An intersectional analysis of poverty, prostitution and the heteronormativity of sexuality education models [GRSJ102]

Research question: How can a revised intersectional framework inform future solutions (legislative, educational, cultural) to poverty, prostitution, human trafficking and reproductive health issues, while also considering the nuanced contextual factors that influence how to best implement such solutions in different local communities across the globe? And more importantly, what are the main tenets of this framework?

When examined superficially from privileged perspectives with little exposure to or no direct experience with structural violence, issues of poverty, prostitution, human trafficking and their interdependencies may seem to be exclusive to the most impoverished parts of developing nations, such as Saki in Nigeria, which Olubukola Adesina refers to as a haven for child traffickers (1). Similarly, Jacquelyn Monroe shows that the causal relationships between poverty, sex work and low reproductive health is evidenced by the disproportionate prevalence of street prostitution in poor, African American communities in the United States (2). The US legal system remains flagrantly racist, classist and sexist, and its treatment of sex workers is no exception, with female workers receiving much harsher penalties for their involvement in the industry than the male clients and even the pimps. Hence, it is important to remain critical of current legal responses, both local and global, to these problems by gearing discourse surrounding them towards an intersectional analysis of how women and children find themselves working in such inhumane and traumatic conditions.

Future solutions and harm reduction strategies will need to be cohesive, enforceable and implemented on an institutional level, particularly in education where the youth should be encouraged to question outdated perceptions of poverty as a choice and relinquish entrenched cultural values that standardise the monogamous, heterosexual two-parent family while scorning any arrangements that deviate from this. However, structural inequities, insufficiency of data, widespread pathologisation of sex workers and LGBTQIA+ people, reinforced by largely heteronormative sexual education curricula (as shown in the Gowen & Winges-Yanez (3), and Elia & Eliason (4) studies), are but few of the obstacles that will thwart the transition to an ethos that is more accepting and inclusive of those who are systematically oppressed by the kyriarchy and hence forced into substandard living conditions and diminished mental health.

In Women in Prostitution: The Result Of Poverty and the Brunt of Inequity, Monroe substantiates claims that financial motives and poverty are the main reasons why women resort to street prostitution, which she identifies as a three prong structural problem – that is, a consequence of sexism, classism and racism. As such, the culprit is implicitly white supremacist capitalist patriarchy and accordingly, an Africana womanist perspective is better equipped to disentangle the causes of the problem and bring about appropriate reformative action than those of Marxist, socialist or radical feminists, none of which sufficiently acknowledge the preeminence of racism in their analyses of street prostitution. Essentially, Monroe contends that while these different variations of feminism generally agree that the high rates of street prostitution in certain communities in the United States can be attributed to systemic oppression, their disagreement regarding which factors weigh heaviest in this association render a unified solution that is universally agreed upon unattainable at this point in time.

In addition, she condemns the historically inequitable prostitution laws in the United States, which up until 1974 punished female sex workers, while allowing male prostitutes to engage in their work without consequences. This was because most states definition of “prostitute” was inherently female. For example, in 1974, the state of Indiana’s statute of prostitution read: “Prostitution is the practice by a female of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with males for compensation.” However, even today, prostitution laws are selectively enforced and tend to give the customer (typically privileged and male) the benefit of the doubt. In the U.S., “Johns” (i.e. male customers of prostitutes) are primarily white, married men who are employed in white collar jobs or skilled trades and usually reside in suburban communities, whereas the majority of street prostitutes (the most vulnerable and lowest ranked member of the sex trade industry) are “female, African American, of an immigrant status, poor, and/or a single parent.” A 1999 study actually showed that in 1993, 69% of prostitutes arrested for solicitation were convicted, while only 9% of arrested customers were. As if this statistic alone didn’t reveal how unfairly the American judicial system treats female sex workers, in 1995, weekend “John Schools” were introduced in San Francisco, which offer single day, psychoeducational courses to Johns in lieu of going to trial, granting them additional special consideration. These schools continue to operate across the United States today, as well as in Canada, South Korea and the United Kingdom (5).

Like prostitution, human trafficking is an industry that both commodifies human beings and exploits women, people of colour and underprivileged groups of lower socioeconomic status. Therefore, it too can be classified as a three prong structural problem best suited to an intersectional analysis. In Modern day slavery: poverty and child trafficking in Nigeria, Adesina presents a range of evidence from existing sources and primary data from open-ended interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires, in her examination of the “nexus between poverty and child trafficking internally in Nigeria.” Before delving into theoretical considerations on poverty and human trafficking, existing inter-/national legal frameworks on child trafficking and conclusions from her own research, she defines the contentious terms, child trafficking and poverty, which recur throughout the paper.

