Monthly Archives: March 2014

Sardine Fishery Management In B.C.

This paper is based on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Integrated Management Plan for Pacific Sardines, revised in 2013. Unless otherwise cited, specific references to fishery management, quotas, etc. are from this primary source.

An Overview of The BC Pacific Sardine Fishery
Although not nearly as well-known as the salmon or halibut fisheries, BC’s Pacific sardine fishery has a long and tumultuous history in this Province. The commercial fishery was established during World War One and in its heyday averaged catches of 40,000-80,000 tonnes per year[1]. The 1940s brought an abrupt end to the Pacific sardine fishery, a demise that has been attributed to overfishing and unfavourable environmental conditions.[2]

The BC Pacific sardine fishery took 45 years to recover, and it wasn’t until 1992 that sardines were again observed off B.C.’s coast. In 1995 the government deemed the stocks to have recovered sufficiently to set up a small experimental fishery[3] which was formalized in 2007 in an Integrated Management Plan under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO).

Migration and Coverage
The DFO characterized the Pacific sardine fishery as an “opportunistic fishery dependent on the migration of sardines into Canadian waters”[4]. Sardines arrive in BC in early Summer and it has been noted that the presence of sardines in BC is a function of their overall abundance on the entire Pacific Coast[5]. The fishery catch quota is established by observing stock data from the California fishery and applying a ‘migration rate’ calculation of about 10%.

The BC sardine fishery operates primarily off the Coast of Vancouver Island and is a multi-species fishery, with mackerel and salmon as the main by-catch. The fishery is open from June 1st to February 9th each year with the exception of permanent and seasonal closures.

License Allocation
Annual total allowable catch is evenly divided among 50 individual vessel based licensees (meaning the quota allocation is tied to the vessel not to an individual). 25 of these licenses are awarded to a standard commercial fleets while the other 25 are awarded to commercial First Nations fleets (also known as communal commercial). First Nations are also able to fish for food, ceremonial and social purposes although the DFO reports that no sardine fishing took place under FCS in 2010. Recreational fisherman can also participate in the fishery by obtaining a BC Tidal Waters Sport Fishing License. The DFO does not track the level of effort or catch of this group.

Initial license allotment can be difficult in a new fishery, and in response to fisherman’s desires for a stable and certain license environment, the DFO engaged in a consultative process in 2007 to establish permanent license eligibility based on three criteria: number of years licensed, landings and effort. This process concluded in 2009, with 25 permanent licenses issued to the commercial fleet which guaranteed each vessel an individual quota and henceforth a percentage of the TAC. In 2007, the DFO also undertook a pilot program to test the effectiveness of allowing quota transfers between vessels and allowed a maximum of 5 unfished sardine licenses to be issued to one vessel at a time, a process known as ‘stacking’. Since the quota is vessel based, this is an all or nothing proposition, as a fisherman cannot transfer a fraction of quota, only the whole quota.

Efficiency and Monitoring
Stacking has arguably led to commercial efficiency in the sardine fishery.  Based on the table below landings from 2002 to 2009 were well below TAC, while these numbers merged in recent years with the introduction of quota transfers. This would suggest that past levels of effort did not result in an economically efficient industry catch and that the transfer of quota has been beneficial in reducing the impact of ‘too many boats catching too few fish’. The DFO reports that in 2009, ½ of the vessels had 3 or more licenses and that 5 vessels accounted for ½ of the licenses (p.17).

Since landings have never reached TAC, the efficiency of the policy can be viewed in terms of reducing overcapitalization of the fleet and reducing imbalances that could lead to unreported exploitation of the species. In this case, fisherman have been incentivized to change behavior to catch more fish and become more efficient, but since landings were below TAC, this is seen as positive development. Vessels exceeding their individual catch quota (or stacked quota) would be the primary concern for enforcement, but the DFO allows a vessel with remaining quota to remove sardines from the purse-seine of another vessel if said vessel is over quota so long as both vessels follow proper log procedures.

In addition to 100% at-sea-observer regulations from 2009-2011, each vessel must land all catch at its designated port. A vessel may only process its own catch and may only offload on land when a official validator is present at which point the validator will weigh and inspect the catch and mark it off against the vessels outstanding quota.

By-catch
Purse-seine gear is the only allowed gear and is somewhat selective as it used to encircle and trap schooling fish. Unless other species are schooling with the target species, by-catch will be limited. Chub and Jack Mackarel are the main by-catch and each vessel is permitted to harvest a combined 10 metric tonnes of these species. This allowance is designed to be large enough to prevent by-catch dumping, while being small enough to prevent the development of an offshoot mackerel fishery. So long as the allowed tonnage for by-catch falls within an achievable range, this is a good measure to combat dumping.

