paper beaver; in which our author completely ignores the question

“We’ll call this the map that roared.”


Despite Don Monet’s position, Mr. McEachern’s remark indeed seems derisory to me – especially given the decision of the court (reviewed below); I do agree that the Chief Justice’s statement evokes the ‘roaring’ resistance of the First Nations’ cartography.

The decision in question resulted in a clear refusal to define the nature of aboriginal title in Canada. This decision legitimated the constitutional question of a First Nation’s territorial sovereignty overriding the Crown’s (and Court’s) jurisdiction and (notably) featured the use of oral histories as evidence – which Justice McEachern did not accept as sufficient ‘historically’, but the Supreme Court of Canada ruled was just as legitimate as written testimony. These histories, however, were not recognized as relevant in the process of defining First Nations’ constitutional interests (see s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867).

Notably (Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.):

Aboriginal title at common law was recognized well before 1982 and is accordingly protected in its full form by s. 35(1). […] Under common law, the act of occupation or possession is sufficient to ground aboriginal title and it is not necessary to prove that the land was a distinctive or integral part of the aboriginal society before the arrival of Europeans.

I thought it might be interesting to get the opinion of a former Justice and spoke with her at some length about the case and land claims in general; I will not be including that discussion here, although I’d be happy to discuss it in a less-public setting.

I will be extending this section after I look at a few more land-claim cases and have a more substantive opinion.


Sparke uses musical metaphor to interpret the Atlas as binary / contrapuntal; he infers subversion of a colonist origin narrative, invites Canadians to re-evaluate what he calls the ‘proleptic’ imposition (here I agree) of a contemporary Canadian template, and raises the question of the location of national discourse. This is of particular interest to me – I’d like to digress completely and explore ‘locating’ electronic discourse (for brevity’s sake).

The first consideration that springs to mind is network infrastructure – despite post-territorial inclinations those ‘cables’ – and therefore the traffic passing through – are subject to the governing body of the territory in which they exist. Surveillance! Privacy! Rights! Expression! You (expressed in information) are subject to examination when you enter sovereign territory.

Another consideration – I’ve been thinking about how virtual space is not ‘finite’ to the same extent a territory might be. This means that traffic – attention – audience – determines the value of networked ‘real estate’. There are myriad factors behind this – relevance (tied to cultures (institutions as well)), accessibility (tied to indexers, Google, etc) and the content itself. Investment, or attraction, or ‘quality’, is part of what drives the value of virtual space.

To bring back the imposition of narratives – the internet (and ‘global’ citizens, an argument I think GREATLY overestimates mediatic power) is not antithetical to the statist paradigm (and I’m not sure it should be). I’m not sure it’s antithetical to anything. I am more and more convinced that networked electronic media are amplifiers rather than differentiators. Nothing within media exists that we have not expressed; media are expressions of ourselves and reflect our desires* (even in the case of a strong A.I. capable of self-alteration). While they do exercise agency in discursive mediation they are not ‘conscious’ (for the moment) and exist according to our agency (for good or ill, and perhaps beyond our intent).

*those of intelligent** actors

**I would say rational, but that’s just wrong. ‘Conscious’ might have been better here

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