Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
This critically acclaimed work explores common pool resource (CPR) problems. Three influential models are described: the tragedy of the commons; the prisoner’s dilemma game and the logic of collective action.
An institutional analysis framework is applied to analyzing self-governing CPRs. Case studies of both successfully and unsuccessfully management of CPRs are explored. Case studies of successful self-governed commons include: forestry management in Switzerland, commons land management in Japan and water management in Spain. The various CPR case studies were analyzed to identify common “design principles.” Seven design principles were observed as being consistently present in successfully managed CPRs and include: (1) clearly defined boundaries, (2) appropriate and flexible rules of appropriation, (3) collective choice arrangements, (4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conflict resolution mechanisms, and (7) flexibility by senior levels of government in the recognition of rights. For CPRs that are part of a larger system (a watershed for example) a framework of nested government, providing a means to convene actors from multiple levels of government and agencies, was an essential element to long term success in uncertain and changing environments. Issues of “credible commitment” and “mutual monitoring” were identified as important considerations in framing self-organizing CPR policy.
Ostrom notes that policy based on metaphors are potentially harmful due to misapplication and oversimplification. Several examples of countries where the ‘tragedy of the commons’ metaphor was misapplied include: Thailand, Niger, Nepal and India. The false dichotomy of solutions (state or privatization) to resolve CPR problems promoted by Hardin’s tragedy of the commons metaphor, misrepresents (ignores) the opportunity to apply local, village level, negotiated outcomes that are considerate of local culture, power dynamics, and scarcity of the resource.
Ostrom recommends that a framework for analyzing institutional choice for the management of CPRs should evaluate the benefits, costs, shared norms and other opportunities as well as acknowledge the process and challenges of institutional changes. Ostrom observes that “the policy space can be thought of as a set of rules concerning who is required, forbidden, or allowed to take what action or affect what outcomes related a specific domain.”
Ostrom cautions social science researchers of the perils of developing institutional governance models in the absence of a localized context due to the potential to succumb to the “perverse effect of supporting increased centralization of political authority.” Four significant observations were identified that support greater consideration of locally negotiated CPR management that include: individual actors have the potential to improve long-term maximization through joint strategy development; individual actors have been shown to take the initiative to avoid CPR traps without external authority intervention; senior governments under utilize and under appreciate established local institutions that may “help acquire information, reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, and equitably allocate appropriation rights and provision duties”; and the challenges and assumptions of normative CPR model advice given by academics and researchers to government actors has inherent limitations, idealized markets or idealized states for example. Ostrom advocates for greater inclusion of multi-disciplinary research and case study analysis to further the evolution of institutions for collective action.
