Global leaders are concerned about the withdrawal of North Korea from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Talks began after the fallout from the failed 1994 “Agreed Framework”, and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Concerns over North Korea's increasing nuclear capabilities, combined with concerns over their leadership, spurred an international commitment to work on negotiating peace with North Korea. Currently, North Korea remains outside of the NPT but did disable nuclear reactor that produced plutonium for its weapons program.

North Korea wants normalized relationships with the United States and a non-aggression pact

As established in the first round of negotiations, a central issue for North Korea was that of creating normalized relationships with the United States, as well as a non-aggression pact. North Korea stated that without meeting these demands they would not consider dismantling their nuclear program. The United States previously rejected a non-aggression pact proposal and remained firm during talks, but later reached an agreement with North Korea. On October 11, 2008, during the sixth round of negotiations, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state-sponsored terrorism as well as removing North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act. This fulfilled one of North Korea’s demands of having a further normalized relationship with the USA.

The United States fails to provide aid to North Korea in a timely manner, sparking lost confidence in the negotiations

Another key demand of North Korea was that of receiving economic aid. After delays in the delivery of aid from the Americans, North Korea walked out of the negotiations. Failing to deliver aid in the agreed timeframe ultimately lead to lost confidence in the peace talks by the North. Rebuilding trust with the north has proven a difficult task since this round of deterioration.

Re-establishing Negotiations with North Korea

Currently, one of the key issues is simply trying to get North Korea to resume the peace negotiations. After failed negotiations in the sixth round, North Korea pulled out of the talks and began to resume their nuclear enrichment program. Despite this, South Korea recently reached a breakthrough when the North agreed to reopen dialogue with the South in 2018 during talks of North Korea’s participation in the Olympics held in PyeongChang.

1. The United States

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The United States has always been the leading promoter of a complete and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear arsenal in North Korea. In consideration of North Korea's record of caprice and outright deceit, the U.S. insisted on a multilateral rather than a unilateral approach to negotiate, in order to impose international supervision on the DPRK. However, even though the U.S. was extremely resolute in disarming DPRK’s nuclear programs during the negotiation, from its national security tactics, the nuclear arsenal in DPRK is still used as an excuse for the U.S. to deploy its own antinuclear weapons in Korea and Japan to counter with the power of China and Russia. Thus, it is believed that the U.S.’s statement for nuclear dismantlement in North Korea was not sincere.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Different than the diplomatic path with China in the 1970s, the U.S. preferred an isolation policy to North Korea without diplomatic recognition nor economic cooperation. However, the U.S. has promised to delist the DPRK as a supporter of terrorism and terminated the exercise of the Trading with the Enemy Act with DPRK in 2008. The U.S. also agreed to provide humanitarian aid with resources supplied if a complete and verifiable denuclearization is agreed to in North Korea.

2. North Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

The Kim family did not have the same economic strength and resources as China to have an open reform, therefore, they regarded military force as their only chip to defend the national ideology and a continued glorification of the family. They have learned lessons from the situations in Iraq and Libya, so they would not give up nuclear weapons unless a better relationship with America and other parties in security, diplomacy, and economy, can be guaranteed for the foreseeable future.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

Valuing regime survival above all else, North Korea has regarding their nuclear program as a weapon to deter a forcible unification with South Korea through the promotion of America. The DPRK remains extremely isolated, although maintains some relations with China and has kept a nuclear resources partnership with Iran and Pakistan.

• Economic sanctions

The illegal transaction of military weapons and technologies with the third world were believed to be DPRK’s major source of income. The economic sanction and isolation policy did little to terrorize the DPRK, which has a lower opportunity cost than Iraq and Iran because of a more autarkic economy – with fewer dependents on global trade and the international system. But, largely depending on the food and energy supply from China, North Korea might lower its head once this biggest trader has determined to stand with America in the case of denuclearization.

3. South Korea

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Bandwagoning with America, South Korea was the free-rider in the negotiation who has relied upon America to balance the powers in the East Asia and the threat from Kim’s regime.

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

The historical issue between South and North Korea was the dynamic of the South to stand against the North in the negotiation, and also the biggest obstacle to establishing a peaceful system on the Korean peninsula. South Korea did want unification with the North, but prepared to wait after they realized the heavy cost. Concerning about the territory hegemons of East Asia, China and Russia, who also own their own nuclear programs, South Korea had no choice but accept its passive position in the relationship with America, and allow the U.S. to deploy its anti-nuclear programs (THAAD) in South Korea territory on the pretext of threatening the North.

• Economic sanctions

The South has little economic connection with North Korea and the economic sanctions were not a useful tool for the South to menace the North. Following the steps of America, South Korea showed its willingness to provide a certain amount of material and financial aids to the North with the processing of denuclearization.

