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# The Role of Social Capital in the Transformation of Cultural Values and Practices: A Case Study on the Chinese Community in Taiwan

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## Abstract

This study explores the traditional views of assimilationists and cultural retentionists on the outcome of an encounter between two heterogeneous groups. Proponents of contact theory along with social capital theorists argue that greater contact and social capital between two groups results in more similarity between them. Other scholars predict that social contact fosters distinction. This study compares the effects of social capital on religious values and practices among the socially connected Taiwanese and Chinese in Taiwan. Data from the 2006 Asia Barometer and repeated cross-sections (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011) of the Taiwan Social Change Survey indicate that the Chinese are significantly different from the Taiwanese in terms of the effects of social capital on religious values and practices. The Chinese in Taiwan are also distinct from the Taiwanese in terms of the effects of gender norms on religious values and

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practices. These findings provide additional evidence for cultural retention rather than assimilation among Chinese in Taiwan.

### Keywords

religion in Taiwan – social capital – Taiwanese national identity – trust

## 社會資本對文化價值和習俗的影響——台灣外省人的個案研究

### 摘要

本文探討台灣兩種異質群體的社會資本如何影響其文化價值觀和習俗，並以同化主義和文化保留主義 (cultural retentionist) 的傳統觀點來分析結果。接觸理論 (contact theory) 和社會資本理論認為，兩個群體之間越多接觸和社會資本，這兩個群體就越變得相似。可是，其他學者卻認為接觸會導致更多差異。我們的研究對象是台灣的台灣人和外省人，研究問題是他們的價值觀和習俗有何異同。根據亞洲指標體系調查問卷 (2006) 及台灣社會變遷調查 (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) 的數據顯示，就社會資本對宗教價值和習俗的影響而言，外省人和台灣人有顯著的差異。另一方面，就性別規範對宗教信仰的影響而言，外省人和台灣人也有差異。本研究結果證實，文化保留主義最能解釋上述的社會現象。

### 关键词

社會資本，信任，台湾国家身份，台湾宗教

What happens when two heterogeneous groups meet? Does the social contact theory explain adequately the resulting similarities or differences in lifestyle for the two groups (Allport 1954)? The assimilationist position (Park 1950), which forms the traditional view on settlement and immigration, considers the complete incorporation of one group by the other as inevitable. The pluralist or retentionist school of immigration scholars (Shibutani and Kwan 1965; Alba and Nee 1997), by contrast, emphasizes cultural retention among immigrant groups by arguing that two heterogeneous groups brought into contact through immigration either maintain the initial social distance between them, or separate themselves further.

This article contends that the process of cultural retention for immigrant groups is as inevitable as the pressures toward assimilation, and that societal pressures toward assimilation and cultural retention occur simultaneously for both groups depending on context. Each group influences the other in such a way that both change, although the change might be much greater for small groups that interact with members of larger host groups. The Other thus serves as a distinct new culture in the process of renegotiating group similarities and differences in immigration, which we refer to here as cultural hybridization. The identities that emerge through this process are inevitably hybrid and fluid, and therefore only make sense in historic context (Chuang 2011:54).

### Types of Hybrid Cultures

To explore the influence of two groups on each other, we must first examine the framework for the possible outcomes of such influence and the potential types of hybrid cultures. Hybrid cultures represent imagined and redefined collective cultural identities born out of interaction and negotiation between groups' similarities and differences (Anderson 1983:52, 55–56; Bhabha 1994: 49–55, 163, 292). The topic of identity in Taiwan, however, has been the subject of debate in recent years. Chuang Ya-chung (2011:54–55) associates the rise of Taiwanese nationalism with the 1987 end of martial law and the subsequent self-identification of many Taiwanese along national, ethnic, or political lines. Alan Wachman (1994:18–22) echoes this stance by arguing that national identity crystallized as the democratization process rose from the ashes of military rule. He also couches Taiwaneseness in terms of ethnicity rather than other important factors, stating clearly that “Taiwanese” refers only to those Han Chinese who lived in Taiwan before the Chinese Communists' rise prompted a mass exodus of Mainlanders to Taiwan (Wachman 1994:18–22). Surely ethnicity is not the singular, monocausal agent in forming national identity.

Other scholars reject the idea that ethnicity is the sole noteworthy paradigm in national self-identification. Steven Philips (2003) and Melissa Brown (2004), in particular, show the ways in which antecedent events and forces undergirded contemporary conflicts over identity. Philips (2003:140) points to the period between Japanese colonial dominion over Taiwan and the establishment of Guomindang (GMD) rule on the island—a period that he describes as “the most tumultuous in Taiwan's history.” But this period did not foment nationalist fervor; rather, as he notes, Taiwanese elites sought actively for compromise that allowed degrees of local autonomy (Phillips 2003:3, 22–44; Hughes 1997). Melissa Brown (2004:1–3), meanwhile, argues that it is a “fundamental

misunderstanding” to ground ethnic and national identity in terms of antiquity (ancestry and culture), which act as ideological stand-ins for what really unites people: social experience. It is for this reason that the following essay applies Benedict Anderson’s (1983) concept of pilgrimage as a crucial factor behind national identity.

In reference to the pilgrimages that functionaries from Europe made to the New World, Anderson (1983:55–56) notes that the functionary

travels up hoping to end his pilgrimage . . . [and on] his journey . . . he encounters as eager fellow-pilgrims his functionary colleagues from places and families he had not heard of. But in experiencing them as travelling-companions, a consciousness of connectedness . . . emerges, above all when all share a single language-of-state.

If applied to the Taiwanese, or to Chinese living in Taiwan, one can see that the notion of sameness in the form of national identity arose as “pilgrims” ventured across the Taiwan Strait during and after 1949. As time passed, various factors ensured that Taiwanesehood was entrenched as a national identity, as was Chinesehood among those who still identified nationally with the Republic of China (Brown 2004:1–3). The current People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “one China” policy added to the political sentiments around such identities. Yet while identity formation in Taiwan dates back for centuries, three crucial factors underpin the problem of identity in Taiwan: (1) Han ethnic identity; (2) Chinese national identity; and (3) the relationship of these two to a “new Taiwanese identity” or “Taiwanese consciousness” that came into view after the lifting of martial law in July 1987 (Brown 2004:1; Huang 2006:153).<sup>1</sup> The PRC claims that Taiwan’s shared Han ethnicity constitutes its case for dominion over Taiwan, whereas Taiwan’s riposte is rooted in Aboriginal cultural and ancestral ties (Brown 2004:2).

