{"id":2,"date":"2016-03-14T19:32:56","date_gmt":"2016-03-14T19:32:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/?page_id=2"},"modified":"2017-03-21T20:11:55","modified_gmt":"2017-03-22T03:11:55","slug":"sample-page","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/","title":{"rendered":"Research"},"content":{"rendered":"

PDF:\u00a0CV<\/a>\u00a0(December 2016)<\/strong><\/p>\n

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PUBLICATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n

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  1. Brown, J. and D.A.\u00a0Matsa. 2016.\u00a0\u201cBoarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications to Distressed Firms\u201d\u00a0Journal of Finance,\u00a0<\/em>71(2): 507-549.\u00a0\u00a0[doi<\/a>,\u00a0working paper version<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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    1. Brown, J. and D.B. Minor. 2014. \u201cSelecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments.\u201d\u00a0Management Science,\u00a0<\/em><\/em>60(12): 3087-3102.\u00a0<\/em>[doi<\/a>, working paper version<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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      1. Brown, J. 2011. \u201cQuitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0Journal of Political Economy,\u00a0<\/em>119(5): 982-1013.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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        1. Brown, J., T.\u00a0Hossain, and J. Morgan. 2010. \u201cShrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0Quarterly Journal of Economics,\u00a0<\/em>125(2):859-876.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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          1. Brown, J. and J. Morgan. 2009. \u201cHow much is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Journal of Political Economy, <\/em>117(4): 668-700.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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            1. Brown, J. and J. Morgan. 2009. \u201cMoving Targets: Price, Quality, and Platform Competition.\u201d\u00a0Journal of Marketing Research,\u00a0<\/em>46(2): 158-159. \u00a0(Commentary and Rejoinder on \u201cDoes Quality Win? Network Effects Versus Quality in High-Tech Markets\u201d)\u00a0[doi<\/a>,\u00a0working paper version<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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              1. Berck, P., J. Brown, J.M.\u00a0Perloff, and S.B. Villas-Boas. 2008. \u201cSales: Tests of Theories on Causality and Timing.\u201d\u00a0International Journal of Industrial Organization<\/em>, 26(6): 1257-1273. [doi<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                1. Brown, J., J. Hastings, E.T. Mansur, and S.B. Villas-Boas. 2008. \u201cReformulating Competition? Gasoline Content Regulation and Wholesale Gasoline Prices.\u201d\u00a0Journal of Environmental Economics and Management<\/em>, 55(1): 1-19.\u00a0<\/em>[doi<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                  1. Brown, J. and J. Morgan. 2006. \u201cReputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust.\u201d\u00a0California Management Review<\/em>, 49(1): 61-81.\u00a0[doi<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                    1. Brown, J., J.A.L.\u00a0Cranfieldand S. Henson. 2005. \u201cRelating Consumer Willingness-to-pay for Food Safety to Risk Tolerance: An Experimental Approach.\u201d\u00a0Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics<\/em>, 53(2-3): 249-263. [doi<\/a>]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                      1. Brown, J. 2001. \u201cPrice discrimination and pricing to market behavior of Canadian canola exporters.\u201d\u00a0American Journal of Agricultural Economics,<\/em>\u00a083(5): 1343-49<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                        WORKING PAPERS<\/strong><\/p>\n

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                        1. Jen Brown and Dylan Minor.\u00a0August 2015. \u201cMisconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations<\/a>\u201d \u00a0NBER Working Paper No.\u00a018608 (revision requested, March 2016)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          ABSTRACT: We examine misconduct in financial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm\u2019s brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data for insurance agents, we find that agents working exclusively for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of justified sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.<\/p>\n

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                          1. Phil\u00a0Brookins, Jen Brown, and Dmitry\u00a0Ryvkin. July 2016. \u201cPeer Information\u00a0and Risk Taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes<\/a>\u201d NBER Working Paper No.\u00a022486<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            ABSTRACT: \u00a0Incentive schemes that reward participants based on their relative performance are often thought to be particularly risk-inducing. Using a novel, real-effort task experiment in the laboratory, we find that the relationship between incentives and risk-taking is more nuanced and depends critically on the availability of informa- tion about peers\u2019 strategies and outcomes. Indeed, we find that when no peer information is available, relative rewards schemes are associated with significantly less risk-taking than non-competitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers receive information about their peers\u2019 actions and\/or outcomes, relative incentive schemes are associated with more risk-taking than non-competitive schemes. The nature of the feedback\u2014whether subjects receive information about peers\u2019 strategies, outcomes, or both\u2014also affects risk-taking. We find no evidence that competitors imitate their peers when they face only feedback about other subjects\u2019 risk-taking strategies. However, decision-makers take more risk when they see the gaps between their performance score and their peers\u2019 scores grow. Combined feedback about peers\u2019 strategies and performance\u2014from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between risk-taking and success\u2014is associated with more risk-taking when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar effect for non-competitive rewards.<\/p>\n

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                            1. Jen Brown and David Matsa. March\u00a02017.\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cLocked in by Leverage: Job Search during the Housing Crisis<\/a>\u201d\u00a0 NBER Working Paper No.\u00a022929<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                              ABSTRACT:\u00a0This paper examines how housing market distress affects job search. Using data from a leading online job search platform during the Great Recession, we find that job seekers in areas with depressed housing markets apply for fewer jobs that require relocation. With their search constrained geographically, job seekers broaden their search to lower-level positions nearby. These effects are stronger for job seekers with recourse mortgages, which we confirm using spatial regression discontinuity analysis. Our findings suggest that housing market distress distorts labor market outcomes by impeding household mobility.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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                              1. Anne Boring and Jen Brown. October 2016. \u201cGender, Competition, and Choices in Higher Education\u201d [email to request most recent version]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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                                  1. Jen Brown and Jin Li. July 2010. \u201cGoing for it: The Adoption of Risky Strategies in Tournaments.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/ol>\n

                                     <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                    PDF:\u00a0CV\u00a0(December 2016) PUBLICATIONS Brown, J. and D.A.\u00a0Matsa. 2016.\u00a0\u201cBoarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications to Distressed Firms\u201d\u00a0Journal of Finance,\u00a071(2): 507-549.\u00a0\u00a0[doi,\u00a0working paper version] Brown, J. and D.B. Minor. 2014. \u201cSelecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments.\u201d\u00a0Management Science,\u00a060(12): 3087-3102.\u00a0[doi, working paper version] Brown, J. 2011. \u201cQuitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":38011,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/38011"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":57,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2\/revisions\/57"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/jenbrown\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}