Hirst’s 1965 paper on liberal education is, with no exaggeration, one of the most important and influential arguments about education made in the post-WWII era. Even if we don’t talk about Hirst today his argument underlies much of our recent thinking on the nature and scope of education, especially at the post-secondary level. And even those who don’t agree with Hirst acknowledge his contribution to educational discourse (you can survey some of the influence by looking at the papers that cite his in Google Scholar.) I was required to read Hirst in my first teacher education class as an undergraduate back in 2001. I point this out for two reasons: one, his paper is still seen as a worthwhile classic in our 21st century but also because if you think Hirst is hard reading for well-educated graduate students, imagine trying to read it when you’re a naive 22 year-old undergrad đ
Hirst’s main point was to try and show that a broad education was valuable, not because it promoted general critical thinking skills or communication skills or other competencies, but because it initiated the learner into forms of knowledge. (Note here how debates about education resurface in different ways at different times – everyone seems to be talking about competencies these days – are they worthwhile or do they involve the de-skilling of the learner, for example?).
The idea of forms of knowledge should be familiar to you from our introductory reading. As a reminder, forms of knowledge are the ways that humanity, over time, has tried to understand the world around them. For example, Math represents our attempt as a species to understand quantity and pattern. Philosophy is our attempt to understand what it means to live a good life. History is an attempt to understand the past, and what it means to HAVE a past. Art is an attempt to understand what beauty is…and so on. For defenders of the forms of knowledge approach, education should be about ensuring that students have an opportunity to share equally in that “human heritage” to which everyone has a stake in (see Michael Oakeshott for more on this idea).
There’s much more to Hirst’s argument. But suffice to say, his work ended up having a lot of influence on various branches of educational policy and practice, especially in the UK. (Unlike, say, in North America where John Dewey had more of an influence).
As you might have expected (and as you can see this kind of pattern repeat itself in our course) there ended up being something of a counter-argument that sought to push back on Hirst and those who shared his view. We’re taking about the late 1960’s and 70’s. Counter-culture is gaining influence. A major student movement was taking place. Educational progressivism experienced renewed popularity. In educational research this manifested itself in the so-called “new sociology of education”. These sociologists argued that schools were designed to reproduce social class and that “knowledge” is in actual fact a means by which the State could impose the dominant beliefs and assumptions of an elite on the poor and oppressed. (Those of you who are fans of Michael Apple or Henry Giroux or Peters Mclaren might be familiar with this educational tradition).
Madan Sarup’s paper was one of the harshest rebukes of Hirst’s account of liberal education. (We can decide together  if his critique is actually a solid one). For Sarup, the very idea of ‘forms of knowledge’ assumes a universe of ‘knowers’ and ‘not-knowers’, ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’. This approach is an ideology that divides society into the powerful and the powerless.
While both readings are challenging, they are an interesting study in contrasts. They show just how different (and interestingly) different disciplines and traditions take up the topic of education is discourse.
Spend some time trying to see to what extent you can grasp Hirst’s argument. To help get the ball rolling, I’ve added some ‘content’ questions below in order to see if we can, as a class. develop a shared understanding of what his paper is actually saying. Then, eventually, we will move onto Sarup.
What Does Hirst mean by “Forms of Knowledge” and how is his version different from the Greek version?
Liberal education is formed by or defined in terms of forms of knowledge. The Greek version of it involves with two concepts: significance of knowledge for the mind and the relationship between knowledge and reality. By liberal, it means âfreeing the mind to function according to its true nature, freeing reason from error and illusion and freeing manâs conduct from wrongâ (p. 31). Moreover, the significance of knowledge refers to the pursuit of knowledge, which is based on the real and the truth, âsuch an education is based on what is true and not on uncertain opinions and beliefs or temporary valuesâ (p. 31). It also refers to the achievement of it to fulfill the mind and to attain a good life, â… liberal education has a value for the person as the fulfilment of the mindâ (p. 31). As a result, liberal education teaches human beings how to live a good life, â… liberal education is essential to manâs understanding of how he ought to live, both individually and sociallyâ (p. 31). Forms of knowledge involves the development of various modes of thinking, such as logical, empirical, moral, and aesthetic. According to Hirst, forms of knowledge can be classified as âdistinct disciplines (math, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts philosophy) and fields of knowledge (theoretical or practical)â (p. 46). Forms of knowledge is acquired by learning to see and to experience the world. It contributes to humansâ understanding of experience and involves the use of publically accepted symbols.
Hirst pointed out, âA liberal education is one that determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind â(p. 41).
The Greek version of liberal education was rooted in philosophical doctrines. One is about the significance of knowledge for the mind; the other is about the relationship between knowledge and reality (p. 30). It gives the idea of liberal education as a process concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of knowledge. Hirst did not have those philosophical doctrines in his definition.
Hirst and the Greek both agree, âliberal education is a kind of education concerned directly with the development of the mind in rational knowledge (p. 43)â. However, the Greekâs justification of a liberal education was based on âthe ultimacy of knowledge as ordered and determined by reality, the significance of knowledge for the mind and for the good life (p. 41)â. Hirstâs definition of liberal education is âno longer supported by epistemological and metaphysical doctrines that result in a hierarchical organization of the various forms of knowledge (p. 41)â.
Good replies (by many) to this question. You mention that the Greeks had a justification for liberal education. To anyone who asks the question,” why should I want to develop my mind?” they have an answer.
And you are exactly right – Hirst doesn’t think the Greek justification is a very good one. But what does he mean when he says, “the ultimacy of knowledge as ordered and determined by reality, the significance of knowledge for the mind and for the good life” (41)? After all, we don’t have assume that just because Hirst claims it it must therefore be true.
Further, if the Greeks don’t have justification what does Hirst think ARE good reasons for getting a liberal education? He doesn’t seem to think the “competency” argument is a good justification. So what is it? He does give an answer, but it represent one of the more interesting (and challenging) sections of the paper.
I believe Hirst introduces a circular argument to justify his justification of a liberal education. He roots the justification in two principles. One, what is being justified must be âintelligible under publicly rooted conceptsâ and two, it must be âassessable according to accepted criteriaâ(p.42). He states that âthese very principles are in fact fundamental to the pursuit of knowledge in all its formsâ(p.42). The circularity arises, according to Hirst, as a result of âthe justification of any form of activity is significant only if one is in fact committed already to seeking rational knowledgeâ(p.42). He then concludes, with the very bold statement, in my opinion, that âit is based on these ultimate principles that characterise knowledge itself and not merely on lower level forms of justification that a liberal education is in a very real sense the ultimate form of educationâ(p.43)
Hirst’s argument regarding the justification for a liberal education leads me to picture him as Vezzini, the Sicilian from The Princess Bride. Particularly when he gets to the part where he says, “to question the pursuit of any kind of rational knowledge is in the end self-defeating, for the questioning itself depends in accepting the very principles whose use is finally being called in question” (p.42). Inconceivable!
It seems something of a cop-out though, after he went to such lengths to criticize the justification of the Greek model, and the HCR. I think I understand the point that he is making, but in the end I think, “Really?”
I find this justification somewhat weak, particularly after he states following his analysis if the Greek model, “they (educational values) are always open to debate, and detailed criticism, and are always in need of particular justification” (p.31) and his criticism of the HCR for having a “limited and debatable justification” (p.33).
The difference that I see in Hirst’s “forms of knowledge” and that of the Greeks, is that the Greek notion was based on a philosophy of a metaphysical reality, and Hirst’s is “an education concerned directly with the development of the mind in rational knowledge, whatever form that freely takes” (p.43). Simply (really simply) put, it’s Reality vs. Rationality. And where our public understanding of reality is subject to change over time, rationality is always measurable against “the use of accepted public symbols” (p.44). However, in this arises the distinctly Positivist perspective, which has come into question quite heavily – and as I understand it, essentially rejected by most social theorists â in the time since the publication of Hirstâs article.
#oldschool #post-positivism
He states that forms of knowledge can be related to experience in that they are connected by specific sets of criteria. So each of these sets of knowledge, whether mathematical or artistic need be assessed by experience particular to it. Additionally, these forms of knowledge must all contain central ideas, concepts and logical structures unique to them. The Greek form of knowledge, on the other hand was rooted in philosophy and metaphysics and was thus unable to be tested against human experience
This is an excellent way of describing it, and laying it out clearly! Thank you.
My apologies for the lateness of this post and the fact that it has all been stated before.
The Greekâs definition of Liberal Education was developed from a number of doctrines that centered around the ideas: knowledge of the mind and the relationship between knowledge and reality (p. 30). The range, structure and content of a Liberal Education was determined by the forms of knowledge and how they interacted with one another. It was not determined by âuseful knowledge (skills), moral virtues or good qualities of mindâ (p.31). The ultimate goal and greatest benefit of education was the development of a good and productive person; a good mind being an essential part of a good life. (p. 30) Liberal in their eyes did not mean education only for the free-man but was speaking to the idea of freeing the mind to function according to nature, freeing reason from error or illusion and freeing manâs conduct from wrong. (p.31) In their pursuit of knowledge, they looked at Natural Sciences, Humanities and Social Studies.
Hirst states that a consistant concept of Liberal Education must be worked out fully in terms of the forms of knowledge. By forms of knowledge, he doesnât mean a collection information, but the many ways man has of understanding experiences. (p.38) He said that over the years disciplines have been added to the original ones, such as religion, and various branches of modern sciences.
