Bardhan, Pranab, and Isha Ray. 2008. Economists, anthropologists, and the contested commons. In The contested commons: Conversations between economists and anthropologists, edited by P. Bardhan and I. Ray. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
This first chapter authored by Bardhan and Isha (the book’s editors) explores the characteristics and application of economics and anthropology to the problem of understanding, developing policy for, and managing common pool resources (CPRs). The authors explore three defining contrasts between economics and anthropology and comment on how these different approaches may support the continued study of the commons problem.
First, the contrast between the concepts of autonomy and embeddedness is explored. The authors argue that the autonomy of economics is foundationally situated in Adam Smith’s utility maximization models based on: methodological individualism, utility maximization and exogenous preferences. This economic approach provides for precision, parsimony and predictive power. The economic autonomy argument has been described by Taylor (1988) as a “thin theory of human action.” In contrast to the autonomy concept, embeddedness provides a layered explanation of causality that has a tradition in anthropology. The concept of embeddedness is supported by the works of Polanyi (1954) who argued individuals are characterised by relationships and reciprocity rather than utility maximization motives. Other concepts of characterizing individual actions include the moral economy from work developed by Geertz (1963) and Scott (1976), and habitus, the practices, principles and rules that give individuals a sense of belonging to society developed by Bourdieu (1977; 1990). It is noted that norms need to be built explicitly into economic models. Basu (2000) defines three categories of norms: rationality‐limiting, preference changing and equilibrium selecting. It is noted that the work of Michel Foucault (1991) suggests that governance consists of certain arts and practices such as measurement, observation and education, through which individuals become “disciplined and governable subjects.”
The second contrast between economists and anthropologists is characterized by parsimony and complexity. The point is made referencing Francis Crick’s argument that Occam’s Razor may be a useful tool in the physical sciences but the over simplification of (biologic) models is inappropriate. By extension, the authors suggest that the simplifications of economic models and absence of explicitly stating the norms and underlying assumptions may be problematic and naively over simplistic and inappropriate to provide normative policy advice when social structures and cultural norms. These models are found lacking because they don’t explicitly state nor account for the role for hegemony (power structures). In contrast, anthropology embraces the need to incorporate complexity in order to “make strange the familiar.” Two chapter authors, Agrawal and Platteau, provide for insight into the role that complexity may play in understanding the commons. Agrawal comments that the challenge is to understand how individuals see themselves in relation to their environments, and how norms and power both constrain and enable them – practices make persons. Similarly, Platteau’s comments that “effective cooperation can be established only if the appropriate beliefs and expectations have come to prevail. There is no reason to believe that such beliefs and expectations spontaneously arise when there is a need for collective efforts.”
The third framework to compare and contrast economic and anthropology contributions to the CPRs questions is that of outcomes and processes. The authors suggest that economics provides a means to develop simplified models that are instructive to policy development. Anthropology and the application of case study are useful to investigate causal processes directly, providing “the structure and function of the relationship themselves…the process determining outcomes matter as well as the outcomes themselves.” (Henrick et al, 2004)