Migrating salmon are of special concern since their migratory paths overlap the sardine fishery and the salmon could become unintentional (or intentional) by-catch.  “From 2008-2011, 100% at-sea observer coverage was utilized in the sardine fishery to monitor the impacts of the sardine fleet on salmon stocks.”(p.20). The fishery was determined to be compliant with all quota requirements and by-catch mitigation measures and the DFO has relaxed its 100% at-sea-observer mandate to a minimum of 25% with additional enforcement during peak salmon migration periods. The sardine fishery has a Salmon By-Catch and Discard Management Program that outlines specific monitoring requirements and fishery closures zones, the preferred method for limiting salmon by-catch.

Although the industry has enjoyed success over the last few years, in 2013 the purse-seine commercial fleet came up empty handed, having not landed a single fishin the former $32 million dollar industry.[6] Sardine stocks are known to be characterized by a boom and bust cycle, so this is not entirely unusual and can be mostly attributed to changes in the ocean environment. The disappearance of the sardines however has also marked the disappearance of the humpback whales that feed on them, as well as the tourists that come flocking to whale watch and serves to remind us us how interconnected we are.

 

List of Works Cited

[1] Pynn, Larry (2013) BC’s Sardine Fishery Collapse – Affecting the Economy, Ecology along the entire Food Chain. Postmedia News. October 15, 2013. Available online at http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/10/15/b-c-sardine-fishery-collapse-leaves-a-hole-in-the-marketplace-repercussions-up-the-food-chain-to-humpback-whales/

[2] A History of British Columbia Seafood (2008).  BC Ministry of Environment: Oceans and Marine Fisheries .Victoria, B.C. Available online at http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/omfd/reports/seafood-poster.pdf

 [3] A History of British Columbia Seafood (2008)

 [4] Pacific Region Integrated Fisheries Management Plan (2013) Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Available online at http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/mplans/2013/sardine-2012-15-eng.pdf

[5] The Sardine Industry: Sustainability and Development (Draft Discussion Paper) (2009) Canadian Pacific Sardine Association. Available online at http://www.bcsardine.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/cpsa_discussion_paper_sust_devt.pdf

[6] Pynn, Larry (2013)

 

 

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BC’s Carbon Tax

Gordon Campbell’s Liberals hurled themselves headfirst into the climate change game in 2008 with the introduction of North America’s first revenue neutral carbon tax[1]. At a time when the BC Liberals were making headlines for social conservatism and support for offshore gas exploration, being a first mover in the climate change game was an unanticipated move.

2007-2008: The political climate.
Climate Change was on the tip of everyone’s tongue in 2008. Al Gore had just won the Nobel Peace Prize (in conjunction with the International Panel on Climate Change) and the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period was getting underway, albeit without the support of big players like the U.S. and China. Big business was also making public about faces, with Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson publicly stating support for a carbon tax[2] and withdrawing company funding for climate change deniers.

In keeping with this spirit, the BC government passed the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target Act into law in November 2007. This act legislated targets for emission reductions at 33% below 2007 levels for 2020, and 80% below 2007 levels for 2050.[3] In addition, the act legislated that the BC government become carbon neutral by 2010.

The carbon tax, the central pillar of the BC government’s climate change strategy, was formally announced in the 2008 budget. It was a pioneering attempt to put a price on carbon that has made BC the poster child for carbon tax, even earning accolades from the OECD as a ‘textbook example’ of good climate policy.[4]

Keeping your friends close, and your enemies closer
The announcement of BC’s carbon tax united an unlikely front with big environmental players like the David Suzuki Foundation and Sierra Club throwing their support behind Gordon Campbell, along with notable BC academics and big business. The political landscape was ripe for a dramatic policy move as it was a two party system pitting the right of center BC Liberals against the definitively left NDP. It has been argued that since the Liberals faced no threat of losing votes to the right, they pursued the carbon tax to endear themselves to center-left voters,[5] and it seems to have worked.

Implementing the academic model
BC followed the textbook carbon tax model to the letter. It began as a token tax at a mere $10 per tonne of CO2 that would increase at a rate of $5 per tonne of CO2 per year until 2012 at which point the tax would be subject to a government review. The initial price bump at the pumps was about 2.5 cents, hardly noticeable to everyday consumers, and more than offset by the $100 carbon dividend paid out to every adult British Columbian in the first year to help ease the short run financial burden due to demand inelasticity. The dividend and low introductory carbon price undoubtedly helped to secure public support for the tax in the first few years.

The Tax
The carbon tax was unanticipated as cap-and-trade systems were dominating climate change policy discussion and BC was an active participant in the Western Climate Initiative. The tax however offered BC some clear benefits.

BC was in an unusual emissions position with only 2% of C02 emissions coming from electricity (compared to 17% in Canada), while 36% of emissions came from transportation (compared to 27% in Canada).[6]  The transport sector was an easy target since carbon emissions from different fossil fuels can be estimated with reasonable accuracy and the calculated emissions can then be taxed on a per volume basis thereby setting a stable carbon price against which consumers can weigh their options of abatement. The intent was not to stop people from driving, but was rather a gentle nudge in the right direction made palatable to society and business by the initial low carbon price and kickbacks (dividends and tax revenue redistribution).

