2019 was already the bloodiest year on record for Mexico as more than 34,000 homicides were recorded, a vast majority of them can be attributed to the ongoing gang violence. So it is more than disconcerting that 2020 is now on track to top that record once again as homicide rates spiked as the worst pandemic in living memory strikes the country. (Grant, 2020) Cartels are now operating in a free-for-all with almost full impunity as Mexican law enforcement, already in a less than ideal shape before the pandemic, is stretched thin to deal with the conflict.
117 people died within 24 hours in Mexico on June 7, 2020, marking the most violent day in the country since the pandemic began and an exceptional spike from prior levels. This is in stark contrast to the rest of Latin America, which actually saw a decline in violent due to pandemic measures limiting mobility and public gathering. But as other Latin American countries asserted their national authorities, the Mexican state is retreating. (Grant, 2020)
Two main points can be made: first, Covid-19 has created a power vacuum in many parts of the country as the government is clearly not up to the challenge, hence bestowing the cartels more opportunities for expansion and growth; second, that power vacuum is a dangerous environment that is now propelling the illegal armed groups further into rebellion territories as the cartels act violently with impunity and forcibly perform critical civic functions that the government are meant to perform, thus it accelerates a growing resemblance to civil wars elsewhere in the world where both state capacities and states’ monopoly on violence are diminished while cartels proceed to militarize and govern their territories.
State of war before COVID
The formal start of the Mexican drug war began with a proclamation by former President Vicente Fox and the Mexican military’s intervention to reduce drug-related violence in Mexico, in coordination with the US government. However, the cartels themselves and the drug trafficking business’s roots go way back to the 1920s and 1930s when they were formed to supply for the drug demand in the United States, largely as distribution and logistics channels for Colombian cocaine. (Brophy, 2011)
Fast forward through decades of growing prominence of Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel and, most recently, CJNG, in particular, the drug war began with a concerted military campaign to counter drug-related violence. Ironically, the very same campaign witnessed a substantial jump in drug-related homicides since it began in 2006, reversing a downward trend of 15 years prior to the campaign. (Enamorado, 2016) According to the US Department of Defense, 150,000 died and 27,000 disappeared between December 2006 and March 2012 due to consequences of the cartel wars. 12,500 and 22,500 homicides directly related to organized crime were recorded in 2017 and 2018, respectively. (Calderón, et al., 2019)
Despite the astronomical death toll, the cartels were not just capable of holding their own, their operations metastasized into other related criminal enterprises and continued to evolve in their tactics and paramilitary capabilities, benefiting in part from the globalization of finance and weapons trade. The cartels have a well-documented history of activities in weapon trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and other forms of racketeering.
The level of militarization and the cartels’ reach in local governance in their territories are two major idiosyncrasies that separate them from criminal organizations elsewhere and move them closer to the columns of rebel forces. First, the paramilitary capabilities are often nothing like what we commonly associate with urban criminals. High tech weaponry like machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, both unequivocally designed for use in large scale warfare, was readily available at some of the cartels’ disposal when they go on the offence or engage with competitors, police and the military. More often than not, their firepower substantially outrank the ones wielded by law enforcement. (Brophy, 2011)
Apart from the highly lucrative illicit drug trade and seemingly endless supplies of advanced weaponry, the structural factors around socioeconomics and demographics also meant little resistance to the cartels’ recruitment and mobilization efforts. RAND National Defense Research Institute rate the Mexican border cities, long the hot zones for cartel activities and drug trade, to be highly susceptible to continued unrest. (Paul, et al, 2011, p.7-8)
An underdeveloped local economy and a demographic “youth bulge” have lowered the cost of operations and helped cartels tap into a massive pool of unemployed or underemployed young males ideal for the cartels and their paramilitary executors. The end result is a highly capable and violent combat force that has cemented the cartels’ control.(Paul, et al, 2011, p.7-8) The finding is corroborated by another research into the correlation between inequality and crime rates during the drug war. From 2007 to 2010, one point increase in Gini coefficient means a 36% increase in drug related homicides per capita. (Enamorado, et al., 2016)