Opposing claims notwithstanding, Homi Bhabha (1994) points us away from ancestral/cultural-based claims and toward examining identities through the lens of hybridity. Indeed, a heterogeneous group is not yet, if ever, the same as the host group, but neither is it entirely different since it is now hybrid (Bhabha 1994:49–55, 163, 292). The host group is thus no longer the same in the presence of an Other since it too has redefined itself and renegotiated the meaning of its own identity. The shared social, economic, and political experiences of those who undertook the pilgrimage, and their subsequent redefinition of

<sup>1</sup> This idea of the “New Taiwanese” identity goes hand in hand with the stance that national identity in general is a product of modernity (Malesevic 2011).

themselves as something distinct, ultimately established a new sense of sameness among peoples who may have otherwise remained disparate.<sup>2</sup>

### A Framework to Test Culture Hybridity

What are the variants of this hybridity? Breton (1964) argues that in immigration, an individual as a representative of one ethnicized group determines whether to join an existing group—the dominant group, immigrants of the same ethnic group in the host country, or another ethnic group—or to remain autonomous. His dualistic either/or framing of the question, however, ignores that assimilation and cultural retention do not in fact have to be at odds and indeed often occur simultaneously, as Mark Cleveland et al. (2009), John Berry (1997), William Yancey et al. (1976), and Herbert Gans (1997) assert. Berry's (1997) classification of changes in cultural identity as a result of immigration helps us to construct a nomenclature for the possible types of hybrid cultures. Depending on the level of cultural similarity that immigrants share with the host culture and the culture of origin, there are four possible outcomes of cultural hybridity (see Fig. 1).




FIGURE 1 *Ideal types of hybrid cultures*

<sup>2</sup> The present study does not aim to provide an exhaustive definition of the emerging Taiwanese identity, asserting instead that identities are fluid and ever-changing. Therefore, for the purposes of the present paper we rely mostly on self-identification (Brown 2004:3; Mendel 1970).

One of the ideal types of hybrid cultures is integration, in which an immigrant group exhibits characteristics of both the original culture and the host culture. However, if a group retains most of the characteristics of the original culture while adopting little from the host culture, then the type of hybridity is separation. Higher levels of adoption of the host culture and lower levels of retention of the original culture are characteristic of assimilation, while deculturation is a possible outcome for individuals and groups that neither retain their original culture nor adopt the host culture (Park 1950).

Explanations of the emergence of hybrid cultures reveal that the changes in cultural values and practices associated with hybrid cultures are context-specific, and the degree and speed of acculturation and cultural retention refer only to a certain period and place. The outcome of acculturation and cultural retention thus depends on many societal conditions, such as the size and resourcefulness of a group, which Raymond Breton (1964) describes as “institutional completeness.” The degree of tolerance and level of discrimination in the host and dominant societies often counterbalance these factors (Lee 1966). All of the integrating and Othering factors can be traced, however, by examining how many relations the community has within the host society and the quality of those relations. Structural opportunities and constraints are therefore traceable in the social resources of immigrants, which reflect the quality of relations with the host community. Social capital, or the network resources of a group of individuals, serves as a reliable indicator of structural opportunities and constraints met by an outside group (Coleman 1990:260, 292–299; Lin 2002:23, 60–63, 117). Societal pressures, social distances, and power differentials therefore form social networks and resources that initiate the process of individual socialization. These opportunities and constraints then translate into attitudes, and more importantly behaviors, and thus the consequences may reveal broader societal trends.

Two prominent ideas about possible outcomes for hybrid cultures dependent on social capital and network resources provide the foundation on which the present study aims to build. One is the social contact hypothesis, which states that a higher level of exposure to another group increases one’s understanding of the other group’s values (Allport 1954:94, 117, 261–281). The social capital theory reiterates this hypothesis (Lin 2002:23, 60–63, 117; Coleman 1990:260, 292–299; Putnam 2000; Burt 2001). Social capital theory, however, is often blind to structural inequalities between different status groups, which results in perceivably different results with respect to groups’ values and practices. For instance, Paul DiMaggio and Filiz Garip (2012) conclude that sameness of identity, namely homophily, within a group, reinforces certain practices that are characteristic of that group, thus exacerbating intergroup differences. The

idea is ultimately reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu's (1980:171–231) link between a class *habitus* and a distinct lifestyle. The question with regard to two discrete identity groups thus remains, Does more contact induce more similarity, or does it polarize groups further according to new forms of distinction?

In summation, societal opportunities and constraints, as reflected in a heterogeneous group's social capital, form new hybrid cultures that are contextually unique and universal. This paper examines the Chinese/Mainlander group as a heterogeneous group in the context of Taiwan to determine whether the ideas described above may apply to any heterogeneous group that comes into contact with a dominant or host group. This is primarily an exploratory research study that poses questions about the link between social capital and the formation of cultural values and practices for heterogeneous groups that face similar geopolitical contexts. Using Taiwan as a case study, we test which of the outcomes is relevant for the Chinese group in Taiwan. Do Chinese living in Taiwan who have higher levels of social capital and reside or intermingle with the host community share more similarities in values and practices with the host/majority group? Or, as Bourdieu (1980:384, 444) and DiMaggio and Garip (2012) claim, does the dominant group prefer to distinguish itself further if it faces a threat to its identity from the dominated group? We leave open the possibility that directional change may occur for people from both identity groups in Taiwan.

### Data and Methods

The present study compares religious values, affiliations, and practices of the Chinese in Taiwan with those of other Taiwanese. We employ data from the Asia Barometer 2006 (Inoguchi 2006)<sup>3</sup> and five cross-sections from the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) for 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011. We chose these cross-sections because they all contain the religious affiliation, practice, ethnic identification, and trust variables. The Asia Barometer research team interviewed in person or via telephone citizens from the Republic of China (ROC) who were 20 years of age and over, and the sampling uses the PPS method. To formulate a representative sample, strata samples were arranged in advance with gender and age quotas that were consistent with the characteristics of the corresponding strata populations. The final sample available for public use

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3 Accessed July 27, 2014, <http://www.asiabarometer.org/>. AsiaBarometer is a registered trademark of Takashi Inoguchi, President of the University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan, and Director of the AsiaBarometer Project.

contains 1,006 observations. The interviewed participants identify themselves mostly as Taiwanese (85%) while some identify as Chinese (12.4%) or Other (0.8%); 1% respond that they do not identify themselves with their nationality. The sample contains more males (51.1%) than females (48.9%), and the mean age is 40.56 ( $SD=12.33$ ).

The TSCS sample, meanwhile, includes data from face-to-face interviews of Taiwan residents who are 18 years of age or older. Data analyzed in this research was collected in the fourth, fifth, and sixth rounds of the TSCS, which was conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica (data gathered before the first year of the third round were conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica), and sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology (formerly known as the National Science Council), Republic of China. The three-stage stratified PPS sampling technique allowed selection of the respondents. Marsh (1996) provides a detailed explanation of sampling procedures and describes the data as it relates to the 1991 TSCS. The dataset includes biannual cross-sections from 1985 to 2013, but only five contain all variables relevant to the present study. These five cross-sections were harmonized, and the final TSCS sample contains 10,263 observations (1,781 respondents for 2004, 2,147 for 2007, 1,927 for 2009, 2,209 for 2010, and 2,199 for 2011). Of the respondents in the sample, 10% report that their fathers are ethnic Mainlanders, while the majority (90%) do not. The TSCS sample also contains more males (50.37%) than females (49.63%).<sup>4</sup> In the TSCS 2013,<sup>5</sup> 68.8% out of 1,952 respondents identify themselves as 'Absolutely Taiwanese' and only 0.3% as 'Not Taiwanese at all.' In comparison, only 14% out of 1,952 respondents identify as 'Absolutely Chinese' and 34.1% as 'Not Chinese at all' in the same dataset.