“A liberal education approached directly in terms of the disciplines will thus be composed of the study of at least paradigm examples of all the various forms of knowledge” (Hirst, p. 48).
What about an approach that is indirect? How might this affect the outcome?
“Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure” (Hirst, p. 52).
Who would be the enterprise designer if that were the case? Society at large? Educators? Policy makers?
Sometimes conversations can be rehearsed n’est – ce pas? Or is Hirst referring to spontaneous dialogue? What about conversations in media, interviews, movies, tv shows, are these rehearsed? And are they not better off if they are indeed rehearsed?
“Freire believes that this ‘deposit-making’ education should be replaced with problem-posing education in which students become critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher” (Sarup, p. 58)
It would appear that Sarup and Hirst would agree on the notion of dialogue/conversation.
Hirst states, “Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure” (Hirst, p. 52).
“A reading of Marx my provide a model of Man as a producer; a creature of need, who in order to obtain satisfaction of his needs, created tools and invented work” (Sarup, p. 62).
“examinations are part of the increasing bureaucratization of knowledge” (Sarup, p. 65).
“The philosophy of education propagated by Peters and Hirst is an ideology that supports the existing pattern of power and privilege” (Sarup, p. 67).
Was Hirst a person of ‘power and privilege’ in his day? What about Sarup? Marx was not of the elite social class yet his works had immense influence over the world. Would Hirst have something to lose if the education system were to reflect Sarup’s philosophy?
What does Hirst like about the Harvard report? Where does he think the report does not understand liberal education?
This paper was an interesting read in light of the redesigned curriculum being rolled out in BC for September. It is fascinating to see the competency (or skill) versus content (or knowledge) debate had been ongoing for a significant amount of time! I wonder how (or if) Hirst’s position would change, given the invention of the Internet and the mass amounts of knowledge available through quick searched. I find it interesting to see how the four abilities brought forth in the Harvard report (effective thinking, communication, making relevant value judgments, and discrimination among values) are very similar to the new Core Competencies in the BC curriculum (thinking, communication, and personal & social skills). I am curious if the curriculum writers based their works off of these ideas.
Before I answer the provided question, I would like to pose a few of my own for discussion:
1) Do you think Hirst’s position would change in the current day because of the Internet?
2) Do you think education can adequately have aims to develop both knowledge and competencies in students? If not, which is the more worthy aim?
3) (I keep coming back to this idea of autonomy, soâŠ) Should teachers have the autonomy within their classrooms to focus more on one (competency or knowledge) based on their own beliefs about teaching and learning? Or should teachers be required to be in alignment with their school/district/province?
Where does Hirst think the report does not understand liberal education?
Hirst writes, “The result [of the Harvard Committee Report] is an ambiguous and unsatisfactory treatment of the problem of definition and a limited and debatable treatment of the question of justification.” (p.33) He outlines three main reasons why he thinks the Harvard report misses the mark on liberal education:
1) The separation of the abilities from the forms of knowledge. He argues the four abilities (effective thinking, communication, making relevant value judgments, and discrimination among values) will have different characteristics within each form of knowledge (natural sciences, humanities, and social studies). “The notion that a liberal education can be directly characterised in terms of mental abilities and independently of fully specifying the forms of knowledge involved, is I think false.” (p.35)
2) The generalization of the abilities. Hirst thinks the definitions provided in the Harvard report are too vague and do not have adequately outlined criteria. He writes, “If the public terms and criteria are logically necessary to specifying what the abilities are, however, then no adequate account of liberal education in terms of these can be given without full account in terms of the public features of the forms of knowledge with which it is concerned.” (p.35) and “The use of broad, general terms for these abilities serves in fact to unify misleading quite disparate achievements.” (p.36)
3) The assumption the abilities developed in one area transfer to others. “Such abilities must be characterised in terms of the public features of knowledge, and whatever general abilities there may be, the particular criteria for their application in diverse fields are vital to their significance for liberal education.” (p.36) For example, he writes that effective thinking is different in aesthetic appreciation than in mathematical thinking. (p.36)
Hirst further questions the inclusion of the fourth characteristic of mind â ‘discrimination among values,’ when he writes, “the difficult connection between education in the making of value judgments and the formation of moral character is noted.” (p.35) He is also dissatisfied the report does not outline how the four abilities are developed from the three forms of knowledge.
I realize I am replying to my own post; however, after reading the article again, and some discussion with classmates, I want to attempt to summarize the main issues I see Hirst having with the Harvard report in a more concise, global manner. Hirst writes, “A liberal education in the pursuit of knowledge is, therefore, seeking the development of the mind according to [âŠ] the structure and pattern of reality. But if once there is any serious questioning of this relationship between mind, knowledge and reality, the whole harmonious structure is liable to disintegrate.” (p.33) Based on this, I see Hirst taking issue with the fact that the Harvard report does not focus on understanding reality, which causes vagueness and ambiguity with the meaning of a liberal education. The Harvard report does define a liberal education based on forms of knowledge, but focuses more on the development of the four abilities (“the qualities of mind [a liberal education] ought to produce”) (p.34), which could be seen as based on experiences and not on a sole reality. Hirst views knowledge as truth, and the pursuit of knowledge as important to the development of the mind and ultimately ‘the good life.’ He questions, “If knowledge is no longer seen as the understanding of reality but merely as the understanding of experience, what is to replace the harmonious, hierarchical scheme of knowledge that gave pattern and order to the education?” and then, “For if knowledge is no longer thought to be rooted in some reality, or if its significance for the mind and the good life is questioned, what can be the justification for an education defined in terms of knowledge alone?” (p.33) I argue the Harvard report’s definition of a liberal education lacks the focus of using knowledge to understand reality, according to Hirst.
I completely agree with you Lindsey. I had to re-read the paper myself and then Googled other articles that discussed his just so I could get a good grasp and I have come to the same conclusion. The Harvard Report, much like our new competencies, are based more on the individual’s experience rather than based on a structured experience that can be equally shared and understood by all.
Just a point of instruction to those new to graduate studies and who are just getting a handle on what it’s like to start a program like this:
For any reading you are assigned in a grad course I would do as Amanda and some others have and re-read the paper (as many times as you can). Rarely does a one-time reading lead to much in the way of clarity or understanding. Part of the task of a graduate class is to try and “reconstruct”, together, some sense of what a reading is actually saying/argument/showing.
Also, taking time to look at secondary articles that may discuss the primary article is also a good idea. For any graduate course your instructor is likely assuming you’re doing additional reading (re-reading the assigned articles and additional secondary articles). And should you DO find an article that could be of interest, feel free to share it with the rest of us via a link!
One way NOT to think of graduate courses is to see them as “undergraduate courses plus more work”. A graduate course is different in quality and scope – the expectations are higher because it assumes a foundation in a prior field or discipline and aims to move students closer to the level of intellectual seriousness that defines the discipline of field to which that graduate course is linked (or, what Hirst might call it, the the public standards that define a form of knowledge). So, graduate work tends to be more demanding and challenging. Of course, the positive flip-side is that graduate study takes you and your developing scholarly point of view seriously – if it did not take you seriously, the courses would involve a series of easy readings and simple assignments to get you through a quick and painlessly as possible (while happily taking your money at the same time).
I am really interested about your question that “Do you think education can adequately have aims to develop both knowledge and competencies in students? If not, which is the more worthy aim”. It will be perfect if education could develop both knowledge and competencies in students. However, I think because eduction is relevant to national policy and needs of society, it will develop what is more needed in the society, maybe the knowledge, maybe the competencies. If we put same focus on the knowledge and the competencies, in the terms of teaching and evaluation, we can develop both. Moreover, I think to some extent competencies are the outcomes of knowledge, we can’t teach student competencies without the base of knowledge.
An very well-rendered reconstruction of Hirt’s position.
You asked: Do you think Hirstâs position would/should change in the current day because of the Internet?
So the idea here, if I get you, is that in a world in which all the propositional knowledge we need is a click away, do we need a liberal education?
That’s a great question! What do you (or others) think? And what might Hirst say in reply?
Trying to put myself in Hirst’s shoes, in light of, as Chris put it, “propositional knowledge being a click away,” I believe he would still argue for a liberal education. I draw this conclusion from an overall read of the paper, but also from Hirst’s description on p.47 where he writes, “What is being sought it, first, sufficient immersion in the concepts, login and criteria of the discipline for a person to come to know the distinctive way in which it ‘works’ by pursuing these in particular cases; and then sufficient generalization of these over the whole range of the discipline so that his experience beings to be widely structured in this distinctive manner.” I think Hirst would argue searching a concept online would not supply “sufficient immersion in the concept” to the point where one becomes versed enough to generally apply it. Interestingly enough, I think this argument he presented is basically the chicken or the egg argument. He thinks one needs to have sufficient front-end loading of knowledge which creates the expertise to be able to apply it as one of the ‘abilities.’ The redesigned curriculum hints at the opposite â that the competencies (‘abilities’) need to be developed as the primary focus, with the content (‘forms of knowledge’) being the driver to achieve that end.
âDo you think Hirstâs position would change in the current day because of the internet?â Great question! With access to reams of information from around the world at any given second, I canât help but wonder how âpublicly specifiableâ ways of understanding experience would become agreed upon. Who generates the specifications? Consensus is vastly more difficult to achieve. With any individual having the ability to post information in a public forum such as the internet, it has become much more necessary to develop the skills involved in ascertaining perspective from reality. Discerning truths from interpretations and ambiguity becomes a skill-based process of questioning sources and critical thought. I believe the new curriculum is a reflection of this societal shift reflecting the propensity towards accessing information from the internet. In this current day, I donât know how Hirst could possibly refute the necessity to focus on skill development versus the acquisition of knowledge.