And much like the state, cartels control territories. And much like extractive insurgents, the cartels have benefited financially from their dominant positions as local authorities, collecting taxes on both legitimate and illicit businesses conducted on their territories. Whether it be drugs, weapons, human trafficking or other forms of contraband, moving these products across territories add to the territories’ commanding cartels’ revenue beyond their main operations. The cartels also charge protection fees, similar to those charged by mafias elsewhere, from local businesses that do not want trouble. (Brophy, 2011)
An important distinction between the cartels and anti-government insurgents elsewhere in the world, the cartels exhibited no clear interest in toppling regimes, and their powers and authority come in parallel to those of the government. To form that hostile coexistence or even symbiosis, the cartels foster their relationships with individuals within the government, law enforcement and military through tactics of bribery, intimidation and other forms of back channel dealing. And by co-opting the actors within the state, the cartels get to operate with relative impunity compared to other criminal organizations and avoid the financial cost and personnel casualties associated with an all-out civil war. (Watt and Zepeda, 2012, p. 62-65)
This piece of the status quo is deeply rooted in the history of the cartels, whose efforts to smuggle contraband into the United States was bolstered from implicit official backing and government-cartel collusion since the early days of the 20th century to the almost explicit complicity of the Mexican government under PRI during the 1980s. (Watt and Zepeda, p. 62-63, 2012)
Often the co-opting goes far beyond such simple complicity. Mexican law enforcement have been documented to directly participate in cartel operations and doing cartels’ bidding under the guise of official duties. For instance, the city police in Nuevo Laredo reportedly kidnapped competitors of the Gulf cartel and then transfer them directly to the Zetas, an ultra-violent syndicate that had performed as the Gulf Cartel’s enforcers before breaking ranks and forming their own cartel. Cartel influence was on blatant display in 2005 when the Nuevo Laredo local police attacked the federal security forces sent in to quell cartel violence, on behalf of the cartels. (Stevenson, 2019)
The coexistence and sometimes deep symbiosis between the Mexican state and the cartels substantially complicate the math of evaluating the supposed “not-war” and “not-insurgency”. While the state capacity substantially recedes in the face of monolithic cartel dominance, the state’s role in the cartels’ math stands not just against it, but also a part of it. And in spite of the disturbing cruelty exhibited by the cartels, the Mexican state has also built up a unwilling tolerance for a certain level of cartel activity, disincentivizing leaders from taking further drastic steps to contain the cartels. COVID-19, the most severe public health crisis in recent memory, may just change that math.
COVID-19 in Mexico
The Mexican government identified and confirmed the first COVID-19 cases in the country on February 28, 2020. As of November 15, Mexico ranks 11th in total reported infections, 4th in total reported deaths, 12th in deaths/million in population. (Johns Hopkins, 2020) The Mexican government’s response has been bemoaned from the start. The government chose a mathematical prediction model over widespread testing, causing the lack of effective contact tracing. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the President of Mexico, was reported to have consistently minimized the dangers of COVID-19 and his government continuously obfuscated on the necessity of face masks. (Ibarra-Nava, et al., 2020)
Significant discrepancies in local governments’ competence to handle the pandemic in regions varying greatly in wealth and poverty was apparently a thorny concern as the Mexican federal public administration decided to centralize COVID-19 related decision making while providing little assistance or guidance to local levels of authorities. A national approach without national guidelines for local authorities accounting for Mexico’s heterogeneity and inequality proved immensely counterproductive since most health facilities are concentrated in major metropolitan areas like Valley of Mexico, Monterrey, Guadalajara and Toluca. (Ibarra-Nava, et al., 2020)
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that while centralizing control, the federal government under Obrador also imposed a strict austerity program on federal public administration that was designed to curb widespread corruption among their ranks. While its effect on fighting corruption, the fiscal implications of such an austerity program already kicked in at the onset of the COVID in the country. Vast restructuring and a tumultuous process have negatively impacted the federal government’s preparedness, leaving weaker regions to fend for themselves. (Cruz, et al., 2020)
Variations in healthcare expertise, welfare preparedness and government capacities predicates that ill-equipped states and municipalities are bound to be stretched thin as they try to contain the raging epidemic. As police and armed forces are directed to enforce COVID-related regulations and local governments struggle to meet the challenge of salvaging plunging local economies and lower infection and death rates, the ensuing power vacuum coincides with significant portions of the civilian population growing increasingly desperate.
