Afghanistan: Security Sector Reform | Peace Processes and Policies Database

Key issues to be addressed by Security Sector Reform

Opium

Opium is a high value cash crop, which has been used by various organizations – including the Taliban – to fund insurgencies. A depressed economy, ineffective rule of law, corruption, and overall failure to alter incentives led to an 87% increase in estimated total opium production from 2016 to 2017[i]. Cultivation poses unique threats to security sector reforms as it funds illegitimate actors who may erode peacebuilding efforts. The production and trafficking of illicit substances impacts rule of law, and therefore legitimacy of governing power if existing regulations cannot be enforced. Transnational criminal networks and insurgencies both contribute to instability and corruption within societal apparatuses[ii], including the security sector. Other economic opportunities must be presented to rural households lift them up out of the black-market shadow economy. Majority of counter-narcotics policy is derived from international donors[iii], but going forward there must be a transition towards Afghan independence for a sustainable reduction. Addressing economic opportunities through positive peace initiatives may help decrease the reliance on opium production and trade. Increasing equality and standards of living reduces incentives to participate in the narcotics business.

Illiteracy

Only 31% of the Afghan population is literate[iv], which poses significant challenges to training of security personnel and their effectiveness during duty. Literacy is a necessary tool for proper enforcement of security by the police and military. Individuals are hampered by their inability to read documents, write notes, or even navigate using street signs. Literate forces are easier to train and command[v]. Additionally, they may better understand the rule of law and safeguard against corruption as they are able to count and keep track of resources and their pay. Illiteracy may be compounding the problems with insecurity, crime, and the opium trade. A literate population could potentially find other economic opportunities and reduce the rates of opium trafficking and production. Literacy can help addressed structural problems. It may help create a viable economic, political, and judicial structure for Afghanistan[vi] that would uphold fair and effective rule of law once international actors exit the region. So far the United States has funded literacy programs in the Afghan police and army ($200M USD 2014) with the aim to bring individuals to a third grade reading, writing, and arithmetic; however, funding jurisdiction has seen shifted to NATO[vii]. Increasing literacy may help address structural violence such as equality of opportunity

Lack of belief in the state’s monopoly on power

To establish, consolidate, and transfer control there must be a belief in the state’s monopoly on power if there is to be increasing stability and security. Without negative peace, it is difficult to achieve positive peace as actors are unable to effectively run operations to address structural violence. Justice and rule of law needs to be expanded across all of Afghanistan. Authorized coercive power has been accused of not upholding the rule of law and nor does it solely belong to the state apparatus. It may contribute to the questioning of governing and/or security legitimacy.

“Strong Man” Militias

Local militias have been legitimized and incorporated into official Afghan forces. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) gave state authorization to irregular civilian military forces amid on-going insurgencies[viii]. The ALP is inexpensive, but dangerous and inadequately trained by the joint Afghan-American-British forces. Militias are a threat to rule of law and stability, potentially prolonging conflict. Those that emerge spontaneously tend to perform the least abuses towards communities; however, the more governing powers attempt to restrain and control militias – which is seen through their authorization in Afghanistan – their detrimental effects multiple in terms of long-term stability and governing political legitimacy[ix]. The ALP has been accused of serious human rights violations, abuses of civilians, and sexual assault of young boys[x]. Unit commanders in Rahimullah and Abdullah have been documented extorting communities, assaulting, and sometimes killing those who do not conform to their demands[xi]. Communities no longer trust or believe in the ALP. They are viewed as abusive forces authorized by the Afghan government seen through a simple patch stitched to their jackets.

Private Military Contractors (PMCs)

Additional agendas are factored into the shaping and understanding of national interest, threats, and security when legitimate force is outsourced. PMCs may erode “the political, cultural, and symbolic foundation of states’ authority regarding the use of force”[xii]. Privatizing state functions may be a threat to accountability, transparency, and democratic principles as there is a shift away from public to private governance. Private Military Contractors (PMCs) are difficult to be held accountable for crimes, alienates local populations[xiii], and are therefore undermining efforts towards SSR.

