Hooks

My initial impressions after watching the film Paris is Burning was that it aimed to showcase the lives of black drag queens in the 1980’s in New York City. Considering that there was a lot of footage of black drag queens participating in balls, it seemed as if it was a film that celebrated this culture. Although many different drag queens were interviewed throughout the film, the focus seemed to always be on the actual balls and the black men performing their roles as drag queens. Therefore, I personally didn’t get the feel of a documentary since many times, the element of serious was missing. I believe this to be very important given that the film is not only about black drag queens but also about the hardships that many of them faced due to poverty and being excluded from their families. For this reason, I sympathize with Bell Hooks’ claim that the “televised images of black men in drag were never subversive; they helped sustain racism and sexism” (146).

Essentially, Hooks believed that the image of black men dressed up as drag queens were in fact disempowering, giving way to public misogyny and reinforcing everyone’s power over black women. Her key argument was that black men who participate in drag, whether they are gay or straight, did so in order to oppose a stereotypical representation of heterosexual black manhood. Nonetheless, she argues that such “subversive images” are altered because they actually express their fantasies of being upper class white women. In other words, the portrayal of oneself as a white woman becomes a “racialized fictional construction of the feminine” (147) that reaffirms patriarchal and colonialist views of black men as disempowered minorities. To be completely honest, I did not pick up on this the first time I watched the film. Although there were moments where I heard more closely about their hardships, these scenes would quickly fade out into images at the balls and clubs. So after watching particular scenes the second time around, it really became clear to me many of the problems that Hooks shared about the film. In fact, my initial impressions of the film clearly prove her point. If the film were intended to express the struggles of black drag queens at the time, the film should not have felt celebratory and glamorizing the first time around. One moment that caught my eye in Hooks’ text was when she mentioned how when watching the film, many people laughed even in the serious parts of the film, illustrating the inability of the film to connect with the audience on a deeper level.

The film is often described as being a powerful portrait of the lives of minority black drag queens, but when watching the film, there is nonetheless a distance vis-à-vis the actual struggles. Hooks cleverly points out that we do not know much about the families of the interviewed drag queens nor do we ever get a real sense of their hardships. It almost seems as if it is masked behind the fantasies of these black men who are always playing the role of the Other. Many of them often mention how they simply do not feel like they are men and that they feel more free when dressing up as drag queens. But Hooks makes a good point, what is the veritable image being projected of themselves when dressing up as drag queens? Is it a portrait of black gay pride or does it simply reflect the desire of being the Other, notably the glamorized white woman? This is not to say that drag does not succeed in disrupting gender norms and in freely creating one’s own identity (see Butler below), but it can also be seen as reinforcing divisions of race and class.

My personal impression is that the drag experience for these black men did not always appear liberating. Many times, it felt like a spectacle since many of their struggles were not addressed in the film. They were rather and literally masked by the glamorization of drag and of the ball world. But one could argue that Hooks’ point of view is just as misleading since she too is analyzing drag culture from the outside. Therefore, although it may appear that Livingston has portrayed drag culture in a certain way, this is not to say that this is what drag culture really means for these black men. What does being a drag queen truly mean for the identity of these men? Considering they have no real family, this experience may provide them with a sense of community. I guess what I am trying to say is that the film provides us with a viewpoint about drag culture seen from the eyes of Livingston, but this does not necessarily encompass everything. The camera is not always on and it is Livingston who chooses what to include and what not to include in her film. Due to the complexities surrounding drag culture and the many questions it raises, one cannot fully reduce the experiences of black drag queens to one film and by extension, to one unique reflection or critique.

Butler

Butler questions the interpellation or hailing of the subject put forth by Althusser in that she does not believe it to be capable in designating stable identities but rather reflects upon the possibility of the subject to refuse the law and the conformity that imposes itself on us. She explains that this can happen through “parodic inhabiting of conformity that subtly calls into question the legitimacy of the command, a repetition of the law into hyperbole, a rearticulation of the law against the authority of the one who delivers it” (122). Therefore, subjects occupy a certain ambivalence because the interpellator relies on the subject in order to maintain his role of power. In other words, there is a kind of reciprocity in that the interpellator cannot impose his power without the presence of the subject. There is thus a form of subversion that takes place since paradoxically, the subject gains a form of agency due to its symbiotic relationship with the interpellator.