Nigel – a particularly nice point on the term ‘consensus’. One of the issues with Hirst’s paper, I think, is that he doesn’t unpack what he means by consensus as well as he should.
By consensus, he does not mean that everyone will agree on all the facts all the time. He means, I think, that we have a broad consensus on what science looks like, and what history looks like. And we can distinguish between a scientific claim and a historical claim. So he thinks there is consensus on the criteria that make up a form of knowledge. But I don’t think he expects us to all agree on the facts of history. And of course people debate scientific conclusions all the time.
So I think we can build on our question and now ask: can skills alone enable students to make sense of all this information? Or, to put it in negative terms: could students be able to do this without some earlier education involving knowledge and understanding?
I would suggest that Hirst likes the Harvard Report because, while it struggles to accurately define and justify a liberal education it offers a jumping off point to explore alternative definitions and justifications. Hirst writes that an examination of the Harvard Report shows, âthat adequate definition and justification are not only not dependent on the classical doctrines, but can in fact be based on an explication of the concepts of âmindâ and âknowledgeâ and their relationship (33).â It is from this point Hirst attempts to define and justify a liberal education highlighting the relationship between âmindâ and âknowledgeâ.
In the Harvard Report this relationship is highlighted between three areas of knowledge; the natural sciences, the humanities, and social studies, and abilities (mind); to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments and discriminate among values (34).
Hirst argues Petersonâs definition of a liberal education comes closer than that of the Harvard Report because it âshies away from the direct term of âknowledgeâ rather using âmodes of thinking; the logical, the empirical, the moral and the aestheticâ(38) and the relationship between knowledge and mind is âaccepted as some kind of âharmonyâ(39).
Finally, Hirst links âmindâ and âknowledgeâ by suggesting a liberal education must be approached in two ways, directly in the study of the various branches of the disciplines and by âconstructing programs that are organized around certain fields of knowledge either theoretical and practicalâ (51).
Hirst is critical of the Harvard Report based on âan ambiguous and unsatisfactory treatment of the problem of definition and a limited debatable treatment of the question of justificationâ (p.33) Hirst also struggles with the reports highlighted abilities, including âto think effectively, to communicate though, to make relevant judgements, to discriminate among valuesâ (p.34) as the report does not identify how these abilities are developed by the three types of knowledge (p.35) As well these abilities fall short when they are used in relation to specific areas of knowledge.
Hirst likes how the Harvard report includes forms of knowledge as well as the four abilities: to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgements and to discriminate among values, as these are all crucial points of a liberal education. He does however, struggle with the abilities being a focus of liberal education, in themselves, “the abilities are directly intelligible in themselves, and the items and features of knowledge they give merely examples of areas where the abilities can be seen.” (p.35) I believe Hirst is stating that if forms of knowledge are well taught and learned, that these abilities would then naturally develop along one’s education al journey.
Harvard report attempts âthe definition of a liberal education in two distinct ways: in terms of the qualities of mind it ought to produce and the forms of knowledge with which it ought to be concerned (p. 34)â. Hirst thought this double characterization of liberal education was unsatisfactory and seriously misleading. According to Harvard report, the three areas of knowledge are the natural sciences, the humanities and social studies; the general education ought to seek the four abilities: to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among values; the three phases of the four abilities are said to correspond to the three areas of knowledge. Hirst pointed out several arguments.
All good replies to this question.
Harvard report puts the emphasis of liberal education on the development of the four abilities, rather than the knowledge itself.
Hirst pointed out several arguments. First, he stated, âthe notion that a liberal education can be directly characterized in terms of mental abilities and independently of fully specifying the forms of knowledge involved (p. 35)â is false. The four abilities mentioned in Harvard report need public criteria to mark and specify them so that the account of liberal education must be given with a full account in terms of the public features of the forms of knowledge with which it is concerned. So the knowledge is logically prior to the abilities in liberal education.
Second, the definitions of abilities are based on specific public criteria and tightly relevant to the areas of knowledge, they are not all of a piece. The real objective differences that exist in forms of knowledge result in the different understandings of mental processes that are related to these. It is quite untenable that the study of one major science or particular knowledge can lead to the development of the four abilities or particular unitary abilities.
Hirst likes the idea that the definition of Liberal Education is being examined. He states that âan education defined and justified entirely in terms of the scope and character of knowledge needs re-examination.â (p.33)
He is not happy with Harvardâs definition of Liberal Education and their justification statements. Hirst believes that there is serious questioning of the relationship of mind, knowledge and reality in the report and as such there are âinevitable problems of definition. (p.33) The level of importance the Greeks gave to the knowledge for the mind is weakened and the belief that man has knowledge of ultimate reality is ignored. He believes that to define Liberal Education, you have to be explicit about the notions of knowledge and mind and their relationship to one another. (p.33)
The reportâs definition no longer just talks about the forms of knowledge but also the qualities of mind that education ought to produce. These attitudes and aptitudes are: effective thinking, communication, making relevant judgments and to discriminate among values. (p.34/35) Reasons Hirst believes the Harvard definition of Liberal Education is not valid include:
âą you canât define Liberal Education in terms of mental abilities without identifying which form of knowledge is involved
âą the criteria for the four characteristics change from one discipline to another
âą the impression given in the report is that these characteristics will be transferable from one discipline or domain to another, and
âą you are no longer looking at just developing the mind but also personal development in the areas of morals and emotions.
What argument does Hirst give for justifying his account of liberal education? In other words, if someone asked why a person should get a liberal education, what would he say to them? This is a really tricky question because Hirst cannot justify liberal education through reference to goods such as job opportunities, life skills and things like that.
To start, what is the point of education? For the purpose of the argument I will say that those who might ask this question are looking for answers that relate to what an education will do for them long term, such as life skills and jobs as was referenced in the comment above. The key to this response is the importance Hirst places on the process of liberal education. That is the process that is undertaken when developing understandings within the forms of knowledge that make up a liberal education. Hirst argues that the development of the mind through liberal education equips one with the skills that one requires in life. If we compare his statements to our new curriculum in BC we find similarities. The educators that developed our new curriculum have made the competencies of communication, thinking, and personal/social skills as educational priorities. âCore competencies are sets of intellectual, personal, and social and emotional proficiencies that all students need to develop in order to engage in deep learning and life-long learning.â (BC Ministry of Education) This is in line with Hirst, âEach form of knowledge, if it is to be acquired beyond a general and superficial level, involves the development of creative imagination, judgment, thinking, communicative skills, etc.â (Hirst 1974, p. 38) Hirst is saying that by developing the mind through a liberal education one will be developing all of the skills that one will need to be successful. These skills are still educational priorities today.
I like this, Erica. When Hirst states, “Indeed understanding a form of knowledge is far more like coming to know a country than climbing a ladder.” (p. 50) He is , in fact, reiterating his point, that if one is to gain a deep understanding of a form of knowledge, that the development of creativity, judgement, thinking and communication will naturally develop, as a result. These skills will only get stronger as more forms of knowledge are learned and better understood.
This is a good start. But this seems to contradict what Hirst says earlier in the paper, when he argues that it is mistaken to view a liberal education as a means to skills and competencies. And this puts Hirst in a weird position – Hirst needs to come up with a justification that is NOT anchoring in expected outcomes or anything like that. His justification is intrinsic.
I think the beginning of Hirst’s answer can be found in Eric’s excellent question: what is the point of education?
Hirst (as I understand him in the paper) wouldn’t agree that anyone who asks this question is looking for something in the long term such a jobs. However, it IS the case that someone who asks the question IS asking for SOMETHING. And this seems to go some way to justifying a liberal education.
I like this description! The idea that the point is about the question in the first place. On a second reading I see what you are saying Chris. It isn’t as simple as I may have thought on my first go through. Hirst does contradict himself a bit and I now agree that it isn’t about the skills and competencies specifically. But that it is about the process and seeking answers to the questions of life.
Strangely, I found the piece of Hirstâs article I found the most compelling in terms of selling the value of a liberal education is the final quote he references. (Hopefully this isnât only because of the rhetoric and language intricacies that overwhelmed me in much of what Hirst stated and my appreciation of the accessible language and metaphor used by Oakenshot). The conversation metaphor struck me in itâs simplicity and ability to visualize what a liberal education can create. The metaphor weaves the complexity of the liberal education Hirst crafts and illuminates what can result in âthe growth of oever clearer and finer distinctions in our experienceâ, suggesting that we view the various forms of knowledge as âvoices in a conversation, a conversation to which they each contribute in a distinctive wayâ(Hirst, 1974). In this sense, the gifts of a liberal education focus around access and entrance into a conversation that allows for âsufficient generalizationâ of disciplines in a way that structures our experiences in a distinctive manner(Hirst, 1974). Hirst might suggest that a liberal education would offer not only distinct and divisible disciplines forms of knowledge, but also fields of knowledge that provide theoretical and practical frameworks that connect the distant dots. In many ways, Hirstâs presentation of a liberal education highlights interdisciplinary study as something not necessarily mutually exclusive to a liberal education. Hirst might suggest that a liberal education provides a critical lens kit from which to see the world, and and clear understanding on which lens should be selected to examine any given issue. He asserts that we cannot construct a liberal education simply in terms of âinformation and isolated skillsâ, but instead construct such upon examining âas far as possible into the interrelated aspects of each of the basic forms of knowledgeâ and to âcover at least in some measure the range of knowledge as a wholeâ(Hirst, 1974). Hirst might not link a liberal education directly to the attainment of vocation or work-related skills, but he may suggest that it levels the playing field, and creates a space where we can see the world at both the micro and macro level, offering us tools to deconstruct and link both.
