Afghanistan National Army has taken over the bulk of counterinsurgency operations in the country since 2014. This came in the aftermath of the change in the role and strategy of International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan to transfer a greater role on the battlefield against the Taliban to Afghan forces and perform in the training and advising capacity for the Afghan military. Three years after the transition and despite the intensifying security challenges and incurring rising casualty rates, the Afghan Army has managed to pull off the task and maintain a government’s control over much of the country’s major urban centers. The situation, however, will be sustainable if no step is taken to address the ever-exacerbating attrition rates in the Afghanistan National Army that is losing more soldiers in the battle and to desertion than it can recruit.

Consisting of approximately 350,000 personnel, The Afghanistan army has lost approximately 6500 soldiers, with another 10,000 wounded in the fight against various insurgency and terrorist groups in 2016 alone. More alarming, the army had to replace 170,000 of the force due to the career changes of the personnel, or simply due to their desertion of duties. To sustain its capabilities, Afghanistan National Army is expected to recruit at least 6000 new soldiers each month while it has only been able to absorb 5000 soldiers per month last year. The attrition of the forces has contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan which in turn invoked the need for the new US administration to increase the number of US forces in the country.

While the 130$ monthly salary of Afghan Army members have been the main attraction for young Afghans to join the military, the increasing risks of serving in the army for the soldiers and their families, corruption, and the political confusion with regards to encountering terrorism and insurgency increasingly discourage new recruitment. Demoralised by the lack of political clarity on their role, uncertain about the logistical support in operations, and fearful of inadequate medical facilities and support in case of injury there remains no wonder the attrition rates are so alarmingly high in the Afghanistan army.

References:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/20/ghost-soldiers-too-many-u-s-trained-afghans-are-going-awol/

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/afghan-security-forces-struggle-just-to-maintain-stalemate.html

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/personnel.htm

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/world/middleeast/civilian-casualties-in-afghan-war-are-unabated-in-2016.html

The Taliban has been a constant source of insecurity in Afghanistan since the early 1990s when the group first emerged to bring peace and Islamic rule to the war-torn country. Having established their Islamic Emirate by 2000, the group turned Afghanistan into a haven for Islamist jihadist from around the world which included Usama Bin Laden, the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Upon the intervention of the international community in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the group had to go underground to be able to operate and challenge the new Afghanistan government. The change in the nature of the Taliban and its mode of operation required and reflected a change in the types and sources of the group’s finances. The Taliban has been successful in bringing about this change which in addition to helping the group to sustain its operations financially, has helped it on other fronts as well. The Taliban’s successful diversification of its sources of income has been instrumental in its ability to maintain a degree of decision making independence, and a higher level of local integration that has in turn contributed to the group’s local popularity and legitimation.

Since the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, the group has secured a stable flow of funds from a variety of sources. It has benefited from facilitating and partaking in drug trafficking; it has established a taxation system that collects taxes from the farmers and small business owners within its territory, and it has found private international sponsors in neighboring countries and wealthy Gulf nations. Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) is another supplier of funds for the Taliban. More surprisingly, however, the US and the international allies in Afghanistan, too, have played an important role in funding the Taliban’s operations by purchasing security from the group for the local projects in the Taliban territory.

Although targeting the vast and varied sources of the Taliban’s estimated annual 2$ billion finances is not easily achievable, there are certain areas that Afghanistan’s international allies could make a difference in this regards. Development of Afghanistan’s infrastructure projects is one such area. Although the Taliban have been the greatest source of concern for Afghanistan’s security, the fact of the matter is that the group and its operations are primarily based in the southern and southwestern parts of the country. Ironically, the bulk of the infrastructure projects after 2001 have disproportionately been focused in those same regions even though the rest of the country suffers from a comparable infrastructure deficit. This pattern has been attributed to the dynamics of the ethnic politics in Afghanistan as the southern and southwestern regions are dominantly populated by Pashtuns who have been dominant in the Afghanistan politics in the past two centuries. For two reasons the international community can play a role in reducing the Taliban’s funds from the development projects in Afghanistan. Firstly, the international donors and supporters can determine where the distribution and investment of infrastructure funds. Secondly, any change in the patterns of infrastructure development in Afghanistan would not have any major adverse effect on the political stability of the country. 

Sources consulted:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19taliban.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8077301/Taliban-Britain-is-our-greatest-source-of-funding.html

http://www.dw.com/en/how-the-taliban-get-their-money/a-18995315

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/03/follow-the-money-the-talibans-growing-criminal-empire.html

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/how-the-taliban-gets-its_b_8551536.html

Access to clean water in Afghanistan is a challenge for the majority of the citizens. The situation in rural Afghanistan, however, is much direr. With approximately 80 percent of the country’s population living in rural areas, the fact that only 20 percent of this segment of the population, in contrast to 27 percent in the cities, has access to sanitary water supplies could shed some light on the scope of the challenge of providing access to clean water and sanitation in Afghanistan. From a myriad of factors that contribute to the problem of access to clean water and sanitation in Afghanistan, lack of adequate and efficient water infrastructure plays an important role. Unlike the urban environment which requires a more centralized and costly infrastructure planning, addressing the issue of insufficient water infrastructure through a relatively decentralized approach could make a tangible impact on the access to clean water for most Afghan citizens.

Decades of civil war and negligence has left Afghanistan with a huge water infrastructure deficit of 11 billion dollars. Lack of any comprehensive water management plan, or capacity for that matter, has further complicated the water situation in Afghanistan. While heavily reliant on rivers and the snow run-off from the mountains during spring and summer for agricultural purposes, no reservoir, water canals, or major dams have been developed to harness and control the country’s major source of water. Climate change’s impact on the geographical and timing patterns, as well as the quantity of the seasonal flow of water that manifest themselves in the form of flooding and droughts, have further intensified Afghanistan’s need for water infrastructure.

 Beyond these ecological impacts, not only do difficulties in having access to water supplies contribute to over 40 percent of local conflicts in rural Afghanistan, it does take a toll on the health and wellbeing of many Afghan citizens too. With over 20 percent of the rural population who deprived of any basic sanitary facilities practice open defecation, the alternative of traditional unsanitary latrines does not offer much relief considering the contamination risk they pose to the underground and surface sources of water that are commonly used by the rural population. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that 25 percent of the death of children under the age of 5 is attributed to water contamination and poor sanitation.

There is no doubt that addressing Afghanistan’s huge water infrastructure deficit requires a significant amount of financial resources and planning. Providing funds and designs for strategic water management projects such as dams, reservoir, sustainable and adequate irrigation systems are contingent on the central government’s political will and ability to negotiate with the international community and neighboring countries to achieve a workable arrangement for the region and the country. Addressing the most urgent aspects of Afghanistan’s clean water and sanitation crisis, however, does not require significant centralized and coordinated effort. Quite to the contrary, educational initiatives on basic sanitation and waste disposal does not require significant financial resources or equipment. Similarly, development of local water treatment facilities through decentralized and local collaboration that could be encouraged by government “water tariffs” in the supply of clean water in the rural Afghanistan would have an immediate impact on the scope and quality of water supply in the rural areas.

Sources consulted:

·       https://www.hydratelife.org/afghanistans-water-crisis/

·       https://borgenproject.org/water-quality-afghanistan/

·       https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/10/24/afghanistans-coming-water-crisis/

·       http://www.mintpressnews.com/MyMPN/afghans-lack-access-clean-water/