{"id":3499,"date":"2014-12-14T12:39:00","date_gmt":"2014-12-14T20:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/?p=3499"},"modified":"2014-12-16T14:46:16","modified_gmt":"2014-12-16T22:46:16","slug":"policy-series-failure-of-not-strengthening-the-parliament","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/2014\/policy-series-failure-of-not-strengthening-the-parliament\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Series: Failure of Not Strengthening the Parliament"},"content":{"rendered":"

Under the 1992 Constitution, the parliament is supposed to become the state policy black box.\u00a0 <\/em>It was empowered to develop, approve, and enforce state policies that would strengthen the country’s sovereignty, maintain\u00a0its domestic stability, facilitate the economic development, and more importantly, protect core principles of democracy (i.e., our rights and rule of law).\u00a0 But, now we’re already losing trust in the legislature.\u00a0Firstly, we witness increasingly polarized debates without any subtantial studies and facts.\u00a0Secondly, we\u00a0see intense factionalized fightings over\u00a0the political posts, election laws, and\u00a0allocations of funds, loans, and bonds. Thirdly, we see\u00a0erratic temptations of changing laws, rules, and regulations even without giving justifiable reasons.\u00a0 Finally, we now can rationally expect what would be major issues for any parliaments in pre-election years (i.e., the changing the constitution, election laws, and revision to the state budget) and post-elections (i.e., dividing up ministries and agencies, cancelling\/revising previous economic\/financial decisions, and typical ‘pork and barrel’ politics). \u00a0This was the case for all past parliaments from 1992. No surprise, same applies to present one.<\/p>\n

So, why our parliament is becoming less respected, weak, and the easiest target for the political blame game?\u00a0 Why it moves from the most powerful constitutional institution to more like ‘symbolic’ one?\u00a0 Why the law (policy) making institution becomes ‘law (policy) breaking’ one?\u00a0\u00a0Are our ‘esteemed parliamentarians’ trading the\u00a0power of the parliament for their parochial, short-term interests?\u00a0 So, what the parliament should do now to regain its real policy-making power and our trust?<\/p>\n

We all know – if\u00a0parliamentarians respect the rule of law and hold their temptations of \u2018cheating\u2019 from their own approved rules, the parliament would easily gain the public trust. But, the overall structure appears to encourage\u00a0cheating<\/em>; therefore, even a good principled person talks about moral principles and patriotic deeds, but acts in favour of parochial interests. \u00a0The result is mistrust and fragmentation.<\/p>\n

So, how can we get out of this\u00a0proverbial crabs in a barrel scenario without dictatorship, oligarchy, revolutions, and foreign interventions? \u00a0We need to improve our institutions – especially, the parliament. \u00a0Our esteemed members should unite on common objectives of the national sovereignty, development, and democracy (i.e., human rights and rule of law) while constraining their tactical (may be strategic) parochial interests.<\/p>\n

In this regard, a key solution seems to me to invest and to empower the parliamentary policy making and enforcing capacity.\u00a0 It’s constitutionally given, but neglected.<\/p>\n

Let’s learn from the institutionalization process of the President.\u00a0 The 1992 Constitution intentionally made the presidential institution symbolic and deal-broker (for the national interests) along with some\u00a0rights of\u00a0checks and balances.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, Mongolia didn’t slide into ‘super-presidentialism’ which is common in most post-communist, esp., post-Soviet, cases and\u00a0all our presidents\u00a0played\u00a0quite constructive roles during major crises (e.g., hunger strike of 1994, July 1 in 2008).\u00a0 But,\u00a0they made the presidential institution – the most bureaucratic and influential one.\u00a0\u00a0Each president enlisted\u00a0leading experts (as advisors); expanded the National Security Council,\u00a0its secretariat and think tank; enshirned its power in judiciary and foreign affairs; and brought all security organizations under the presidential influence (esp., the president’s power to confer the highest ranks for leaders of these security institutions).<\/p>\n

In contrast, the parliament did not increase its bureaucracy and even stripped numerous executive power-checking rights for others.\u00a0 Yes, the parliament has 8 standing committees, 10 sub-committees, and secretariat with 9 special departments.\u00a0 But, the real question is – do they matter in the parliamentary policy-making process?\u00a0 How much autonomy and power does the parliament give to its own bureaucracy?\u00a0 Or, the parliament and its members simply use them for daily secretarial,\u00a0clerical, and protocol purposes?<\/p>\n

The fault of our parliament is unable to unite and empower its own bureaucracy to regain its chief policy-making power and to increase the public trust.\u00a0 To do that, parliament members need to get over their parochial interest and self-defeating internal bickering.<\/p>\n

The law (policy) making is a complicated process.\u00a0 First, we need to state the problem and identify main causes.\u00a0 Here the parliament needs to provide greater autonomy for its standing committee members and staffers.\u00a0 They must be empowered to question all stakeholders, including outside experts.\u00a0 Second, we need to develop short, mid, and long-term solutions and attempt to calculate its possible intended and un-intended consequences.\u00a0 Parliament members could not do that because they are constrained by multiple interests (party, business, local, and personal).\u00a0 The parliamentary staffers with help of experts could perform these tasks of developing and evaluating different options.\u00a0 Finally, we need to follow up our policy outcomes for years.\u00a0 Parliament members couldn’t do that because they are temporary political creatures and overwhelmed with their interests.\u00a0 Therefore, the parliament needs to build up and empower its own non-partisan bureaucracy<\/strong> – that would build up the parliamentary institutional memory, knowledge, and expertise, and serve as gate-keepers against parochial, corporate, and ad-hoc interests.<\/p>\n

