Hi all,
Apologies for the delayed posting.
Here are questions from those of you who emailed yours to me.
from Nick:
For this week’s reading, I want to ask whether folks think The Clay We Are Made Of might be a viable example of how a non-Indigenous scholar might be able to consider viable ethical research frameworks based upon the fundamentals of what Susan Hill lays out. I find it pretty interesting that Roy and other Indigenous historians we have looked at this term offer extensive introductions that lay out the strengths and limits of their methods, sources, and cultural knowledge but some of the non-Indigenous scholars we have read, stop short of discussing the limits of their decolonizing lens, if they mention it all.
I wonder how we might consider Hill’s point that for the Haudenosaunee, “the belief that creation is a constantly occurring and reoccurring process rather than something that happened once in the long-ago past,” (Hill 17) might be a viable framework to look for elsewhere. That is not to say we try to find some totalizing notion of Indigenous time and past but rather if we can learn from scholars such as Hill to read between the lines and look for different frameworks and ways of knowing that might guide non-Indigenous scholars to ask better questions of sources. Coming back to my question around ethics, Hill’s conclusion lays out the groundwork for what considerations must be made if we are to move forward with any sort of effective reconciliation project, outlining the importance of land claims, education, and environmental responsibility. I wonder if we might use this as a framework for approaching non-Indigenous ethical scholarship?
from Vicki:
A theme that Hill revisits throughout The Clay We are Made of is that of continuity. She discusses the importance of continuity in showing Haudenosaunee connection to land, to understanding and working towards reconciliation, and also in bringing a more inclusive understanding to Haudenosaunee history overall. I feel as though she addresses continuity in two specific ways (1) by interweaving published sources, oral histories and origin stories together to create a coherent (and continuous) dialogue and history and (2) by highlighting the ways that this method of inquiry and discussion illustrates a Haudenosaunee history that is continuous and adaptive, instead of fragmented and disconnected.
We’ve touched on this concept of continuity before in several class discussions, but I feel like Hill wants to bring the discussion to another level. So, on the theme of continuity: What are the wider implications of Hill’s approach, both disciplinarily and for Haudenosaunee and Indigenous history in Canada overall? In what ways might it be subversive, and what might it subvert? How does the fact that Hill is framing these arguments in wider discussions about land occupation and rights relate to her claims about continuity? How might it also relate to ongoing discussions in Canada about land rights and claims?
I am interested in Hill’s presentation of sources. For large segments of the book, Hill bases her arguments in non-Indigenous written material. When examining these documents, she tends to present the quotes as long block quotes. Her quotes are abnormally long–for most historical methodologies, a bit of paraphrasing and much shorter quotes would suffice. I wonder why Hill does this. Perhaps it relates to creating a usable history that doesn’t just provide analysis, but also provides a host of evidence to base land claims around. By providing quotes in full, Hill not only offers readers a strong analysis, but also a host of contextualized documents to use independently of the book. It also seems to stress just how biased, fallible, and heavily used the sources are. As a result, it is important to not just cherry pick the documents, but instead reframe them in the context of Haudenosaunee ties to the land. So, my question: what is gained and lost by consistently providing such lengthy quotes?
I’m interested in Hill’s proposal for a new definition of the beginning of Mohawk (and by extension all Haudenosaunee) and European “contact.” Instead of locating the beginning of this relationship in a short and violent confrontation in 1609 with Champlain and his French forces—an event that has indeed been used in legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Canada as a precedent for establishing Mohawk rights—Hill suggests we consider two instances of “interaction and exchange” (85) in later years as the beginning of relations: The 1613 Kaswentha Treaty, or the first recorded visit of a European to a Haudenosaunee village in 1634. Doing so, Hill contends, could re-centre peaceful and reciprocal relations between the settler-state and Haudenosaunee nations, instead of foregrounding them in violence and disagreement.
My question here is: how can we take cues from Hill to work within and against a politics of periodization? How can historians shuffle around, decentre, and destabilize “events” that discursively produce material consequences for Indigenous peoples? What other “events” have been damaging to Indigenous peoples in contemporary struggles for sovereignty and self-determination?
My second question is to do with reading and interpreting Indigenous cosmology and creation stories. Hill’s foregrounding of Haudenosaunee thought and philosophy is part of what allows for her re-reading and Indigenization of these histories. But to what extent could settler scholars participate in a similar practice of exegesis? At what point does the cultural knowledge needed to interpret these stories fall within spiritually and intellectually qualified members of the community from which the story derives? However, as Hill also points out, in regards to the Haudenosaunee name for the earth and the history of how that name came into being, “everything a person could possibly need to know is there.” Hill thus urges us to fight the temptation to “know more” and “discover deeper meaning” (3) in ways that I think might challenge some of the exegetical or interpretive strategies implemented by settler scholars.
This book felt like it was doing something really heavy and substantial in terms of actual decolonising history but I simultaneously found it hard to draw out her overall argument, beyond a kind of wholesale re-writing/re-storying of Haudenosaunee history, so I look forwards to hearing everyones thoughts tomorrow. I really value everyone’s questions above, particularly the ideas about cosmogonies. I am reminded of a quote by the Portuguese writer Pedro Neves Marques, “There is only one earth,” as the saying goes, but this earth is open to many worlds, mediated by different ontologies, with very different nature-culture dynamics…”
I suppose my question is building on this, and I want to ask what this history (aka if this history was granted similar legitimacy to the work of white settler historians and anthropologists by the Canadian state) could mean for legal restitution and settlements. Thinking along my own line of research, I am thinking particularly of reading against the currently very individualist forms of recompense for residential schooling (eg. the Common Experience Payment, which (until 2012) required individuals to prove they had attended a residential school, and the Independent Assessment Process, which dealt with individual cases of sexual or physical abuse). If we truly recognised the interdependence of self with social world, land, and ecologies (and thus recognised that the kind of harms experienced by Indigenous peoples could not be healed by giving individuals a small amount of money), then these worlds and environments would also need substantial redress. It is hard to conceive what this healing/restitution could be, but I wonder whether we can take cues from Hill to begin to think in this directions. Thoughts? (I’m sorry, this is more of a statement with a question mark at the end).
I found the structure of Hill’s book to be thought-provoking and very different from the ways other scholars have approached chronologies of their own subjects this term. She begins with a series of stories connected to the Haudenosaunee cosmogony and concludes with an analysis of the various continuing land claims made by Haudenosaunee peoples. Along the way, she repeatedly emphasizes the way that the Confederacy held up their end of a number of agreements while the British and Canadian governments found ways to circumvent their own obligations. Hill states, and this structure demonstrates, that her intent is to support and advocate for reconciliation and decolonization efforts. To my mind, her strategy to connect and blur the line between the “traditional” and “non-empirical” knowledge of Haudenosaunee creation with the “modern” and “empirical” knowledge produced by documented negotiations and treaties strikes me as particularly effective. As a reader, I’m drawn into the broader narrative of the Haudenosaunee’s historical relationship with their land, and I’m convinced that contemporary efforts at reconciliation and decolonization are necessary. This might be a function of my ignorance of much of this history, but I wonder how Hill’s strategy sits alongside other histories that explicitly call for reconciliation and decolonization?