Butler goes on to discuss ambivalent drag. She posits that Hooks’ claim that gay male drag is misogynistic assumes that drag is purely associated with male homosexuality and makes “male homosexuality about women” (127). According to this logic, “heterosexual desire is always true, and [homosexual] desire is always and only a mask and forever false” (127). In other words, Hooks failed to consider the possibility that gay male drag could just be a genuine form of pleasure and desire as opposed to a displacement and appropriation of women.

This seems to raise the question whether or not gender is simply a performance? Gay drag queens are projecting themselves as women but in male-bodies and thus are performing femininity despite being male. It seems for Butler that gender and by extension masculinity and femininity are social constructions based on culturally dominant norms. Therefore, viewed in this light, drag becomes very significant since it challenges such dominant norms and the notion that sex implies gender. Although conventional norms tell us how a male and how a female should behave, drag seems to illustrate that gender is not at all predetermined but instead a perpetual learning process, which ruptures the male/female binary. It can thus be seen that in the film Paris is Burning, contrary to Hooks’ assumptions, drag seems to subvert traditional gender roles by proving the possibility of movement from one role to another. Through drag, gender is performed and is no longer seen as misogynistic but rather revolutionary. This is precisely what creates the ambivalence since heterosexual norms are questioned through an imitation of heterosexual activity by gay male drag queens.

The problem

Although I can see how Butler’s point regarding the role of drag in subverting traditional gender norms makes sense, it is nonetheless contradictory in itself. It is true that gay male drag queens can redefine traditional gender roles by performing as women in male bodies and thus, give a new meaning to what gender means. In fact, we really begin to question that biology is the sole reason why we think of men as men and women as women. We are inclined to doing so precisely because in many societies, sex determines gender. Nonetheless, one cannot help but overlook the fact that in the process of achieving to subvert these gender roles, they paradoxically act within the norms of heterosexual society. Acting like a woman can be seen as a form of conformism since femininity as performed in drag is after all just another gender role determined by conventional/dominant norms. I guess this is slightly what Hooks is getting at when she claims that drag culture glamorizes the white heterosexual culture. How does one then categorize such a form of subversion? Is drag truly subversive or does it simply perpetuate the very stereotypes that it seeks to refute?

It is no surprise that the most important phrase in this reading, repeated several times, is when Williams states that “culture is ordinary”.  But of course, like most texts we read, we wonder: what does that mean? This means, according to Williams, that “every human has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning” (4). He believes that a culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions and the new observations and meanings. Therefore, one can deduce that there are things that remain fairly static in a culture (known meaning and directions; tradition for example) and things that are constantly evolving and changing (new observations and meanings). Moreover, he explains the two ways in which culture is defined: a whole way of life and the arts and learning. Although some writers only consider one of these definitions, Williams believes that both are significant. For example, when we consider an individual to be very cultured and well-educated, we are thinking of the arts and learning whereas when we ask someone about their culture or where they are from, we are clearly referring to a whole way of life. The two meanings thus make very much sense depending on the context.

Where things get interesting is when Williams discusses the two senses of culture, mainly because he refuses to recognize them.  First, he explains the distinction being made between cultivated people and ordinary people. He uses his personal experience in a teashop in Cambridge to explain how these “cultured people” attempt to exclude all those who they felt were not cultured on the basis of their trivial differences of behavior or the variations of their speech habits. Williams says although we cannot stop them, we can ignore them (5). Second, he discusses those who are culture-vultures. He refers to these people as highbrows and superior prigs who reject any culture that is not part of the upper class. Evidently, Williams is strongly opposed to this form of exclusion. This is precisely why he believes that culture is ordinary; culture cannot be limited to one group but is rather accessible to everyone. For Williams, culture has not at all grown from the upper class or elite groups but rather from the working class and what he calls “the masses”. His view on culture further implies his support for the working class and his disagreement with Marx’s view that we live in a “dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant …” (8). Williams believes that the way of life of the working class, by its “emphases of neighborhood, mutual obligation, and common betterment …” (8) is in fact the best foundation for the future of English society.