Child trafficking is defined as “the business of taking children away from their homes, transporting them elsewhere, to be put to use by others, usually to make money.” As one of the main purposes of the study is to show the link between poverty and susceptibility to being trafficked, she then defines poverty, acknowledging that it is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon with no universal definition but can be simplified as “the lack of necessities.” In a similar vein to how Monroe outlines various feminist perspectives on the issue of prostitution before firmly favouring one of them, Adesina differentiates between different theories that attempt to explain the reasons for poverty, namely those that attribute it to individual circumstances, to systemic and geographic circumstances and those that interpret it as cyclical, dependent on both individual and systemic factors. She arrives at what she calls restricted opportunity theories, which blame poverty on insufficient access to economic opportunities. While there are legal frameworks in place to curtail the proliferation of human trafficking in Nigeria, such as the National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matter (NAPTIP), and Nigerian NGOs, such as Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF), working in tandem with both the Nigerian government and international organisations, the study reveals there has been an increase in internal trafficking of women and children within Nigeria in recent years, particularly through, and in/out of Saki. This failure of law enforcement to mitigate child trafficking is traceable to ineffective legal frameworks, weak institutional mechanisms, unavailability of pertinent data, public ignorance of the problem, rising unemployment and too much focus on combating external trafficking, in and out of the country.

However, neither papers refer to the unique experiences of LGBTQIA+-identifying people who find themselves working in the sex trade or being trafficked, and so both of their policy recommendations fall short of full inclusivity. In a CBC news article titled Transgender and unemployed: Businesses shut doors to trans workers (6), David Burke draws attention to the phenomenon of transgender people struggling to find work or being fired from their job post- or mid-transition. This blatant discrimination by employers leads many trans people to find work in the sex industry.

This omission of a queer reading of said issues is exactly the focus of Discourses of Exclusion: Sexuality Education’s Silencing of Sexual Others, with regards to hetero-/cis-normativity of U.S.-based and international models of sexuality education. Elia and Eliason recount the history of sex education in the United States, which was introduced as a means of both hindering the spread of venereal diseases and to encourage certain sexual morals among the youth, which were exclusively informed by a heterocentric, marital and primarily sex-negative framework. A summarised continuum of sexuality education models in the U.S. is given, identifying five key paradigm shifts that characterise this history:

No sexuality education
Abstinence-only-until-marriage sexuality education
Abstinence-based sexuality education
Comprehensive sexuality education
Anti-oppressive, inclusive sexuality education

All but number 5 are exclusionary to LGBTQ children to some extent, and the authors offer a comprehensive list of ten principles that ought to be incorporated into sexuality education in order to achieve the ideal anti-oppressive, inclusive framework. These principles recommend the following: inclusion of anti-oppressive or social justice education, democracy and inclusivity of all students, attention to intersectionality of oppressions, making values transparent, a balanced approach that sees relevant concepts such as pleasure/danger and risk/protection as spectrums rather than dichotomies, promotion of health in the broadest sense, recognition of both resilience and risk factors regarding LGBTQ youth, as well as balancing developmental sequencing with teachable moments.

Elia and Eliason mention how there has been progress made in secondary school sexuality education, thanks to the promotion of social and sexual justice in schools by organisations such as GLSEN (Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network) and PFLAG. However, as suggested by the Gowen and Winges-Yanez study, which was undertaken in Oregon and involved discussions with 30 LGBTQIA+ identifying or questioning youth, aged 16 to 20, in five different focus groups, there is still a significant amount of progress to be made. Exclusion of LGBTQ individuals was reported to manifest in the form of both active and passive silencing, heterocentric sexual discourse and pathologising narratives of queer identities. In fact, in some ostensibly progressive, developed nations such as Australia, there is currently a trend of retrogression with regards to inclusion of LGBTQIA+ issues in sexuality education. The voluntary “Safe Schools” program in Australia, which commenced in 2010 and sought to challenge notions of heteronormativity and promote acceptance of LGBTQIA+-identifying students, was de-funded by the federal government of Australia in February of this year, as certain members of parliament considered the program to be indoctrinating children with queer gender theory and Marxist ideology without consent of their parents (7).

Amidst Australia’s debate around the legalisation of gay marriage and the suggested plebiscite regarding this debate, estimated to cost roughly $175 million, it could be argued that this kind of divestment is merely a political strategy aiming the retain conservative voters. Moreover, the recommendation that parental consent be required for students to participate in such programs runs contrary to its purpose; many LGBTQIA+ youth are afraid of “coming out” because of the imagined reactions of their parents. If these children aren’t provided with spaces in which they can feel safe to discuss these kinds of realisations, risk of mental health issues and even suicide is exacerbated greatly.

From the focus groups carried out in Oregon, several suggestions to increase inclusivity were offered and agreed upon by a majority of the participants. These suggestions included greater focus on LGBTQ issues and identities, increased access to LGBTQ resources, more emphasis on STI prevention, and more discussion about both relationships and anatomy. I believe that a sexuality education curriculum that combines elements taken from suggestions in both the Elia and Eliason, and Gowen and Winges-Yanez studies, if adopted internationally, would be effective in improving the school experience for LGBTQIA students and encouraging acceptance and understanding amongst their peers. Contrary to the beliefs of the current Australian government, I think that these principles should be incorporated into syllabi as early as kindergarten, as these are the formative years of a child’s life in which prejudiced views are bred.

While these two studies are focused on deconstructing the heteronormativity of sexuality education and recommending more inclusive alternatives, I found that they are both fundamentally deficient, in that neither of them broach the very topical issue of consent. Mutual consent is a prerequisite of any kind of sexual activity, regardless of the participants sexual orientation or gender identity. Disturbingly, a Canadian Women’s Foundation study recently found that 1 in 3 Canadians don’t actually know what sexual consent means (8). For example, few Canadians realise that consent is not only required between new partners but also married couples. These ideas, as well as those concerning retraction of consent, the difference between “yes” and not saying “no,” non-verbal cues and intoxication must be incorporated into a reformed framework of sexual education, otherwise the problem of sexual assault will continue to fall under the radar despite progress made with regards to LGBT issues.

