6 thoughts on “Social Construction”

1. Following last week’s discussion over political ecology and policy (that is to say the debate over what exactly the role of political ecology is, to provide complex and dimensional analyses of situations, or to do this and offer practical solutions and paths of action), my interest was particularly piqued by the amount of focus given over to the stakes of considering the social construction of nature. Again and again the readings for this week turned an eye to the effect of their task. It quickly became clear that William Cronon’s “The Trouble With Wilderness” was an important first step in this week’s topic, if not for its being chronologically first, then for its repeated invocation by the other authors. Originally published in the New York Times in 1995, Cronon’s piece evidently caused a stir, leading some to the extreme worry that he was somehow “against” the wilderness. And though this week’s authors seem to understand that Cronon’s discussion of wilderness is more nuanced than that, they still take on the ethically loaded burden of determining what an embrace of the concept will mean for us.

   David Demeritt’s 2002 article approaches this idea early on: “Some worry that constructionist arguments fail to take seriously the physical reality of nature, which demands our respect, if not for its own sake then because it will impact us materially in ways we will never be able to understand or ameliorate so long as we regard it as a mere projection of social interests.” (Demeritt, 768) Further on Demeritt glosses what he calls the “discursive constructionist” approach, “often intended to deflate expert confidence about the knowability and therefore manageability of these risks [climate change, nuclear power, genetic engineering, etc].” (774) Taking this further into poststructuralist influenced arguments that “reality” is constructed by language, Demeritt notes that “Critics complain that such a philosophical stance is relativist and politically dangerous, in so far as its nominalism about truth and reality licenses industrial objective scientific proof of it.” (775)

   James D. Proctor positions himself as “sympathetic to social constructivism though concerned that constructivists have not yet adequately clarified its epistemological complexities as suggested by the charge of relativism raised by their opponents.” (353) Proctor’s definition of his own positionality follows from his introduction to the perceived threat to nature, as posed by social construction theories. Quoting from the 1995 book Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction, “The so-called deconstructionist view…asserts that all we can ever perceive about the world are shadows…[the contributors, Soulé and Lease] agree that certain contemporary forms of intellectual and social relativism can be just as destructive to nature as bulldozers and chain saws.” (352)

   This leads me to the beginning of Bruno Latour’s discussion, where he charges “an artificially maintained scientific controversy” for feeding into anti-environmental rhetoric in Washington. (226) For Latour, this is something of a crisis of profession, he writes: “I myself have spent some time in the past trying to show ‘the lack of scientific certainty’ inherent in the construction of facts.” (227) Even further, on the same page, he goes on to say “Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives. Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies?” (227) Later in the article Latour arrives at the following maxim for the critic: “The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles.” (246)

   Questions:

   Where does this concern for the moral duty of the critic leave us? It seems problematic to take a field built on complicating knowledge, and then say that criticism must shoulder the burden of proof.

   If the concern over the stakes of discussing nature as socially constructed is so great (perhaps even to the extent that raising it as an issue is problematic in the realm of political policy), how does the critic proceed? Are there certain criteria (as suggested by the typological approaches of some of this week’s readings) set out for how the responsible critic must discuss “nature”? Is this not taking on some of god’s eye view position that Latour malignes?

