Methods of Analysis
Discourse Analysis
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In most organizations practitioners act as if talk is cheap, things are easier said than done, you can't start acting until you stop talking, action is preferable to talk, discourse is passive while 'doing' is active, and talking and doing are consecutive rather than concurrent. (Weick, 2004, p. 405)

Data are expensive but talk is cheap and text is cheaper. Most mobile plans offer unlimited text and while talk is cheap, it accrues pricey long distance changes. Data, talk, and text can each get one into trouble and the type of price paid depends on the mistake made. How much and what is said have implications.

In onse sense, "discourse is synonymous with text" and discourse analysis (DA) is dependent on entextualization (p. 81). Simply put, entextualization is "the process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of linguistic production into a unit— a text— that can be lifted out of its interactional setting. A text, then, from this vantage point, is discourse rendered decontextualizable" (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 73). McKenzie (1999/2004) indicates the scope of texts DA encounters: "verbal, visual, oral, and numeric data, in the form of maps, prints, and music, of archives of recorded sound, of films, videos, and any computer-stored information, everything in fact from epigraphy to the latest forms of discography" (p. 13). In another sense, "discourse can be identified with utterance" (Greimas & Courtés, 1979/1982, p. 82). Discourse is text— spoken, written, depicted, gestured, and performed— but text is not merely a trace of discourse. Unspoken, spoken, and written words say and do things differently.

Discourse also refers to "the exchange of speech acts," which include "paralinguistic and nonverbal activities" (Cicourel, 1980, p. 101). Since the 1920s, speech has commonly been coupled with activities or actions in DA. Coining "speech act" as a unit of analysis, Sapir (1927) reasoned that "there is no pure linguistic conduct. There is only conduct in which the need is felt for communication or expression" (p. 422). In the influential *How to do Things with Words*, Austin (1962) often uses the hyphenated "speech-acts" to maintain the relation between speech and *act*ions— not merely symbolic actions— or words and deeds (p. 52). Performative utterances or speech-acts, Austin emphasizes, are direct and indirect means of "producing consequences" or "achieving of a certain effect" (p. 115). Hence, exchange of speech acts extends "from 'what is said' to 'what is done'" (Labov, 1972, p. 114). DA entails making sense of utterances or parsing speech acts into sentences to describe "how things 'get done' with what 'gets said'" (Groce, 1991, p. 213).

DA can otherwise simply be defined as the "separation of the discursive whole into its components" and, minimally, describing the exchange of speech acts or interactions between discourse and potential meaning (Greimas & Courtés, 1979/1982, p. 82). Discourse makes meaning as meaning makes discourse. But, analysts clarify, discourse "is not only a resource but also a constraint for agents. Agents do not just use discourse [or draw meanings] as they see fit" (Paroutis & Heracleous, 2013, p. 937). Analysts are wont to show how other discourses and "discursive formations" constrain or shape actions and meaning (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 107).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) considerably enlarges the scope of DA as "a methodology that weaves together an apparently disparate range of tropes and cultural phenomena into an all-encompassing network. The danger with this methodology is that it makes this network seem more seamless and unproblematic than it really is" (Hudson (2010, p. 351). Whether "all-encompassing" or not, analysts certainly aim to establish how discourses or texts are networked, webbed, or woven.

Interested in power dynamics, CD analysts minimally ask: "How is the text positioned or positioning [i.e., framing] readers? Whose interests are served by this positioning? Whose interests are negated? What are the consequences of this positioning?" (Janks, 1997, p. 329). CDA tends to focus on tying texts together and demonstrating politics and power of seemingly mundane speech acts, statements, and utterances or gestures, images, icons, and symbols or beats, lyrics, melodies, rhythms, and sounds. For instance, one might demonstrate *how* a school rule posted on a website implicates surveillance systems or *how* a sequence of images in a textbook engenders racist or sexist discourses and norms (Janks, 1997; Luke, 1995). In most cases, CD analysts try to explain *why* these discourses are what they are and do what they do.