I found that both studies concerning poverty and prostitution (i.e. those by Monroe and Adesina), as well as those about reproductive health (i.e. the Gowen/Winges-Yanez and Elia/Eliason studies) provide sound recommendations in their respective fields, but fall short in covering more nuanced facets of the problems they are dealing with. Monroe makes no mention of the correlation between being LGBTQIA+ and involvement in sex work while Adesina’s “restricted opportunity theories” seem to be oversimplify the intricate, multidimensional industry of human trafficking. Similarly Gowen, Winges-Yanez, Elia and Eliason don’t even broach the topic of consent in their evaluation of current sexuality education models. While implementation of their proposed solutions would be a major step forward for several different groups of marginalised people, a truly intersectional reading of these issues would be more encompassing and inclusive of a wider range of feminist considerations.

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Bibliography

Adesina, Olubukola S. 2014. “Modern Day Slavery: Poverty And Child Trafficking In Nigeria”. African Identities 12 (2): 165-179.
Monroe, Jacquelyn. 2005. “Women In Street Prostitution: The Result Of Poverty And The Brunt Of Inequity”. Journal Of Poverty 9 (3): 69-88.
Gowen, L. Kris and Nichole Winges-Yanez. 2013. “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, And Questioning Youths’ Perspectives Of Inclusive School-Based Sexuality Education”. The Journal Of Sex Research 51 (7): 788-800.
Elia, John P. and Mickey Eliason. 2010. “Discourses Of Exclusion: Sexuality Education’s Silencing Of Sexual Others”. Journal Of LGBT Youth 7 (1): 29-48.
Cook, I. R. 2015. “Making links between sex work, gender and victimisation: The politics and pedagogies of John Schools”. Gender, Place and Culture 22 (6): 817-832.
Burke, David. 2016. “Transgender And Unemployed: Businesses Shut Doors To Trans Workers”. CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/transgender-unemployed-business-jobs-discrimination-1.3740571.
Birmingham, Simon. 2016. Statement On Safe Schools Coalition. Adelaide: Liberal Party of Australia.
“Only 1 In 3 Canadians Know What Sexual Consent Means”. 2016. canadianwomen.org. http://canadianwomen.org/press-consent.

Big Idea part 10: Reflect and Connect [FNIS100]

As a non-Indigenous person, raised in the settler-colonial nation of what is now called Australia, by a middle-class family who are privileged by multiple facets of their identity, it was not until recently I realised that allyship is not as simple as voicing support for Indigenous peoples, nor can it be self-proclaimed. While it was not the intention of the course to impart guilt, Indigenous Foundations helped me understand that since my ancestors “have blood on their hands” (whether that be figuratively or literally), I have the responsibility to educate myself and offer my support in the pursuit of justice for Indigenous peoples around the world whenever I can.

It did this by meticulously unpacking terminology commonly used in discourse surrounding Indigenous issues, much of which is outdated and deemed offensive, in order to establish a foundation for respectful dialog; by analysing the history of the colonial project and how laws and treaties were manipulated by settlers in legal to-and-fros with Indigenous peoples in order to maximize their land acquisition; and by exploring ways in which depictions of Indigenous peoples in Western pop culture and media have largely been molded to coincide with existing imperialist agendas through vilification and bastardisation.

One recurring difficulty is that the complexity introduced by the varying interests of a diverse range of Indigenous cultures, as well as the abstraction of the truth by these imperialist versions of history often lead to an impasse in discussion about ways forward. However, a kind of positive positive energy was fostered during class, which encouraged us to see these complications as motivation to work harder rather than as obstacles to progress.

Now more than ever, citizens and governments of settler-colonial nations must admit to their frailty, confront and accept responsibility for their violent histories and practise empathy in heeding the instruction of traditional owners of the land they live on, in regards to humanity’s relationship with the natural world, deeply entrenched sociopolitical injustices and how we can most effectively harmonise and address the several impending crises that threaten our population.

Short Blog Essay #3: War and Conflicted Related Sexual Violence [GRSJ102]

Given its short documented history and lack of recognition in international law, sexual violence in conflict environments remains a contentious field of study. Both the PRIO and USIP policy briefs uphold that in addition to this perceived political insignificance, methodological shortcomings and equivocal definitions have rendered most conclusions regarding the patterns of wartime sexual violence invalid. In acknowledging the complexity of the issue and the discordance between how relevant terms are defined across studies, both reports accordingly address the definitional considerations in their first pages.

The PRIO policy brief, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts, outlines how the legal definition of rape in conflict has evolved since its inception following the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993, showing that formal meanings assigned to these novel terms are merely tentative, prone to policy changes and volatile international political relationships. While this isn’t necessarily negative, the USIP report, Wartime Sexual Violence: Misconceptions, Implications and Ways Forward, attributes the slow accumulation of relevant knowledge to these ambiguities, and explicitly states that it does “not advocate any particular definition” in order to maintain credibility even as these definitions are reformed.

