Big Idea Prospectus [FNIS100]

Since my initial project proposal in the first week of October, the angle from which I want to approach the issue of appropriation of Indigenous cultural heritage in Western fashion, art, literature and music subcultures has been both clarified and broadened. Originally, I modestly envisioned my project to take the form of a rebuttal to certain “hipster” circles, who typically congregate at music festivals (e.g. Burning Man) and appropriate an assortment of different cultures’ traditional attire. My final paper would, and still will, refer to First Nations, Métis and Inuit perspectives to substantiate the arguments that it will present.

However, while the intention of my project remains (that is, to appeal directly to the violators of culturally appropriative behaviours in an attempt to convince them that these behaviours are immoral and harmful), the target audience to which I am directing my inquiry and the range of resources that it will draw upon have expanded. Upon realising that I have up to ten pages to explore my topic, I decided not only to focus the discussion on the white youth, who shamelessly embrace every opportunity from Halloween to Coachella to “celebrate Indigenous peoples and their creativity” (IPinCH 2015), but also on the companies who manufacture the bootlegged war bonnets and bindis worn by these festival-goers and the “artists” who produce the whitewashed versions of the Indigenous art and music that they obliviously admire.

This decision was influenced by a number of texts I have been reading in my research, which explore the issue from a legal point of view (more on this later), as well as the realisation that the nuances and intricacies of the debate surrounding cultural misappropriation (of Indigenous cultural heritage or otherwise) require a comprehensive analysis of how we got to this point; that is, ethical, social and legal readings of the present and historical contexts of settler-Indigenous relations. With this revised plan, I believe my project will carry greater significance and credibility, in that it will unpack all contributions to the problem at hand and hopefully encourage passive observers to think more about the big picture.

Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism serves as an apt introduction to the discussion and a form of justification for the discordance between Indigenous and Western capitalist opinions on the “sharing” of cultural elements in the 21st century. A concept first introduced in Capital: Critique of Political Economy (Marx et al. 1955), commodity fetishism refers the obscuring of an object’s real value by its economic value in the market. In the context of this discussion, an “object” can refer to products of Indigenous cultural heritage (for example, clothing items, musical instruments, artworks and art styles, languages, etc.). Through this process, traditions with rich cultural histories of thousands of years are reduced to profitable commodities who may be exploited by whoever is willing to invest in the costly process of copyrighting. Couple this phenomenon with existing imbalances of power and it becomes plain to see that the free market poses a real threat to the preservation of sacred Indigenous cultures.

In his article Scenes from the Colonial Catwalk: Cultural Appropriation, Intellectual Property Rights, and Fashion, Peter Shand attributes the main causes of misappropriation to early Enlightenment principles:

“It is a dull fact that the initial phase of modern cultural heritage appropriation was underscored by the twinned ages of Enlightenment and Empire, during which all the world was made over to fit the intellectual, economic, and cultural requirements of first Europe, then the United States. All manner of cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples (from design patterns to artifacts to body parts, even the people themselves) were looted, stolen, traded, bought, and exchanged by colonials of every status (from Governors General to itinerant sealers).” (Shand 2002)

Moreover, he asserts that while Anglo-American law treats tangible heritage (e.g. paintings, dress, sculptures) differently from intangible heritage (e.g. languages, songs, customs), Indigenous peoples typically do not make this artificial distinction. By following this line of thought, I want to emphasise the fact that intellectual property laws are inadequate when it comes to protecting cultural heritage, an idea stressed by the IPinCH project based at Simon Fraser University, in British Columbia (IPinCH 2015).

Indigenous conceptions of property simply do not align with that of European and settler nations, which are based off a “Cartesian proprietary scheme” and ratify a certain domination involved in the possession of an object by a subject (Moustakas 1989). Such a relationship does not exist in Indigenous cultures and hence, it is unfair, to say the least, to impose stringent copyright laws and regulations on products of these cultures. In sum, Western notions of property, material form, authorship and originality that pervade intellectual property law do not translate into anything meaningful in most Indigenous cultures, and hence are used to colonise and erase cultural heritage through convoluted legislation.

By exploring legal, ethical and historical considerations, my final paper will aim to, at least, encourage discussion about casual appropriation of Indigenous cultures in pop culture and niche subcultures and hopefully expose some of the reasons why it continues to be such a problem.