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2. Victoria Padilla
   Reflection
   The social construction of nature
   When it comes to the social construction of anything –but especially of nature- it seems to me that there are meaningful conceptual specificities that require attention. Following Castree and Braun (1998) I agree that we have take into account that there is a material construction of nature and a semiotic construction of nature. These two are distinct yet highly interconnected concepts and even as it may appear so neither one necessarily imply any radical relativism. David Demeritt explained that perhaps the relation between these forms of ‘constructing’ nature can be explained in a somewhat dialectical form. The concepts and notion we have constructed about nature guide our material construction –i.e. physical intervention- of nature which in turn influences how we conceive nature. The issue at stake for many is how much room do this ideas leave for nature beyond human endeavor.
   Accordingly, the other -yet highly intertwined- lingering epistemological problem has to do with realism and the degrees of relativism implied by the different understandings of social construction. I tend to agree with James Proctor who argues for more nuanced conceptual grounds that allows for actual work to be done, instead of producing a sort of intellectual stagnations. For him the epistemological question of realism and relativism is answered by a sort of middle ground composed of Critical Realism and Pragmatism. So, following Proctor nature is a social concept with ontological basis that is formulated via social frameworks according to the needs of a specific context. However, as Critical realism implies the validation or higher consideration of certain forms of explanations and knowledge over others, which can be tricky since it tends to favor western scientific knowledge over other forms of local knowledge that can be as valid if not more in certain context. Perhaps the pragmatist side of his position answers to that kind of concerns, although I’m no entirely sure if that is clear.
   In any case, the problem lies in the political implication that all these kinds of statements have, especially regarding environmental concerns. One of the clear points of contention to William Cronon’s argument in ‘The trouble with wilderness’ was that it seemed to imply that there is no such thing as a wilderness out there, as a reality beyond humans that required human consideration and protection -from human actions. However, Cronon denied the existence of an untouched nature separate from humans as it was conceived under the historically constructed -male, North American, and somewhat racist- notion of wilderness, not the existence of nature ‘out there’ nor the need to care about it. Cronon’s point was more towards the two forms of construction discussed above (semiotic and material) and what they mean, than towards a relativization of the reality of nature. However the problem with Cronon, as Demeritt explained is that for ecologist the overall idea of the construction of nature is problematic because it implies a refusal to acknowledge the independence of nature by objectifying it as a means to human –I’ll add economic, political or even intellectual- ends. For Cronon and others in the environmental fields that are more allied to the constructionist idea, the notion of wilderness –biological diversity, untouched nature, etc- or the need to save it reify the externality of nature which in turn can have negative effects on peoples and nature.
   The idea that there is no such thing as untouched wilderness does not seem as controversial today as it may have been in the 1990s when Cronon dramatically stated that what people in North America knew as ‘wilderness’ was a social construct pervious to historization. These days it seems that claiming that everything is at least to some extent socially constructed – without any further consideration of what that really means- is not only common place but often an analytical dead end. This is when Bruno Latour reflections on the spirit of critique becomes crucial. The vulgar uses of oversimplified critical thought and opportunistic relativism, show that the aim of critique needs to change, to go from the ‘to debunk things’ -or to fight disciplinary wars- towards building better understandings of things. He argues for assemblage as the epistemological basis of this new direction, but what I get out of his reflection has to do more with the tone, the purpose and the uses of our work, than with the epistemological consideration. It seems clear that all these concerns have meaningful epistemological and political implication in academic work today and are of particular importance in the environmental fields.

   Question
   Is it still pertinent to discuss degrees of realism and degrees of relativism? Are we still concerned with matter of objectivity and subjectivity? Will there ever be a consensus? Or does the lack of consensus points towards the relativistic side of the spectrum as the winning side? Are middle ground epistemological positions such as that of Proctor the better choice? Is pragmatism more politically responsible than the more abstract positions? Do the political implications of these positions influence your preference or is it a more epistemological based decision?

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3. My background as a conservation biologist makes me believe that ‘wilderness’ conservation is an essential part of solving our current sustainability problems. Consequently, I tend to support modern scientific claims that highlight the ecological importance of ecosystems over arguments implying that “the actual phenomena known by science are themselves socially constructed in the same way that national identity and beautiful music are: it is only our conventional belief in their existence that makes them ontologically ‘real’ (Woolgar 1988, cited by Demeritt, 2002)”. I admit I have trouble comparing one’s taste for ‘beautiful music’ with our scientific knowledge on the ecology of trees, which is informed by a rigorous scientific methodological framework. On the other hand, I am not indifferent to the notion that practices in conservation biology often lead to inequalities and a clash of worldviews. For instance, Robbins, in his introduction to political ecology, successfully highlights the inconsistency of the western concept of wilderness when applied in Kenya. Expelling the Maasai in the name of ‘wilderness’ not only represents an environmental injustice but also a total incoherence because it pays no heed to the historical role that the Maasai played in shaping this ‘wilderness’. In this context, social constructivism appears informative and constructive because it permits to critically explore a taken-for-granted and deceptive mindset about our notion of the natural world and of humans’ relationship with ‘wilderness’.

   My biggest concern with social constructivism, especially in its strongest forms (presented as constructivism-as-philosophical-critique by Demeritt) is that it does not seem to leave room for the idea that nature possesses intrinsic value apart from human’s subjective valuation. The possibility for nature to possess inherent value implies that the existence of an organism is a separate entity to be valued, without any incidence of human life. This value has to be attributed with a complete metaphysical determination, free of humanism and psychological influence. Even if Cronon argues that nonhuman nature is “a world with its own independent, nonhuman reasons for being as it is (p. 87)”, I believe that his essay does not permit “learning to honor the wild – learning to remember and acknowledge the autonomy of the other (p. 89)”. On the contrary, strong constructivism “denies the importance of nature as an object external to human experience (Proctor, p. 362, citing Dickens 1996)”. Personally, I would agree with George Sessions that this perspective resembles an “anthropocentric humanism” and that social constructivism could “threaten to replace a long-disavowed natural reductionism with a social reductionism (Nicholas and Entrik, 1996, cited by Proctor).”