### *Demographic Measures: Who Are the Self-identified Chinese in Taiwan?*

The Taiwanese government's decision to lift martial law in 1987 unleashed several debates about national identity in Taiwan. As Simon (2005:2) states,

during the Lee Teng-hui era (1988–2000), debates about “Chinese-ness” versus “Taiwanese-ness,” long suppressed under Chinese Nationalist rule in Taiwan, slowly resurfaced into the mainstream of Taiwanese life. . . . By the 1990s, social scientists began “indigenizing” scholarship, shifting the

4 It was impossible to harmonize personal weights for all five TSCS cross-sections because only a few of them contained weight variables.

5 Although the TSCS 2013 “National Identity” did not contain all variables needed for the present study, the 2013 cross-section is useful for illustrating questions of national identity.



focus of anthropological and sociological research from Chinese culture to Taiwanese society.

These political changes in Taiwan make it less surprising that the majority of respondents in the Taiwan sample, as per the Asia Barometer 2006, identify themselves as Taiwanese (85%) instead of Chinese (12.4%) (Inoguchi 2006).

Who are the self-identified Chinese in Taiwan? Many of the Chinese in Taiwan are either mainland nationalists who fled the Communists in 1949 or their descendants, and the PRC tends to underline this fact when making its case for national sameness with Taiwan (as part of China). This might be the case for the TSCS sample, where we identify individuals who report their fathers' ethnic background to be 'Mainlander' (*da lu ge sheng ren* 大陸各省人) as Chinese.<sup>6</sup> The Chinese subsample in the Asia Barometer 2006, however, is rather different since it includes, *inter alia*, individuals of younger generations who were the descendants of mainland migrants of 1949, other Han people born in Taiwan, and recent migrants. For the Asia Barometer dataset, we measure national identity according to self-identification: 'Chinese' (*zhongguoren* 中國人) or 'Taiwanese' (*Taiwanren* 台灣人) (Inoguchi 2006).

There were also some respondents who identified themselves as 'Other' or replied, 'I don't identify myself with my nationality,' but these responses were miniscule (1.8%); the majority of the respondents in the Asia Barometer identify either as 'Taiwanese' or as 'Chinese.' These types of self-identification questions became more and more common as the issue of national identity became prominent after the advent of democracy in 1987 (Chuang 2011:54). These are, of course, subjective allegiances that might not have a direct correlation with ethnic background as reported in the TSCS. Therefore, in the TSCS dataset, we identify Chinese as those who report paternal origin from the mainland. It is worth noting, though, that the Mainlander category in Taiwan has a historic nuance. The label is a remnant of the post-1947 Republic of China (ROC), which "defined identity in Taiwan on official documents in terms of 'provincial origin' (*shengji* [省籍]), this being the origin of contrasting identities as 'Mainlander' (*waishengren* [外省人]) versus 'native Taiwanese'" (Simon 2011:20). Since 1989, ethnic groups in Taiwan have been lumped into four main categories, namely "Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Aborigines, 'Taiwan's Four Great Ethnic Groups' (*Taiwan si da zuqun* 台湾四大族群)" (Simon 2011:21). In the present study, we contend that self-identification or self-identification

6 We identify 'Taiwanese' in the TSCS as all other Taiwanese who do not report their parental background to be from the mainland.

of parental ethnic background may be the best available way<sup>7</sup> to determine national allegiances, because nowadays, “a ‘Mainlander’ population . . . is no longer determined by objective origin, but by subjective identifications—their offspring born in Taiwan and raised in a specific political tradition and worldview” (Corcuff 2011:34).

Tables 1A and 1B report the descriptive statistics for both the datasets and the subsamples. The subsample of self-identified Chinese has significantly higher levels of income than the group with Taiwanese identity ( $t=-3.69$ ,  $p<.01$  for the Asia Barometer,  $t=-2.32$ ,  $p=.01$  for the TSCS). The income measure in the Asia Barometer has 19 categories, while in the TSCS it has 22–23 categories, which were recoded to 22 in the harmonized dataset. For both datasets, income categories were recoded as midpoints and used as logged continuous variables. Similarly, in both datasets, the Chinese subsample has higher levels of education than the Taiwanese. Thus, in the TSCS, the proportion of Chinese with college or higher education was 29%, whereas only 18% of Taiwanese reported completing college or higher tertiary education.

There are also a few notable differences in the datasets. In terms of religious affiliation, Table 1A shows that the Asia Barometer sample contains

TABLE 1A Basic demographic measures by identity group in Taiwan (Asia Barometer)

	Identity Group		$\chi^2$ or t
	Taiwanese (n=855)	Chinese (n=125)	
Income (log of midpoints)	11.06	11.22	-3.69, $p<.001$
Age (years)	40	42	-1.04, $p=.30$
Gender (1=male)	51%	47%	0.71(1), $p=.40$
Married (1=yes)	70%	70%	0.01(1), $p=.94$
Highest level of education (years)	11.58	12.01	-1.24, $p=.22$
Generalized Trust	40%	37%	0.64(1), $p=.42$
Buddhist (1=yes)	33%	22%	6.18(1), $p=.01$
Daoist (1=yes)	40%	49%	3.47(1), $p=.06$

7 In the future we plan to extend the analysis to more categories of identity groups and to use a wider variety of sources to analyze national self-identification in Taiwan. To clarify the results presented here, it is worth noting that some respondents identify themselves with both groups and thus national identity in Taiwan does not have a clear-cut ethnic backbone.

TABLE 1B Basic demographic measures by paternal background in Taiwan (TSCS)

	Parental Background		$\chi^2$ or t
	Taiwanese (n=9,244)	Mainlander (n=1,019)	
Income (log of midpoints)	8.27	8.58	-2.32, p=.01
Age (years)	44	48	-6.86, p<.000
Gender (1=male)	50%	55%	10.8(1), p=.001
Married (1=yes)	61%	64%	4.46(1), p<.05
Less than high school	38%	19%	132(1), p<.000
High school	26%	30%	4.89, p<.05
Some college	18%	22%	8.39(1), p<.01
College or above	18%	29%	75.8(1), p<.000
Generalized Trust	34%	39%	9.19(1), p<.01
Buddhist (1=yes)	23%	27%	5.81, p<.05
Daoist (1=yes)	16%	6%	75(1), p<.000
Folk Religion (1=yes)	34%	17%	124(1), p<.000
Other Religions (1=yes)	27%	50%	254(1), p<.000

higher proportions of Daoists among the Chinese than among the Taiwanese ( $\chi^2(1)=3.47$ ,  $p=.06$ ), while there are significantly more Buddhists among the Taiwanese than among the Chinese ( $\chi^2(1)=6.18$ ,  $p=.01$ ). However, the TSCS sample contains a higher proportion of Buddhist Mainlanders (27%) than Buddhist Taiwanese (23%), and higher proportions of Daoist Taiwanese than Daoist Mainlanders ( $\chi^2(1)=75$ ,  $p<.000$ ). The TSCS sample also distinguishes folk religion, to which more Taiwanese than Chinese currently profess affiliation ( $\chi^2(1)=124$ ,  $p<.000$ ).

