by Andy Wu, Mukund Sundar, Frank Xiong, Hao Jing, Mingyu He (University of British Columbia)

Savings Funds and Rainy Day Funds are proposed by governments as method to save funds which are to be used for various purposes. In a similar vein to the Alberta Heritage Trust Fund (AHTF), the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF), the British Columbia Liberal Party has established a savings fund called the Prosperity Fund. Since the Prosperity Fund is fairly recent, not much academic research or discussion regarding its structure or value has occurred.

We will discuss why the Prosperity Fund does not make fiscal sense. We will look at the rules that are set up to govern the Prosperity Fund and show why these rules will not ensure the long term success of the Prosperity Fund. In doing so, this paper hopes to contribute to the discussion on setting up responsible savings funds by pointing out the flaws in the current implementation of the Prosperity Fund.

Continue reading “An Analysis of the BC Prosperity Fund”

 

Introduction

 

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms expanded the powers of the judicial branch, replacing the not so effective statute called Bill of Rights, validating courts’ unneglectable presence in the legislative process with greatly empowered judicial review. This article examines the interactions and dialogues on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms between the judiciary and the legislatures in Canada, explains Section 1 limits on Charter rights and Section 33 of Legislative Override, explores some forms of non-constitutional protection of individual rights, and ultimately tries to prove why the courts have adequately protected rights in Canada despite certain imperfections.

Continue reading “Courts, Legislatures, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Evolution of Legal Human Rights in Canada”

by Andy Wu (University of British Columbia)

Introduction

Herman Bakvis suggested that “Canadian prime ministers enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society” back in 2001 after Jean Chrétien called an early election at a time he thought to be optimal, arguing that the counterweights to prime ministerial power within the cabinet and outside of the federal government are

…not always capable of being held accountable by popularly elected bodies, are insufficient and idiosyncratic, … (Bakvis, 60, 76)

Now, in 2016, after an election that partially focused on the highly disputed practices of the Harper Ministry, and also in the middle of a national investigation on electoral reforms carried out by House of Commons special committee, the political power structure in Canada has come under even more intense scrutiny. How did the parliamentary system that was designed to put the Prime Minister as “first amongst equals” that shares collective executive responsibility, ended up resulting in the Prime Minister having one of the most centralized federal-level powers in the world, more centralized than that of a lot of other heads of governments in presidential democracies?

Continue reading “Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies: Distinctions and the Movement in Between”