Lack of Cohesion

There are a multitude of Afghan security forces, except there is little cooperation and oversight between the organizations. Quick ‘band-aid’ solutions have been the go-to as encouraged by international actors. This led to the creation of interim forces, like the ALP, who have been accused of abuses, yet have become semi-permeant institutions. The Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Public Police Force (APPF) all have different directives to fill security gaps; however, they have difficulties effectively working together. It is compounded by discrepancies in training tactics as they have been under the oversight of different international actors. For example, US forces trained the ANA, joint US-UK oversaw the ALP, and the ANP was under the directive of Germany. Additionally, International actors struggled at times to cooperate. ANP reform shifted to under US control as they accused Germany of favouring literate police officers. Germany focused on extensive training for few police while the United States opted to train more individuals but less extensively[xiv]. Depending on the timeframe and region police officers received very different training. It has generated an unstable and at times confusing security force that is unable to effectively control internal territory or borders.

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[i] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Afghanistan's Opium Production Is through the Roof-why Washington Shouldn't Overreact." Brookings. November 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/21/afghanistans-opium-production-is-through-the-roof-why-washington-shouldnt-overreact/.

[ii] Kamminga, Jorrit. "From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan." UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (2012): 101. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/40662/38984.

[iii] Kamminga, “From Disengagement to Regional Opium War”, 91.

[iv] "Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Programme." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/youth-and-adult-education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-iii/.

[v] Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute (2009): 18. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

[vi] The World Literacy Foundation “The Economic & Social Cost of Illiteracy: A snapshot of illiteracy in a global context.” August 24, 2015. Available from https://worldliteracyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WLF-FINAL-ECONOMIC-REPORT.pdf

[vii] Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Illiteracy Persists among Afghan Troops despite US Education Drive." The Guardian. January 28, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/illiteracy-afghan-troops-us-education.

[viii] The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019: 1. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

[ix] Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Hurray for Militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience." Small Wars & Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (2016): 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.

[x] Mashal, Mujib. "U.S. Plan for New Afghan Force Revives Fears of Militia Abuses." The New York Times. September 15, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/world/asia/afghan-local-police.html.

[xi] Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for Militias”, 264

[xii] Petersohn, Ulrich. “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. July 25, (2015): 2. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228396821_Outsourcing_the_Big_Stick_The_Consequences_of_Using_Private_Military_Companies

[xiii] State of Affairs: Three Years after Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors. September 2010: 3 Accessed March 28, 2019. http://www.ciaonet.org/record/21700?search=1.

[xiv] Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171204800103.

Key actors: Domestic

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The Afghan National Police (ANP) was created after 2001 by the international coalition as part of the peace building process in Afghanistan. While often overlooked in favour of the Afghan National Army, the ANP are essential to the maintenance of law and order in Afghanistan, and the protection of democracy. The ANP is under the authority and control of the Ministry of Interior Affairs[i].

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Beginning in 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA) was created from scratch as the new army of Afghanistan with the goal to eventually operate independently in Afghanistan against the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. The ANA is under the authority and control of the Ministry of Defence[ii].

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

The civil order police (or civil order force) was recently transferred from the ministry of the interior to the ministry of defence to act as a police reserve to aid and augment the ANP. They perform counter-insurgency, highway patrol, and border security[iii].

Afghan Public Police Force (APPF)

A pay-for-service protection force run by the ministry of the interior. Not members of the ANA or ANP, the APPF provide personal protection as well as convoy and infrastructure protection to allow the ANA and ANP to focus on counter insurgency and law enforcement. The APPF were created after the Afghan government ruled Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Contractors (PMCs) illegal and offered contractors the option to join the newly formed APPF; however, PSCs and PMCs may still operate in Afghanistan if registered as ‘risk-management’ companies[iv].