4. China

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

China was the host and mediator of the peace talks between the U.S. and DPRK. Despite sharing a border with North Korea, China did not believe the nuclear weapons in DPRK would ever hurt its national security. To China, the opposite sides in the negotiation were U.S. and DPRK, and North and South Korea. But, China still positively involved in the talk since recognizing that the possession of nuclear weapons might promote nuclear proliferation in the neighboring

• The geopolitical relationship in Northeast Asia

As both a historical friend and communist comrade, China has always kept a friendly relationship with the DPRK. The intense relationship with South Korea and Japan continues to threaten China’s position as regional hegemony within Asia, as a result, the key statement of China in SPT was a denuclearization in the whole Korean Peninsula. However, although China behaved positively in the SPT to reciprocate America for its favorable behaviors in the previous years, especially for its concession in the Taiwan issue, China opposed vehemently against America about THAAD for its threats to their national security.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

China is the DPRK’s largest trading partner. For instance, the exporting of coal contributed 30% of the trading income in North Korea. During the negotiations, China was worried that imposing economic sanctions on the North would cause economic damage that could lead to destabilization and potentially trigger conflict on Northeast Asian territory.

5. Japan

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Attended the negotiation as a great power in Asia, Japan was not actually involved in the conflict nor would they be affected by the result of the negotiations. Although they had been bandwagoning with the U.S. for its concern about national security, Japan did not really want a compromise from the DPRK, for which they might lose an excuse to deploy their own army and military instruments.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

Having stayed in an intense relationship with China for historical reasons, Japan has installed the US-developed Aegis ship-based anti-ballistic missile system in 2007 to defend the attack from North Korea while threatening China.

• Economic sanctions

Similar to South Korea, Japan had little commercial connection with the North but imposed harsh economic sanctions as the response to the call from America. Since 2006, Japan imposed a ban on North Korean ships from Japanese ports and import of products.

6. Russia

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal

Russia was not deeply involved in the conflict, Russia’s ambition was to play a constructive broker or moderate role in the strives of denuclearization. However, on the other hand, Russia provided technology to aid in the DPRK’s nuclear programs in the former Soviet period, it is believed that the dynamic of Russia in promoting denuclearization is similar with its partner China - aimed at the whole Korean Peninsula instead of to antagonize with the North.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

As another hegemony in Asia, Russia has always kept a close cooperdinationship with China. Owning the biggest nuclear warhead arsenal, Russia was invited to the peace talk mainly because of its powerful strength as a nuclear-armed territory hegemony, rather than any vested interests in the region. After the demise of the USSR, the Russian position in Asia has considerably declined especially since the rise of Far Eastern regions. In this circumstance, a multilateral structure in Northeast Asian security and cooperation was desirable for Russia to access the decision-making process for its own further interests. The problem of North Korea was a good entry path for Russia to improve its regional effects.

• Economic sanction on DPRK

Russia was the only member of the Six-Party Talks besides the United States that actually supplied heavy fuel oil to North Korea as was agreed in February 2007. Prioritizing the peace conditions in Northeast Asian territory in the first place of the whole negotiation, Russia was not active in imposing economic sanctions on the DPRK while impugning America’s “super-hardline policy” to force new concessions from Pyongyang without adequate reciprocity. Moscow was worried that a radical sanction might not only worsen the contradiction in the current nuclear problem, it might also cause the DPRK to become desperate, and trigger a security problem in the Northeastern Asian territory.

1. European Union

• Why they were not invited

As one of the biggest international powers, the EU was not invited to the peace talks simply because it had neither a direct interest in North Korea nor a considerable regional effect in Northeast Asia. However, with increasing commercial trades with Asian countries, such as China, the EU had actively engaged in the nuclear problem of the DPRK to improve its own influence in Asia.

• Disarmament of the nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

The EU clearly stated its position with other participants in the SPT, insisting on the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, and has supported international sanctions against the DPRK. Lacking political ties with South Korea, the EU was a neutral civilian actor to the North. Supported EU’s request for enhanced observer status in UNGA and introduced more SEZs to promote trade, the economics of DPRK could be shocked heavily once EU strengthens the economic sanctions. Besides, EU had involved in KEDO construction with financial aid provided.

• Humanitarian aid to North Korea

Because the DPRK is not part of the WTO, they do not benefit from their programmes for developing nations under the EU's General System of Preferences (GSP). The EU had been providing humanitarian aid to North Korea’s agricultural sector since 1995 when severe famine afflicted the country, with a programme funded by the Food Security Thematic Programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.