The PRIO brief gives an abridged timeline of sexual violence in armed conflict since 1980 and the UN Security Council Resolutions that were introduced in response. The report arrives at a small set of suggestions for scholars and policymakers, namely to direct their efforts toward the plight and status of war children, the impact on the reproductive health of victims, the stigmatisation of victims and commonly held misconceptions about the perpetrators, victims and motivations of wartime sexual violence.

Much of the paper examines the history of this violence, whereas the USIP report addresses ten common misconceptions surrounding the issue, effectively summarising a comprehensive list of existing literature and statistics, all of which was published post-1980. In doing so, it unpacks and interrogates simplified hypotheses that attempt to infer causal relationships between contextual variables, demographics and prevalence of wartime sexual violence, such as those adapted from Seiferf (referred to in PRIO report):

Sexual violence is an integral part of warfare
Sexual violence is a weapon of terror and revenge, used to inflict humiliation upon male opponents and to reaffirm own masculinity
Sexual violence can be understood as a way of destroying an opponent’s culture
Sexual violence can be seen as an outcome of misogyny

For example, in the conclusion, the first hypothesis in the list above is challenged as the authors compare the passive victims of both rape and gun violence during wartime – the former were intentionally violated, whereas in most cases where noncombatants are killed by crossfire it is accidental.

Furthermore, the authors challenge misconceptions related to the ubiquity of sexual violence in war, the prevalence of the problem in African countries and ethnic wars, the gender of victims and perpetrators (as well as whether they belong to rebel groups, state militaries or are even combatants at all), the nature of the violence (whether it is strategic or opportunistic) and claims about trends in wartime sexual violence. These misconceptions, and the recognition of flaws in our current knowledge of the phenomena as well as commonly accepted false correlations (for example, between decreasing overall level of lethal violence and decreasing level of wartime rape) form the basis of the policy recommendations made at the end of the report.

reported-wartime-rape

Overall, the analyses are thorough and give clear direction to future research and policy. However, one drawback of the policy briefs is that they fail to adequately explain the reasons for and effects of these misconceptions. For example, upon reading the “Misconception: An African Problem” section of the USIP report, I thought about how media biases play a major role in influencing these misconceptions. In particular, how perpetuation of nationalist principles and white saviour narratives by Western mainstream media outlets effectively absolves colonial military forces from responsibility for instances of wartime rape, and hence from prosecution. In turn, such sexual violence is associated with the “other,” or that which is foreign, which breeds fear of and contempt for immigrants, ethnic minorities and people of colour living in the U.S. and other white imperialist nations.

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Bibliography

Chun, Suk and Inger Skjelsbæk. 2010. Sexual Violence In Armed Conflicts. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
Cohen, Dara Kay, Amelia Hoover Green, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2013. Wartime Sexual Violence: Misconceptions, Implications, And Ways Forward. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Big Idea part 9: Prepare a page for the final paper [FNIS100]

My big idea project will focus on the appropriation of Indigenous cultural heritage (particularly attire) in Western fashion, art and music in Western pop culture and niche subcultures. This choice was inspired by recent online media attention on youth at music festivals (predominantly white) wearing Native headdress, as well as on American college students dressing up in similarly racist costumes on Halloween or at themed parties.

I’m learning that not only is this issue being discussed broadly in blogs, textbooks and articles from an Indigenous studies perspective, but there is a range of literature that covers cultural appropriation from a legal angle, by criticising current intellectual property laws for their incompatibility with and insensitivity of endangered cultural heritage. By consolidating these two different directions, my final paper will formulate a robust ethical argument that will hopefully impose moral obligations upon the perpetrators of appropriative behaviours.

Big Idea Prospectus [FNIS100]

Since my initial project proposal in the first week of October, the angle from which I want to approach the issue of appropriation of Indigenous cultural heritage in Western fashion, art, literature and music subcultures has been both clarified and broadened. Originally, I modestly envisioned my project to take the form of a rebuttal to certain “hipster” circles, who typically congregate at music festivals (e.g. Burning Man) and appropriate an assortment of different cultures’ traditional attire. My final paper would, and still will, refer to First Nations, Métis and Inuit perspectives to substantiate the arguments that it will present.

However, while the intention of my project remains (that is, to appeal directly to the violators of culturally appropriative behaviours in an attempt to convince them that these behaviours are immoral and harmful), the target audience to which I am directing my inquiry and the range of resources that it will draw upon have expanded. Upon realising that I have up to ten pages to explore my topic, I decided not only to focus the discussion on the white youth, who shamelessly embrace every opportunity from Halloween to Coachella to “celebrate Indigenous peoples and their creativity” (IPinCH 2015), but also on the companies who manufacture the bootlegged war bonnets and bindis worn by these festival-goers and the “artists” who produce the whitewashed versions of the Indigenous art and music that they obliviously admire.

This decision was influenced by a number of texts I have been reading in my research, which explore the issue from a legal point of view (more on this later), as well as the realisation that the nuances and intricacies of the debate surrounding cultural misappropriation (of Indigenous cultural heritage or otherwise) require a comprehensive analysis of how we got to this point; that is, ethical, social and legal readings of the present and historical contexts of settler-Indigenous relations. With this revised plan, I believe my project will carry greater significance and credibility, in that it will unpack all contributions to the problem at hand and hopefully encourage passive observers to think more about the big picture.

Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism serves as an apt introduction to the discussion and a form of justification for the discordance between Indigenous and Western capitalist opinions on the “sharing” of cultural elements in the 21st century. A concept first introduced in Capital: Critique of Political Economy (Marx et al. 1955), commodity fetishism refers the obscuring of an object’s real value by its economic value in the market. In the context of this discussion, an “object” can refer to products of Indigenous cultural heritage (for example, clothing items, musical instruments, artworks and art styles, languages, etc.). Through this process, traditions with rich cultural histories of thousands of years are reduced to profitable commodities who may be exploited by whoever is willing to invest in the costly process of copyrighting. Couple this phenomenon with existing imbalances of power and it becomes plain to see that the free market poses a real threat to the preservation of sacred Indigenous cultures.

In his article Scenes from the Colonial Catwalk: Cultural Appropriation, Intellectual Property Rights, and Fashion, Peter Shand attributes the main causes of misappropriation to early Enlightenment principles:

“It is a dull fact that the initial phase of modern cultural heritage appropriation was underscored by the twinned ages of Enlightenment and Empire, during which all the world was made over to fit the intellectual, economic, and cultural requirements of first Europe, then the United States. All manner of cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples (from design patterns to artifacts to body parts, even the people themselves) were looted, stolen, traded, bought, and exchanged by colonials of every status (from Governors General to itinerant sealers).” (Shand 2002)

Moreover, he asserts that while Anglo-American law treats tangible heritage (e.g. paintings, dress, sculptures) differently from intangible heritage (e.g. languages, songs, customs), Indigenous peoples typically do not make this artificial distinction. By following this line of thought, I want to emphasise the fact that intellectual property laws are inadequate when it comes to protecting cultural heritage, an idea stressed by the IPinCH project based at Simon Fraser University, in British Columbia (IPinCH 2015).

Indigenous conceptions of property simply do not align with that of European and settler nations, which are based off a “Cartesian proprietary scheme” and ratify a certain domination involved in the possession of an object by a subject (Moustakas 1989). Such a relationship does not exist in Indigenous cultures and hence, it is unfair, to say the least, to impose stringent copyright laws and regulations on products of these cultures. In sum, Western notions of property, material form, authorship and originality that pervade intellectual property law do not translate into anything meaningful in most Indigenous cultures, and hence are used to colonise and erase cultural heritage through convoluted legislation.

By exploring legal, ethical and historical considerations, my final paper will aim to, at least, encourage discussion about casual appropriation of Indigenous cultures in pop culture and niche subcultures and hopefully expose some of the reasons why it continues to be such a problem.

Bibliography

IPinCH (The Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage).Think Before You Appropriate: Things To Know And Questions To Ask In Order To Avoid Misappropriating Indigenous Cultures. 2015. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University. http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch/sites/default/files/resources/teaching_resources/think_before_you_appropriate_jan_2016.pdf.
Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, Samuel Moore. 1955. Capital. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.
Shand, Peter. 2002. “Scenes From The Colonial Catwalk: Cultural Appropriation, Intellectual Property Rights, And Fashion”. Cultural Analysis 3: 47-88.
Moustakas, John. 1989. “Group Rights In Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability”. Cornell Law Review 74 (6): 1179-1227.

Big Idea literature review: Entering a conversation [FNIS100]

Option 2 – A ‘state of the art’ literature review

[Resource: Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage Project, 2015. Think Before You Appropriate. Things to know and questions to ask in order to avoid misappropriating Indigenous cultural heritage. Simon Fraser University: Vancouver.]

I found the literature I’ve chosen to review while perusing Chelsea Vowel’s blog, where she recommends reading a guide for creators and designers, compiled by IPinCH (The Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage), an international research initiative based at Simon Fraser University.

The guide interrogates the idea of misappropriation of Indigenous cultures from both legal and ethical angles, appealing specifically to business owners, creators and designers. It isn’t published in any formal academic journals, nor does it directly address the subjects that I wish to focus on in my Big Idea project, i.e. the uninformed or apathetic consumers of culturally appropriative products. However, the principles that it covers are deeply relevant to all members of the supply chain, as well as the users of its products.

The clarity of the language used, as well as the format / design of the guide, which utilizes nested headings, lots of space between paragraphs, and bullet points, makes the guide very accessible and easy to understand, for a range of readers with different levels of proficiency in the English language.

Moreover, the way in which the authors stipulate the definitions of certain relevant terms, evaluate the costs / benefits of each parties’ involvement in cultural exchange, give examples of culturally misappropriative products and anticipate counterarguments, demonstrates an acumen of both perspectives and potentially exacting philosophical / “Devil’s Advocate” interpretations of the guide.

And in a sense, such a comprehensive yet unequivocal inquiry into misappropriation of Indigenous cultures is warranted; designers and creators of white European background continue to steal elements of Aboriginal cultures for the sake of setting or adhering to fashion trends, despite persistent backlash. Ideally, upon being challenged about misappropriation, these “artists” would practise their human quality of compassion and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, it would seem that a combination of post-Enlightenment hyperrationalism and uninhibited ambitions of increasing profitability has rendered many more privileged folk incapable of exercising empathy when it comes to culturally sensitive issues such as these.