Afghan Local Police

Local militias who have been trained and are paid by the U.S. government to protect rural areas and fill the security gap left by the ANP and ANA. The ANP is supposed to oversee the ALP however that has largely not occurred with the local police being frequently accused of violence and abuse of power. The ALP is accused of still acting as local militias with some accused of strongman-style extortion and abuse[v].

Current Government of Afghanistan

The current Afghan government is led by President Ashraf Ghani who was elected in 2014 for a 5-year term. Ghani serves both as chief of state and head of government as per the Afghan constitution. The Minister of Defence is Tariq Shah Bahrami, and the Minister of Interior Affairs is Wais Barmak[vi].

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics

Established in 2005, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics coordinates all counter-narcotic activity in Afghanistan. The ministry is responsible further responsible for evaluation and implementation of the anti-narcotic strategy. The current Minister of Counter Narcotics is Salamat Azimi[vii].

Warlords

Much of Afghanistan remains outside of the control of the central Afghan Government, and instead is governed by various tribal powers who may be described as warlords. Not all individual Warlords are significant actors, but there are some notable ones such as the Northern Alliance[viii][ix].

Northern Alliance

Officially known as the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan, they were a coalition of militias who fought against the Taliban from 1996 to 2001. They controlled large amounts of Afghanistan by the time of the US-led invasion which allowed them to have significant say over the future of the country[x].

Taliban

An Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 which was ended by the US-led invasion. The Taliban survived and continued to operate an insurgency against the security forces and is currently (as of March 2019) in peace talks with the US government[xi].

Afghan Women for Peace

A grassroots women’s movement who’s declared goal is to promote women’s voices from across the country. The movement has been very active in opposing the bilateral negotiations between the Taliban and the U.S. government[xii].

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[i] A joint report by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” February 3, 2013. Available from https://www.fpri.org/docs/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf

[ii] Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute (2009): 18. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

[iii] "Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit." NATO Resolute Support | Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit. March 27, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://rs.nato.int/news-center/feature-stories/2018-feature-stories/ministry-of-defense-takes-command-of-police-unit.aspx.

[iv] Government of Afghanistan. "What Is the Afghan Public Protection Force?" Afghan Public Protection Force. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://appf.gov.af/?page_id=205&lang=en.

[v] The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

[vi] Central Intelligence Agency. "Afghanistan." The World Factbook. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

[vii] "History MCN." History MCN - Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/1835/history-mcn.

[viii] "Afghan Warlords Maintain Grip on Power in Rural Provinces." BBC News. November 27, 2012. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-20516013/afghan-warlords-maintain-grip-on-power-in-rural-provinces.

[ix] Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. “Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/warlords_as_bureaucrats.pdf

[x] "The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative." The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative | START.umd.edu. October 25, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa.

[xi] Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

[xii] Gharib, Malaka. "'This Is Not The Way': Afghan Women Push Back On U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks." NPR. March 05, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/700173721/this-is-not-the-way-afghan-women-push-back-on-u-s-taliban-peace-talks.

Key actors: International

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

An intergovernmental alliance between European and American states that led combat and non-combat missions to assist, advise, and train Afghan institutions and security forces[i].

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

A NATO conducted security mission in Afghanistan, which was established in December 2001 by the United Nations Security Council. Their objective was to assist in rebuilding institutions and train Afghan security forces in addition to combat operations. NATO member states contribute personnel[ii].

Japan

Under ISAF Japan was the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRR) lead. They provided two thirds of the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) budget and began implementing DDR even though they lack history and experience in such programs. Worked under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)[iii].

Germany

Under ISAF Germany oversaw police reform where they focused on extensive training for police officers of select rank[iv].

United States

The US led the invasion of Afghanistan in fall 2001 with support of NATO allies. They remained to rebuild and reform under the directives of various United Nations, NATO, and ISAF missions in addition to their own organizations. They directed training of the Afghan National Army and eventually became the de facto leader of police reform by 2007[v].