Although what Williams raises is a pertinent question in cultural studies, is an “ordinary” culture truly possible? Or will elitist attitudes always search to produce the distinction between “cultured” and “uncultured” people? The fact of the matter is, William’s idea that culture is ordinary emphasizes and makes clear, whether one wants to recognize it or not, that culture is found in the commonplace and not in the exceptional. Whether or not those of the upper class are willing to come to terms with this is a completely different story.

Benjamin’s essay discusses the role of technological reproduction in determining aesthetic experience, specifically looking at the effects of film and photography in altering our perceptions of art. In a way, he sees technological reproduction as a means of creating new art, contributing thus to the loss of the aura of a work of art. Benjamin defines the aura as “[a] strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be” (23). In other words, the loss of the aura would mean that our perception towards the work of art changes due to the influence of new technologies.

Benjamin begins by stating that the work of art “has always been reproducible” (20). This basic fact leads him to question the extent to which technological reproduction has influenced not only our perception of art, but also the artistic process. He argues that technological reproduction modifies the way in which we perceive all known works of art and thus, this modifies their effect. Benjamin also interestingly mentions how it [technological reproduction] had also “captured a place of its own among the artistic process” (21). As a result, the reproduction of art via technology imposes itself as a new form of art, thus posing a problem for the original or traditional form of art.

This brings us to the problem of authenticity. Benjamin explains that the number one thing lacking in the reproduction of art is “the here and the now of the work of art – its unique existence in a particular place” (21). He explains that in technological reproduction, the work of art loses its full authority because of two reasons. First, the reproduction process is more independent of the original than manual reproduction. Second, technological reproduction can displace a copy of the original to other situations or contexts that are otherwise inaccessible to the original. Therefore, the presence of the original work is crucial for authenticity since the latter is “the quintessence of all that is transmissible in it from its origin on, ranging from its physical duration to the historical testimony relating to it” (22). He explains the difference between the images seen by the naked eye compared to the images reproduced by photography. Evidently, the images taken by a photo can be reproduced whereas the images seen by the naked eye are unique and “escape natural optics altogether” (21).

It appears nonetheless that for Benjamin, it is the reproduction of these works of art that destroys their “aura”. I can understand this distinction when dealing with classic works of art like the Last Supper in that seeing this painting in real life is much different than simply finding the image on Google. However, is it really important that all objects be authentic? The reason I ask is because we live in a world where virtually everything is reproduced and where the original in many cases has been forgotten. Media constantly reproduces the reality and produces something new for example. What is produced often has nothing to do with the truth. Moreover, reproduction and authenticity becomes problematic when thinking of other contemporary examples such as religion. For example, Islam, as interpreted by some of its extreme followers, does not seem to correspond to the authentic word of God found in the Quran. In some cases, the Quran seems to have been reproduced and used as a means for justifying violence. I believe this is what Benjamin meant when he was talking about the politicization of art.

There was no shortage of entertainment in reading the back and forth between Searle and Derrida. Although the debate started with Derrida’s critique of Austin’s work regarding the notion of communication, it quickly turned into a battle between Derrida and Searle. Searle published a reply to Derrida’s critique of Austin in which he was ill pressed to suggest that Derrida was somehow attacking Austin. However, Searle only came to this conclusion due to his misreading of Derrida’s original work. Ironically enough, it was in his original work that one of Derrida’s main points was the “necessarily possibility” of such misreading. That is, that one can never be sure of one’s intended message.