Issues of sampling in both datasets aside, the data collection process of the Asia Barometer helps us to explain these discrepancies with respect to religious affiliation in the sample.<sup>8</sup> As a multinational survey, the Asia Barometer did not address local nuances in religious affiliations, focusing instead on commonalities across East and Southeast Asian countries. In Taiwan, Daoism

8 Additionally, there are differences in the religious practices tested in the Asia Barometer and the TSCS. The results, therefore, should be interpreted only for the individual response variables. The focus of the analysis is on the consequences of generalized trust in terms of discrepancies in beliefs and behaviors, with the latter being of more practical interest.

and Buddhism “are combinations of beliefs, superstitions, and cultural practices passed down from generation to generation,” and although the former originated in China, it gained traction as Chinese migrants crossed the Taiwan Strait and settled on the island (Chang 2010:447; Weller 1994). Extant folk religions, which blended Confucianism with ethical ideologies, converged and diverged with Buddhism and Daoism to create hybrid variants (Chang 2010:447–448). Such a reality may help to explain why, despite Buddhism’s popularity in Taiwan, “few people actually practice Buddhism but many profess belief” (Laliberté 2004:3).

### **Main Independent Variable: Social Capital as Trust**

Social capital has been chosen as the main reflection of the context of the two groups examined here. As opposed to merely tangible resources, social capital represents the resources available to individuals through their relations with others (Lin 2002:23, 60–63, 117). Extending Nan Lin’s (2002) thesis, we contend that the key process in the formation and retention of social capital is trust (Putnam 1993:177; Fukuyama 2001; Enns, Malinick, and Matthews 2008). We consider trust to be the major indicator and precondition of social capital, and thus in this study trust comprises the basis and main explanatory factor of assimilation, retention, and cultural hybridity in general (Uslaner 1999; Hardin 2002; Putnam 2000). Following convention (Inglehart 1997:352), we measure generalized trust in both datasets with the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”

### **Measures of Religious Beliefs and Practices (Dependent Variables) and Main Hypotheses**

Why is religion of interest when we talk about changes in values and practices in Taiwan? Spirituality, for instance, is emphasized within the realms of Taiwanese and Asian identities (Lee 2004). Religious values and attitudes are also of interest since, in Taiwan, adherents link them inextricably to political views and activities (Laliberté 2004:3; Chang 2010:447–448). As a historic consequence of people migrating from various provinces of mainland China, notably during the Ming (1366–1644 CE) and Qing (1644–1912 CE) dynasties, the names of localities often “reflected the respective languages spoken there” and also the specific “local community religion” (Huang 2006:156–157). It comes as

no surprise, therefore, that religious affiliation and identity in Taiwan are concomitant with political sentiments (Huang 2006:186).<sup>9</sup> The present study measures Taiwanese religious values by comparing beliefs in the spiritual world and the religious affiliation of Taiwanese and Chinese subgroups. If we apply a social capital framework to explain the formation of values and practices, then levels of generalized trust among the minority Chinese ought to correlate with a positive or negative change in terms of religious values if, of course, they share similarity with the majority of the Taiwanese. Thus, we present the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis A1.1* (social contact theory, Asia Barometer)

Generalized trust has the same effect on the likelihood of believing in the spiritual world in the Chinese subsample as it does in the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis A1.2* (distinction theory, Asia Barometer)

Generalized trust has a distinct effect on the likelihood of believing in the spiritual world in the Chinese subsample when compared to the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis B1.1* (social contact theory, TSCS)

Generalized trust has the same effect on the likelihood of professing religious affiliation with Daoism in the Chinese subsample as it does in the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis B1.2* (distinction theory, TSCS)

Generalized trust has a distinct effect on the likelihood of professing religious affiliation with Daoism in the Chinese subsample when compared to the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

We measured values in two ways. The Asia Barometer Survey asked respondents, “Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?” (*nin xiang xin you yi gu kan bu jian de jian shen shi jie, zai ying xiang wo men zhou zou de xian shi shi jie ma?* 您相信有一

9 Chun-Chieh Huang (2006:186) further states that Taiwanese consciousness “became virulent provincial self-awareness against ‘outsider’ Mainlanders who had become the ruling class”; Paul Katz and Murray Rubinstein (2003:4), meanwhile, contend that religion and religious events “constitute key arenas that members of different interest groups attempted to utilize to achieve both economic and political goals.”

個看不見的精神世界，在影響我們周遭的現實世界嗎?). The answer choices included 'Definitely I believe' (*wang quan xiang xin* 完全相信), 'Somewhat I believe' (*you dian xiang xin* 有點相信), 'I do not really believe' (*bu tai xiang xin* 不太相信), 'I do not believe at all' (*wang quan bu xiang xin* 完全不相信), and 'Don't know' (*bu zhi dao* 不知道). We recoded the responses for the answers 'Definitely I believe' and 'Somewhat I believe' as '1=yes,' and the responses for the answer choices 'I do not really believe' and 'I do not believe at all' as '0=no.' There were also 35 'Don't know' replies (3.5% of all respondents), which we coded as missing.

The responses reveal that the majority of both Taiwanese (72%) and Chinese (77%) believe in the existence of a spiritual world (see Table 2). There was no comparable measure for belief in a spiritual world in the TSCS, thus we chose to analyze religious values in the TSCS using self-professed religious affiliation. Religious affiliation with Daoism represents a harmonized variable in the repeated cross-sections of the TSCS,<sup>10</sup> and distinguishes Daoism from Buddhism, folk religions, and other religions combined.<sup>11</sup> Taiwanese in the TSCS sample appear to be more likely to affiliate with all of the distinct religious categories listed above than Mainlanders, who report 'other' religious affiliation more frequently than Taiwanese (27% of Taiwanese and 51% of Chinese).<sup>12</sup> Sixteen percent of Taiwanese reported Daoist affiliation, whereas only 6% of Mainlanders did.

In addition to spiritual values and religious affiliation, we measure religious practices by the frequency of praying or meditating in the Asia Barometer and by the frequency of participating in religious worship in the TSCS (see Table 2).<sup>13</sup> If the assimilationists (Park 1950; Gordon 1964) are correct about the effects of social capital, then levels of trust must have the same effect on religious practices, such as praying or visiting religious services, among both

10 Details on the harmonization of religious affiliation questions *v108* in TSCS 2004(1), *a16* in TSCS 2007(2), *v15* in TSCS 2009(2), *v12* in TSCS 2010(2), and *g12* in TSCS 2011(2) can be provided upon request.

