by Andy Wu (University of British Columbia)
Introduction
Herman Bakvis suggested that “Canadian prime ministers enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society” back in 2001 after Jean Chrétien called an early election at a time he thought to be optimal, arguing that the counterweights to prime ministerial power within the cabinet and outside of the federal government are
…not always capable of being held accountable by popularly elected bodies, are insufficient and idiosyncratic, … (Bakvis, 60, 76)
Now, in 2016, after an election that partially focused on the highly disputed practices of the Harper Ministry, and also in the middle of a national investigation on electoral reforms carried out by House of Commons special committee, the political power structure in Canada has come under even more intense scrutiny. How did the parliamentary system that was designed to put the Prime Minister as “first amongst equals” that shares collective executive responsibility, ended up resulting in the Prime Minister having one of the most centralized federal-level powers in the world, more centralized than that of a lot of other heads of governments in presidential democracies?
Distinctions in Concepts
The definitions of these two systems are not really up for debate. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb listed the key features of presidentialism and parliamentarism (2). They listed how the government is not responsible to the legislature, how presidential regimes have direct elections for heads of governments and how executive responsibility is evidently unipersonal for the part of presidential democracy (Poguntke & Webb, 2). These characteristics constitute an executive branch that revolves around one executive, possesses a huge amount of power and is largely independent and protected from the influence of the legislative branch. They also describe how under parliamentarism, cabinet members have to be elected legislator and how the confidence of the legislature makes the executive responsibility collective (Poguntke & Webb, 2). If this were the case, the executive branch would be controlled or heavily influenced by the legislature collectively with very narrow authority dispersed onto all of the cabinet members.
However, these features don’t really fit the cases of the United States and Canada nicely like gloves. The political system of the United States, undeniably presidential, requires that all federal appointments by the President, including Supreme court judges and cabinet members, be confirmed by the Senate which the President doesn’t necessarily control. In contrast, the Canadian Prime Minister can appoint independently even in a minority government. Besides, the US President’s power can significantly shrink if his or her party doesn’t control both the house or the senate, while tools like confidence motions, party discipline and suspense and prorogue of the Parliament give the Prime Minister of Canada enough leverage to push his ideas through the legislative process.
Presidentialization, Decentralization, and the Blurred Lines
The apparent inconsistency between those definitions and reality lead to the question: “What exactly has changed?” Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb argued that prime ministers make gains in three aspects in the process of presidentialization: (a) increasing executive power resources; (b)Increasing leadership autonomy; (c) Increasing leader-centered electoral process (Poguntke & Webb, 5). For the sake of efficiency in modern politics, it is only logical to grant Prime Ministers full control of the government unless an inconsistent set of policies and a government susceptible to constant interruptions and/or harassments are more desirable to voters. However, in this case, the prime ministers also don’t have to sacrifice any of their control over the legislatures while gaining all the extra power. In light of the instances of the Harper Ministry making a handbook teaching its committee chairpersons how to obstruct and manipulate committees and the posters of Justin Trudeau visible in every local race in the 2015 Federal Election, the role that the Prime Minister play is the very opposite to “first among equals”.
The traits listed by Poguntke and Webb are all reflected in Bakvis’ description of Canadian Prime Minister’s tendency towards autocracy: lack of counterweights and checks and balances; Lack of real obligations towards other ministers or MPs; Full control over ministerial and deputy-ministerial appointments and a wide array of tools to maintain discipline within the cabinet; full control over timing of budget, elections and legislative agenda (Bakvis, 22-23).
The importance of both the House and the Senate has been highlighted during the second half of the Obama Administration, showing that they are an integral part of any truly meaningful progress even if the President executes his power independently. Democrats’ landslide defeat in state-level races is also more alarming than they previously thought.
The presidentialization of Canada and the decentralization of the United States are perfect examples of how the designed mechanisms can have counter effects: (a) The Separation of Powers designed to protect both the executive and legislative branches’ autonomy in presidentialism propels a higher rate of deadlocks, stagnating both the executive and legislative process, therefore intensifies their interdependence. (b) Parliamentarism requires the prime minister to gain the confidence of the legislature in order for the parliament as a whole to supervise the submissive government. This confidence later leads to the head of government gaining nearly complete control over the legislative process, no matter if it is a majority government or not given all the tools (confidence motions, party discipline and suspense and prorogue of the Parliament, etc.) that the prime minister can use to force his platforms down the parliament’s throat.
So what are the complications of such changes in both presidential democracy and parliamentary democracy? Alan Siaroff summed it up:
On the one hand, Juan Linz (1994: 70) has concluded that ‘presidentialism seems to involve greater risk for stable democratic politics due to various flaws in (most) presidential systems. On the other hand, Shugart & Carey (1992: 44–46, 40) stress that presidential systems have the advantages of accountability and transparency lacking in (coalitional) parliamentary systems, and they (and others) do not find that presidential regimes as a whole break down more frequently than parliamentary ones. (Siaroff, 287)
Conclusion
The basic principles and rules of presidential and parliamentary democracies remain intact with a strong consensus among scholars. But although the room for them to change is relatively small, how these principles are executed and how the execution affects the power structure back in turn make a significant difference.
Separation of power in the US made the Administration and the Congress more interdependent, while Canada’s responsible government and confidence of Parliament gave the Prime Minister very centralized power on the federal level. Political systems always change through time, and both parliamentary and presidential democracies can borrow each other’s characteristics and move towards a more centralized or dispersed political structure.
Works Cited
Siaroff, Allan. Comparative presidencies: “The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction” European Journal of Political Research (2003) 42: 287–312. Print.
Bakvis, Herman. “Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of Reform?” Journal of Canadian Studies (Winter 2001); 35, 4. 60-79. Print.
Poguntke, Thomas & Webb, Paul. The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005. Print.