Hirst’s (1974) definition of liberal education is “one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of the mind. (p. 41) and he defines a form of knowledge as “distinct ways in which our experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public symbols”. In other words, I believe he is saying that liberal education is a large scope of understanding that can be used in various areas once we have mastered the basics of the symbols. If we focus merely on skills we end up with a knowledge base that is specialized and non-transferable, where as in a liberal education, we provide all pupils with an equal opportunity to be exposed to these forms of knowledge. The new competencies curriculum actually moves away from a liberal education by providing more of a “watered-down, box-checking skills and vague competencies like âcritical thinkingâ or âintercultural understandingâ as stated by Steven Ward in his article “Let them eat Cake (Competently)” (2016).
What does Hirst mean when he says that forms of knowledge have ‘standards’ or criteria’?
When Hirst defines forms of knowledge he says they are “distinct ways in which our experiences become structured round the use of accepted public symbols” (p. 44) and that “all knowledge involves the use of symbols and the making of judgments in ways that cannot be expressed in words and can only be learned in a tradition” (p.45). If these symbols are necessary for one to obtain these forms of knowledge then it must also be necessary that everyone have an equal opportunity to obtain and learn these symbols and if we are to do so, there must be some agreeance and standards as to what those symbols are and when and why to teach them. Hirst also points out that “Whatever the pattern of liberal education in its larger stages, it must not be forgotten that there is being presupposed a broad basic education in the common area of everyday knowledge” (p. 51). Again, if there is a necessity of a broader basic education, then there must also be a standard for what that education is in order for liberal education to work. Otherwise we are no longer equally able to gain that “good life”.
Hirst argues that knowledge must be verifiable, “as true or false, valid or invalid.” (p.40) And suggests that, “it is by means of symbols, particularly language, that conceptual articulation becomes objectified.” (p.39) He believes this because having a common means to communicate and share, allows for accountability for forms of knowledge, as they may be tested and/or questioned by the public. Knowledge is then able to be assessed according to one’s knowledge and experience, which is important, as the relationship between knowledge and reality is also a vital characteristic of a form of knowledge. This is why emotional experience or mental attitudes and beliefs, Hirst argues, are so difficult to include within forms of knowledge, as they have personal under currents that cannot be put into words, or tested in the same way that knowledge, and its many forms, can.
Yes, not all knowledge can be assessed or tested or verified. To acquire knowledge is to see and learn about experiences in the world, however, not every experience can be depicted through words, especially emotional feelings such as love, pain, loss, etc. We can understand others’ feelings when we have shared a common/similar experience even when others don’t explicitly express them.
Interesting point. There might be something here about Hirst’s assumptions about the nature of knowledge.
If I understand Nathen correctly, though, he is saying that the emotions cannot count as knowledge because they are private – we cannot articulate them or justify them to others. (I can think of some exceptions to this idea – if I am upset because someone hit my car I get angry, but when the person explains they they were having a heart attack, I get less angry because my emotions are responsive to reasons. It is unreasonable to get angry at someone for something that was not their fault).
However, you claim that not every experience can be articulated through language. This may be true. But is knowledge the same thing as experience? What might Hirst say?
Knowledge is different than experience, I suppose. Knowledge sometimes can look like a scatter plots on a graph, however experience are these scattered plots connected together (a connection/series of knowledge). But to acquire knowledge, it means to become aware of experience and to experience the world (p. 40). Does that make sense?
I think so. Good example.
But maybe another example would help: could you come up with an example where a person could say to themselves, “I know X.” But that they cannot articulate that knowledge to others? In other words, is it possible for there to be knowledge that is purely intuitive or “private” in the sense that you suggest?
For example, when I say that I learned from experience I usually mean that I took something from that experience (as you suggested above) and I now know something that I did not know before. If I go running without stretching my legs I know, from painful experience, that I can tear my hamstring. But this knowledge, while derived from my individual experience, is explainable to others and seems to apply to all persons, not just to me. (We even have a form of knowledge, science, that can help explain why hamstring tears happen when you run).
Hirst seems to think that all knowledge is “public” – that what MAKES it knowledge is that others can engage in it regardless of who they are or where they come from. But it is possible that Hirst’s account my be too narrow. You suggest this in your post, but also see Marci’s post above. So, some inetresting possibilities here with respect to the limits of Hirst’s argument.
Hirst would argue that knowledge is the understanding of reality, which is much different than experience, as one does not always experience reality in relation to the form of knowledge they are attempting to learn. Experience is not enough to satisfy the need of knowledge, as “knowledge is achieved when the mind attains its own satisfaction or good by corresponding to objective reality.” (p. 33)
Ok, itâs definitely very late, but I had a question regarding the Hirst reading and his argument regarding the value of liberal education and the nature of knowledge. And, not to be âthat guyâ (or girl, really) but it does seem to make a lot of assumptions, and leave out many forms of knowledge. Consider the BC curriculum redesign, for example. There has been considerable work on this document to include First Peopleâs ways of knowing across all curriculums. Hirst mentioned that the values of education, âcan be, and often are, values that reflect the interests of a minority group in the societyâ (Hirst, 1974, p32). It would seem so in the case of the BC curriculum. And what might he say about the justification for including First Peopleâs ways of knowing in the curriculum? Would he see it as significant knowledge? Hirst concluded that in order to justify education it must be, âan education whose definition and justification are based on the nature and significance of knowledge itself, and not on the predilections of pupils, the demands of society, or the whims of politiciansâ (Hirst, 1974, p32). But as society changes, and our perspectives become more globalized, what makes the forms of knowledge that he settled on the best ones? Or the ones that lead to the âgood lifeâ? I did relate here to the arguments by Friere and Giroux regarding power and social justice in education. The assertion that, âpedagogy is not a method or an a priori technique to be imposed on all students but a political and moral practice that provides the knowledge, skills, and social relations that enable students to explore the possibilities of what it means to be critical citizens while expanding and deepening their participation in the promise of a substantive democracyâ (Giroux, 2014) seemed to have some relevance here.
Giroux, H. (2014). Rethinking Education as the Practice of FreedomâŻ: Paulo Freire and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy, 8(6), 1â9.
Hirst, P. (1974). Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. GenĂšses, (99), 3â7. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-0691.2011.03558.x/pdf
Hi Marcia,
Excellent posts and thanks for the references!
First, asking critical questions about the arguments made in the readings, and assessing possible counterarguments, is the bread and butter of the course. Note, for example, that the Sarup article raises some objections against Hirst that are similar in nature to the kind that Giroux would make. So, keep on questioning! The aim of the course is not to tell students what they should think about each discourse, but to develop one’s capacity to independently engage in discourse.
Second, your specific objection is that Hirst may be excluding certain forms of knowledge (he’s making arbitrary assumptions about what is worthwhile). I think this is an important possibility and you are right to raise it. So how, as readers, can we begin to address the question? Well, as a logical start we need to really ask two questions: i) what is a form of knowledge (according to Hirst) and ii) can we come up with examples of knowledge and understanding that may be excluded on the basis of Hirst’s account but that we strongly believe (with good reason) should be included? If we can, we may need to reject or at least modify Hirst’s theory.
Let’s take the example of an indigenous cultural perspective (I leave to the side “ways of knowing”. The idea that particular cultures have their own distinct epistemologies is a debatable one and isn’t necessary to the argument…yet). What would Hirst say if we told him that his account of liberal education excludes First Nation’s and indigenous points of view? Could he reply with an argument that denies that charge i.e. he can say, well, no it doesn’t, and here is why…? That might be another good way to start thinking about this.
What does Hirst mean by âForms of knowledgeâ and how is his version different from the Greek version?
A form of knowledge is âa distinct way in which our experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public symbols (p. 44)â.
I think the accepted public symbols can be named the public criteria, âwhereby the true is distinguishable from the false, the good from the bad, the right from the wrongâ (p. 43). These criteria give objectivity to knowledge and then the liberal education that frees mind from error and illusion.
Liberal Education in the 21st Century
FYI, here is one example of how the liberal education vs soft skills debate still has relevance for today. The argument focuses on higher education and there are some connections to be made to the kind of argument that Hirst is trying to make:
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/02/01/competency-based-education-threatens-further-stratify-higher-education-essay
An interesting read from the Chronicle of Higher Education. The Dean of MIT is going to open a new University without majors, lectures or classrooms. This would seem to lead to a highly specialized education, not the liberal education Hirst argues for.
http://chronicle.com/article/MIT-Dean-Takes-Leave-to-Start/235121/
Thanks for sharing! This is quite interesting. I see that she has no plans for tenure, either. I wonder why?
I’m not sure how to cite an entire journal, but On the Horizon, Volume 22, Issue 1, 2014 is a special issue on “Liberal Education in Crisis”. Although none of the contributors seemed to cite Hirst specifically, all of their submissions address a range of positions and perspectives on liberal education in current education policy and practice. It was also interesting because many of the authors submitted critical commentary on some of the other papers included the issue. Anyway, here is a citation for one of the articles. Perhaps it may help lead you along to the others.
