasri argues that Muslim Democracy is a new kind of democracy – a hybrid between free and fair elections and religious orthodoxy. I can certainly see a potential conflict of interest here but I respect that in this region, religion is an effective mobilizer. The way I see it, any perversion of the “root definition” of democracy that may be manifest in Muslim Democracy has the potential to work itself out over time. Because, as Cesari points out, since the collapse of authoritarian regimes, democracy has become the “only game in town.”

Cesari does a convincing job arguing that Muslim Democracy’s failure to transition to “root democracy” has to do with the movement’s noviceness rather than it’s incompetence. After all, a functioning democracy is incredibly intricate, and starting from the ground up is never easy. This sort of thing takes time, so it seems Muslim Democracy may just work its way up the Ladder of Generality just yet.

In my last post, The Caterpillar vs. Democracy I mentioned how I thought altruism should be recognized as a cornerstone of democracy. When I said this I knew full well that a fuzzy concept like altruism is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure. But nonetheless, I see it is fundamental to democracy so I am not prepared to drop it simply because it is difficult to gauge quantitatively – it sounds like Schedler seconds this notion.

In his article, Judgment and Measurement in Political Science, Schedler argues against “the exclusive reliance on rules and observations” when conducting political analysis. As an alternative, he argues for a balance of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This argument resonates with me because, like Schedler, I recognize “the essential role judgment plays in, above all, the measurement of complex concepts.” Plus, I have a natural aversion to following rules.

I have always valued individual discretion so naturally I am attracted to Schedler’s argument. I agree with his notion that where intricate variables are a play, grey areas will inevitably follow. As he argues, when this happens, a standard quantitative analytical template will not suffice, leaving only individual discretion.

This relates back to my The Caterpillar vs. Democracy post. As I have mentioned, I believe altruism plays an integral role in a democracy, but I cant think of one template that could be used to measure altruism. This certainly shouldn’t omit altruism as a legitimate variable of democracy.