Cartels, Territories, and Authority: before and during COVID
“They are the law here. If you have a problem, you go to them. They solve it quickly,” a woman said in El Anguaje, as reported by the Associate Press. The woman was referring to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel that completely bent the town to its knees. (Stevenson, 2019)
The reporting was done in 2019, before COVID. Even when the government, law enforcement and the military were not overburdened by a crushing pandemic, they were already in retreat in many parts of the country, in the style of a failed state conceding to its rebels and insurgents.
Instance of government authorities completely relinquishing control was already widespread across the country. In 2009, the town of Tancítaro witnessed all of its local officials resign en masse due to their fear for their own safety and their lack of confidence in local armed forces and law enforcement’s ability to protect, even though their local presence was heavy. (Watt and Zepeda, p.179-180, 2012) In 2019, the City of Culiacan was completely overrun by armed cartel operatives in armored trucks when gang members arrived to retrieve a drug lord’s incarcerated son. The prisoner was swiftly released, and the government did not even attempt to keep up an appearance of enforcing the law. (Stevenson, 2019)
Given just how much power the cartels have harnessed over the years to credibly challenge the heart of the Mexican regime, it is sufficient to say that the cartels do fall in the criminal insurgency category. But unlike anti-state insurgents motivated by a desire to topple regimes, the cartels’ greed and grievances seemed limited to their illicit businesses and maintaining control over their territories. Through co-opting and a neoliberal approach of “hollowing out” the state apparatus, the diminished state capacity has served the cartels well.
COVID undoubted continued the same trend before COVID and exacerbated the situation. “Law enforcement assets in Mexico will focus on Covid-19-related lockdowns, and criminal groups are clearly using the economic downturn and lockdowns to build up political capital,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Brookings Institution fellow. (Ernst, 2020)
Cartels expand their influence in two ways during COVID. First, they attempt to push their territories even further. The latest news reports from both BBC and the Guardian suggest that CJNG (Jalisco New Generation Cartel, now considered a new cartel superpower, is taking advantage of a distracted Mexican government and security forces to gradually build up their presence in several states that used to be considered relatively safe and under control, including the State of Guanajuato and the densely populated State of Mexico, which encompasses Mexico City. (Ernst, 2020) (Grant, 2020)
Horror stories of unimaginable pain ensued. Latest data presented by the Mexican federal government shows a 7.7% increase in October compared to September, which already broke the prior records. 2020 is well on track to being the most violent year ever recorded as cartels take the opportunity of vacuum to resort to go on the attack on other cartels and the government. Mass shootings are shockingly rampant. In Irapuato, Guanajuato, a dispute between CJNG and another cartel led to a mass murder at a drug rehabilitation centre in July, leaving 26 dead. And for the first time since 2006, a federal judge was murdered, presumably by members affiliated with the CJNG. (Grant, 2020)
In the midst of all this violence, cartels are also incentivized to present themselves in a good light to civilians within their territories, in contrast to the incompetence of government officials. Early comments by some security experts expressed some optimism that the pandemic could significantly reduce drug trade due to border restrictions and limited international mobility. And that might just translate into a financial problem for the cartels. So far, no toll on the cartels’ operations has manifested itself. Instead, the cartels have been acting in the capacity of political authorities and social safety net in a turbulent pandemic economy, spending generously to supposedly help civilians with nowhere else to turn.(Felbab-Brown, 2020) In Apatzingán, Los Viagras, a cartel, has been collecting tax-style “contributions” from local businesses finance its handouts to local citizens in need. Cartel-sponsored food banks have been popping up, and in one particular case the food bank was established by the municipal government at the “instruction” of the local cartel. (Ernst, 2020)
An argument can be made that cash-strapped cartels with ample ammunitions can be extremely dangerous when they get desperate. But at least up till now, the reported cases of cartel-related violence have largely been driven by opportunism and greed over territorial control rather than purging civilians for their financial benefit. But the cartels’ accumulation of political capital, at a time when the Mexican government’s response to the pandemic and aid to the poorest populations have been so underwhelming, is incredibly dangerous all the while the cartels have ostensibly gone on killing sprees since the pandemic began.