Bussey, M. (2014). Liberal education may be dead but the magic will not die! On the Horizon, 22(1), 3â6. http://doi.org/10.1108/OTH-09-2013-0034
Oh, and there was this – for some “light” reading đ
http://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2016/02/02/465239105/what-is-the-value-of-an-education-in-the-humanities?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20160202
To be honest, this article was difficult for me to read, I felt I was reading Japanese – understanding some fragments of it. Anyway, based on my understanding, below’s what I can conclude.
Hirst doesnât believe that liberal education can be characterized in terms of mental abilities. He believes that each of the ability mentioned above needs public criteria to judge for its achievement, â… there can be effective thinking only when the outcome of mental activity can be recognized and judged by those who have the appropriate skills and knowledge…â (p. 35), âTerms which, like âeffective thinkingâ, describe activities involving achievements of some sort, must have public criteria to mark themâ (p. 35), âComing to understand a form of knowledge involves coming to think in relations that satisfy the public criteriaâ (p. 50). He also mentions that an activity can be justified if it âis both intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assessable according to accepted criteriaâ (p. 42). The Harvard Report says that there are three areas of knowledge: natural sciences, humanities and social studies. For each area of knowledge, there are four abilities that should be practiced: effective thinking, communication, make relevant judgements and to discriminate among values. Hirst pointed out that the Harvard Committee has claimed specific areas of knowledge have developed specific subdivisions of abilities, âlogical thinking is developed by the sciences, relational thinking by social studies, and imaginative thinking by the humanitiesâ (p. 37). However, with multiple meanings in different contexts, these abilities need to be redefined and be completely divided into groups, because, for example, the ability to think effectively in mathematics differs from the ability to think effectively in literature.
I also had a difficult time with this reading. As I do feel I am a bit unqualified to critique your summary I do feel you did a good job of identifying some of the key aspects of the Harvard report as well as Hirst’s criticism of it.
Thanks for your comment and encouragement. I just felt I was often confused about different perspectives, i.e. who believes in this or that view… When I read it the first time, it seemed to me that it was jumping between Greek view, classical view, Hirst view… liberal education, forms of knowledge… And that’s why I could only pick up fragments of it, but unable to see it as a whole or the connections between them.
Sarup vs Hirst
First, some really excellent exegetical points (and critical questions) about Hirst.
We don’t have to agree with Hirst’s argument about liberal education. But he should work hard to understand what Hirst actually is saying before we determine WHERE we stand.
In this respect Sarup’s article is an instructive one. Jus like before, I’ll throw out a few content questions and see if we can see what Sarup’s assessment of Hirst looks like.
What are Sarup’s mains criticisms of Hirst? Are those criticisms based on an accurate or fair understanding of Hirst? Does Sarup provide textual support for those criticisms?
One of Sarupâs main criticisms of Hirst is that his âmodel of education implies an asymmetric relationship – it presumes a superiority of the teacherâ(p.53). He goes on to link this view with positivist sociologists stating that they both âdo not consider sufficiently the construction of meaning by pupils and othersâ(p.53). There is a citation included (4) in Sarupâs chapter, but I am not sure I have access to it. Sarup continues on with this contention, but provides no reference to Hirstâs work. In re-re-reading Hirst I could find no mention of the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil (perhaps I missed it). In my interpretation of Hirst’s paper it seems that Hirst advocates for an intrinsic view of the attainment of knowledge. Hirst speaks of âpursuit of knowledgeâ, âfulfillment of the mindâ and âaspects of personal developmentâ.
I think this might be the quote you were looking for in Hirstâs paper about the:
âthe transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupilâ
âAcquiring knowledge of any form is therefore to a greater or lesser extent something that cannot be done simply by solitary study of the symbolic expressions of knowledge, it must be learned from a master on the jobâ (p.45).
Thanks for helping me out Desley. It does seem that Sarup’s point on the matter is sound with this quote being considered.
Sarupâs first criticism is the asymmetrical relationship between students and teachers held by Hirst and other liberal philosophers. He believes that teachersâ role is highly valued (and even perhaps unnecessary or unfair). âit presumes a superiority of the teacher… there is an over-emphasis on the way social meanings are imposed on children… the liberal philosophers have a âdeficitâ view of pupils…â (p. 53). Sarup criticized the liberal philosophers for believing that teachers are the sole knowers who are transmitting knowledge and students are the receivers of knowledge, therefore teachers are perceived to be better or superior.
Sarup has also criticized the liberal philosophers because they use public independent criteria or standards to assess and judge, however, Sarup believes that people have different interpretations of phenomena, events, understanding, agreement. Therefore, â… the criteria of validity of one perspective cannot be applied…â (p. 54). Sarup criticized that most liberal philosophers view knowledge as an absolute and something unchanging, âmost philosophers… have tended to treat knowledge as a truth, an absolute… that it is fixed and unchanging, that it has independent criteria and is therefore above bargaining. Knowledge, for them, is seen as a set of unsituated, uncontexted meanings.â (p. 55).
Sarup pointed out that Hirst only focused on propositional knowledge, which is the knowledge of facts, based on declarations; but Hirst ignored two other types of knowledge: knowing how and knowledge by acquaintance. The liberal philosophers suggest that ordinary language philosophy centers around words only, the critique is that it is also with the world, âcan enrich our understanding of politics, society and human thoughtâ (p. 55). Moreover, Sarup brought up liberal philosophersâ view that knowledge is context free and independent and that they are the messengers of knowledge, â… conceiving of themselves as âmessengersâ as if it is through them that knowledge speaks. They do not conceive that it is they who take it upon themselves to give a version of knowledge…â (p. 56).
I can’t agree with you more about the understanding of Sarup’s article. It seems we have some shared idea about Sarup’s criticisms of Hirst.
First, Sarup pointed out Hirstâs model of education implies an asymmetric relationship between students and teachers. Teachers have the superiority and they are transmitters of knowledge, children have a deficit until they are educated to gain the knowledge. âThe liberal philosophers have a âdeficitâ view of pupils⊠the liberal philosophers have a predefined notion of rationality. It means that the theorizing of children⊠is often deniedâ (p. 53).
Second, Sarup provided some arguments to Hirstâs view of knowledge. âThe liberal philosophers gloss over many of the difficulties concerning the procedures and tests of validityâ(p. 54). In some cases, people have different perspectives to a same problem, even in same discipline. The criteria of validity have no universal standard, which illustrate that the âassertion that the forms of knowledge have distinctive procedures and tests of validity (p. 54)â needs to be reexamined.
In addition, Sarup stated that Hirstâs work exclude two kinds of knowledge, namely, âknowing how, or skills, and knowledge by acquaintanceâ (p. 54), propositional knowledge becomes meaningful by linking with these.
Last but not least, Sarup questioned Hirstâs idea that knowledge is independent, absolute, fixed, unchanging and seen as a set of unsituated, uncontexted meanings. The argument is that the normal usage of knowledge may vary according to different groups and peopleâs use of knowledge may have âdifferent unshared meaningsâ (p. 55). Sarup said, âthey do not conceive that it is they who take it upon themselves to give a version of knowledgeâ (p. 56).
Sarup indirectly criticizes Hirst by suggesting that âliberal philosophersâ have interpreted âordinary language philosophyâ as merely verbal and have not considered that âordinary language philosophy is concerned not merely with words but also with the world and can enrich our understanding of politics, society and human thoughtâ (Sarup 2012, p.55).
Hirst uses the narrow definition when arguing that knowledge needs to be learned from a teacher, or âmaster on the jobâ, it cannot simply be learned from âsolitary study of the symbolic expressions of knowledgeâ (45).
â All knowledge involves the use of symbols and the making of judgments in ways that cannot be expressed in words and can only be learnt in tradition. The art of scientific investigation and the development of appropriate experimental tests, the forming of an historical explanation and the assessment of its truth, the appreciation of a poem: all of these activities are high arts that are not in themselves communicable simply by wordsâ (Hirst 1974, p.45).
A good example of looking to the source (Hirst) to better understand what the critique (Sarup) involves.
Saying that learning requires a “Master on the job”/an expert certainly sounds just what Sarup says – Hirst may position knowledge and understanding as being a divide between experts and non-experts (at least when it comes to the forms). But let’s look at the issue by itself. What’s wrong with admitting that some people have expertise and others do not? Physicians know more about medical interventions than their students. Indigenous scholars know more about Indigenous culture and history than many white Canadians. So we learn from these experts. How does Sarup think that this would reflect an inaccurate picture of how knowledge and understanding works? Does he explain how?
I do not think Sarup is saying that we should not learn from expertise. I think he is saying knowledge being passed on from experts has been made sense of in light of their own contexts, and while it has value, it should not be taken as an absolute truth. Sarup criticizes Hirst’s proposal that knowledge is an absolute truth. Sarup believes in constructivism, and that meaning and knowledge are created through experiences, which in turn means knowledge cannot be an absolute truth. Sarup writes, “Teachers and students are both subjects in the task of unveiling reality and re-creating knowledge through common reflection and action; thus, teachers and students discover themselves as its permanent re-creators.” (p.659) He thinks Hirst and “the liberal philosophers are ethnocentric, remaining unconscious of the normative nature of their presuppositions” which “prescribe for us a restricted way of seeing the world.” (p.66)
Sarup criticizes Hirst’s view that pupils can only attain meaningful knowledge through the teachings of one who is superior. Sarup refers to this as an “âŠasymmetric relationship⊔ (53). “The liberal philosophers have a ‘deficit’ view of pupils. Thus the teacher has a corpus of knowledge to be transmitted, and the pupil has a deficit until he has been brought ‘up’ to it: in a word. initiated.” (53) Sarup argues that Hirst “âŠdeals chiefly with propositional knowledge” yet excludes “âŠknowing how, or skills, and knowledge by acquaintance.” (54) He further states that the liberal philosophers view knowledge as “⊒objective’, that knowledge is externalâŠimposed⊔ (64). “âŠthe liberal philosophers make knowledge the subject and men the predicate.” (64).