I think that the authors of the guide have recognized this, and have done everything they could have done in 23 pages to convince the reader that cultures as entities in themselves have moral standing and therefore, we have certain duties to respect their traditions and heritage.

To begin, a summary of the motivations and intentions of the guide is given. It states that its main purpose is the unpack important questions such as “Why do products inspired from Indigenous cultural heritage seem to spark particuarly strong reactions and pushback?” and to “underline the mutual benefits of responsible collaboration with Indigenous artists and communities.”

It goes on to clarify the definitions of key terms, such as cultural heritage, tangible heritage, intangible heritage and appropriation before defining misappropriation as “a one-sided process where one entity benefits from another group’s culture without permission and without giving something in return.” The guide stresses the fact that due to existing power imbalances, not only are Intellectual Property (IP) laws typically formulate without regard for Indigenous cultural heritage, but Indigenous peoples, already underprivileged, are less likely to be able to afford the copyright, trademarks, patents, etc. than the companies who reap the profits of the products of this heritage. Moreover, it outlines the fact that IP laws only protect an individual’s creations for a limited time span, whereas products of Indigenous cultures are “developed collectively over many generations.” This is particularly a problem when a people’s wellbeing is largely dependent on the economic returns of their cultural expression.

The following are given, with explanations, as the tenets of a responsible creative collaboration:

Free prior and informed consent
Shared control over process and conduct
Acknowledgement and attribution
Respect for cultural differences
Reciprocity and benefit-sharing

Following this, the costs and risks of misappropriation “for you and your company” and, separately, “for Indigenous artists and communities” are given, as well as the benefits of taking part in a responsible collaboration, for the same two parties.

The final sub-heading, “How can you contribute to the ethical treatment of Indigenous cultural heritage?” meticulously addresses common reasons that people give for engaging in cultural misappropriation. These include:

“It is trendy in my industry, therefore I see it as a good business opportunity”
“I want to celebrate Indigenous peoples and their creativity”
“I would like my work to reflect a connection to the Indigenous history and culture of where I live”

To conclude, the guide gives six hypothetical examples of misappropriation of different kinds and degrees, all of which are inspired by real-life cases. These examples, as well as the rest of the guide, can be accessed at the link below:

http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch/sites/default/files/resources/teaching_resources/think_before_you_appropriate_jan_2016.pdf

Short paper on Intrinsic value and Obligations towards nature [PHIL345A]

The Lack of Necessity of “Intrinsic Value” in Environmental Ethics

Today, we need only exercise intuition in our observation of the rampant exploitation of non-human nature by humans in the fulfillment of industrial interests and deliberately inflated notions of subsistence requirements to arrive at the same conclusion as Regan (Regan 1992); that the prevalent conception of environmental ethics within contemporary philosophical discourse does not do the work required of it. It does not adequately and universally justify our moral obligations to this nature, as evinced by our unsustainable habits of resource overconsumption and general neglect of how such habits may disrupt natural ecosystems.

While this anecdotal insight may serve as an impetus for philosophical debate, we must arrive at the same conclusions via logically sound reasoning if they are to carry any argumentative weight in meta-ethics, a field of meticulous criteria. In his criticism of past attempts by philosophers at formulating a robust environmental ethic, Regan incorporates elements of both J. Baird Callicott (Callicott 1985) and Holmes Rolston, III’s (Rolston, III 1991) models into a comprehensive checklist, which serves as the benchmark of his analysis.

Regan’s ideal environmental ethic is:

“(1) an ethic of the environment (as distinct from an ethic for its use), (2) an ethic that attempts to illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards natural entities (…), (3) an ethic that attempts to illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty to natural entities by appealing to their intrinsic value, and (4) an ethic that relies on an account of intrinsic value that attributes not only different but greater intrinsic value to wild in comparison with domestic organisms and species… “ (Regan 1992)

Before I continue with this review of Regan’s argument, it is necessary to stipulate exactly what I will mean when I use certain recurring terms. I will use the term nature to refer to the Earth’s four subsystems (the lithosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere (Keller 2010)). While the biosphere may be seen to include human beings and their built environments (e.g. cities, roads, etc), due to the nature of Regan’s argument, my definition of these three equivalent terms will be limited to non-humans and their ecosystems.

To remain consistent with the language used by Regan, natural entity will be used in its broad definition to refer to individual beings and objects of nature, species, populations and ecosystems.

As much of this debate revolves around contentious claims about the term intrinsic value, it is worth invoking pertinent assertions made by John O’Neill (O’Neill 1992). On the varieties of intrinsic value, O’Neill believes that the majority of literature on environmental ethics is guilty of equivocating two of the three different senses of the term. The two senses that are most commonly conflated are those corresponding to non-instrumental value (that is, a property of an object that is an “end in itself”) and objective value (that is, the type of value held by an object independently of any evaluative agents). Therefore, any efforts towards developing a rigorous environmental ethic by appealing to the notion of intrinsic value must show that natural entities have both non-instrumental and objective value, and arrive at this conclusion rationally without committing any logical fallacies.

Like Regan, O’Neill maintains that the ontological shortcomings of these efforts are exactly why they are unable to induce moral obligations in humans with respect to their relationship with nature.