A systematic study by the RAND Institute, which specializes in national defense research, identified several similarities between the Mexican drug war and the first stages of several other historical insurgencies after comparing Mexico to 30 other cases. They also identified three key weaknesses in the government’s preparedness: individuals within the law enforcement and the military are less capable and motivated to combat the criminal forces; low regard for government forces from the civilians compared to the criminal forces; and different levels of government each have different agendas and goals. (Paul, et al, 2011, p.63-79)
And their verdict is that, regardless of whether we categorise the cartels as an insurgency should not matter, Mexico should address these weaknesses as soon as possible, recognize the threat level in time, and build up state and police capacity before the conflict metamorphosize into something even bigger. (Paul, et al, 2011, p.7-8)
In 2020, the kinds of characteristics that used to highlight Mexico’s security risks surrounding the cartels are amplified by the COVID-19 crisis. None of the key witnesses that RAND pointed out are trending in the positive direction. No systematic security research has gone into the impact of COVID-19 on the cartels, but news sources, anecdotal evidence and official accounts of events have all pointed to the cartels are getting bigger, stronger, more brazen and even more normalized while the state is facing more severe challenges in declining capacity and perception of legitimacy, and no evidence has surfaced yet to bolster the efficacy of Obrador’s anti-corruption austerity laws at lowering levels of corruption.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen if the COVID crisis would cement the cartels’ advantageous position, or it would be the catalyst for a deadly escalation and destabilization. It is difficult to design a litmus test for when unchecked violence and cartel influence are spiraling out of control and the state has lost its ability to properly respond or even govern. And it is hard to tell when the cartels evolve in its military and civic functions to pose an existential crisis to the Mexican government, not as criminal enterprise but as criminal regime. But the trend is clearly negative and Mexico is inching closer to state failure as the pandemic rages on.
The solutions are easier said than achieved. Rooting out corruption and cartel co-optation, building up the government’s apparatus for civil service delivery and reassert meaningful law enforcement are just some of the obvious ones, regardless of COVID. But in light of the latest developments since COVID, any kind of reform must be undertaken with a renewed urgency.
Works Cited
Brophy, Stephanie. “Mexico: Cartels, Corruption and Cocaine: A Profile of the Gulf Cartel.” Global Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, 2008, pp. 248-261.
Watt, Peter, Roberto Zepeda Martínez, and Ebooks Corporation. Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy. Zed Books, London;New York;, 2012.
Paul, Christopher, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Colin P. Clarke, The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1125.html. Also available in print form.
Enamorado, Ted, et al. “Income Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence from Mexico’s Drug War.” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 120, 2016, pp. 128-143.
Calderón, Laura Y., et al. “Organized crime and violence in Mexico, analysis through 2018.” Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego. Available at https://justiceinmexico. org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Organized-Crime-and-Violence-in-Mexico-2019. pdf (2019).
Ramírez de la Cruz, Edgar E, et al. “The Transaction Costs of Government Responses to the COVID‐19 Emergency in Latin America.” Public Administration Review, vol. 80, no. 4, 2020, pp. 683-695.
Ibarra-Nava, Ismael, et al. “Mexico and the COVID-19 Response.” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 2020, pp. 1–2., doi:10.1017/dmp.2020.260.