Sarup brings forward the view of the new sociology of education which “âŠemphasizes the human character âŠthat knowing cannot be detached from what it is to know. Knowledge is the relation between knower and known.” (64).
Sarup is concerned with this liberal view. He warns that the liberal philosophers have “âŠcome to dominate the teaching of the philosophy of education in this country.” (66). He believes that (the liberal philosophy) “âŠsupports the existing pattern of power and privilege.” (67).
Although I would agree with Sarup that it is important to base the content of education on the interests, experiences, locality and purpose of the individual for it to be meaningful and engaging, I wonder where the need for teaching basic foundational skills comes in. Hirst’s idea that education should be based on the seven forms of knowledge may be taking the need to teach these basic skills to all pupils, before they are able to move forward in their education, into consideration. I think in many cases, in particular education in reading, writing, science and math; education needs to be guided by ‘experts’. If a pupil has no background knowledge in physics, for example, wouldn’t they need to be taught the basics from an expert (teacher) in order to move forward in their studies and perhaps pursue higher education in that particular area of study, if this is what interests them? Does Sarup ever approach the idea that there could be a balance struck between the two philosophies? It seems to me that Sarup does a great deal of criticizing of the liberal philosophy of education but he really never offers an answer, or possible solution. The conclusion of this reading reads more like fear mongering to me, than comments that are based on research, data collection and observation over time. Food for thoughtâŠ
I completely agree with you Deb. Sarup’s first criticism of liberal education is his view on the asymmetrical relationship between teacher and student (p. 53) and that this results in imposing social meaning on students (p.53). He also states that he does not believe that liberal educators take into consideration the ability of students to construct meaning for themselves (p. 53). After re-reading Hirst, though, I do not see anywhere a statement on how educators are expected to impart knowledge. HIrst states that “knowledge in any form is therefore to a greater or lesser extent something that cannot be done simply by solitary study of the symbolic expression of knowledge, it must be learnt from a master on the job” (p.45). The reality is that there a necessity to learn the basics, as you pointed out Deb, and that in order for that to happen there needs to be someone with the knowledge to impart that information. But that does not mean that the student needs to be viewed as having a ‘deficit’or that it cannot be taught in a way that is meaningful or that the student might not be able to bring new meaning to the process that the educator had not thought of before. I have not read anything on the other liberal educators, but I think that Sarup is making a big assumption in stating that liberal education results in a superiority complex in educators and a deficit in students. I also wanted to say it was funny Deb that you mentioned physics, because my husband always says that if students could learn physics from a book he would be out of a job. Just thought I would add that tidbit đ
Sarup States, “knowledge or ideas are never free from the interests of the actors involved in their production.” (p.62) I see this as a direct shot at Hirst’s argument, as Hirst believes, “men are able to come to understand both the external world and their own private states of mind in common ways, sharing the same conceptual schemata by learning to use symbols in the same manner.” (p.39) Hirst follows this by stating that knowledge must be justified as, “testable as true or false, valid or invalid.” (p.40) and that it must be “assessable according to experience” (p.40) Sarup’s argument suggests these statements are flawed, because if a particular group has a common interest, bias or view, for example, then they will find a way to justify and substantiate it. Sarup supports this argument by quoting Marx, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (p. 62), which leads into questioning knowledge at the expense of ideologies, as they are used to, “justify inexplicable or absurd actions.” (p.63) I have to agree with Sarup in his thinking on this matter, as I, too, believe that if there is a particular direction you want to drive an idea, learning or knowledge, around a particular ideology, then there is definitely a way to contribute to its success or demise through the presentation or teachings of knowledge and education. Just look at the American National Rifle Association, which is an American social welfare organization that advocates for gun rights. This is a great example, as it is an identity that supports and drives a particular ideology, which does meet Sarup’s four conditions. This ideology, however, is one that is quite controversial and it is losing steam, and support, due to the fact that, “historical constructs of a particular time”(p.64) are changing and, now, coming into play and having greater influence. I use this example because I believe it demonstrates how extreme ideologies can be convincing and justified, depending on who is ‘pushing’ them, even with a topic as polarized, and emotionally charged, as gun ownership. Sarup states, “Knowledge is the relation between the knower and the known.” (p.64) Meaning, we teach and influence most about what we, ourselves, believe, and are passionate about.
One of Sarup’s criticisms targets someting I had mentioned earlier, in that,”Hirst deals chiefly with prepositional knowledge and his work appears to exclude two other kinds of knowledge: knowing how, or skills, and knowledge by acquaintance” (p.54). He focuses on particular forms of knowledge as being the only valid means of finding truth and leading the âgood lifeâ. However, it seems that Sarup does not necessarily disagree with the forms of knowledge, he instead disagrees with Hirstâs evaluation of the ways you can know. But, it seems incorrect that Hirst and the liberal philosophers are only concerned with propositional knowledge. Sarup praises the new sociologists âwho always stress the notion that experiences are meaningless unless they are made meaningful by understandingâ (p.54), in effect criticizing the liberal philosophers for not doing the same. Yet, I donât see how this is any different from Hirstâs aim of a liberal education, which he states many times as being, âconcerned with developing a personâs ways of understanding experience, the others [aims] are concerned with mastering the details of knowledge, how it is established, and the use of it in other enterprises, particularly those of a practical natureâ (Hirst, 1974, p.48).
Can someone explain how these are different? Have I misunderstood something?
Sarup on the assumptions of new sociology.
Sarup claims that the new sociologists have a different view on educational policy, practice and research because of a series of “presuppositions” (p. 57).
How valid or generalizable are these presuppositions? (In other words, should all researchers or practitioners adopt these presuppositions?)
Sarup stated, the presuppostions “involve the returning of respect to those whom it has been previously denied, which are about” relationships of dominance and subordinancy”. The presuppostions are related to human’s moral recognition,they are “the basis of our belief”(p. 57), so in this aspect, I think Sarup admited the validity of those presuppostions.
What does Sarup mean when he claims that knowledge is “ideological”?
âThe philiosphy of education propagated by Peters and Hirst is an ideology that supports the existing pattern of power and privilege.â (pg. 67) If we go with the oxford dictionary definition of ideology, âA system of ideas and ideals, especially one that forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.â I can start to see what Sarup is getting at. One of Sarupâs main arguments against a liberal education is the hierarchical relationship between teacher and student. âThese philosophers have a particular view of the nature of Man, rationality, society.â (p. 66) âFor them social reality lies outside the individuals who make up society, and in this process they come to treat knowledge as if it were something other than a human product, a manifestation of divine will or a fact of nature.â (p. 66) Sarup is saying that this way of thinking leads to a view of social life as hierarchical as well. If I am following correctly this method of putting the power with those in âthe knowâ or the teachers and professors, this takes something away from those that donât have the knowledge. This system of ideals that is education therefore impacts the society around it supporting the âpattern of powerâ that Sarup is referring to.
Excellent use of sources. And you offer interpretive comments on what you think Sarup means. That is a very good writing practice.
Just to echo what I posted below about argument vs. assertion: if true, Sarup has surely dealt a killing blow to Hirst. But what evidence do we have in Hirst’s paper that any of these beliefs follow from his argument? Where, for example, does Hirst claim that reality exists outside the individual?
âThose with power are frequently least aware of â or least willing to acknowledge â its existence.â (Delpit, 1988)
For the purposes of this response, Iâm merging two of the questions Chris posed because I feel that they are intertwined. A key criticism of Hirst that Sarup presents is linked to the notion of knowledge as ideological and deeply rooted in assumptions fostered by power and privilege.
Sarup links Hirstâs assertions about the value and nature of a liberal education to issues of power and privilege, and challenges those holding similar stances to confront their own preconceptions and challenge structures of power and dominance. Though Sarup doesnât explicitly link his critique to the underpinnings of white privilege and Critical race Theory, I see many parallels within his work. Sarup might argue that a plethora of individual and institutional forms of racism have continued to marginalize groups of people in the world. Sarup examines the impact of structures of power and privilege in society and their relationship with the education system, considering how structures of power and dominance are often hidden beneath long held beliefs and assumptions about the nature of knowledge and learning. Sarup suggests that there is much that liberal philosophers take for granted and think of as âobjective, context-free, consensualâ and do not conceive that it is they who âtake it upon themselves to give a version of knowledge, ârationalityâ and âeducationâ and so realize and maintain inâ(Sarup, 2012). Sarup argues that our judgements cannot be âsevered from their contextsâ and uses the work of Maxine Greene to it is difficult for liberal education philosophers to conceptualize âalternative conceptions of philosophyâ that challenges the âAnglo-American traditionâ(Sarup). This tradition serves to enforce the notion that some knowledge can be deemed as superior and competing perspectives of knowledge(in particular âpracticalâ knowledge) by nature would then be inferior, and âabstract theorizing becomes possible for only the initiated, privileged fewâ(Sarup, 2012).
