{"id":7554,"date":"2021-04-08T10:35:48","date_gmt":"2021-04-08T17:35:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/?p=7554"},"modified":"2021-04-03T18:02:38","modified_gmt":"2021-04-04T01:02:38","slug":"guest-post-covid19-ulaanbaatar-emergency-lockdowns","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.ubc.ca\/mongolia\/2021\/guest-post-covid19-ulaanbaatar-emergency-lockdowns\/","title":{"rendered":"Guest Post: COVID19 in Ulaanbaatar II – Emergency Levels, Lockdowns and Patterns"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

By Pawe\u0142 Szczap<\/em><\/p>\r\n

[This is a second part to a post published on Apr 2 2021 focused on mass testing and risk areas<\/a>.]<\/p>\r\n

In order to combat the spread of COVID-19 in Ulaanbaatar, a two-week-long, citywide lockdown was introduced mid-February 2021. As the lockdown overlapped with the Mongolian Lunar New Year it was supposed to keep the disease at bay during a potentially very vulnerable period. Additionally, a mass testing program called Neg khaalga \u2013 Neg shinjilgee (One Door \u2013 One Test; below abbreviated as 1D1T) was implemented during the lockdown. Data gathered during the testing campaign served as a foundation for modeling the development of the local pandemic. 1D1T has been discussed in more detail in the first part of this text. After lifting the February lockdown, the number of new COVID-19 cases in Ulaanbaatar started increasing. Throughout March the emergency and municipal authorities were trying to avoid introducing a next citywide even despite the Health Ministry\u2019s recommendations. Patterns which were made visible through 1D1T served as basis for enforcing a makeshift strategy of neighborhood lockdowns. This second part of the\u00a0 COVID-19-related March events\u2019 summary deals mostly with restrictions on mobility in Ulaanbaatar throughout March 2021 and the relationship between the city\u2019s urban tissue and the spread of COVID-19.<\/p>\r\n

Emergency Measures<\/h2>\r\n

A notable increase in new cases is visible in the Mongolian Statistical Information Service\u2019s data, starting March 5th<\/sup> i.e. ten days after the lockdown was lifted \u2013 just about enough time for people to reenter society, effectively transmit the disease and start showing symptoms. The strategy of the mass testing program was defective. This might have been due to various factors (but most likely their combination, including): using PCR test which are not best suited for mass testing, errors in testing procedures and communicating outcomes to citizens, lack of proper case investigation and contact tracing or too little time between tests and lifting of the lockdown just to name the most probable.<\/p>\r\n

Orange-level state of emergency has been introduced for March 15th<\/sup> through March 29th<\/sup> and further extended to April 5th<\/sup><\/a>. On March 31st<\/sup> the State Emergency Commission seems to have upheld a version of this orange-level state of emergency\u00a0 until April 18th<\/sup><\/a>. In theory, this means a temporary halt for most venues and events related to leisure, other social activities and more. In practice many establishments continue functioning regardless. A detailed list of the restrictions sorted by emergency state can be found below:<\/p>\r\n

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Fig. 1 Emergency state restrictions sorted by emergency level<\/p><\/div>\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n

In the case of many other cities, the phrase \u2018partial lockdown\u2019 implies partial limitations, such as those listed above. In the Ulaanbaatar context however, partial lockdown implies strict limitations but imposed only onto a specific neighbourhood.<\/p>\r\n

The way in which the 1D1T campaign was designed as well as the way in which its outcomes are being utilized, all point to a narrative presenting the coronavirus as being transmitted nearly exclusively within residential areas. Also the strategy to combat the virus seems to be aligned with this residence-oriented narrative. This is not to say that measures related to public spaces and social life (e.g. as those listed above) are not being introduced. However, the household, seen as a container for the coronavirus infected, seems to be the main concern of the authorities. This leads to increased-risk areas being announced primarily on the khoroo (basic administrative unit of the capital) level, and so it is also the khoroo-level on which partial lockdowns are being enforced. Such an approach has both pros and cons but what is interesting in the local context are the parallels to be found with a strategy previously used to combat infectious disease (hoof-and-mouth disease in particular) in Mongolia. It is based around the idea of establishing smaller, marked and often policed quarantine zones in order to limit or fully prevent movement around and through areas of increased viral risk. This neighbourhood lockdown drill is already known not only in the countryside but also in the city.<\/p>\r\n

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Fig. 2 Part of the 5n buudal ger district locked off during an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease (HMD) in 2001.<\/a> Photo by Gerelsaikhan<\/p><\/div>\r\n

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Fig. 3 An area in Ulaanbaatar\u2019s Songinokhairkhan district quarantined due to confirmed cases of HMD, 2018<\/a><\/p><\/div>\r\n

However, respiratory disease transmission occurs differently from that of HMD, and the approach to COVID-19-related partial lockdown measures should not be copied from the HMD drill in a 1:1 manner. It could also be seen on the recent example of Bayanz\u00fcrkh district\u2019s 26th khoroo, that if not sufficiently announced prior, closing off an area with a population of several thousand on the basis of several confirmed cases might spur further distrust towards the authorities\u2019 actions.<\/p>\r\n