Upon reaching the conclusion of Regan’s inquiry, it is clear that his intention is not to detract from ostensible progress made by the likes of Kant (Kant 1930) and Taylor (Taylor 1981) in environmental ethics, but instead to contribute to the fortification of such an ethic’s meta-ethical basis. I share Regan’s view that the failures of environmental ethics, thus far, can be attributed to an equivocal ontology of intrinsic value and the lack of attention paid to what constitutes such value. I will now rehash Regan’s arguments that show why the most prominent theories of intrinsic value are incapable of passing the aforementioned checklist, before concluding the discussion by questioning whether this insistence on appealing to the intrinsic value is at all necessary in the formulation of our ethics.

In Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?, Regan substantively demonstrates why existing theories of intrinsic value do not suffice in environmental ethics. He shows that mental-state theories are unable to illuminate respect or duties to natural ecosystems, while states-of-affairs theories cannot prove that species or populations have intrinsic value, as they are not states-of-affairs themselves. In addition, Regan criticizes the end-in-itself theory by highlighting its egalitarianism and consequent inability to assign different degrees of value to different kinds of natural entities, for example wild and domesticated (Regan 1992).

And it is his objection to the hierarchical ends-in-themselves theories, which I believe can be extended to all environmental ethics that depend on conceptions of intrinsic value. If we are going to grant that there is a scale of intrinsic values; that is, different entities carry different amounts of intrinsic value, then is this very notion not superfluous? If all cases of environmental ethics that rely on this idea of intrinsic value have proven themselves to be feeble, as Regan has shown, is this not an unnecessary layer of abstraction? Like Regan, I do not claim to bear the details of a reformed environmental ethic, but I hope that questions similar to those I have raised are able to guide further work towards an ideal ethic of the environment.

Bibliography

Regan, Tom. 1992. “Does Environmental Ethics Rest On A Mistake?”. The Monist 75 (2): 162-181.
Callicott, J. Baird. 1985. “Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, And Environmental Ethics”. Environmental Ethics 7 (3): 257-275.
Rolston, III, Holmes. 1991. “Environmental Ethics: Values In And Duties To The Natural World”. In Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle, 1st ed., 73-96. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Keller, David R. 2010. “Introduction: What Is Environmental Ethics?”. In Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, 1st ed., 2. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
O’Neill, John. 1992. “The Varieties Of Intrinsic Value”. The Monist 75 (2): 119-138.
Kant, Immanuel. 1930. “Indirect Duties To Non-Humans”. Lectures On Ethics, 239-241.
Taylor, Paul W. 1981. “The Ethics Of Respect For Nature”. Environmental Ethics 3: 197-200.

Big Idea evidence analysis / close reading [FNIS100]

After reading the prescribed chapters of her book for class, I became curious about Chelsea Vowel’s background and decided to do some online research into her. I quickly found that in addition to her main occupation of teaching Inuit youth under protection, Chelsea Vowel, 38 year old Métis academic, mother and author of Indigenous Writes, maintains a blog, on which she posts under the name âpihtawikosisân (which literally means “half-son”, and is the name the Cree gave to the Métis). Her page includes links to many valuable resources related to Indigenous issues in North America (including articles, legal documents and documentaries), language-related materials and intiatives that revolt against the ongoing colonial project in Canada. While she only posts sporadically, her entries discuss incredibly complex topics in Indigenous studies in a conversational tone, making concepts that many white people may struggle to empathize with quite intelligible.

One such topic is the wearing of headdresses by “non-Natives”. This is one of the main manifestations of cultural appropriation in white cultures that I wish I focus on in my Big Idea project and since, like all of her other blog entries, the page links to several other webpages containing Indigenous perspectives and literature on this debate, I figured it could serve as a springboard for deeper investigation on the matter. Before delving into the broader idea of un-/restricted symbols of different cultures, she urges the reader to read through the statements on a “bingo card” (shown below).

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Vowel’s posts commonly feature similar prefaces as this, effectively anticipating possible reactionary counterarguments or doubts that non-Indigenous readers may have, which would hinder their ability to comprehend the true meaning and intentions behind Vowel’s work. Admittedly, I could identify with a couple of the statements mentioned on the card above at earlier points in my life and therefore, I can appreciate Vowel’s acumen here. Following this, Vowel goes on to discuss the idea of “Restricted Symbols”, by first referring to several examples related to white North America – for example, military medals, Bachelor degrees and other prestigious awards. Here, it is clear that she is tailoring her language and analytical approach to a white audience. This makes sense, as they are the ones who typically perpetrate culturally appropriative practices, however, while doing so is very productive in its own right, it is no Indigenous person’s responsibility to cater discourse surrounding these ideas to settlers. For this reason, I deeply admire Vowel’s approach of simplifying an idea especially for the intended audience, despite the deeply emotional response she may have to it as a result of her heritage.

She continues this direct tone through to the conclusion, where she seems to comfort the reader in saying that “It’s okay to make mistakes” and insinuating that many white people are simply ignorant to what constitutes appropriation and why it is problematic. However, she states that the best response to being confronted about such behavior is to acknowledge the situation and possibly apologize. I think a suitable addition to this list would be to learn from it. This very idea of having to inform people of how to react to being “called out” appeals to a trickier, overarching problem of “white fragility” and “white guilt.” In pursuing my research topic, I anticipate that these notions will prove to be pertinent in unpacking the reasons why cultural appropriation of Indigenous cultures continues to be a contentious topic that many people still struggle to acknowledge and understand the connotations of.

