{"id":6626,"date":"2019-10-09T10:44:13","date_gmt":"2019-10-09T17:44:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/?p=6626"},"modified":"2019-10-09T13:56:51","modified_gmt":"2019-10-09T20:56:51","slug":"constitution-reform-referendum-parliamentary-presidential","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/2019\/constitution-reform-referendum-parliamentary-presidential\/","title":{"rendered":"Mongolian Constitutional Revision Leads to Uncertainty"},"content":{"rendered":"

By\u00a0 Mendee Jargalsaikhan and <\/em>Julian Dierkes<\/em><\/p>\n

In hope of revising the 1992 constitution, G Zandanshatar, the speaker of the Mongolian parliament proudly declared the parliament\u2019s decision<\/a> to hold a national referendum on proposed changes on September 11 at the closing of the parliamentary special session. But, his party, the governing Mongolian People\u2019s Party (MPP), which controls 64 of 76 seats, failed to override the presidential veto<\/a> on the referendum. If the referendum is held on October 30-31 as scheduled, it would be only the second referendum since 1945 when Mongolians voted for their independence from the Chiang Kai-shek government following the Yalta Agreement. Even though all key political actors support the constitutional amendments, they disagree on who, when, <\/em>and how<\/em> to make these changes since it will restructure the political landscape.<\/p>\n

Background <\/em><\/h2>\n

In 1990 Mongolia became the first Asian state that revised their state-socialist constitution by re-introducing a bi-cameral legislature, prime-ministerial cabinet, ceremonial president, and multiparty elections. In that summer, the country held its first-ever multiparty election and established an interim legislature to pass the country\u2019s first democratic constitution. After a year of serious debate especially over the choice between a presidential or parliamentary system, the legislature finally approved a hybrid structure: a 76-member unicameral legislature and directly-elected, ceremonial president.<\/p>\n

In retrospect, the constitution has served Mongolia well in establishing a democracy where political powers have been transferred repeatedly over nearly 30 years between two major political parties through regular, inclusive, free, and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. But, this hybrid system has also created governance challenges which have become difficult to address.<\/p>\n

Governance Challenges<\/em><\/h2>\n

The hybrid constitutional structure has provided more room for parliament to micro-manage the prime minister and president to increase its control over cabinet and judicial institutions. As a result, the prime minister and his cabinet along with the public service are vulnerable to parliament, parties, factions, and even populist members whereas all key judicial appointments are dependent on the president\u2019s decision.<\/p>\n

Similar to other parliamentary democracies, the majority party or coalition of parties nominates the prime minister, but, in Mongolia, a presidential endorsement needs to be secured. A few parliament members can initiate the non-confidence voting in prime minister or even individual cabinet members. Only two prime minister has served full terms \u2013 in 1992-1996 and 2000-2004 \u2013 when the MPP held the majority of seats in parliament. In pursuit of parochial interests, parliament members engage in vote-trading games especially over the financial and budgetary matters \u2013 thus causes frequent political instability and policy discontinuity.<\/p>\n

The constitution defined the president as the head of the state and \u201cembodiment of the unity of Mongolian people\u201d \u2013 in short, the president was intended to be ceremonial and non-partisan. But, presidents have slowly expanded these ceremonial rights as a way to influence, if not control, the judiciary. Thus, three members of the constitutional court, chief justice and members of the Supreme Court, chief prosecutor, and judges at different levels of courts and appeals are replaced after each new president takes the office. This politicization process began with President Enkhbayar, and was institutionalized by President Elbegdorj.\u00a0Instead of professional meritocracy, President Elbegdorj appointed a party-affiliated politician as a chief prosecutor. Shockingly, on March 27, 2019<\/a>, parliament quickly approved a law \u2013 empowering the National Security Council, including the president, speaker, and prime minister, to recommend the change of chief judges, prosecutors, and director of the anti-corruption agency. President Battulga promptly replaced all leaders of the Supreme Court, Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Independent Authority against Corruption. It is not difficult to imagine the downward chain effect as well as to question the effectiveness of the rule of law.<\/p>\n

Reform Efforts <\/em><\/h2>\n

Since 2014, all major political parties and key actors have been in support of constitutional revision, but none have succeeded. Even though all parties and key actors pledged to fight for an independent judiciary and stable, powerful cabinet, they quickly forget these promises after elections.<\/p>\n

With a landslide victory in 2016, the MPP has made constitutional revision one of their major platforms.\u00a0The party\u2019s 62 MPs initiated the first-round of parliamentary debate in June, 2019.<\/p>\n

Despite numerous issues are included, the following major revisions were proposed:<\/p>\n