For Derrida (1967/1997), DA is deconstruction, which in addition to taking texts apart, means questioning, following, and taking detours in and through texts (pp. lxxv, 10, 349). Derrida analyzes various discourses on grammatology, primarily by pursuing a series of detours implied and avoided within Rousseau's *Confessions* and *Essay on the Origin of Languages*. Most specifically, Rousseau's conceptualizations of *supplement* imply various productive detours. His uses of supplement, Derrida notes, are links in some or another "textual chain" or potential reroutes of detours through additional discourses (p. 163). Derrida suggests that deconstruction of Rousseau's text, "if it attempts to make the not-seen [i.e., supplements] accessible to sight, does not leave the text" (p. 163). Derrida then states the "axial proposition" of Rousseau's *Confessions* and his deconstruction "*There is nothing outside of the text*" (pp. 158, 163).

Upon summing up the flow of conversation, Derrida (1978/2007) gives a sense of deconstruction with telling shorthand: "we will make nothing but detours" (p. 370). One detour he takes is comparing the circulation of alphabetic signs (i.e., letters and words) with the circulation of money. "The critical description of money is the faithful reflection of the discourse on writing," he says. "In both cases an anonymous supplement is substituted for the thing" (1967/1997, p. 300). To lighten things up, and given the levity in parts of *Confessions* and Rousseau's trouble with magistrates, Derrida should have added, "talk is cheap until lawyers get involved" or "talk is cheap, except when a lawyer is talking" (Hyman, 1998, p. 1439).

Derrida detours through Freud's discourses on dreams but avoids the psychoanalysis of humor and jokes. Freud (1928) insightfully concludes that humour's intention, "whether it concerns the subject's self or other people," is to reveal: "'Look here! This is all that this seemingly dangerous world amounts to. Child's play— the very thing to jest about'" (p. 5)! It is often said that "analysis ruins the surprise and destroys the humor" and while this is as often said about magic, music, and religion, it can readily apply to analysis of any and all discourses (Zinkhan, 1994, p. vii). Whether componentization, debunktion, deconstruction, or dissimulation, DA's scope of all and every type of discourse would be fair enough if not for the cautions of pantextualism.

1. If actions speak louder than words, do words out perform actions?
2. What is Discourse?
    a. Language does not occur in stray words or sentences, but in connected discourse. (Harris, 1952, p. 3)
    b. Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972, p. 131): We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, explained); it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined.
        i. (p. 90): instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements; and have I not allowed this same word 'discourse', which should have served as a boundary around the term 'statement', to vary as I shifted my analysis or its point of application, as the statement itself faded. from view? This, then, is the task that now confronts me: to take up the definition of the statement at its very root.... At first sight, the statement appears as an ultimate, undecomposable element that can be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other similar elements. A point without a surface, but a point that can be located in planes of division and in specific forms of groupings. A seed that appears on the surface of a tissue of which it is the constituent element. The atom of discourse. And the problem soon arises: if the statement really is the elementary unit of discourse, what does it consist of?
        ii. (p. 97): the statement is not the same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act; it cannot be referred therefore to the same criteria; but neither is it the same kind of unit as a material object, with its limits and independence. In its way of being unique (neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material), it is indispensable if we want to say whether or not there is a sentence, proposition, or speech act; and whether the sentence is correct (or acceptable, or interpretable), whether the proposition is legitimate and well constructed, whether the speech act fulfils its requirements, and was in fact carried out.
        iii. (p. 121): I am well aware that most of these definitions do not conform with current usage: linguists usually give the word discourse a quite different meaning; logicians and analysts use the term statement in a different way.... In particular, then, the analysis of statements does not claim to be a total, exhaustive description of 'language' (*langage*), or of 'what was said'. In the whole density implied by verbal performances, it is situated at a particular level that must be distinguished from the others, characterized in relation to them, and abstract. In particular, it does not replace a logical analysis of propositions, a grammatical analysis of sentences, a psychological or contextual analysis of formulations: it is another way of attacking verbal performances, of dissociating their complexity, of isolating the terms that are entangled in its web, and of locating the various regularities that they obey.
    c. Foucault (1971, p. 20): Western thought has seen to it that discourse be permitted as little room as possible between thought and words. It would appear to have ensured that *to discourse* should appear merely as a certain interjection between speaking and thinking; that it should constitute <mark>thought, clad in its signs and rendered visible by words</mark> or, conversely, that the structures of language themselves should be brought into play, producing a <mark>certain effect of meaning</mark>.