Otherwise, our policy-making process will still be failure and victim of parochial interests.<\/p>\n

First, repeated elections of parliament members would not provide the policy continuity<\/strong>.\u00a0 Just take an example of this parliament, there are 28 new members, 19 members in their second term, 16 in their third, and 12 in their fourth and more terms. Previous parliaments had quite well-balanced representation of new and old members.\u00a0 Have we seen the policy-continuity and responsible policy-making?<\/p>\n

Second, increasing the number of individual staffers also couldn’t contribute for the good policy-making<\/strong>.\u00a0 From 1992, parliament members continuously adding funding and numbers of their staffers.\u00a0 But, they are also political creatures – more concerned with their own options and interests – than contributing to the institutional memory of the legislature.<\/p>\n

Third, increasing the secretarial capacity of the parliamentary secretariat without adding more powerful policy experts will not strengthen the parliament.<\/strong>\u00a0 Even though the current parliamentary secretariat has many fine policy experts, they would not stand for the good policy making unless the parliament provides the protection from the political and business interests.<\/p>\n

The parliamentary non-partisan staffers – who are protected from political and business interests – could help the parliament to ensure proper policy-making and monitoring capacity. \u00a0Otherwise, we will continue to operate on the USB (flash drive) memories of parties, factions, and influential politicians.<\/p>\n

There are many policy issues are waiting for parliamentary non-partisan policy reviews, the followings are just examples.<\/p>\n

1. The control and use of the security, law-enforcement\u00a0organizations and tax authority: as we have witnessed explicit and implicit attempts by politicians, parties, and factions to insert their control and influence in security organizations and to use them for their own interests.\u00a0 The politicization and fractionalization of the security, law-enforcement, and tax organizations are the most dangerous phenomena for any states<\/strong> [examples are abundant].\u00a0 Now it is time for the parliament to re-examine the entire set of policies of institutionalization of security, law-enforcement, and taxation agencies to keep them outside of domestic politics and committed for the public good.<\/p>\n

2. The investment agreements especially in mining: the parliament could set up an independent commission to examine the past mining investment agreements, including the OT, for the policy-making (learning) purposes.\u00a0 The commission along with parliamentary staffers should able to question and examine all past\u00a0agreements\u00a0and evaluate the state policy-making procedures in order to improve its own policy-making processes and to train policy experts. \u00a0The commission results should not be used for political purposes; therefore, the commission could be headed prominent politicians – outside of the\u00a0current politics<\/strong>. \u00a0Otherwise, we don’t learn anything from our past and most current policy-making expertise.<\/p>\n

3. The public service is another aspect, which dearly needs non-partisan review. \u00a0The current politicization (could even we called, privatization of ministries and agencies by parties, factions, and politicians) of the public service adds to public mistrust of politicians and parties. \u00a0If public servants, especially, those are entering into service, lose their fate in principle of rational bureaucracy (based on professional merits), it is hard to expect good policies and dedications. \u00a0Changing and re-appointing political appointees to the ministerial, vice-ministrial, and directorial posts are not the solution.<\/strong> \u00a0They would be the part of the problem – deepens the current legitimacy crisis. [There are many examples in our neighbourhood – both good and bad – in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.]<\/p>\n

In the past, there were attempts to investigate and conduct open hearings on the July 1 riots and anti-corruption reporting, but members used them for their own political purposes.\u00a0 But, now it is a time for our politicians to rise above parochial interests and focus on national imperatives – by strengthening and empowering the law (policy) making capacity of the parliament. \u00a0More importantly, parliamentarians need to cure their ‘let’s change it’\u00a0syndrome. \u00a0<\/b>If parliamentarians keep changing rules without thinking (i.e., not asking hard questions), parliamentarians are (non)intentionally propagating the culture of ‘rule of chaos’ – not ‘rule of law’. \u00a0If parliamentarians couldn’t strengthen their own base, it will breed the ground f<\/span>or unstable domestic politics, emergence of authoritarian figures, and may be even foreign intervention.<\/p>\n

At the macro level of international relations (i.e., systemic level), we clearly see how our own domestic polarization and fragmentation\u00a0makes the state (a Mongolian state) a weak actor to deal with other state and non-state actors (i.e., multi-national corporations, international institutions). \u00a0If we look our domestic political structure at micro-level (i.e., domestic level), we could easily see how parochial interests of parliamentarians deteriorate the institutional capacity of the parliament. \u00a0Now it is a time for parliamentarians to strengthen the policy (law)-making capacity of the parliament.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Under the 1992 Constitution, the parliament is supposed to become the state policy black box.\u00a0 It was empowered to develop, approve, and enforce state policies that would strengthen the country’s sovereignty, maintain\u00a0its domestic stability, facilitate the economic development, and more … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3610,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[983079],"tags":[307958],"class_list":["post-3499","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-policy-series","tag-mendee-jargalsaikhan-2"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3610"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3499"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3566,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499\/revisions\/3566"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3499"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3499"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3499"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}