Hirstâs assertions and claims would likely very much delegitimize those that would compete with Eurocentric values, and I too would make the assumption that Indigenous worldviews, in particular, would not meet the standards and criteria for knowledge and enlightenment that Hirst presents within his liberal education viewpoint. There is much that Hirst takes for granted, and this is undoubtedly rooted in the positions of power and dominance he may not have been aware he held as a member of the education elite where âpower is effectively hidden in the colour- blind, class-blind and gender-blind discourses in liberal multiculturalismâ (Orlowski, 2008).
Additional sources –
Delpit, L. (1988). The silenced dialogue: Power and pedagogy in teaching other peopleâs children. Harvard Educational Review, 58 (3), 280-98.
Orlowski, P. (2008). That would certainly be spoiling them: Liberal discourses of social studies teachers and concerns about Aboriginal students. Canadian Journal of Native Education, 32(2), 110-129.
Nicely written and good use of other sources. And really good to see you make arguments keep the dialogue going!
One of the key features of assessing education discourse is distinguishing between assertion and argument.
An assertion is when I claim something but I don’t substantiate it with evidence or reasons. So if I say, “Brooke disagrees with Hirst because she discriminates against British people” I’m making an assertion. But I haven’t made a good argument. I don’t explain or justify my assertion. In fact, while it sounds damning (Gasp! Brooke is being mean to Hirst!) we would plainly see I haven’t got anything to back it up.
An argument can involve making a critical claim but there have to be reasons underlying that claim.
Is Sarup making assertions or arguments? You point to one of Sarup’s assertions about Hirst – that Hirst takes a variety of things for granted. But what specific examples does Sarup give in order to support this claim? Does he ever cite Hirst or explain why or how it would be oppressive?
I think the multicultural point is a good one. Modern society has been slow to move on this mark. But I wonder if Hirst is guilty of this charge. Hirst claims that art, religion, history, philosophy and science can all be forms of knowledge. People of all sorts of cultures (Indigenous and otherwise) have art and history and religion and so on. These cultures have and will contribute to the forms of knowledge (Indigenous Studies is a thriving area of scholarship in universities). Does Hirst ever claim that only Europeans can participate in the forms of knowledge? Or that they decide what counts as a good argument? Or, could you give an example of how the forms must, if taken seriously, exclude other cultures?
Again, good stuff.
Thanks, Chris.
I think that Hirst would defend his ability to see beyond the lens of the race/social class/time in the world he was a part of, but I donât know that he effectively separates values and the liberal education he speaks of. Hirst agrees that as education is a âdeliberate, purposeful activity directed to the development of individuals, necessarily involves considerations of valueâ that may be âreligious, political or utilitarian in natureâ(Hirst, 1974). He suggests that there may be a more âultimate basis for the values that should determine education, more objective groundâ but he doesnât convince me that the liberal education he speaks of can off such a ultimate, unbiased and universal value(Hirst, 1974). Every construct of knowledge and education has been created and understood contextually and through the unique lens of the looker. In many ways, I can compare Hirstâs claims about the possibility of finding an ultimate basis for values akin to being color blind – he makes the statement around the âcomplex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which are publically specifiableâ(Hirst, 1974), but does not consider that different races and colours may have an entirely contrasting opinion on the criteria or understanding of what publically specifiable is understood as, or how people understand and process experience could vary greatly across race, cultures, and time. I think that the legitimizing of Indigenous Studies has been unfortunately a recent phenomena, and I don’t know if that was the case of the time when Hirst was examining a liberal education(but now I’m the one making an assertion based on my own assumption!). I think that educational programs from K- postsecondary have been transforming, and I think that the nature of what constitutes a liberal education is different today than it would have been in any other time; I think that criterias for liberal educations are ever-shifting and contextual.
Sarup makes the argument that âknowledge can be described and accounted for differently by various approachesâ (Sarup, 2012, p.61). He states this claim through the realization that if all viewpoints of knowledge were to be accepted, then difficulties resulting from an absence of ârightnessâ or âwrongnessâ would occur. There could not be a common belief if these different and varied viewpoints contradicted one another. As Sarup states, âIf all must be accepted-then we are faced with relativismâ (p.62). So, in order to gain common understandings of what knowledge is, Sarup makes the claim, âThe importance of ideologies lies in the fact that they are ways of interpretation which limit possibilities, or conceiving of alternativesâ (Sarup, 2012, p.63). This ultimately contextualizes knowledge and allows for a common understanding of what is being argued, giving terminology for much clearer definitions. Sarup continues that as groups begin to define their ways of understanding and share their meanings of knowledge, there is a tendency to make their viewpoint absolute; âA group then attempts to maintain and tries to legitimate a way of seeing and understanding which becomes the wayâ (p.63). Without knowledge being ideological, this tendency would not be possible as viewpoints, beliefs, and perspectives could not be argued as being ârightâ or âwrongâ.
I like that you use this quote, Nigel, âknowledge can be described and accounted for differently by various approachesâ (Sarup, 2012, p.61). As educators, parents and members of society, we can debate about the different forms of knowledge and their level of importance. Our beliefs on this matter, however, will be strongly based on our own personal experience, which is what I believe Sarup is eluding to when he states that education is ideological, as it is the narrow, yet dominant view that gets the most attention and focus in education. I often get parents and teachers asking me if their student or child can miss PE, or art class, to catch up on math work or complete a science test. This request suggests that certain forms of knowledge are more important than others and, through my experience, I would have to say that a lot of people would agree that math and science trump art and PE. Hirst argues that a hierarchical organization of the various forms of knowledge is inevitable, which, perhaps, is a reason why we see advanced placement classes for math and English, for example. If Hirst’s argument is applied here, the request stated earlier in this post is unjustifiable, as it is through the deep understanding of many forms of knowledge that links are made between forms and a greater learning is attained.
Sarup stated, “knowledge is neither absolute nor autonomous, it is not value free but is grounded in the actions and interests of men”(p. 61), which is an opposite view to Hirst’s idea that knowledge is something objective, context free or universal and consensual. Moreover, Sarup point out, “The philosophy of education propagated by Hirst is an ideology that supports the existing pattern of power of privilege”(p. 67).
First, Sarup said, “A literate work, or a curriculum, cannot divorced from experience”(p. 60), which means each work is related to its creator’s experience and is a kind of conscious effort based on the creator’s understanding of the lived-world. Human’s consciousness is determined by social existence. Knowledge is related to the interests of its productors. “Knowledge, like language, is not independent of its use, and should be understood in its social and historical context” (p. 61).
Second, “all knowledge is grounded in perception”(p. 63). Perception is not free from a particular time, knowlege is related to certain rules and criteria that are agreed and defined by groups. Knowledge is not independent of man and the methods of its production and is not external to the individuls. “Knowledge is the relation between knower and known”(p. 64).
Like several people here have said I found this week’s article particularly challenging but I ma going to attempt an interpretation.
Hirstâs argument, to me, is really complex and multilayered. I do think that the crux of his argument lies in the labelling of liberal education and the interpretation of what liberal education is as well as the virtues or failings of liberal education in society today (Hisrt , 1974). His description of how liberal education is sometimes viewed as an indulgent form of learning is supported by a number of examples that show that that this issue is complex and requires a change in ideology in order to justify or support its proliferation (pg. 33). He emphasizes the need to redefine longstanding positions on liberal education by examining how the metaphysical and the practical clash within these restricted definitions of liberal education (pg. 42).
I think that the main idea is that liberal education provides a valid avenue for the development of learning in that it nurtures thinking skills that support the idea of âeducating the whole childâ. Hirst is careful to reiterate the importance of balance between the metaphysical and the practical and outlines how liberal education can be practical (pg. 31).
In reading this article I have been thinking considerably about the real purpose of education. As we have seen in the last few weeks of this course. The purpose of education can be quite contentions. In some respects (and in the case of the detractors in Hirstâs argument) education must be about reason and practicality because this is a true reflection of our society. In other respects education must be more about thinking and knowledge and the development of fundamental skills. While I do agree with Hirstâs position on the emphasis of relative knowledge I am also aware of the realities that befall many students in the world today. It is difficult to extol the virtues of learning on populations where reality and practicality are a means of real survival (physical, corporal, social), rather than the metaphysical.
I guess at first I must admit I am no expert on this debate. The amount of reading I have done on the philosophical debate on liberal education is summed up by these two readings that are, for me at least, difficult to decipher. I have to say, that I am happy other people are having difficulty understanding what Hirst is trying to say. I donât even understand what he is trying to defend. Liberal education it seems is defined differently by different people. In this nature it is ripe for criticism. My understanding of liberal education has simply been a broad approach to challenge and develop the mind as a whole. And since we are talking about the mind; Hirst speaks to it as an entity independent from the self. I think he makes too many inferences to what the mind does and how it does it. Using a logical approach we know the mind is an organ that harbors billions of neurons that make up our reality. But for me the real debate revolves around defining forms of knowledge and the hierarchal approach to it. As someone invested in education I find the latter more of an interesting topic. And since Sarup brings this up many times in his argument itâs worth further examination. While Hirst may claim that knowledge is best passed on by a master, Sarup sees the student to be an equal in the attainment of knowledge. But how can this be so? Certainly we can agree there are better educators than others, and that the correlation between age, experience and transference of knowledge is not linear, as Sarup suggests, we must at least concede that there is typically more knowledge in an adult than a child. The hierarchal fears of Sarup that transcends into oppression, seems to me at least to be an overreaction to the current state of education. After all, life is built on hierarchies in the social order and always will be. A Marxian approach to education will undoubtedly fail as the Marxian approach to political ideology. I donât think our education system today is flawless and not in need of an overhaul both in body and philosophically, I just donât think squabbling over definitions and absolutisms will solve the problem. Education is dynamic in some sense, but being rooted in certain disciplines is not a bad idea, even if those disciplines remain, or change. I think Hirst too desperately tries to justify liberal education, and Sarup tries too hard to criticize it. Both provided me with meaningless interpretations of the topic and neither provided an alternative.
