

DynPolAC: Dynamic Policy-based Access Control for IoT Systems

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Motiation: IoT Space

- The number of IoT systems are growing
- About 26 devices per person



200 billion IoT devices

Motivation: mobile IoT by 2020



7 million unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)




10 million connected vehicles

1 in 4 cars are autonomous by 2030

Autonomous IoT: Drones


(1) Moving objects have higher levels of interaction than stationary networks

(2) with linear growth of IoT nodes, communication between them grow quadratically $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$



Problem: Malicious Attacks

spy and snoop



Our Goal: Develop an authorization scheme for highly interactive IoT systems

Challenges

High interaction means fast authorization required



Dynamic IoT nodes are constrained systems


- Weight limitation
- Power consumption




Communication in congested networks could build up quadratically → so does authorization



Previous Work



Our Goal



Outline

- Motivation
- Approach
- evaluation

DynPolAC: Key Insight

We describe rules in high level language

- Reduce syntax size
- Save the parsing time

Use only the necessary expressions
required in IoT space

remove unnecessary nested
elements and make simple syntax


⊢ Will show even in small embedded
platforms DynPolAC is fast and meets
the overall speedup in the system
performance.

DynPolAC: No-fly Zone

We can construct rules with 6 primitives only


1. Access type: Permit
2. Data type: coordinates
3. Drone name: Friendly
4. Time: ALL
5. User: UTM
6. Group: Airport

➤ Spatial, temporal, and role-based expressions can be built with 6-element policy blocks



➤ Radar sees an unknown asset

➤ UTM starts communicating with the drone to re-route



DynPolAC: Comparison

Let's see how rules look in previous model?

DynPolAC

```
1. <policy>
2. <rule>access</rule>
3. <attributes>
4.   <type>email</type>
5.   <vendor>MediCorp</vendor>
6.   <time>ANY</time>
7.   <user>ANY</user>
8.   <group>med.example.com</group>
9. </attributes>
10. </policy>
```

removed unnecessary nested elements, still 6 primitives, made simple syntax

10 vs. 39

650 4.1 Example one

651 4.1.1 Example policy

652 Assume that a corporation named Medi Corp (identified by its domain name: med.example.com) has an
653 **access control policy** that states, in English:

654 Any user with an e-mail name in the "med.example.com" namespace is allowed to perform any **action** on
655 any resource.

656 An XACML **policy** consists of header information, an optional text description of the **policy**, a **target**, one
657 or more **rules** and an optional set of **obligation** expressions.

```
658 [a1] <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
659 [a2] <Policy
660 [a3]   xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
661 [a4]   xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
662 [a5]   xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17
663 [a6]   http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-core-v3-schema-wd-17.xsd"
664 [a7]   PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimplePolicy1"
665 [a8]   Version="1.0"
666 [a9]   RuleCombiningAlgId="identifier:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
667 [a10] <Description>
668 [a11]   Medi Corp access control policy
669 [a12] </Description>
670 [a13] <Target/>
671 [a14] <Rule
672 [a15]   RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:SimpleRule1"
673 [a16]   Effect="Permit">
674 [a17]   <Description>
675 [a18]     Any subject with an e-mail name in the med.example.com domain
676 [a19]     can perform any action on any resource.
677 [a20]   </Description>
678 [a21]   <Target>
679 [a22]     <AnyOf>
680 [a23]       <AllOf>
681 [a24]         <Match
682 [a25]           MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rfc822Name-match">
683 [a26]           <AttributeValue
684 [a27]             DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
685 [a28]             >med.example.com</AttributeValue>
686 [a29]           <AttributeDesignator
687 [a30]             MustBePresent="false"
688 [a31]             Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-
689 [a32]             subject"
690 [a33]             AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
691 [a34]             DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"/>
692 [a35]           </Match>
693 [a36]         </AllOf>
694 [a37]       </AnyOf>
695 [a38]     </Target>
696 [a39]   </Rule>
697 </Policy>
```


Outline

- Motivation
- Approach
- evaluation

Research Questions

- RQ1. At micro-level, what is the processing time improvement?
- RQ2. At system-level, what is the response time?
 - Check stability condition
 - Can it meet requests in interactive environments?
 - Sensitivity analysis
 - what is the bottleneck in extreme scenarios?
- RQ3. What is the memory overhead?


Experimental Setup



Goal: show the homogeneity of our results in different platforms


Experimental Setup

System Study: Emulate an interactive IoT environment



RQ1. Processing Time

Rules by DynPolAC syntax are parsed
and processed in milliseconds
Less than half seconds




RQ1. Comparison

Speedup is higher in slower platforms



DynPolAC is a suitable scheme for low-capacity devices




- ✓ On Average 4x process improvements
- ✓ up to 7.27x speedup

RQ2. System Stability Condition

| Parameter | Unit | value |
|----------------------------|--------------|----------|
| Arrival rate (λ) | 1/s | 1 - 8 |
| Size of query | Bytes | 200 – 5K |
| Size of policy | No. of rules | 1 - 2000 |

Goal: measure system performance by calculating the response time


The end-to-end time of a drone to initiate the request until the reply is received.



RQ2. System Stability Condition

| Parameter | Unit | value |
|---------------------------------|--------------|----------|
| Mean Arrival rate (λ) | 1/s | 4 |
| Size of query | Bytes | 200 – 5K |
| Size of policy | No. of rules | 1 - 2000 |

| simulation | response time (ms) | Response rate (μ) |
|------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| No-policy | 178 | 5.6 |
| DynPolAC | 245 | 4.1 |
| XACML | 840 | 1.2 |



DynPolAC satisfies the stability condition being right above the threshold of 4.

RQ2. Stability Condition

| simulation | response time (ms) | Response rate (μ) |
|------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| No-policy | 178 | 5.6 |
| DynPolAC | 245 | 4.1 |
| XACML | 840 | 1.2 |

XACML-based policy systems experience instability, so it cannot keep up requests!!


DynPolAC improves the overall response time by 70%.

RQ2. Sensitivity Study

Extreme case

Arrival Rate: 8/s


Data size: 2kB



Sweep the number of rules

RQ3. Memory Overhead

DynPolAC
incurs only 7.5% memory overhead
compared to the rest of our system[¥]



Can be deployed to memory constrained nodes

[¥] Karimibiuki, Mehdi, and André Ivanov. "MiniCloud: a mini storage and query service for local heterogeneous IoT devices." *Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Internet of Things*. ACM, 2018.

Summary

- Looked at a scenario of dynamic IoT system
 - DynPolAC is the solution to securely authenticate dynamic objects
- Insight: DynPolAC has a crisp language selection
 - high-level language to express very low-level parameters.
 - expresses similar rules compared to previous work.
 - Suitable for constrained IoT nodes with only 7.5% overhead.
 - Up to 7.28x speedup achieved, 4x on average.
- DynPolAC guarantees system stability.

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Download DynPolAC: <https://github.com/DependableSystemsLab/DynPolAC>