Bibliography

IPinCH (The Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage).Think Before You Appropriate: Things To Know And Questions To Ask In Order To Avoid Misappropriating Indigenous Cultures. 2015. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University. http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch/sites/default/files/resources/teaching_resources/think_before_you_appropriate_jan_2016.pdf.
Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, Samuel Moore. 1955. Capital. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.
Shand, Peter. 2002. “Scenes From The Colonial Catwalk: Cultural Appropriation, Intellectual Property Rights, And Fashion”. Cultural Analysis 3: 47-88.
Moustakas, John. 1989. “Group Rights In Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability”. Cornell Law Review 74 (6): 1179-1227.

Big Idea literature review: Entering a conversation [FNIS100]

Option 2 – A ‘state of the art’ literature review

[Resource: Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage Project, 2015. Think Before You Appropriate. Things to know and questions to ask in order to avoid misappropriating Indigenous cultural heritage. Simon Fraser University: Vancouver.]

I found the literature I’ve chosen to review while perusing Chelsea Vowel’s blog, where she recommends reading a guide for creators and designers, compiled by IPinCH (The Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage), an international research initiative based at Simon Fraser University.

The guide interrogates the idea of misappropriation of Indigenous cultures from both legal and ethical angles, appealing specifically to business owners, creators and designers. It isn’t published in any formal academic journals, nor does it directly address the subjects that I wish to focus on in my Big Idea project, i.e. the uninformed or apathetic consumers of culturally appropriative products. However, the principles that it covers are deeply relevant to all members of the supply chain, as well as the users of its products.

The clarity of the language used, as well as the format / design of the guide, which utilizes nested headings, lots of space between paragraphs, and bullet points, makes the guide very accessible and easy to understand, for a range of readers with different levels of proficiency in the English language.

Moreover, the way in which the authors stipulate the definitions of certain relevant terms, evaluate the costs / benefits of each parties’ involvement in cultural exchange, give examples of culturally misappropriative products and anticipate counterarguments, demonstrates an acumen of both perspectives and potentially exacting philosophical / “Devil’s Advocate” interpretations of the guide.

And in a sense, such a comprehensive yet unequivocal inquiry into misappropriation of Indigenous cultures is warranted; designers and creators of white European background continue to steal elements of Aboriginal cultures for the sake of setting or adhering to fashion trends, despite persistent backlash. Ideally, upon being challenged about misappropriation, these “artists” would practise their human quality of compassion and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, it would seem that a combination of post-Enlightenment hyperrationalism and uninhibited ambitions of increasing profitability has rendered many more privileged folk incapable of exercising empathy when it comes to culturally sensitive issues such as these.

I think that the authors of the guide have recognized this, and have done everything they could have done in 23 pages to convince the reader that cultures as entities in themselves have moral standing and therefore, we have certain duties to respect their traditions and heritage.

To begin, a summary of the motivations and intentions of the guide is given. It states that its main purpose is the unpack important questions such as “Why do products inspired from Indigenous cultural heritage seem to spark particuarly strong reactions and pushback?” and to “underline the mutual benefits of responsible collaboration with Indigenous artists and communities.”

It goes on to clarify the definitions of key terms, such as cultural heritage, tangible heritage, intangible heritage and appropriation before defining misappropriation as “a one-sided process where one entity benefits from another group’s culture without permission and without giving something in return.” The guide stresses the fact that due to existing power imbalances, not only are Intellectual Property (IP) laws typically formulate without regard for Indigenous cultural heritage, but Indigenous peoples, already underprivileged, are less likely to be able to afford the copyright, trademarks, patents, etc. than the companies who reap the profits of the products of this heritage. Moreover, it outlines the fact that IP laws only protect an individual’s creations for a limited time span, whereas products of Indigenous cultures are “developed collectively over many generations.” This is particularly a problem when a people’s wellbeing is largely dependent on the economic returns of their cultural expression.

The following are given, with explanations, as the tenets of a responsible creative collaboration:

Free prior and informed consent
Shared control over process and conduct
Acknowledgement and attribution
Respect for cultural differences
Reciprocity and benefit-sharing

Following this, the costs and risks of misappropriation “for you and your company” and, separately, “for Indigenous artists and communities” are given, as well as the benefits of taking part in a responsible collaboration, for the same two parties.