Is Sarup making a “performative contradiction”?
Here’s a neat logical error that sometimes crops up in educational discourse (and research in general): the performative contradiction.
Simply put: it’s when you claim one thing, but what you presuppose in saying that thing conflicts with that claim.
Here’s a famous one: “Everything that I say is a lie.” Think about the logical implications of that statement.
Some have argued that Sarup is engaged in a kind of performative logical error of his own. Maybe someone can take stab at figuring out what it is. I’ll hint that it might have something to do with denying the forms of knowledge.
Ah, so that’s what its called. I am certain Sarup is performing for someone in his harsh criticism, and for me it distracts me from giving his argument due consideration. But to your point about performative contradiction, I believe he admittedly ignores propositional knowledge for skill knowledge and acquaintance knowledge, but his logic for doing so would lay under the category of propositional knowledge. So I guess in a sense, his argument contradicts itself. (though I may have read that wrong) His paper was more of an attack than a criticism (at least in my perspective) but at least the arguments shed light on a topic that I had not before considered to such a depth.
Excellent. Very well put. I think you’ve gotten to the essence of it. There’s a couple of ways he is engaged in such a contradiction. I think you are right, but he also engages in such a contradiction when he, in various places, denies the forms of knowledge. But if you notice, he uses and draws from concepts in a number of forms of knowledge while doing so (he talks about epistemology, labour power and so on, concepts that originate from sociology and philosophy…). So he uses the forms of knowledge in order to reject the forms of knowledge.
Of course, simply because Sarup proceeds with such a contradiction doesn’t mean that his critique does not have value, as you rightly say. And also, just because someone reasons poorly in their argument does not mean that the critical POV as a whole is therefore wrong. To do so would be an example of the fallacy fallacy.
I have been away due to some trauma in our household lately, so I’m coming late to the party, but Hirst has had me thinking and brewing for the last three weeks. I apologize for the length of my response!
The Hirst article resonated with me in many ways. Particularly his debate about the value of the Liberal Arts reflects the discussions about the new curriculum that we’re having around our staff room table these days.
At Eagle River Secondary we’ve been piloting the draft curriculum for four years, so we had embraced all sorts of possibilities of the competency assessment model. In contradiction to Hirst, we loved education that was based on the “predilections of pupils” (Hirst, p. 32) because it brought with it passion and interest. We saw value where Hirst is dismissive. We’ve been presenting cross-grade (8-10) cross-curricular (English, Socials, Science, and Math) six week courses. We worked toward our students’ “understanding of experience” (p. 33) within the scope of their realities. Because, as I noticed Hirst neglected to mention, the pursuit of “truth” is complicated when truth is relative and Our major detractors spoke about the need for set content, and now content is included in the draft documents, the learning for the joy of it has weakened.
Hirst speaks of the Greeks interpretation of liberal arts as “freeing the mind.” (p. 31) and I’m finding myself pondering the suitability of various types of education within a population. Once upon a time we stratified education. Like the Medieval guildsmen, there were those who were suited, inclined, and interested in trades or creating with their hands. Other students went on to study philosophy and the arts. In such a world, the liberal arts were meant for the elite. A certain class of person was free to fulfill his mind regardless of “utilitarian or vocational considerations.” (p. 31). This is the difference between vocational and academic streams.
In North America we have eliminated this separation, but in Europe it continues. In Finland, for example, ammattikoulu is trades school and lukio is academic school. When I attended lukio, there was a clear and definite perceived prestige over the students at the local ammattikoulu down the road. With the new system in Finland, a student is free to attend either ammattikoulu or lukio or to move into the other later or even concurrently to come out of high school with both academic and vocational certification (chef, hair stylist, mechanic, etc). As the Finnish Education Ministry website shows it, it is more of a circle than a fork now. So a student might choose to do ammattikoulu for mechanics and lukio for physics and math, and then write the exams to enter university as an engineer with the benefit of practical experience. Here in British Columbia those students with a vocational mindset are still expected to pass academic courses in order to graduate. So far, there is still a set expectation about what the courses look like and how they are evaluated. But I am the Career Coordinator at my school, and I have a grade 11 academic student who’s already finished an electrical apprenticeship worth 16 credits. I have another who’s finished his academic coursework, and is now working on an automotive service technician program to earn an apprenticeship in that area. We try to offer both opportunities simultaneously, in the same building. In other words, like Finland, we offer both vocational and academic courses to our students and yet we do not offer them the traditional seven liberal arts.
I was intrigued by the notion of seven specific liberal arts, and so I hunted them down. According to Andrew West (2010) a young Greek student in ancient times would begin his studies with grammar, dialectics (logic), and rhetoric (speech) and then move on to music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy. Our students today could benefit from this broad base of knowledge, despite its clear aims to train young men for leadership. Hirst suggests these seven liberal arts rose out of a “demand for an education whose definition and justification are based on the nature and significance of knowledge itself.” (p. 31). I think it was broader than this. Slaves weren’t receiving this kind of training. This was the education for the ruling class. These liberal arts may have been meant to “free the mind” (p. 31) of the student, but an understanding of how a man “ought to live, both individually and socially” (p. 31) comes with it an obligation to ethical leadership.
A student in BC schools today is not expected to inculcate truth, fulfillment of mind, or understanding of how he ought to live. (p. 31). He is expected to know to some extent, specific content knowledge and/or some specific skills. Do today’s teens care to know more? I can only think of one or two students in each grade who philosophize, who are curious about learning for its own sake, and who struggle with the set learning they’re obliged to study to jump through the hoops leading to graduation. There are a few more who work hard to see A’s on the report card and meet parental expectations. The majority of my students, however, are comfortable with less thinking, and in fact, will complain when we ask them to engage in higher-order thinking activities.
Hirst’s summary of the Harvard Report’s challenges boils down the debate in our school: “if knowledge is no longer thought to be rooted in some reality, or if its significance for the mind and good life is questioned, what cana be the justification for an education defined in terms of knowledge alone?” (p. 33). My own question is Do kids need to hold the knowledge in their heads when they have world of knowledge in their hands? With the rise of the smart phone, our students have become completely reliant on these miniature computers. On a device no bigger than their palms, they use the calculator; they read books; they do research; they type essays.
The three types of thinking (logical, relational, imaginative) that the Harvard Report links to the three types of learning (natural sciences, social studies, humanities) (p. 35) are too narrow. To be an effective thinker, do our students not need to be able to apply all three types of thinking to all three types of learning? (and to other types of learning, as well?)
Hirst raises a powerful question when he points out the complications of requiring thinking to be demonstrated by some sort of achievement. (p. 35). If we can not properly evaluate whether thinking is happening, how can we measure it? If we can’t measure it, how do we know it’s happening? If the achievement (task, project, assignment) doesn’t seem to reflect the kind of thinking we anticipated seeing, does it thereby follow that that thinking did not actually occur?
Using mastery learning and competency based assessment, at Eagle River Secondary we have freed ourselves from the artificial nature of percentages and letter grades with our grade eights and nines, at least. However, Hirst (1974) has me thinking that it’s all pointless and wondering if we have any business formalizing instruction at all. What if we just presented experiences to our students, and let them do their own thinking? What if we didn’t evaluate, assess, or comment on what they chose to do or not do? Thematic explorations, along the lines of Hirst’s “programmes that are in the first place organize round certain fields of knowledge” (p. 51) could allow students to develop the “techniques and skills they need.” (p 51). We’ve tried to offer this kind of experience at my school.
However, in our cross-curricular, cross-grade six week courses, we’ve found that many students will gravitate to one type of study to the detriment of others, avoiding courses with a heavier weight of English competencies in favour of those with a science focus, for example. In the first years of our pilot project, we let this happen because we were focused on student choice (or pupil predilection, perhaps). Our new principal, however, believes balance across the curriculum is important, so students are being moved into different courses in order to fill the holes in their learning. I wonder whether this allows the “growth of ever clearer and finer distinctions” (p. 52) in their experience?
This Hirst article has opened up many questions on the nature of education and the changes that are unfolding around us.
Works Cited:
Hirst, P. (1974) “Liberal education and the nature of knowledge.” Knowledge and the Curriculum. Routledge and K. Paul. pp. 30-53.
“Koulutus & varhaiskasvatus” (Education and ECC) Opetus ja kultuurriministeriö (Education and Cultural Ministry) webpage. http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Koulutus/koulutusjaerjestelmae/ collected Feb. 2015
West, A. (2010). “The Seven Liberal Arts.” Classical Academic Press. http://classicalacademicpress.com/the-seven-liberal-arts/ Visited Feb. 2015.
Found another interesting read on this topic. Hopefully some of you return, because it gets pretty lively. It’s an argument regarding the state of higher education in Canadian universities today, and it starts out rather scathing. I am pretty keen to hear some of your thoughts. I have heard many of these same complaints leveled against today’s high school students, and I would like to discuss some of the points in the articles once others have had a chance to read them.
http://thewalrus.ca/pass-fail/
http://thewalrus.ca/the-kids-are-alright/
http://thewalrus.ca/learning-the-hard-way/
I seem to have gotten stuck “awaiting moderation” again. Just doing a test post to see if this one works.