Basically, what Austin views as “failure” or “infelicities”, Derrida views as a “possibility”. He believes that language should not be viewed from a unique perspective since this excludes a large part of communication. Derrida introduces the notion of iterability to emphasize the ways in which repeating utterances over and over again in various contexts can come to create different meanings and interpretations. Without iterability, we would be unable to question the meaning of these utterances. According to Derrida, by labeling speech acts as “parasitic”, Austin is assigning a pejorative identity to certain speech acts while considering others as “normal”. In other words, one cannot view the speaker’s discourse as possessing absolute power but rather as indeterminate and polysemous.

Responding to Searle’s accusations that he was attacking Austin, Derrida replied with “Limited Inc. a b c …” in which he broke down Searle’s misreading in order to show how things can be taken out of context to suggest a meaning other than what they were intended to convey. Poignantly, Derrida used this technique to creatively discuss the idea of “citationality”. That is, text can always be taken out of context, and placed in another context, outside the author’s control. Essentially, Derrida is explaining that his intent was never meant to attack Austin, but merely to discuss his theory of speech acts. This really underscores the idea behind the intention inherent in language and how it can easily be misinterpreted. Nowhere does Derrida claim that intentionality plays no role in meaning and communication; he simply does not regard it with a great degree of importance. Although Derrida recognizes the speaker’s intention, he cleverly points out that the intentions attached to the utterances of the speaker become ambiguous and unimportant once they are delivered since the speaker is no longer in control of them. Viewed in this light, Derrida is not attacking the notion of intentionality but is rather questioning its omnipresence in a speech act.

Interestingly enough, I got the impression that Searle’s reply to Derrida was emotionally charged, rather than backed by logic. In fact, Derrida, in discussing his debate with Searle, suggested that there is an “ethical directive that one actually read and engage with the work one is attempting to critique”, and that Searle failed to do this. As a result of this, many have actually suggested that to label the back and forth between Searle and Derrida as a debate is actually a misnomer. Frankly enough, I would have to agree – it never seemed evident that Searle, like Derrida points out, engaged in the discussion. Two sides have to engage with each other for a debate to exist; Searle was attacking his idea of what he believed Derrida to be saying rather than what Derrida actually wrote.

In How to do things with words, Austin introduces several concepts to explain his view on how utterances that he names performatives affect actions in the world. His primary belief is that sentences with truth-values (meaning they can be true or false), although they exist, do not constitute the large range of utterances we encounter on a day-to-day basis. He gives many examples of utterances known as performatives that are neither true nor false (Ex. “I do”). The words “I do” indicate that we are doing something, namely marrying and that such an act is described by “saying certain words”. This is precisely what Austin means by performative utterance; these are utterances that are not meant to describe and thus, have no truth-value (cannot be true or false). They are rather deemed felicitous or infelicitous. Moreover, these utterances are not merely sentences that are spoken, but they serve to perform a particular kind of action. Like in the example cited above, the words “I do” are uttered not only as an “outward and audible sign” (166) but signify the act of marriage. Austin explains that when such acts go wrong or fails, like in the case of marriage or betting, the utterance is then not false but unhappy.

The idea of a performative quite simply put is that the things we say are often transformed into action. We make things happen by using words. When, for example, a man and a woman are declared husband and wife, the individual marrying them has used a particular utterance that is not simply descriptive but that performs an act by displacing the man and woman from simply being a couple to being a married couple. Thus, this utterance is a felicitous speech act since the couple has legitimately been married (the act is sincere and is conventionally accepted). Such an act can nonetheless in many instances be considered null or void. If as a joke, I pronounce my two friends as husband and wife since they are always acting like lovebirds, this is infelicitous; I have not actually married them. Although the act is achieved, it is considered a lie or is insincere so the act is void or without effect. According to Austin, all utterances are naturally performatives. In other words, by saying something, we are always doing something. Performatives are not merely utterances that create action but as Austin suggests, create social realities. But do these performatives truly create realities in all contexts? Is it only the speaker being considered? Who exactly establishes felicity?