d. Greimas & Courtés (1979/1982, p. 81): [D]iscourse is synonymous with text.... the terms discourse and text have also been used to designate certain non-linguistic semiotic processes (a ritual, a film, a comic strip are then viewed as discourses or texts).
    i. (p. 81): When one has in mind the existence of two macrosemiotic systems— the "verbal world" manifested in the form of natural languages, and the "natural world" as the source of nonlinguistic semiotic systems— the semiotic process appears as a set of discoursive practices: linguistic practices (verbal behavior) and nonlinguistic practices (signifying somatic behavior manifested by the sensory orders).
    ii. (p. 82): In a somewhat different theoretical framework— but one which is not contradictory with the preceding one— discourse can be identified with utterance. The more or less implicit way in which the utterance (= what is uttered) is conceived determines two theoretical attitudes and two different types of analysis.
    iii. For phrastic linguistics, the basic unit of the utterance is the sentence. The discourse is then viewed as the result (or the operation) of the concatenation of sentences. By contrast, discoursive linguistics— as we conceive it— takes as its basic unit the discourse viewed as a signifying whole. Consequently, sentences are only segments (or broken-up parts) of the discourse utterance.
    iv. When, by contrast, it is postulated from the outset that the utterance-discourse forms a whole, then the procedures to be set up must be deductive— and no longer inductive. The procedures must consist of the analytic separation of the discoursive whole into its components.
e. Cicourel (1980, p. 101): the exchange of speech acts. Discourse analysis is simply "making sense of the speech acts"
f. Dunn & Neumann (2016, pp. 17-18): Exploring discourse as a postpositivistic method, we identify the ways in which discourses function as the part of the social world where meaning is constructed. A focus on discourses is part of a broader "linguistic turn" in the social sciences, a scholarly development that recognizes that language does not reflect reality so much as creates reality. It is the recognition that language does not reveal a preexisting reality, but that language is what makes reality "real" in the sense of being understood and acted upon by humans. In the introduction, we regarded a discourse as a system of meaning-production that fixes meaning, however temporarily, and enables actors to make sense of the world and to act within it.
    i. (p. 39): everything can be studied as text— as phenomena linked together by a code. This clearly does not mean that everything is text. But it implies that everything— gestures, monuments, films, dress, grave goods, and so on—can be read as text. Since language enters between humans and the world, there is nothing existing independent of text— there is nothing outside of text, nothing that can be comprehended regardless of text.
g. Laclau & Mouffe (2001, p. 107): Our analysis rejects the distinction between discoursive and non-discoursive practices [of Foucault, CDA, etc.]. It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discoursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the forms of discoursive totalities.
3. What is Discourse Analysis?
    a. Jakobson (1961, p. 245): Linguistic analysis, however [as different than discourse analysis], came to resolve oral speech into a finite series of elementary informational units. These ultimate discrete units, the so-called "distinctive features," are aligned into

simultaneous bundles termed "phonemes," which in turn are concatenated into sequences. Thus form in language has a manifestly granular structure and is subject to a quantal description.