The carbon tax offered no exemptions in its first 5 years and any person or business who generated emissions by combusting fossil fuels was taxed at the same rate. This all encompassing tax satisfies the equimarginal principle and allows society to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost. The stable carbon price and the government’s credible commitment to not only keeping the tax, but also to raising rates over time, not only allowed firms and individuals to analyze the costs and benefits of abatement over a long time horizon, but also stimulated innovation. Furthermore, since administrative infrastructure was also already in place to collect gas taxes and fuel levies, expanding that infrastructure to collect a carbon tax was simple and cost-effective.

In 2013, the government granted permanent carbon tax respite to greenhouse growers. Although this does not exempt them from paying the carbon tax, it does provide them with a permanent grant which “will be set at 80 per cent of the carbon tax paid on natural gas and propane used for heating and CO2 production.”[7] In principle, since the growers still have to pay the tax they are still incentivized to reduce emissions, however the special status does threaten the ability of the tax to achieve emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost since users now face different carbon prices.

One hand taketh, one hand giveth back
Despite the misinformed rhetoric that dominates public forums claiming that the carbon tax is nothing more than a tax grab, the carbon tax is in fact revenue neutral by design and every dollar generated by the tax is returned to BC residents. Carbon tax generated tax reductions equaled $260 million in 2012/13.[8] The government implemented the non-taxable low income climate action tax credit to help mitigate the inherently regressive nature of a consumption tax (regressive meaning a tax that has a disproportionally negative effect on low income individuals) and the Northern and Rural Homeowner benefit which pays up to $200. Carbon tax revenues also allowed BC to lower the personal income tax rate (BC now has the lowest tax rate in Canada for individuals earning up to $122,000), and BC small business income taxes have fallen by 44%. Tax cuts to business (large and small) were also designed to dampen reduced competitiveness attributed to operating in a carbon tax environment, and in this sense redistribution addresses more than just regressiveness.

The race to the top?
BC’s carbon tax has been a success but BC’s overall climate strategy has a long way to go if BC is to achieve its emissions targets. The David Suzuki Foundation estimates that the carbon tax rate needs to rise to about $75/ton by 2020[9] to achieve emissions targets, something that will not happen given the government’s current tax review which froze the tax for the next 5 years. If we are serious about leading the race to the top (which I don’t think we are!) we need to combine carbon tax increases with a cap-and-trade system to cover non-fossil fuel combustion related emissions. Throw in the the development of the LNG industry, which is extremely carbon intensive, and you have a Province who will not be meeting their emissions targets. Emission estimates for one large LNG plant are 21million tonnes of CO2 per year (based on the equivalent of Shell’s plant buildout at full capacity), a very large number given BC’s target emissions are 40 million tonnes of CO2 for 2020, and 12 million tonnes of CO2 by 2050.[10]  Carbon emission from gas venting are not covered under the carbon tax.

That being said, BC has shown that a government can implement a carbon tax and still win an election (although they did win the election after the HST fiasco, so I am not sure that this isn’t simply reflective of a very forgiving electorate), and that is a feather that BC should proudly wear in our hat. Once other Provinces, States and Countries start to follow suit with their own carbon pricing mechanisms, thereby making competitiveness and carbon leakage less of a problem, I suspect we will see more aggressive government action on climate policy, even if it is only to woo the environmental vote.

References:
[1] Harrison K, (2013) “The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax” OECD Environment Working Papers, No 63. OECD Publishing. P. 8
[2] Exxon Mobil Climate Policy Debate Web. Accessed March 9, 2014 http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/current-issues/climate-policy/climate-policy-debate/overview
[3] Government of BC. 3rd Session, 38th Parliament. Bill 44 – 2007: Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Act
[4] Partington, P.J. Pembina Institute http://www.pembina.org/blog/757 Web accessed March 9, 2014.
[5] Harrison K, (2013) “The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax” OECD Environment Working Papers, No 63. OECD Publishing. P. 11
[6] Government of BC Livesmart BC Website http://www.livesmartbc.ca/learn/emissions.html Web Accessed March 9, 2014
British Columbia Ministry of Finance Myths and Facts about the Carbon Tax. Web Accessed March 9 2014. url: http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A6.htm
British Columbia Ministry of Finance Balanced Budget 2008 Backgrounder. Web Accessed March 19, 2014 url:http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/backgrounders/backgrounder_carbon_tax.htm
[7] British Columbia Newsroom Website. April 9, 2013. Web accessed March 9, 2014 http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2013/04/permanent-carbon-tax-relief-for-bcs-greenhouse-growers.html
[8] British Columbia Ministry of Finance Climate Action Secretariat. Web accessed March 9, 2014 http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A4.htm
[9] David Suzuki Foundation BC Carbon Tax Reality Check/Media Backgrounder Reality Check PDF. June 2008. Web accessed March 10, 2014http://www.davidsuzuki.org/media/news/downloads/BC_Carbon_Tax_Reality_Check.pdf
[10] Partington, P.J. Pembina Institute Blog 757. Web accessed March 9, 2014 http://www.pembina.org/blog/757

 

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