Austin asks one among 3 interesting questions that I will address: “How widespread is infelicity?” He claims that infelicity is an “ill to which all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, all conventional acts: not indeed that every ritual is liable to every form of infelicity (but then nor is every performative utterance)” (168). It seems that the message that he is trying to convey is that performatives are prone to infelicity. We can deduce that when a performative is regarded as a conventional act or procedure, it will be deemed as improper or infelicitous. Nevertheless, Austin recognizes that not all performatives are prone to infelicity. I am nonetheless confused here. I thought that one of the conditions for felicity is that social conventions are followed. But given that we live in a society that adheres to a set of standard rules and conventions, would this mean that in applying the notion of performative within our social constructs, we are merely victims of an infelicitous existence? It also seems that the notion of an accepted conventional procedure is questionable since it is difficult to define what is accepted. For example, the utterance “I divorce you” said three times constitutes a divorce in certain Islamic practice; however, this is not unanimously accepted. It is thus interesting to posit that performatives can be socially contested thereby invalidating the performative act. As a result, Austin’s claim that all utterances are natural performatives suddenly becomes questionable in that they do not always seem to enact the subject into action. However, how does one classify the speech act “I divorce you”? Is it a felicitous or infelicitous act? Can the receiving side (the woman in this case) even determine the success of the performative act or is it only the man? Evidently, this is where things become problematic, which means this is a good place to stop … for now at least.

My first thought upon reading this story: “this story is just messed”. Kafka’s depiction of the penal colony is extremely disturbing and troubling. I am really unsure how to interpret its meaning as the story seems to take me in all different directions. Of course, one could analyze it in so many different ways, or simply, examine the story for what it is: a disturbing tale of suffering and torture. One particular theme that is difficult to ignore is that of justice and punishment. The penal colony seems to operate on a very rigid system of punishment that is best captured by the officer’s infamous quote: “Guilt is never to be doubted”. In other words, those who are accused of a crime should not be given the opportunity to defend themselves but instead, are guilty without question. The accuser is always right whereas the accused is always wrong. This seemingly unjust process of condemnation is then followed by a brutal and torturous massacre of the condemned. The idea is to use a machine or apparatus that slowly rotates the prisoner’s body and cuts it repeatedly with numerous needles in aims of inscribing the commandment that the prisoner is supposedly guilty of violating. This is meant to teach the prisoner a lesson and to enlighten him on what commandment he has violated. In the case of the condemned man in the story, it was: “Honour your superiors”.

Aside from the fact that this punishment process seems barbaric and only seen in movies such as “SAW” and the “Human Centipede” (by the way, trailer is very disturbing; refrain from watching), what is more interesting to me is the perceptions of the explorer and the officer regarding this execution procedure. On the one hand, the explorer finds it to be unjust and extreme. On the other hand, the officer lauds it greatly, seeing it as the greatest form of justice possible. Can there really exist such a large divergence in one’s point of view about justice? Evidently, it seems almost natural to believe that the officer is an insane and sadistic psycho who has clearly been surrounded by prisoners far too long. His perception of justice seems to be completely distorted, but in a way, understandably so, since he has been in the penal colony for almost all his life. This explains his belief that guilt can never be doubted in that everyone in the penal colony is guilty of something. The officer seems to have developed a very jaded view of humanity given his incessant contact with prisoners and in a way, feels obliged to fulfill a moral duty (this ironically being in a very brutal and inhumane way). He relishes completely in the power of being judge of the colony and of being able to bring justice by executing prisoners with the apparatus. Maybe he is trying to make them feel (no pun intended) how guilty and how awful they truly are as human beings. We can try and justify what the officer could have been thinking or we can simply read him as someone who is insane and just pure sick. He finds pleasure in the pain of others and wants to see them suffer and pay. But since the officer views everyone as being guilty, we could even read this story from a religious point of view (which I will not get into details here) in the sense that most religions share this same belief. Maybe he viewed the old Commandant as God and himself as a prophet who is fulfilling God’s wish of punishing the sins of humanity. Oh that’s right, I said I wouldn’t talk about that here, maybe in class!