11 The religious affiliation in the TSCS is more detailed than in the Asia Barometer. For the explanation see pp. xxx–xxx above.

12 It is also worth noting that there is a sizable Christian population in Taiwan. According to the *Survey of Religious Experience in Taiwan* (National Chengchi University 2009), Catholics and Protestants comprise 4.96% of the population. For more information see Tsai Yen-zen, ed., *Religious Experience in Contemporary Taiwan and China* (Taipei: Chengchi University Press, 2013).

13 Since profession of belief and religious practice do not always coincide (Laliberté 2004:3), we chose to analyze both beliefs and behaviors to cover a greater range of possibilities.

TABLE 2 *Religious values and practices by identity group and paternal background in Taiwan*

	Identity Group/Background		$\chi^2$ or t
	Taiwanese	Chinese	
Believe in the spiritual world (YES)	72%	77%	1.33(1), p=.25
How often do you pray? (reverse)	4.06	3.67	3.29, p<.01
Religious affiliation with Daoism	16%	6%	78.98(1), p<.01
How often do you go to religious services?	3	2.9	1.63, p=.051

Chinese and Taiwanese. We constructed the following hypotheses to test differences or similarities in the effects of social capital on religious practices based on national and ethnic self-identification.

*Hypothesis A2.1* (social contact theory, Asia Barometer)

Generalized trust has the same effect on the frequency of praying or meditating in the Chinese subsample as it does in the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis A2.2* (distinction theory, Asia Barometer)

Generalized trust has a distinct effect on the frequency of praying or meditating in the Chinese subsample as compared to the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis B2.1* (social contact theory, TSCS)

Generalized trust has the same effect on the frequency of visiting places of worship in the Chinese subsample as it does in the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis B2.2* (distinction theory, TSCS)

Generalized trust has a distinct effect on the frequency of visiting places of worship in the Chinese subsample as compared to the Taiwanese subsample, *ceteris paribus*.

For measuring religious practices, Asia Barometer interviewers asked respondents to indicate how often they pray or meditate (*ni duo jiu dao gao/ming xiang*

*yi ci?* 你多久禱告/冥想一次?). The participants had the following response choices: '1=Daily' (*mei tian* 每天); '2=Weekly' (*mei zhou* 每周); '3=Monthly' (*mei yue* 每月); '4=On special occasions' (*zai te ding de qing kung xia* 在特定情況下才會); '5=Never' (*cong lai mei you* 從來沒有); and 'Don't know' (*bu zhi dao* 不知道). There were five 'Don't know' answers (0.5% of all respondents), which we recoded as missing. As a result of recoding, lower scores on the scale represent a higher frequency of praying or meditating. A t-test in Table 2 reveals a significant difference in the measured religious practice between the two groups in focus ( $t=3.29, p<.01$ ). In comparison, the TSCS asks a question about visiting places of worship: "How often do you participate in any religious group at present (e.g., pilgrim group, practicing Zen, Sunday service, spirit-cultivation meeting, volunteer work, etc.)?" The answer choices varied, but we harmonized them for the five cross-sections. They range between '1=Never' and '8=Daily or several times a week.' A t-test did not show a significant difference in religious attendance between the two groups in focus ( $t=1.63, p>.05$ ).

To test the above hypotheses, we used logistic regression analysis on measures of religious values (professing belief in the spiritual world and Daoist adherence) and practices (praying/meditating and participating in religious groups).<sup>14</sup> The first block of models that relate to religious values and affiliation uses binary logistic regressions to address the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables. In the case of religious practices, we chose multinomial logistic regression analysis to capture the nominal character of the dependent measure. We include three main common blocks of independent and control variables in the models: (1) demographics; (2) religious affiliation; and (3) social capital as measured by generalized trust.

## Findings and Discussions

### *Modeling Belief in the Existence of the Spiritual World Using the Asia Barometer 2006*

Table 3A summarizes the logistic regression analysis of belief in the spiritual world from the Asia Barometer dataset. We include the independent and

<sup>14</sup> Identity influences both attitudes and behaviors (Stryker 1980). Connections to other people with the same identity (as for the self-identified Taiwanese in Taiwan) or to those with a different identity (the minority who identify themselves as Chinese in Taiwan) can have different consequences on attitudes and behaviors for the majority in comparison to people who do not identify with the majority. We measure these connections as generalized trust. The behavior of individuals has more tangible and immediate consequences on the social fabric and, therefore, may be considered more consequential than attitudes.



control variables discussed earlier in successive blocks. The dependent variable is a dichotomy with '1' representing belief in the existence of the spiritual world, and '0' otherwise. Overall, we find that social contact theory fails to explain factors that motivate differences in spiritual values for the Chinese in Taiwan. The results contradict the social contact *Hypothesis A1.1*. We find that generalized trust has the opposite effect on the likelihood of believing in the spiritual world among self-identified Chinese compared to Taiwanese.

Model 3 in Table 3A indicates that social capital is significant for both Taiwanese and Chinese in relation to their belief in the unseen world. The direction of the relation for the subsamples is, however, reversed. The Taiwanese who trust the generalized Other are significantly less likely to believe in the spiritual world. Chinese with higher levels of generalized trust are, by contrast, more likely to believe in the unseen world. This result may be linked to the differences of social trust measured in the two communities. As Eric Uslaner (1999) describes, for Chinese the measure of trust represents heterogeneous trust, or trust in people who are not necessarily similar to oneself (generalized trust), whereas for the self-identified Taiwanese it is homogeneous trust, or trust in people who are homogeneous or similar to oneself (particularized trust).

Additionally, there are some notable gender differences. The initial Model 1 shows that Taiwanese women and people with higher levels of income are more likely to believe in the unseen spiritual world. The two demographic variables persist throughout all three models, remaining significant in their association with the dependent variable. We anticipated this finding because "religion in Northeast Asia is not, as in the West, a separate and distinct entity. Rather it is essentially social and deeply involved in shifting structures of family life, which in turn are mutually implicated in gender norms, values and relationalities" (Turner and Salemink 2014:295). Nevertheless, gender does not appear to be significant for the Chinese subsample, marking a difference between the two subsamples with respect to gender effects on religious values.