b. Labov (1972, p. 114): analysis of the factors which lead children and adults to speak inevitably involve us with a consideration of the actions being performed, and the underlying propositions about the role of the speaker and addressee. Such considerations form the foundation of a study of discourse which distinguishes sequencing rules from rules of interpretation which carry us from 'what is said' to 'what is done'.

c. Greimas & Courtés (1979/1982, pp. 82, 83): When analysis of discourse is located in the wake of phrastic grammars, it seeks to recognize—and to construct models of—the discoursive sequences viewed as series of sentence utterances... network among sentences and/or series of sentences…. When, by contrast, it is postulated from the outset that the utterance discourse forms a whole, then the procedures to be set up must be deductive— and no longer inductive. The procedures must consist of the analytic separation of the discoursive whole into its components. When, furthermore, a generative approach complements these procedures, semiotic theory is led to conceive of the discourse as a multilayered organization constituted by a number of depth levels, superposed on each other. Only the last one— the most superficial one— can receive a semantic representation which is approximately comparable to the "deep" linguistic structures (in the Chomskian perspective). Thus it appears that phrastic grammar is the natural sequel to discourse grammar…. A discoursive analysis, distinct from the narrative analysis that it presupposes.

d. Cicourel (1980, p. 101): the exchange of speech acts. [DA is] making sense of the speech acts…. our interpretation of intonation and stress, hesitations, false starts, and other paralinguistic information will depend on our intuitions about language, particularly our own native language.

e.

4. What is Critical Discourse Analysis?
   a. Dunn & Neumann (2016, p. 35): First, CDA assumes that there are two realms: the discursive and the extra-discursive. Second, they claim discourses can have a measurable degree of causality that often leads to claims of empirical rigor. Both positions are rejected by poststructuralists.
      i. (p. 38): If you simply postulate that discourse has an anchor outside of itself, which Critical Discourse Analysts programmatically do, the methodological implication is a two-step process of analyzing the recontextualization chain. The first involves the analysis of the initial communicative event—such as an act, speech, or document—to expose how it tried to reshape or reproduce an order of discourse. Following this, recontextualizations of this event and the order of discourse are traced in real time to expose the degree in which some future social event(s) can be attributed to this initial process of discursive structuring. As Banta claims, "the analyst gains insights into the causal ability of a discourse and its 'discourse circle' to alter the order of discourse in one way or another, and connects this to theoretically salient features of extra-discursive practice" (Banta 2013: 394–95).

5. What is Deconstruction?
   a. Spivak (1967/1997, p. lxxv): A reading that produces rather than protects. That description of deconstruction we have already entertained. Here is another: "… the task is… to dismantle [*deconstruire*] the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work in [the text] not in order to reject or discard them1 but to reinscribe them in another way." (MP 2 561 WM 1 3).

b. Johnson (1981, pp. xiv-xv): In fact, the word "de-construction" is closely related not to the word "destruction" but to the word "analysis," which etymologically means "to undo"— a virtual synonym for "to de-construct." The deconstruction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or generalized skepticism, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself.... It can thus be seen that deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a critique. A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws or imperfections. It is not a set of criticisms designed to make the system better. It is an analysis that focuses on the grounds of that system's possibility. The critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself.

c. Crowley (1989, p. 16): Derrida thinks that traditional philosophy binds and distorts our thinking about the relations between self-conscious-ness, thought, and language. Traditional thought about these matters promotes a number of powerful and yet unspoken assumptions that have blinded Westerners to the deceptive nature of speech and writing and their role in human activities. The project called "deconstruction" attempts to expose these assumptions for what they are.

d. Winterowd, 1989, p. x): In bare essence, the project of deconstruction is to obliterate the doctrine of presence in Western metaphysics that is, to deconstruct the all-pervasive notion that behind the words is *a* truth that the words express. (And if there were, how could that truth be expressed, except in words?) Deconstruction, then, razes determinate meaning and from the rubble constructs the indeterminate text, behind which or within which there is no single, unvarying meaning.