The final sub-heading, “How can you contribute to the ethical treatment of Indigenous cultural heritage?” meticulously addresses common reasons that people give for engaging in cultural misappropriation. These include:

“It is trendy in my industry, therefore I see it as a good business opportunity”
“I want to celebrate Indigenous peoples and their creativity”
“I would like my work to reflect a connection to the Indigenous history and culture of where I live”

To conclude, the guide gives six hypothetical examples of misappropriation of different kinds and degrees, all of which are inspired by real-life cases. These examples, as well as the rest of the guide, can be accessed at the link below:

http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch/sites/default/files/resources/teaching_resources/think_before_you_appropriate_jan_2016.pdf

Short paper on Intrinsic value and Obligations towards nature [PHIL345A]

The Lack of Necessity of “Intrinsic Value” in Environmental Ethics

Today, we need only exercise intuition in our observation of the rampant exploitation of non-human nature by humans in the fulfillment of industrial interests and deliberately inflated notions of subsistence requirements to arrive at the same conclusion as Regan (Regan 1992); that the prevalent conception of environmental ethics within contemporary philosophical discourse does not do the work required of it. It does not adequately and universally justify our moral obligations to this nature, as evinced by our unsustainable habits of resource overconsumption and general neglect of how such habits may disrupt natural ecosystems.

While this anecdotal insight may serve as an impetus for philosophical debate, we must arrive at the same conclusions via logically sound reasoning if they are to carry any argumentative weight in meta-ethics, a field of meticulous criteria. In his criticism of past attempts by philosophers at formulating a robust environmental ethic, Regan incorporates elements of both J. Baird Callicott (Callicott 1985) and Holmes Rolston, III’s (Rolston, III 1991) models into a comprehensive checklist, which serves as the benchmark of his analysis.

Regan’s ideal environmental ethic is:

“(1) an ethic of the environment (as distinct from an ethic for its use), (2) an ethic that attempts to illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards natural entities (…), (3) an ethic that attempts to illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty to natural entities by appealing to their intrinsic value, and (4) an ethic that relies on an account of intrinsic value that attributes not only different but greater intrinsic value to wild in comparison with domestic organisms and species… “ (Regan 1992)

Before I continue with this review of Regan’s argument, it is necessary to stipulate exactly what I will mean when I use certain recurring terms. I will use the term nature to refer to the Earth’s four subsystems (the lithosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere (Keller 2010)). While the biosphere may be seen to include human beings and their built environments (e.g. cities, roads, etc), due to the nature of Regan’s argument, my definition of these three equivalent terms will be limited to non-humans and their ecosystems.

To remain consistent with the language used by Regan, natural entity will be used in its broad definition to refer to individual beings and objects of nature, species, populations and ecosystems.

As much of this debate revolves around contentious claims about the term intrinsic value, it is worth invoking pertinent assertions made by John O’Neill (O’Neill 1992). On the varieties of intrinsic value, O’Neill believes that the majority of literature on environmental ethics is guilty of equivocating two of the three different senses of the term. The two senses that are most commonly conflated are those corresponding to non-instrumental value (that is, a property of an object that is an “end in itself”) and objective value (that is, the type of value held by an object independently of any evaluative agents). Therefore, any efforts towards developing a rigorous environmental ethic by appealing to the notion of intrinsic value must show that natural entities have both non-instrumental and objective value, and arrive at this conclusion rationally without committing any logical fallacies.

Like Regan, O’Neill maintains that the ontological shortcomings of these efforts are exactly why they are unable to induce moral obligations in humans with respect to their relationship with nature.

Upon reaching the conclusion of Regan’s inquiry, it is clear that his intention is not to detract from ostensible progress made by the likes of Kant (Kant 1930) and Taylor (Taylor 1981) in environmental ethics, but instead to contribute to the fortification of such an ethic’s meta-ethical basis. I share Regan’s view that the failures of environmental ethics, thus far, can be attributed to an equivocal ontology of intrinsic value and the lack of attention paid to what constitutes such value. I will now rehash Regan’s arguments that show why the most prominent theories of intrinsic value are incapable of passing the aforementioned checklist, before concluding the discussion by questioning whether this insistence on appealing to the intrinsic value is at all necessary in the formulation of our ethics.

In Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?, Regan substantively demonstrates why existing theories of intrinsic value do not suffice in environmental ethics. He shows that mental-state theories are unable to illuminate respect or duties to natural ecosystems, while states-of-affairs theories cannot prove that species or populations have intrinsic value, as they are not states-of-affairs themselves. In addition, Regan criticizes the end-in-itself theory by highlighting its egalitarianism and consequent inability to assign different degrees of value to different kinds of natural entities, for example wild and domesticated (Regan 1992).