   In his essay, Latour critically questions much of his own work on the social criticism of science. He explains his frustration when observing “conspiracy theorists” using his own arguments for unproductive anti-science discourses, such as the claim that global warming is not an urgent issue because it is a socially constructed and that there are still scientific uncertainties. As Latour put it: “I am worried to detect, in those mad mixtures of knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation from the social neverland, many of the weapons of social critique […] dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives.” While he supports the idea of always critically evaluate the taken-for-granted scientific knowledge that originates from “particular standpoint”, he argues that the typical social critique (that he himself uses) is imperfect and that “there are inconsistencies and double standards that go largely unrecognized in the field”. Reading his article strengthen my doubts on where we are supposed to draw the line between “hard-won evidences” and “socially constructed impressions?” From what standpoint are we supposed to accept our scientific knowledge about climate change as unquestionable evidence, whereas the scientific premise, at least in the world of conservation biology, that nature must be preserved without human presence should be seen as socially constructed? Maybe Cronon is right when saying that wilderness is “the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human history (p. 69)”, but that does not necessarily makes the practice less ecologically valid and rational.

   I find very interesting and useful the attempt made by Proctor to present an alternative that ‘takes social constructivism seriously but does not rob us of our ability to speak some degree of truth about nature as a consequence (p. 353).” I am especially attracted by critical realism that accepts that “a certain social construction of our perspective of the natural world does not support the broader metaphysical claims associated with postmodernism and other varieties of construction talk”. I find appealing an approach that, while recognizing that different worldviews significantly affects people’s perspective of the natural world, still believes that some things really exist and that it is possible to know them relatively truthfully. Being able to confidently describe phenomena about the natural world (e.g., climate change, decline in biodiversity, ocean acidification) is fundamental to fight against environmental degradation. As Procter puts it, “truth-claims concerning the state of nature may not be a sufficient condition to justify environmental action, but they are in many cases a necessary condition” (p.353).

   Questions

   Are some environmentalists right in saying that social constructivism reduces the ontological weight of the nonhuman world and therefore allows for a feeling of mastery over nature? Or does it permit, like Latour puts it, to “emancipate the public from prematurely naturalized objectified facts (p. 227)”?

   Is it possible to assume that humans have the ability to partly know some truth about the external world at the same time than accepting that all forms of knowledge is socially constructed?

   Is an indispensable component of effectively addressing the environmental and social problems of modern industrial society some kind of ‘re-enchantment’ of our world, which would provide a more spiritual connection to ‘nature’, in the image of what Cronon describes as “the mountain as cathedral”?

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4. Reflection on the social construction of nature
   Colin Sutherland

   William Cronon’s piece ‘The Trouble with Wilderness; or Getting Back to the Wrong Nature’ (1995) was an excellent way to set the stage for what was to be an interesting week of reading. I instantly fell into the trap of defending environmentalism in my mind. I felt that during my first read through this piece I identified with those original readers, feelings of shock and betrayal by what was being written. While there was much I did agree with I found myself seeing a great deal that could be used against environmental efforts and arguments that in the wrong hands could discredit both environmental movements with strong social elements as well as those that completely ignore them. I asked myself what of the rights of the non-human yet living residents of the planet? What of the rights of those yet to come? Yet, at the same time, I found myself taking pride in Cronon’s work. Throwing Wilderness in our face and making us look at it for what it really was. I was also pleased that he was able to leave us with something to work with rather than tearing down wilderness and leaving us with only ruins. Wildness emerges as something that we can at least work with, a sense of nature that goes beyond a simply human-centric ideal. Regretfully, one idea that I continue to be critical of is the assumption that simply because humans have existed around the planet, humans have a right to be there. It is not that I contest anyone’s right to nature but the assumption without critical analysis that humans should be the benefactor and nothing else.
   Proctor (1998) and Demeritt (2002) both look at this idea of the social construction of nature as well. What I found is that perhaps there is value in other means of looking at nature, like the merits a pragmatist and realist viewpoint can give us. One reason I particularly like these readings, and Latour (2004) who follows, is that they show that social construction is not the be all and end all of our discussion on nature, or society for that matter. Of utmost importance was that I no longer had to feel that when I looked at nature I was looking into a black hole of social constructivism, there were still other options.
   Latour in particular became the light at the end of the tunnel, which was a bit of a surprise for me. This wad embodied in his assertion that we exist as an “[A]ntifetishist for everything you don’t believe in […] an unrepentant positivist for all the sciences you believe in [and…] a perfectly healthy sturdy realist” (241). I think authors often forget that even though they may commit to an epistemology, we simultaneously accept a number of them at the same time. Beyond this I was also pleased to hear a rallying call for a new approach to critique, one that not only deconstructs but also moves things forward. I found this particularly important because our reality, depending on what way you choose to see that reality, is that our social relationship with nature is becoming more important. I mean this with regards to environmental change and the realization that we are vulnerable not only to the physical dimensions of nature but also by how we construct it. If we do indeed want to continue a social construction of nature, or wildness, or whatever, and want it to be human centric there needs to be a redefinition to benefit those that Cronon claims the current (for the 90s anyways) definition excludes. I think this redefinition of nature goes beyond just environmentalism and policy, and seeps into that endless dimensions of human society.
   While I do get the sense that our academic place in this discussion on nature is to be hands off from the actions of society, I do not see how this approach is to improve anything besides our own readings lists. I feel like we have a responsibility to not necessarily disseminate information, impose viewpoints, and preach, but I do think that we should be having conversations with those outside of this immediate academic arena.