Short Blog Essay #2: Water as an Instrument of Socio-political Control [GRSJ102]

There seems to be a tendency among those who have spent their lives as citizens of First World countries to take access to clean water for granted and fail to ever consider the political nature of water-related issues on a global scale. Our bodies themselves consist of over 50% water and there is little debate over the fact that, like air and food, it is imperative for human survival. Other than human consumption, water is required in agriculture, food preparation, cleaning, washing, personal hygiene and waste disposal(1). However, much like land, the commodification of water, and the interrelated inequities, are inextricably bound to the history of imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy.

The Ahlers and Zwarteveen article(2) presents a robust argument for the reformation of neo-liberal water proposals regarding allocation and distribution, which are built upon pre-established economic models of privatization and commercialization and encourage dispossession of vital resources from those who are systemically oppressed by rigid power structures – i.e. women, people of color and other groups of underprivileged people.

The crux of Ahlers and Zwarteveen’s inquiry is that the praxis of neo-liberalism that offers an ‘equalist’ response to widespread concerns related to resource bureaucracy and land tenure rights, intentionally disregards and denies the gendered dynamics, abstractions and biases deeply embedded in existing socio-political configurations. Their aim of methodologically re-politicizing water questions, de-individualizing water access and aligning legislated water rights with intersectional feminist principles is scrupulously articulated and theoretical solutions are posited for the global scale. However, little is said about how such solutions could be practically implemented or where similar efforts have been made, which could serve as models for future policy amendments.

For this reason, I found that in complement with each other, the two readings formed a thorough critique of contradictory neo-liberal water politics, which disregard both the “social dependencies that are intrinsic to water ownership”(2) and the “central role of women in water management”(1) by assuming a level playing field. Ahlers and Zwarteveen appeal broadly to the insitutional coruption and legal pluralism that dictates how the variable availability of water is managed to facilitate the prosperity of dominant markets, while the UN Water policy brief provides numerous case studies that demonstrate how these injustices trickle down and have detrimental effects on the health, education and economies of local communities.

Women bear the heaviest burdens of these effects, as they are expected to perform unpaid labour related to procuring of water, and the domestic duties that use it – i.e. cooking, cleaning, washing, etc. Despite this, and the fact that the International Water and Sanitation Centre has empirically proven that water sanitation projects “run with the full participation of women are more sustainable and effective” than those that aren’t(1), women are still largely excluded from decision-making roles in resource management sectors and in many countries, do not have direct access to water due to how little land they own.

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The UN Water policy brief uses the term gender mainstreaming to refer to the suggested measures delineated in the Ahlers and Zwarteveen article, establishing a layer of abstraction that allows more tangible realizations of the aforementioned solutions to be discussed. While my reflection has framed global water issues as being in a dire, irrecoverable state, the policy brief summarizes several instances of concerted efforts to improve water distribution and irrigation systems in impoverished cities over the world, and elect women into managerial positions related to the implementation of these solutions. In particular, the Interagency Task Force on Gender and Water, established in 2003 and who developed the policy brief, has been effective in consolidating the objectives of gender and water / sanitation specialists and bringing the gendered nature of water issues to the forefront of international political discourse.

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Bibliography

GWTF, Gender, Water And Sanitation: A Policy Brief. UN Water, 2006. Web. 16 Oct. 2016. Water For Life.
Ahlers, Rhodante and Zwarteveen, Margreet. “The Water Question In Feminism: Water Control And Gender Inequities In A Neo-Liberal Era”. Gender, Place and Culture 16.4 (2009): Web. 16 Oct. 2016.

In response to Tom Regan’s “Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?” (1992) [PHIL345A]

The purpose of Regan’s argument remains ambiguous until its conclusion, whereby it becomes clear that it is not his intention to detract from ostensible progress made by the likes of Moore, Kant and Taylor in environmental ethics, but instead to contribute to the fortification of such an ethic’s meta-ethical basis. Regan seems to believe that theories of environmental ethics that rely heavily on the idea of certain (or all) natural entities having “intrinsic value”, are inherently flawed in how they “cannot do the philosophical work demanded of them by the conception of environmental ethics with which we are concerned”; that is, a conception that vindicates appropriate respect and duty towards the environment. In other words, an ethic of (not for) the environment.

While he fails to adequately do so, Regan alludes to the fact that a reformed environmental ethic will necessarily circumvent the need of forming its premises on such a contentious and dubious term as “intrinsic value”. For any branch of ethics to be effective in its purpose of en-/dis-couraging certain action across the human population based on justification of certain moral obligations, it must substantively and universally prove its related “oughts” through derivations of formal logic, in a manner akin to proofs in mathematics. The main point that I took away from reading Regan’s argument is that all attempts in doing so thusfar have been unconvincing as they have, to speak in the language of Hume, derived that “ought” from an “is.”

Question: Assuming Regan is correct and that using the term “intrinsic value” should be avoided in formulation of an environmental ethic, what are some of the alternative premises on which we can base such an ethic?