And it is his objection to the hierarchical ends-in-themselves theories, which I believe can be extended to all environmental ethics that depend on conceptions of intrinsic value. If we are going to grant that there is a scale of intrinsic values; that is, different entities carry different amounts of intrinsic value, then is this very notion not superfluous? If all cases of environmental ethics that rely on this idea of intrinsic value have proven themselves to be feeble, as Regan has shown, is this not an unnecessary layer of abstraction? Like Regan, I do not claim to bear the details of a reformed environmental ethic, but I hope that questions similar to those I have raised are able to guide further work towards an ideal ethic of the environment.

Bibliography

Regan, Tom. 1992. “Does Environmental Ethics Rest On A Mistake?”. The Monist 75 (2): 162-181.
Callicott, J. Baird. 1985. “Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, And Environmental Ethics”. Environmental Ethics 7 (3): 257-275.
Rolston, III, Holmes. 1991. “Environmental Ethics: Values In And Duties To The Natural World”. In Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle, 1st ed., 73-96. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Keller, David R. 2010. “Introduction: What Is Environmental Ethics?”. In Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, 1st ed., 2. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
O’Neill, John. 1992. “The Varieties Of Intrinsic Value”. The Monist 75 (2): 119-138.
Kant, Immanuel. 1930. “Indirect Duties To Non-Humans”. Lectures On Ethics, 239-241.
Taylor, Paul W. 1981. “The Ethics Of Respect For Nature”. Environmental Ethics 3: 197-200.

Big Idea evidence analysis / close reading [FNIS100]

After reading the prescribed chapters of her book for class, I became curious about Chelsea Vowel’s background and decided to do some online research into her. I quickly found that in addition to her main occupation of teaching Inuit youth under protection, Chelsea Vowel, 38 year old Métis academic, mother and author of Indigenous Writes, maintains a blog, on which she posts under the name âpihtawikosisân (which literally means “half-son”, and is the name the Cree gave to the Métis). Her page includes links to many valuable resources related to Indigenous issues in North America (including articles, legal documents and documentaries), language-related materials and intiatives that revolt against the ongoing colonial project in Canada. While she only posts sporadically, her entries discuss incredibly complex topics in Indigenous studies in a conversational tone, making concepts that many white people may struggle to empathize with quite intelligible.

One such topic is the wearing of headdresses by “non-Natives”. This is one of the main manifestations of cultural appropriation in white cultures that I wish I focus on in my Big Idea project and since, like all of her other blog entries, the page links to several other webpages containing Indigenous perspectives and literature on this debate, I figured it could serve as a springboard for deeper investigation on the matter. Before delving into the broader idea of un-/restricted symbols of different cultures, she urges the reader to read through the statements on a “bingo card” (shown below).

3223223918_8c26b9105d_o

Vowel’s posts commonly feature similar prefaces as this, effectively anticipating possible reactionary counterarguments or doubts that non-Indigenous readers may have, which would hinder their ability to comprehend the true meaning and intentions behind Vowel’s work. Admittedly, I could identify with a couple of the statements mentioned on the card above at earlier points in my life and therefore, I can appreciate Vowel’s acumen here. Following this, Vowel goes on to discuss the idea of “Restricted Symbols”, by first referring to several examples related to white North America – for example, military medals, Bachelor degrees and other prestigious awards. Here, it is clear that she is tailoring her language and analytical approach to a white audience. This makes sense, as they are the ones who typically perpetrate culturally appropriative practices, however, while doing so is very productive in its own right, it is no Indigenous person’s responsibility to cater discourse surrounding these ideas to settlers. For this reason, I deeply admire Vowel’s approach of simplifying an idea especially for the intended audience, despite the deeply emotional response she may have to it as a result of her heritage.

She continues this direct tone through to the conclusion, where she seems to comfort the reader in saying that “It’s okay to make mistakes” and insinuating that many white people are simply ignorant to what constitutes appropriation and why it is problematic. However, she states that the best response to being confronted about such behavior is to acknowledge the situation and possibly apologize. I think a suitable addition to this list would be to learn from it. This very idea of having to inform people of how to react to being “called out” appeals to a trickier, overarching problem of “white fragility” and “white guilt.” In pursuing my research topic, I anticipate that these notions will prove to be pertinent in unpacking the reasons why cultural appropriation of Indigenous cultures continues to be a contentious topic that many people still struggle to acknowledge and understand the connotations of.