   Questions:

   With reference to Cronon, why do we immediately feel that all things that are socially constructed are of no value? Even if we construct a nature that excludes humans, can it not have value for some(thing)?

   Bill Willers, a biologist is quoted by Procter saying “Cronon may be correct that ideas of nature don’t exist outside of cultural understandings, but Nature in all of its self-governing complexity most certainly does”. How can our changing critique of nature, and the various ways one can talk about it, have a positive impact on the growth of a positive relationship with the Nature that Bill Willers says does exist?

   Are we willing to accept the existence of a nature that exists outside the realm of human interaction? Or, at the very least can we accept the idea of a nature that does not exist for the purpose of human existence but one that exists in tandem with humans?

   Is it dangerous to fight for the rights of non-humans in our critique of the construction of nature? By giving rights to the ocean, microbes and air quality to we disenfranchise humans? Or, are we indirectly empowering them in the long term?

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5. I’ve read the Cronon piece several times in the past, and am always moved by it. As an individual who has spent a lot of time and effort getting myself to the wilderness, I am forever trying to understand what drives me to be there, what privileges I’ve been gifted that make these experiences possible. It’s always interesting to think about how my wilderness trips which feel so distinctly individual are part of a much broader conversation about how wilderness is understood… but this is perhaps the a topic for another essay.

   At the end of the piece, Cronon makes an argument that we need to shift our understanding of wilderness to place ourselves in it; an understanding of wilderness as home. He argues for the development of self-criticism and self-awareness in order to make responsible decisions as to how to use, or not use, nature. But who has the pure choice to do so? And who defines ‘responsibility’?

   Proctor uses Cronon’s argument as an inroad to a much larger discussion concerning the social construction of nature. For Proctor, the issue of Cronon’s argument lies in its “mute embrace of relativism” which in part fostered significant backlash by environmentalists (358). For Proctor, the matter of relatitivism is paramount: “To call social constructivism “relativist” is to charge that, according to the epistemological perspective of anticonstructivists, constructivism is not a viable position from which knowledge can be produced. Relativism, in this sense, is less an extreme position to be vigorously denied than an epistemological challenge” (359). His hope seems to be that actively engaging with issues of relativism will allow scholars to move past these kinds of simplistic charges and further understandings of the social construction of nature.

   In contrast to Proctor, charges of relativism warrant little concern for Demeritt. Rather, his frustration lies in the lack of precision with which scholars use the term ‘social construction of nature.’ He has a point. Cronon’s piece, which caused quite a stir in 1996, now seems commonplace; in Geography, the phrase ‘social construction of nature’ is ubiquitous. For Demerritt, part of the issue lies in how geographers have addressed the philosophical underpinnings of their arguments: “There are important issues at stake in debates over the construction of nature, both political and philosophical. So much of the discussion, particularly among self-styled critical geographers, has emphasized its political implications that we may have lost sight of its philosophical ones” (786).

   Latour also turns to philosophy in his article on the failures critical scholarship. He states: “If we had to dismantle social theory only, it would be a rather simple affair…the difficulty lies in the fact that they are built on top of a much older philosophy, so that whenever we try to replace matters of fact by matters of concern, we seem to lose something along the way” (Latour 243). In sum, I think that Latour’s argument is that examining and changing philosophical foundations will allow scholars to move beyond the self-satisfying realm of critique such that the critic becomes “not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles” (246). Demerit seems to think that by being deliberate and cognizant of use of terminology and its philosophical implications, meanings of the social construction of nature will carry more weight. For Latour, these matters seem almost beside the point; that scholars don’t need to reform the terms of the conversation but begin a new one entirely.