In Model 2, meanwhile, for the Taiwanese subsample the measures of religious affiliation are associated significantly with belief in the unseen world. Taiwanese Buddhists are 2.21 (=e.<sup>0.792</sup>) times more likely to believe in the spiritual world when compared to non-Buddhists. Daoists, however, are 1.63 (=e.<sup>0.486</sup>) times more likely to believe when compared to non-Daoists. The association between religiosity for the Taiwanese remains significant in the last model, but for the Chinese neither adherence to Daoism nor Buddhism has a significant association with belief in the unseen world. Hence, religious affiliation is not contingent on belief in the spiritual world for Chinese. The introduction of the religious affiliation variable as a control, however, uncovered the significance

TABLE 3A *Logistic models estimating belief in an unseen spiritual world among self-identified Taiwanese and Chinese*

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese
<b>Demographic Variables</b>						
Age	0.017 (0.010)	0.026 (0.023)	0.017 (0.010)	0.023 (0.024)	0.020* (0.010)	0.022 (0.024)
Male	-0.575*** (0.164)	0.230 (0.449)	-0.576** (0.166)	0.253 (0.452)	-0.599*** (0.167)	0.230 (0.461)
Married	-0.028 (0.211)	-0.845 (0.558)	-0.576 (0.166)	-0.788 (0.566)	-0.099 (0.216)	-0.792 (0.173)
Education	0.025 (0.398)	-0.113 (0.080)	0.042 (0.030)	-0.150* (0.088)	0.053 (0.031)	-0.167* (0.090)
Income	0.492** (0.158)	0.457 (0.571)	0.448** (0.160)	0.576 (0.594)	0.440** (0.162)	0.539 (0.609)
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>						
Daoist			0.486* (0.204)	-0.475 (0.576)	0.459* (0.207)	-0.597 (0.590)
Buddhist			0.792*** (0.218)	0.269 (0.659)	0.811*** (0.219)	0.073 (0.679)
<b>Social Capital</b>						
Generalized trust					-0.425* (0.167)	0.894* (0.520)
Constant	-0.58*** (0.16)	-3.07 (6.54)	-5.21** (1.83)	-3.69 (6.73)	-5.21** (1.86)	-3.22 (6.88)
$\chi^2$ (df)	24.26*** (5)	6.55 (5)	38.32 (7)	8.17 (7)	44.10 (8)	10.81 (8)
Observations	806	119	803	119	795	117

Source: Asia Barometer 2006

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

For 'Taiwanese' (N>790): \* p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

For 'Chinese' (N<120): \* p<.10; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

of education for belief among Chinese. Thus, more highly educated Chinese are less likely to believe in the spiritual world ( $\beta = -.150, p < .10$ ), an effect not present in the Taiwanese subsample.

To summarize, the final model (Model 3) yields results that contradict the expectations about the assimilation of Chinese in Taiwan. The beliefs of self-identified Chinese do not appear to be driven by the factors that matter to self-identified Taiwanese. Socially disconnected or rich people, women, Buddhists, and Daoists are more likely among Taiwanese to believe in the spiritual world. None of these factors is contingent on religious belief among Chinese.

### *Modeling Belief as Daoist Affiliation Using the Taiwan Social Change Survey*

Table 3B details the logistic regression analysis of religious affiliation using the TSCS data. We include the main independent and control variables for the years 2004 and 2011, and in the final model we employ a year fixed-effect logistic model in which the dependent variable is a dichotomy, with '1' representing religious affiliation with Daoism and '0' otherwise. As in the Asia Barometer data, the results of the TSCS contradict the social contact *Hypothesis B 1.1*. We establish a distinct effect of social trust on the religious affiliation of Mainlanders, confirming the reverse effect of generalized trust when compared to other Taiwanese.<sup>15</sup> We find that the social contact theory does not explain adequately the factors that motivate differences of religious affiliation for Mainlanders in Taiwan, especially in terms of the effects of the generalized trust. The results, therefore, provide partial confirmation for the alternative *Hypothesis B1.2* and the cultural retention perspective.

In Model 1 (2004) and Model 2 (2011) for the Chinese subsample in Table 3B, the measures of generalized trust do not appear to be associated significantly with Daoism. The switch in the direction of the association from 2004 to 2011, however, is striking. While in 2004, sons and daughters of Mainlander men who trusted the generalized Other were 3.12 ( $=e^1$ .<sup>138</sup>) times more likely to be Daoists than those who did not trust others in general, in 2011 trusting Chinese were 3.38 ( $=1/e^{-1}$ .<sup>219</sup>) times less likely to be Daoists than non-trusting Mainlanders. In light of this drastic change over the period, the association between trust and religious affiliation with Daoism for the Chinese is not significant in the final aggregated model.

15 Similar results concerning the effects of social capital are obtained when we use Buddhist affiliation as the dependent variable. Results for more traditional religions are more reliable than results for religious affiliations that are trending now. Such fads in religious participation can contaminate the results.

TABLE 3B *Logistic models estimating Daoist affiliation among Taiwanese and Mainlanders*

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese
<b>Demographic Variables</b>						
Age	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.057)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.040*** (0.012)
Male	0.258 (0.133)	1.569 (1.009)	0.185 (0.151)	(omitted)	0.325*** (0.066)	1.000** (0.359)
Married	0.114 (0.148)	(omitted)	0.352* (0.175)	1.277 (1.360)	0.247*** (0.075)	2.085*** (0.510)
Income	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Year (Base=2004)	YES	YES				
2007					-0.532*** (0.097)	-0.109 (0.488)
2009					-0.299** (.096)	0.343 (.457)
2010					-0.242* (0.103)	-0.131 (0.528)
2011			YES	YES	0.145 (0.098)	-0.185 (0.556)
<b>Social Capital</b>						
Generalized trust	-0.041 (0.153)	1.138 (0.771)	-0.364* (0.154)	-1.219 (1.140)	-0.136* (0.069)	0.143 (0.322)
Constant	-1.583*** (0.336)	1.192 (2.086)	-2.033*** (0.343)	-4.342 (3.100)	-1.717*** (0.165)	-2.668*** (0.839)
$\chi^2$ (df)	4.98 (5)	5.13 (4)	12.96* (5)	3.64 (4)	103.13*** (9)	31.72 (9)
Observations	1597	100	1174	67	7565	832

Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

(N=9,240 for Taiwanese, N=1,019 for Chinese): \* p<.05; \*\*p<.01;\*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Model 3 in Table 3B indicates that social capital is significant for Taiwanese and not for Chinese in its relation to Daoist affiliation. This, however, may be due to the changes reported over the analyzed period in Mainlander attitudes toward Daoism. The direction of the relation for the two subsamples in Model 3 is reversed, which indicates differences in the effects of generalized trust on religious affiliation between the two subgroups. The Taiwanese who trust the generalized Other are significantly less likely to be Daoists (1.15 times<sup>16</sup> less than non-trusting Taiwanese). Chinese with higher levels of generalized trust are, by contrast, more likely to be Daoists (1.15 times<sup>17</sup> more likely than non-trusting Chinese), though we do not have enough evidence to support this finding with statistically significant confidence ( $p > .0$ ). Chinese people with more social capital are therefore more likely to share Daoist affiliation with the majority in Taiwan, where the percentage of Daoists is higher than the Chinese subsample.