2. Iran and Pakistan

• Why they were not invited

Iran and Pakistan were not invited to the Six-Party talks because of its passive position in the Asian territory. Iran, like the DPRK, is also a violator of the NPT and was not invited to the peace talks about denuclearization.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal in the DPRK

Allegedly in contact with North Korea and thought to have exchanged technology, Iran and Pakistan have been considered accomplices to the DPRK. Neither had made any clear statement about the nuclear programs in North Korea, nor promoted nuclear non-proliferation with other participants in the talk.

3. NATO

• Why they were not invited

There is no clear explanation about why NATO was not invited to the six-party talk, but the reason may be similar to that of the EU.

• The geopolitical relationship in Asia

NATO has been hoping to expand relations with South Korea since the early 2000s when South Korea was engaging with NATO to create a Security Partnership. However, this expansion has contained Russian and Chinese influence and it would not be worth it for South Korea to sacrifice relations with China and Russia by joining NATO as they are vital partners in de-escalating North Korean aggression.

• Disarmament nuclear arsenal and economic sanctions on the DPRK

NATO had always played a positive role in promoting denuclearization in North Korea while urging the interest-related countries, such as other participants in the SPT, to impose tougher sanctions on DPRK.

4. KEDO

• Why they were not invited
  

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, which entailed the construction of two light water reactor nuclear power plants in North Korea to replace North Korea's Magnox type reactors. The KEDO was a good step in freezing North Korea's nuclear programs by collective efforts of America, South Korea, and Japan. They were not invited to the SPT perhaps because all their members had already been involved in the talk to express their position previously, therefore it was not necessary for KEDO to attend as an actor. Furthermore, without a “sustained, high-level political leadership”, the light water reactor program had been closed in 2006. It is believed that the broken promise of the KEDO members had worsened the conflict between the oppositions in the SPT.

The goal of the Six-Party Talks was to peacefully negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Cooperating together, the six nations of North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan hoped to establish a dialogue that could create a greater level of peace and stability in the region. Ultimately, the peace negotiations fell apart during their Sixth Round, with North Korea leaving the negotiations indefinitely. Despite this, there has been some progress made since North Korea left the negotiation table that leads many to be hopeful that the talks may resume in the future.

North Korea’s missile program rapidly progressed in 2017, during which time it fired 23 missiles (Berlinger). These actions triggered concern throughout the international community, with the South Korean government stating, “We strongly condemn yet another provocation from the North,” (Manson et al.). The Americans also said that “all options are on the table” in response to a ballistic missile launch (Manson, Sevastopulo, and Harding). North Korea’s continued technological advancements and disregard of concern in the international community has only served as an added sense of urgency to resuming dialogue.

Despite an escalation in conflict in the Asian region recently, relations between North Korea and their southern neighbor have made some progress. In an unexpected move, North Korea asked to send delegated athletes to attend the 2018 Olympic Games held in PyeongChang.Their attendance was an unprecedented move, with South Korea diplomatically welcoming their athletes and establishing a formal dialogue for the first time in two years with North Korea (Stiles). Despite some international criticism, allowing the North to compete in the Olympics potentially offered a new sense of diplomacy between the two nations.

Under heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea the possibility of further talks have been renewed with North Korea sending an unexpected invitation of talks to the U.S. In a message delivered by South Korean diplomats to the United States stating that they wanted to reopen dialogue about the nuclear issue, President Donald Trump emphatically accepted their offer, stating that it was “very positive” (Cohen et al.). Additionally, after talking with the North, Seoul's national security chief, Chung Eui-yong, stated that the North offered to refrain from conducting nuclear and missile tests that while in talks with the U.S (Cohen et al.). These talks are expected to commence in mid-2018. The potential magnitude of these future discussions has yet to be seen and a resumption of the Six-Party Talks does not yet seem highly likely.

There has been a substantial lack of confidence in the North Korean regime and their ability to follow through on their statements of resolution. Although the idea of North Korea dismantling their nuclear program remains unlikely, the move towards more open communication, rather than their previous isolationism, offers some hope that peace talks could resume in the future. Until then, nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula are unlikely to go anywhere.