Short Blog Essay #2: Water as an Instrument of Socio-political Control [GRSJ102]

There seems to be a tendency among those who have spent their lives as citizens of First World countries to take access to clean water for granted and fail to ever consider the political nature of water-related issues on a global scale. Our bodies themselves consist of over 50% water and there is little debate over the fact that, like air and food, it is imperative for human survival. Other than human consumption, water is required in agriculture, food preparation, cleaning, washing, personal hygiene and waste disposal(1). However, much like land, the commodification of water, and the interrelated inequities, are inextricably bound to the history of imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy.

The Ahlers and Zwarteveen article(2) presents a robust argument for the reformation of neo-liberal water proposals regarding allocation and distribution, which are built upon pre-established economic models of privatization and commercialization and encourage dispossession of vital resources from those who are systemically oppressed by rigid power structures – i.e. women, people of color and other groups of underprivileged people.

The crux of Ahlers and Zwarteveen’s inquiry is that the praxis of neo-liberalism that offers an ‘equalist’ response to widespread concerns related to resource bureaucracy and land tenure rights, intentionally disregards and denies the gendered dynamics, abstractions and biases deeply embedded in existing socio-political configurations. Their aim of methodologically re-politicizing water questions, de-individualizing water access and aligning legislated water rights with intersectional feminist principles is scrupulously articulated and theoretical solutions are posited for the global scale. However, little is said about how such solutions could be practically implemented or where similar efforts have been made, which could serve as models for future policy amendments.

For this reason, I found that in complement with each other, the two readings formed a thorough critique of contradictory neo-liberal water politics, which disregard both the “social dependencies that are intrinsic to water ownership”(2) and the “central role of women in water management”(1) by assuming a level playing field. Ahlers and Zwarteveen appeal broadly to the insitutional coruption and legal pluralism that dictates how the variable availability of water is managed to facilitate the prosperity of dominant markets, while the UN Water policy brief provides numerous case studies that demonstrate how these injustices trickle down and have detrimental effects on the health, education and economies of local communities.

Women bear the heaviest burdens of these effects, as they are expected to perform unpaid labour related to procuring of water, and the domestic duties that use it – i.e. cooking, cleaning, washing, etc. Despite this, and the fact that the International Water and Sanitation Centre has empirically proven that water sanitation projects “run with the full participation of women are more sustainable and effective” than those that aren’t(1), women are still largely excluded from decision-making roles in resource management sectors and in many countries, do not have direct access to water due to how little land they own.

womencarryingwater
The UN Water policy brief uses the term gender mainstreaming to refer to the suggested measures delineated in the Ahlers and Zwarteveen article, establishing a layer of abstraction that allows more tangible realizations of the aforementioned solutions to be discussed. While my reflection has framed global water issues as being in a dire, irrecoverable state, the policy brief summarizes several instances of concerted efforts to improve water distribution and irrigation systems in impoverished cities over the world, and elect women into managerial positions related to the implementation of these solutions. In particular, the Interagency Task Force on Gender and Water, established in 2003 and who developed the policy brief, has been effective in consolidating the objectives of gender and water / sanitation specialists and bringing the gendered nature of water issues to the forefront of international political discourse.

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Bibliography

GWTF, Gender, Water And Sanitation: A Policy Brief. UN Water, 2006. Web. 16 Oct. 2016. Water For Life.
Ahlers, Rhodante and Zwarteveen, Margreet. “The Water Question In Feminism: Water Control And Gender Inequities In A Neo-Liberal Era”. Gender, Place and Culture 16.4 (2009): Web. 16 Oct. 2016.

In response to Tom Regan’s “Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?” (1992) [PHIL345A]

The purpose of Regan’s argument remains ambiguous until its conclusion, whereby it becomes clear that it is not his intention to detract from ostensible progress made by the likes of Moore, Kant and Taylor in environmental ethics, but instead to contribute to the fortification of such an ethic’s meta-ethical basis. Regan seems to believe that theories of environmental ethics that rely heavily on the idea of certain (or all) natural entities having “intrinsic value”, are inherently flawed in how they “cannot do the philosophical work demanded of them by the conception of environmental ethics with which we are concerned”; that is, a conception that vindicates appropriate respect and duty towards the environment. In other words, an ethic of (not for) the environment.