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

Created by the United States Congress they independently audit and oversee reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Their aim is to ensure effective use of resources and prevent abuse through investigations and inspections. SIGAR has uncovered corruption within security sector reform[vi].

United Nations Development Program – Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (UNDP-DIAG)

Created in 2005 under the directive of the Afghan New Beginnings Program UNDP-DIAG focused on DDRR of illegitimate armed organizations who were neglected in the Japanese led DDRR, which solely focused on the Afghan National Army (ANA)[vii].

United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan

A UN mission at the request of the Afghanistan Government to support the creation of sustainable peace though respect of human rights, rule of law, and good governance[viii].

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE provides assistance for counter-narcotics operations, border security, and police training at the request of the Government of Afghanistan. Additional work is done by sponsoring experts to oversee developed of democratic institutions to protect human rights[ix].

Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization (ANHDO)

Operating in seven provinces they aim to build a strong agricultural industry to increase national living standards. Funded by the European Union their mission may be viewed as an attempt to provide alternatives to rural opium production[x].

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[i] NATO. "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan." NATO. July 18, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

[ii] NATO. "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified September 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

[iii] Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

[iv] Ayub Fatima, Sari Kouvo, Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

[v] Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi/10.1177/002088171204800103.

[vi] "About SIGAR." Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1.

[vii] Major Selber, “A Question of ‘Government’”, 346

[viii] United Nations. "Mission Statement." United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/mission-statement.

[ix] "Afghanistan and the OSCE." Organization for Security and Co-Operation Europe. Last modified December 1, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.osce.org/mc/87191.

[x] Weqar, Khaksar. "Vision, Mission, and Long-term Goals." Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization. Last modified August 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://anhdo.org.af/?p=728.

Barriers to Successful Reform

Corruption

Corruption impacts the legitimacy and effectiveness of political and legal institutions. Individuals will not defer to Afghan institutions if they do not believe their request will be honoured in a straight-forward manner. For example, the Taliban have developed an extensive judicial network in parallel with the state judicial system. Rural Afghans hold greater trust in the Taliban’s judicial system to “solve disputes in a fair way…without having to pay bribes”[i]. Bribes are a part of everyday life in Afghanistan and is compounded by the widespread acceptance of patronage and nepotism. Aid, resources and money routinely go missing. Nearly $1 billion USD has disappeared from Kabul Bank[ii].

The ANP and ANA specifically struggle with ‘ghost soldiers’, which is yet to be addressed in SSR. There are thousands of individuals in the ANP and ANA who do not exist. Commanders are inflating personnel numbers and collecting payments for the non-existent ‘ghost soldiers’. Security sectors still struggle with lack of verified and coordinated data to accurately determine personnel numbers. The discrepancy between payments to ‘ghost soldiers’ and actual personal is in the thousands[iii]. The resources of and trust in the Afghan government are being drained.

It is characterized by the absence of public institutions. Those that do exist lack strong tools to implement their directives and prevent corruption. Informal power-holders through the wars have maintained their positions of privilege; therefore, they have resisted attempts to formalize and consolidate legitimate power. Addressing corruption is necessary for national survival as it “undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to humanity to flourish”[iv]. In 2018, President Ghani’s administration implemented a new anti-corruption strategy, except the reforms are yet to have any tangible impact and have glossed over the political economic dimensions of corruption. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has questioned the government’s ability to adequately implement the strategy and have a long-term commitment. They accuse the government of not taking “Action against public officials who violate internal codes of ethics, while simultaneously failing to protect reformers and whistle-blowers from reprisal, a climate of corruption will endure”[v].

Centralization of power

Control of territory dictates who collaborates, instead of the ideology of the population. If individuals feel insecure and risk punishment they will not collaborate with the legitimate Afghan forces. The Afghan government holds almost no de factor power outside of Kabul. It limits their ability to effectively institute nationwide change and is a result of the rewarding militia commanders, who sided with ISAF coalition forces, key ministry positions in a power sharing agreement[vi]. The weak interim government and the international community’s decision to defer to ministry leaders (who were militia commanders and warlords) institutionalized the traditional responsibility of tribal alliances and militias for security.