Statement by the Secretary-General on the Six-Party Talks
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2008-06-26/statement-secretary-general-six-party-talks

US Department of State Archives on Six-Party Talks, 2001-2009
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104558.htm

American Policy regarding North Korea and the Six-Party Talks, from Bush to Obama
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/obamas-north-korea-policy/

North Korea Taken off State Sponsored Terrorism List
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html

Article on the background of Six-Party Talks
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm

Buszynski, Leszek. Negotiating with North Korea: the Six-Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue. Routledge, 2016.
Leszek Buszynski is a professor of International Relations. In his book, Buszynski examines the multilateral negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, with a focus on bargaining and negotiation. His focus on how negotiation shapes outcomes is an interesting addition to the literature surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue in that North Korea, being in strict isolation, is often seen as hostile and difficult to negotiate with. The importance of negotiating is a key component of peacebuilding, but as Buszynski there is difficulty is finding common ground between negotiators, with members of the Six-Party Talks having varying approaches to the issue. Another key idea that Buszynski addresses are the power dynamics that exist in negotiations, in particular that of the prevention of the U.S as being a “dominant player”, since they had to compete with China, who further had the support of Russia. This created difficulty in creating a resolution with North Korea. The ideas offered by Buszynski are of great importance when attempting to understand the difficulty of creating a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp. 247-283.
Millard and Chae examine the positions of the European Union in the SPT, and the relationship between EU and KEDO. This article listed EU and KEDO’s contribution to the denuclearization and reconstruction in North Korea provided a possible reason for them being not invited to the SPT.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 363-394.
This research started from Japan’s tactics and policies in the DPRK issues, deeply analyzed Japan’s diplomatic relations with other five participants of the SPT, demonstrated Japan’s dynamic to bandwagon with America and cooperate with China for both the nuclear issue and the whole national blueprint.

Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Schneider introduced the characteristics of nuclear weapons in DPRK, Pakistan, and Iran indicated their illegal commercial connection for nuclear resources and technologies. This article is the base of the analyzation about Iran and Pakistan’s perspectives in the denuclearization of DPRK.

Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Chu and Lin’s article expressed Chinese respective toward the nuclear non-proliferation in the DPRK and the relationship between these two communist countries. They indicated Chinese tactic and dynamics to promote denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, deeply analyzed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. All of their analyzation was derived from the diplomatic and economic connection between these six participants.

Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Synder’s article mainly discusses the relationship between America and DPRK, profoundly analyzed America’s tactic in promoting denuclearization in North Korea.

Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
In this article, Such listed the obstacles the participants met in the SPT, concretely explained why they did not reach a workable agreement after the negotiation.

Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017, pp. 307-324.
This article also discussed the state quo and power balances in Northeast Asia. Besides, the author also provided a short but clear explanation about Kim family’s “military first” policy.

“The Six-Party Talks at a Glance.” The Six-Party Talks at a Glance | Arms Control Association”, Arms Control Association, July 2017, 
The Arms Control Association is a nonpartisan organization established in 1971 focused on providing public education and information on arms control policies. The information offered by this organization provides a clear analysis of the timeline of events in the Six-Party Talks. Beginning with the events leading up to the establishment of the peace negotiations, the article follows by summarizing each round of negotiations, one through six in brief detail. This organization offers valuable information about the issues being discussed in the Six-Party Talks, providing researchers a concise database of information.

Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 45-69.
Toloraya made a similar analyzation about Russia as what Chu and Lin did about China. Russia’s relationships and interest conflictions with other five participants around nuclear problem were at the core of this article.

Berlinger, Joshua. “North Korea's Missile Tests: What You Need to Know.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 4 Dec. 2017.
Cohen, Zachary, et al. “Trump Touts 'Positive' Korea Talks but Wants Action.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 7 Mar. 2018,
Manson, Katrina, et al. “US Considering 'All Options' over North Korea Missile Launch.”
Financial Times, 29 Aug. 2017.
Millard, Andrew S., and Chae-Deug Yi. "The EU’s Potential Role in the Six-Party Talks and the
North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Baltic Journal of European Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, pp.
247-283.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy
Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp.
363-394.
Rozman, Gilbert. Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught
between North Korea and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007;2011;
Schneider, Mark. "The North Korean Nuclear Threat to the U.S." Comparative Strategy,
vol. 33, no. 2, 2014, pp. 107-121.
Shulong, Chu, and Lin Xinzhu. "the Six-Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective." Asian Perspective,
vol. 32, no. 4, 2008, pp. 29-43.
Snyder, Scott. "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK
Negotiation Strategies." Pacific Focus, vol. 22, no. 1, 2007, pp. 47-72.
Stiles, Matt. “North Korea Says It Wants to Go to the Winter Olympics in the South.” Los
Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 8 Jan. 2018,
Suh, J. J. "three Failures of the Past, Three Structures of Peace." Asian Perspective, vol. 34, no.
2, 2010, pp. 201-208.
Tan, Ming H. "Multilateral Engagement of North Korea: An Assessment of the Six-Party Talks
and the ASEAN Regional Forum." Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 5, no. 2, 2017,
pp. 307-324.
Toloraya, Georgy. "the Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective." Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no.
4, 2008, pp. 45-69.