While he fails to adequately do so, Regan alludes to the fact that a reformed environmental ethic will necessarily circumvent the need of forming its premises on such a contentious and dubious term as “intrinsic value”. For any branch of ethics to be effective in its purpose of en-/dis-couraging certain action across the human population based on justification of certain moral obligations, it must substantively and universally prove its related “oughts” through derivations of formal logic, in a manner akin to proofs in mathematics. The main point that I took away from reading Regan’s argument is that all attempts in doing so thusfar have been unconvincing as they have, to speak in the language of Hume, derived that “ought” from an “is.”

Question: Assuming Regan is correct and that using the term “intrinsic value” should be avoided in formulation of an environmental ethic, what are some of the alternative premises on which we can base such an ethic?

Final Big Idea + summary [FNIS100]

Appropriation of Indigenous traditions in Western in art / culture / music

The recently growing trend of appropriating Indigenous cultures in Western fashion, art, literature and music subcultures is based on the same insensitivities and misunderstandings of what decolonization looks like as the caricaturization of Aboiriginal identities in sports such as American Football, that has been protested against for decades now. The exploitation and bastardization of the image of the “Dead Indian” (1) in sporting mascots continues to be defended by a warped rationale of preservation and through similar justification, white youth still believe that wearing war bonnets to music festivals and painting their faces brown on Halloween are innocuous acts. A common response when criticized about these choices is to vindicate their own innocence using arguments that go something like “we are all one,” “I don’t see color” or “my intentions are good.” In Australia, for example, these attitudes are fostered in “bush doof” culture; an underground music scene where predominantly white people congregate, consume psychedelic drugs in hopes of reaching elevated levels of consciousness and enlightenment, and embrace a melting pot of whichever traditions, values and religions fascinate them the most.

This 21st century white hippie rhetoric, which preaches idealized notions of peace dogmatically as a catch-all solution to social injustice and systemic oppression, implicitly tells the marginalized to “calm down” and allow the colonial project to continue to take its course in the political sphere as well as in activism. The issue is complicated when, for example, people who are or claim to be Native Americans vehemently defend the right of the Washington NFL team to name themselves the Redskins (2), or when iconic people of color, such as Pharrell Williams, are seen wearing headdress on the covers of fashion magazines.

As McGill University law graduate Vanessa Udy mentions (3), some progress is being made, as can be seen in how music festivals (such as British Columbia’s Bass Coast and Montreal’s Oshega Music and Arts Festival) are beginning to “ban the popular practice of wearing headdresses.” (4). But I don’t wish to focus on these kinds of outside perspectives on whether we’re headed in the right direction or not, nor do I want to simply list all the manifestations of this phenomenon and why they are problematic, as this is common knowledge in the discourse of Indigenous and post-colonial studies. Instead, I would like to explore Indigenous perspectives on the nuances of this issue (for example, Chelsea Vowel’s blog post (5) and make a clear distinction between appreciation and appropriation. In doing so, I hope to formulate a meticulous argument against these appropriative trends, particularly aimed at the “young left,” who live by a mantra of “free speech / expression,” and hopefully convince those who are on the fence that these practices that may seem harmless to them are in fact perpetuating a long history of harmful Western imperialism.

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Bibliography

King, Thomas. 2012. The Inconvenient Indian. [Toronto]: Doubleday Canada.
McKenna, David. 2013. “Redskins’ Indian-Chief Defender: Not A Chief, Probably Not Indian”. Deadspin.Com. http://deadspin.com/redskins-indian-chief-defender-not-a-chief-probably-590973565
Udy, Vanessa. 2015. “The Appropriation Of Aboriginal Cultural Heritage: Examining The Uses And Pitfalls Of The Canadian Intellectual Property Regime”. Intellectual Property Issues In Cultural Heritage. http://www.sfu.ca/ipinch/outputs/blog/canadian-intellectual-property-regime/
Marsh, Calum. 2015. “Osheaga’s Headdress Ban Shows Festival’s Zero Tolerance For Cultural Appropriation”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/jul/17/osheaga-music-festival-headdress-cultural-appropriation.
Vowel, Chelsea. 2016. “An Open Letter To Non-Natives In Headdresses”. Blog. Âpihtawikosisân. http://apihtawikosisan.com/hall-of-shame/an-open-letter-to-non-natives-in-headdresses/.