Additionally, the final model (Model 3) yields more results that contradict the expectations about assimilation of the Chinese in Taiwan. The beliefs of Chinese are affected by marital status more strongly than among Taiwanese, which suggests possible cultural differences in marital role expectations. Model 3 shows that married Taiwanese are slightly more likely to be Daoists than unmarried Taiwanese. The institute of marriage in the Mainlander-background families, meanwhile, seems to increase the likelihood of religious affiliation with Daoism when compared to the majority of other Taiwanese. Married Taiwanese are only 1.28 times more likely to be Daoists, while married Chinese are 8.04 times more likely to be Daoists than unmarried Chinese. Year dummy variables also show that the changes were more significant among the Taiwanese subsample than among Chinese, where year coefficients are not significant.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Modeling Religious Practices Using the Asia Barometer Data*

The next two sections analyze the effects of social capital on religious practices. Table 4A summarizes the results for the multinomial logistic regression of the self-identified Taiwanese and self-identified Chinese subsamples using the Asia Barometer dataset. We use the frequency of praying or meditating as the dependent variable. In all models 'Daily,' 'Weekly,' 'Monthly,' and 'On special occasions' are compared to the reference category 'Never.' Overall, we find that the social contact theory is not supported by our findings on the religious

16  $(=1/e^{-.136})$ .

17  $(=e^{.143})$ .

18 The base year is 2004.

TABLE 4A *Multinomial logistic models estimating the frequency of praying or meditating among self-identified Taiwanese and Chinese (reference category: 'Never')*

Independent Variables	Model 1 Daily		Model 2 Weekly		Model 3 Monthly		Model 4 On special occasions	
	T	C	T	C	T	C	T	C
<b>Demographic Variables</b>								
Age	0.034 (0.018)	0.077** (0.037)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.046 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.119** (0.056)	-0.023*** (0.010)	-0.042 (0.028)
Male (o=ref)	-0.816** (0.310)	-0.304 (0.737)	-1.23** (0.445)	-0.610 (0.956)	-1.02*** (0.274)	-2.98** (1.248)	-0.153 (0.165)	-0.535 (0.519)
Married (o=ref)	0.087 (0.436)	-0.518 (0.931)	0.856 (0.569)	(om.)	0.755 (0.394)	2.052 (1.383)	0.255 (0.212)	-0.054 (0.626)
Education	-0.060 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.137)	-0.027 (0.081)	-0.169 (0.176)	-0.059 (0.050)	-0.256 (0.163)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.138 (0.104)
Income	1.23*** (0.338)	2.73*** (1.01)	1.57** (0.513)	-1.347 (1.166)	1.27*** (0.307)	2.057 (1.455)	0.609*** (0.169)	2.05*** (0.754)
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>								
Daoist (o=ref)	-0.033 (0.444)	-1.064 (1.05)	1.82** (0.662)	1.130 (1.390)	1.68** (0.513)	-0.003 (1.151)	0.752*** (0.209)	0.138 (0.653)
Buddhist (o=ref)	1.09** (0.406)	0.570 (0.932)	1.391 (0.727)	2.037 (1.492)	2.44*** (0.507)	0.142 (1.337)	1.05*** (0.221)	-0.036 (0.752)
<b>Social Capital</b>								
Generalized trust (o=ref)	0.471 (0.306)	0.803 (0.826)	0.024 (0.427)	2.48** (1.013)	0.335 (0.267)	1.376 (0.942)	0.242 (0.169)	0.808 (0.594)
Constant	-15.7*** (4.04)	-34.5*** (12.3)	-16.7** (5.92)	21.12 (14.1)	-12.2** (3.61)	-16.9 (16.2)	-4.19** (1.97)	-18.4** (8.66)

Source: Asia Barometer 2006

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, (om.) omitted because of insufficient number of cases for one of the groups.

For 'Taiwanese' (N>790): \* p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

For 'Chinese' (N<120): \* p<.10; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01 (two-tailed tests);

T=Taiwanese, C=Chinese (individuals who identify themselves as Chinese)

practices of self-identified Chinese in Taiwan, while we find a partial support for the distinction theory as defined in the present paper.

The models in Table 4A demonstrate that social capital has a much stronger effect on the Chinese minority subsample in Taiwan than social contact theory predicts. Instead of resembling the majority of the population, i.e., the Taiwanese-identified people, the Chinese who have higher levels of trust in the generalized Other are more likely to pray more often, which is contrary to the expectations raised by their assimilation with the Taiwanese majority.

As for praying and meditating occasionally among Taiwanese, an increase of one year in the respondent's age is associated, on average, with a 0.023 decrease in the logit of religious practice, which holds other demographic, religious, and trust variables constant. Thus for each one-year increase in the respondent's age, the odds of praying are multiplied by 0.977 ( $=e^{-.023}$ ), yielding a decrease of approximately 2%, and the odds that a 31-year-old Taiwanese prays or meditates are 1.02 times lower than those of a 30-year-old.

There are a few stark differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese subgroups that are worthy of note. Religious affiliation does not appear to correlate significantly with the frequency of praying or meditating among the Chinese, which is contrary to the findings for the Taiwanese subsample. The results thus present evidence contradicting the social contact theory explanation and the assimilation of self-identified Chinese in Taiwan. Chinese appear to have different religious norms (due in part to a connection between affiliation and practices) when compared to self-identified Taiwanese.

#### *Modeling Religious Practices Using the Taiwan Social Change Survey*

Table 4B summarizes the results for the multinomial logistic regression of the Taiwanese and Mainlander subsamples, respectively. We use the TSCS data, in which the dependent variable is the frequency of attending religious services. All models use 'Never' as the reference category. We find support for the distinction theory and for *Hypothesis B2.2* regarding the frequency of religious worship of Chinese in Taiwan.

In Table 4B, with regard to social trust, the 'Weekly' category is the main interest. Many Taiwanese and Mainlanders are likely to attend religious services less frequently, and very few would commit to doing so daily. However, the main differences between the two groups arise in attending services weekly. Indeed, we find that social trust has opposite effects on weekly religious attendance among the two subsamples. Trusting others make Taiwanese 28%<sup>19</sup> more likely to participate in religious activities, while it makes the Chinese

19 ( $=e^{.249}$ ).

TABLE 4B *Multinomial logistic models estimating the frequency of participation in a religious group among Taiwanese and Mainlanders (reference category: 'Never')*