I think it’s also necessary to consider the explorer in all of this. Although he is against the officer’s severe way of punishment, one cannot help but notice his passivity. One can compare him to the reader of the story since he doesn’t seem to have much influence on the plot. He is simply there to watch the entire scene unfold. It is even mentioned in the story that the explorer did not care much about the apparatus and simply observed the prisoner with indifference. It is important to note that the explorer is a Western investigator who is sent out to study criminal procedures in all different parts of the world. It is possible that he is emotionally detached by the officer’s disturbing beliefs given that he has already been subjected to all kinds of cruelty. He doesn’t really seem to be sympathetic to the prisoner despite his disagreement with the cruel punishment. It is even mentioned in the text that the judicial procedure had not “satisfied” him. This is quite mild in terms of emotion considering the extent of the brutality of this procedure. Why would the explorer be “touched” by the officer’s severe conviction rather than be disturbed by this? In fact, the only time the explorer is “greatly troubled” is when the machine breaks down and slaughters the officer. This is definitely difficult to grasp since there seems to be an ambiguity in the explorer’s stance about the whole situation.

This brings me to the ending. What are we supposed to make of it? The explorer decides to leave the colony in a boat, leaving the soldier and condemned man behind. I guess the officer’s brutal death must have really got to him so he immediately wanted to leave. But how is it that the details of the nature of the execution did not trouble him as much? This is difficult to grasp. Maybe he was just so disturbed by the end that it was all too much for him to handle. After the officer’s death, the explorer goes with the soldier and the condemned man to the teahouse in the colony where the old Commandant is buried. There, they see inscribed on his grave a prediction that he will rise again. It’s interesting here that only the explorer doesn’t find this humorous, almost as if he was finally scared of the power of this perverted system of justice. This could perhaps explain his prior indifference, simply regarding the officer’s belief as something he had already seen before. There is still something unsettling between the humour and the horror in that final scene at the old Commandant’s grave. Could this be a critique of society that tortures and controls its people both physically and psychologically? It definitely seems pertinent today. All in all, this story leaves room for a plethora of interpretations. I think this was part of Kafka’s intentions; we are forced to question the significance of his story on so many different levels and at many times we wonder: what does that mean? Moral of the story – there is definitely more questions than answers. This should however stimulate an interesting discussion next week!

To say that Lacan’s “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason, Since Freud” is somewhat of a difficult read would be a gross understatement.  Those not versed in the fundamentals of psychoanalysis or Freudian Psychology would most definitely have a hard time in attempting to understand the complexities of Lacan’s discourse.  My attempt to analyze Lacan’s work would do no justice as I find some of his concepts too abstract to grasp.  However, for the sake of some casual blogging, I will attempt to shed light on some of the aspects that I believe Lacan was attempting to convey.

In the most general of analyses, I do believe that what Lacan was generally trying to say was that language exists in our subconscious and that through speech we are able to reflect on the world in our own subjective manner.  He goes on to add that the development of speech is the beginning of the symbolic order of the universe.  Put more clearly, as we reach the age in which we are able to speak, the language present in our unconscious lends itself to speech, allowing us to subjectively see the world and make sense out of it.  I speculate that maybe this is why as human beings we are always striving to confirm the existence of an established order in the universe.  It can sometimes be quite difficult to accept the notions of randomness and obscurity when lending interpretation to the events of our lives; order gives birth to meaning and in doing so, affirms our place in the universe.  Lacan further emphasizes this point in his explanation of the signifier and the signified, in which he places primacy to the signifier.  I think what he is trying to say here is that by establishing the algorithm signifier/signified, the process of signification can take place.  That is, the world is composed of signs that have no inherent meaning attached to them.  Instead, they [signs] garner meaning through the difference between other signs, a process that is ascribed via language.  This is exactly how metaphor serves to invoke a greater meaning/lesson through seemingly unrelated language.  The process at work here is one of signification; one is able to draw a deeper meaning associated with language not intended to be literal.  Of course, at the heart of this is the notion of subjectivity and how as subjects we help to move along the process of signification.  Therefore, just as Freud had suggested that our dreams provide insight into our unconscious and our suppressed desires and true feelings, language may serve to express our notions of how we see the world and, more provocatively, harbor the inner yearnings of our unconscious.