   Questions: I found it curious that Proctor focuses extensively on pragmaticism, but this school of thought never makes an appearance in Demerit’s piece. Why might this be? Additionally, in what ways do their analyses of critical realism differ from each other?

   How do debates related to the social construction of nature relate to debates within political ecology?

   What exactly does Latour mean by ‘matters of fact’ and ‘matters of concern’?

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6. Reflections on Cronon (1996), Proctor (1998), Demeritt (2002) and Latour (2004) on the Social Construction of Nature

   by Marc

   To me, this stuff is the bread and butter of environmental geography, and perhaps political ecology as well (question – what’s the difference between them?).

   It is certainly interesting to reflect on the career trajectories of the authors of the different contributions. To what extent was the receipt of and response to Cronon’s argument shaped by Cronon’s stature as a full professor and veteran of environmental history? (How) was his argument read as a continuation of his earlier research, or was this contribution seen as ‘out of the blue’? Would things have been different if he were a ‘young Turk’ like Castree/Braun/Demeritt? The Demeritt/Castree/Braun trio developed the social construction of nature argument into a vehicle which launched them into careers and into major focal points of disciplinary debate in years to come – Demeritt’s social construction project ran very deep, resulting in many papers and a key contribution to the global warming discourse… With Proctor, the paper constituted one of a number of high-profile venue contributions to philosophical debate in geography from early in his career, which steered into related but different terrain concerned with ethics, spirituality and nature. Latour’s paper was from a Stanford talk, which in some ways explains its lack of argument – to me it seems more of a reflective piece, which is more allowed with senior than junior scholars… but I could be wrong.

   Cronon’s writing is magisterial, making broad claims about Romanticism, modernity and the like. While his essay could have been faulted on those terms, it seems (as per Proctor 1998) that most have attacked a relativist straw man that they interpreted him as promoting. I’ve come across citations to this essay in just about every environmental studies text I’ve read, but what is so interesting is how it lies almost entirely in the realm of discourse. As his evidence he cites poets and writers, and he cites periods of history and myths of society and spirituality to make his argument… for a biologist or forester then, I can see how they might swing toward a ‘material’ critique of the essay.

   In many ways, the papers by Proctor (1998) and Demeritt (2002) are very similar in their sympathetic-yet-critical (or shall I say ‘critical’) orientation to construction arguments. Both seek to clarify the positions and their chief claims, and neither seem to provide a satisfying response to the question implied by Demeritt (780-1, which I will paraphrase) about how to evaluate the merit of different truth claims. This is pretty much the crux of the issue, and while we can get ‘closer’ to the answer by structuring our choices around philosophical paradigms, it seems still elusive. Proctor’s argument is valuable though, that we can learn from pragmatism and critical realism in ways which inform our ongoing quest for compelling explanations. As a kind of rejoinder to these discussions, I thought the recent contribution from Simandan http://phg.sagepub.com/content/35/4/568.abstract was valuable in thinking some things through. Simandan promotes ‘statistical error theory’ as a (perhaps Popperian?) approach to assessing the validity of claims, which – while it sounds quantitative – is quite qualitative in the sense that it simply compares different explanatory frameworks and draws on judgement and argument to ‘line up behind’ (as Latour might say) particular frameworks. Barnes and Sheppard respond compellingly however, pointing out that a commensurable measure of ‘truth’ is a tad reductionist, and that even partial explanation is valuable… so the saga continues!

   I had read Latour (2004) before and found it wanting, and I found a bit more value this time around, but still not much. When he argues that criticality has gone off the deep end, I agree (who wouldn’t?). When he says we should develop new tools for new targets, I’m also on board – I sense his metaphorical diagnosis is valid. But his ultimate argument that we should seek to multiply rather than ‘subtract’ from reality doesn’t seem consistent with the arc of the paper. Aren’t the multitude of 9-11 conspiracy theories a way of multiplying the fact into a thing? But maybe I’m not understanding something here…

   QUESTIONS – Where should critical social constructionists of nature spend their energies? Should we seek to *refute* false realities by pluralising explanation? Or should we seek to consolidate explanations which lead to particular social actions?

   How can we move from an apolitical social constructionism to a political construction of nature which cares about providing better accounts of the material world?

   Since we can’t transcend our own ‘tainted’ capacities of observation, how can and should we promote our value as ‘explainers’ of the socionatural?

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