Independent Variables	Model 1 Daily		Model 2 Weekly		Model 3 Monthly		Model 4 On special occasions	
	T	C	T	C	T	C	T	C
<b>Demographic Variables</b>								
Age	0.030*** (0.004)	0.014 (0.010)	0.015*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.024*** (0.005)
Male (o=ref)	-0.097 (0.143)	-0.860* (0.369)	-0.305*** (0.077)	-0.697** (0.241)	-0.093 (0.105)	-0.685 (0.347)	-0.002 (0.050)	-0.408* (0.166)
Married (o=ref)	-0.167 (0.149)	0.131 (0.390)	0.242** (0.085)	0.540* (0.268)	0.329** (0.122)	0.646 (0.412)	0.233*** (0.056)	0.397* (0.186)
Year	0.088** (0.030)	0.055 (0.079)	0.067*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.050)	0.142*** (0.023)	0.045 (0.073)	0.063*** (0.010)	0.013 (0.034)
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>								
Daoist (o=ref)	-0.221 (0.218)	0.987 (0.680)	-0.271* (0.127)	-0.195 (0.645)	0.840*** (0.174)	1.98** (0.674)	0.819*** (0.081)	1.21*** (0.351)
Buddhist (o=ref)	-0.034 (0.180)	0.476 (0.398)	0.068 (0.103)	0.189*** (0.280)	1.19** (0.157)	2.24*** (0.439)	0.852*** (0.075)	1.38*** (0.197)
Folk Religion (o=ref)	-1.14*** (0.206)	-1.679 (1.033)	-0.493*** (0.100)	-0.510*** (0.383)	0.565*** (0.153)	1.054 (0.560)	0.619*** (0.068)	0.962*** (0.217)
Other Religions (o=ref)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)	(om.)
<b>Social Capital</b>								
Generalized trust (o=ref)	0.246 (0.149)	0.345 (0.359)	0.249** (0.081)	-0.022 (0.244)	0.308** (0.108)	0.555 (0.338)	0.163** (0.053)	0.321 (0.166)
Constant	-181** (59.30)	-114 (159.3)	-136*** (31.49)	-45.61 (100.8)	-288*** (46.13)	-93.1 (146.4)	-126*** (20.27)	-25.57 (69.01)

Source: Taiwan Social Change Survey

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

(N=9,240 for Taiwanese, N=1,019 for Chinese): \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests);

(om.) omitted reference variables; T=Taiwanese, C=Mainlander (individuals whose fathers are Mainlanders)



group, on average, 2%<sup>20</sup> less likely. These findings are consistent with the results from the Asia Barometer (Table 4A) in which we find evidence that suggests dissimilarity of the socially connected Chinese vis-à-vis Taiwanese. Thus, more socially connected Chinese are more likely to pray or meditate weekly than not, while self-identified Chinese, on average, show higher levels of praying and meditating. Therefore, our results from the TSCS also contradict the social contact theory explanation of assimilation regarding Chinese in Taiwan. Daughters and sons of Mainlanders appear to have different outcomes with respect to the quality of social ties within the community than the Taiwanese subsample.

Table 4B shows that Chinese who belong to one of the main religious groups are more likely to attend religious services than Taiwanese. For instance, Taiwanese Buddhists are approximately 3.29 times more likely<sup>21</sup> than non-Buddhist Taiwanese to attend religious services monthly, as opposed to never. Chinese Buddhists, however, are 9.39 times more likely<sup>22</sup> than non-Buddhist Chinese to do the same. In general, the difference in likelihood of monthly religious attendance between the Taiwanese and Mainlander subsamples is substantial.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, for attendance on special occasions, the percent increase in likelihood of the Taiwanese subgroup by various religious affiliations is roughly two times lower than that of the Chinese subsample.<sup>24</sup> These differences in the effects of religious affiliation on attendance of religious groups confirm the distinction hypothesis and act as a counterpoint to the social contact theory.

We also find that elderly Taiwanese appear to be more active in attending religious services than elderly Chinese when compared to their respective younger counterparts. In Models 1T and 1C, each additional year of age in the Taiwanese subsample increases the likelihood of attending religious services by 3%.<sup>25</sup> A 60-year-old Taiwanese is 60% more likely to attend religious services than a 40-year-old Taiwanese. In comparison, a 60-year-old Mainlander is only 30%<sup>26</sup> more likely than a 40-year-old Mainlander. If we compare attendance on special occasions, then we find a similar pattern. A 60-year-old Chinese is

20  $(=e^{-.022})$ .

21  $(=e^{1.19})$ .

22  $(=e^{2.24})$ .

23 The percent of increase for Chinese, on average, is the square of the value for the Taiwanese group.

24 The average of  $(e^{.819}) (e^{.852}) (e^{.619})$  for Taiwanese and the average of  $(e^{1.21}) (e^{1.38}) (e^{.962})$  for Chinese.

25  $(e^{.030})$  for each year of age.

26  $(e^{.014})$  for each year of age.

60%<sup>27</sup> less likely to attend religious services on special occasions (compared to not attending at all) than a 40-year-old Chinese. In contrast, a 60-year-old Taiwanese is only 20%<sup>28</sup> less likely to do the same when compared to a 40-year-old counterpart. We find, therefore, that age is a stronger predictor of religious attendance among Taiwanese than among Chinese, where gender differences play a bigger role. These findings suggest considerable cultural differences in religious behaviors between the two groups and the persistence of cultural retention among Chinese in Taiwan.

Social capital, in sum, has a stronger effect on the Mainlander minority subsample than among other Taiwanese. This finding runs counter to what the social contact theory proposes. Instead of resembling the majority, i.e., other Taiwanese people, Mainlanders show distinct social capital effects on religious practices.

### Conclusions

Chinese who live in Taiwan differ in a few ways from the majority of the Taiwanese population. Our exploratory study provides evidence for the cultural retention perspective. Chinese in Taiwan have a different culture in terms of the effects of religious affiliation and social capital on practicing and professing religious beliefs. While for Taiwanese, religious affiliation is an important factor linked intimately to belief in the spiritual world and to the frequency of praying and meditating, this is not the case for the religious practice of self-identified Chinese. Trust has a distinct effect on Chinese when compared to Taiwanese. Chinese who trust people in general are more likely to believe in the unseen world or to be Daoists, whereas generalized trust has the opposite effect on Taiwanese. The Taiwanese who trust others more are less likely to believe in the existence of the spiritual world. The results provide partial evidence to confirm cultural retention among the Chinese in Taiwan and the distinction theory discussed herein.

One ought to consider the findings together with their limitations. Ethnic self-identification in the TSCS does not perfectly correspond to national identity in the Asia Barometer. Thus, the groups identified as Chinese in the two data sets and treated as one group in this study only coincide to a certain extent. Yet it is often the case that people who identify as nationally Chinese are also more likely to be ethnically Mainlanders. Another limitation is that the

27  $(e^{-.024})$  for each year of age.

28  $(e^{-.006})$  for each year of age.

TSCS provides a better measure for religious beliefs specific to the context of Taiwan, while the Asia Barometer instead aims at a multinational comparison, utilizing broader definitions of religion. With these limitations in mind, future research will benefit from the analysis of differences in the two identity groups and changes in attitudes and behaviors within the social and historic context in Taiwan.

The present study is a first step toward demonstrating that cultural retention for heterogeneous groups can occur despite pulls toward assimilation. In the Taiwanese context, one might view the idea of continuous heterogeneity itself as progressive (Chuang 2011) because it is an outcome of recent historic events in Taiwan. An explanation of the observed differences in the effects of social capital may lie in the power differentials between groups. As John Berry (1997), Denise Ogden et al. (2004), and Mark Cleveland et al. (2009) find, asymmetry in the influence of one group over the other might be due to power differentials between heterogeneous groups. This direction could pose an interesting challenge for further research on social capital.

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