Top-down reforms focused on a Kabul centralized government and its strengthening. It did not address legitimacy of regional governments and institutions. They lacked coherence and long-term vision, only focusing on the short-term while simultaneously attempting to be far-reaching and specific[vii].

Thus, security, governance e, and upholding rule of law is shared between the central government and traditional local power structures. They exist in parallel, but results in a fragmented state as local power structure contest the supreme power of the central governance. The tribal governance lacks a formal legal basis, yet it is the primary source of authority throughout much of Afghanistan[viii]. There was never one coherent nationwide peacebuilding mission, which left the fledging regime without the needed coercive power to persuade others of their supreme legitimacy outside of Kabul.

On-going insurgencies

Afghanistan is still yet to reach a negative peace. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ) insurgency is ongoing with them holding significant portions of the country. Additionally, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) has developed branches in Eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan. Former Taliban and AQ leaders have pledged allegiance to ISIL-KP, challenging current Taliban and AQ factions in their traditional rural Afghan strongholds like Helmand, Nangarhar, and Herat. ISIL-KP and the Taliban are in open conflict[ix]. The insurgencies are transnational as they somewhat freely move across the poorly secured Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which increases counter-insurgency (COIN) difficulties.

Afghanistan has been in an almost constant state of war since 1978 and the Soviet-Afghan War. The main actors and ideology has simply evolved over time, but an entire generation does not know negative peace. All-encompassing societal reforms are almost impossible as the on-going insurgencies prevent their spread across the country. The legitimate government does not have the power nor resources needed to dedicate to reforms, even with the aid of the international community, and instead more is consistently being diverted to COIN.

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[i] Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

[ii] Afghanistan's Fight against Corruption: From Strategies to Implementation. May 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. P.6. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_from_strategies_to_implementation-14_may_2018.pdf.

[iii] Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). P.7 Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf.

[iv] Afghanistan’s Fight against Corruption, 2018, p.7

[v] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. Report no. 18-51-AR. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts. Government Publishing Office, 2018. P.41 Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-51-AR.pdf.

[vi] Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 350. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

[vii] Ayub, Fatima, Sari Kouvo, and Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009. P.7

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

[viii] Ayub, Kouvo, and Wareham, “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform”, p.11

[ix] Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed." Connections 16, no. 1: 37-49. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://connections-qj.org/article/islamic-state-enters-al-qaedas-old-hotbed-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

Brief analysis of success

Overall it is very difficult to claim that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan was successful. Casualties from the conflict are going against global trends by rising every year, and large portions of the country are still highly contested war-zones between the Taliban and the Afghan Government[i]. However, it would be incorrect to label the SSR a complete failure as there have been some significant tangible successes from the program.

In terms of positive peace, there are some successes to highlight. Literacy, a major target of the positive peace reforms, has improved from 31% in 2011 to 38%[ii] in 2018 through direct education of the Afghan Police as well as programs to educate the civilian population. However, a contrast between male and female education still exist. According to Human Rights Watch, “only 37 percent of adolescent girls are literate, compared to 66 percent of adolescent boys. Among adult women, 19 percent are literate compared to 49 percent of adult men”[iii]. The Afghan Police, once a male-only police force, is now 2% women (a 38% increase since 2014)[iv]. While this is obviously a small fraction of the entire police force, it still represents a step in the direction of equal gender representation. Girls and women have been able to receive education, something that was illegal under the Taliban regime, where now there are 71 girls for every 100 boys in primary school[v]. The Afghan infrastructure also received a boost, access to electricity has increased by 30% and the UNDP has been funding the construction of micro-hydroelectric power plants[vi].

Unfortunately, in terms of positive peace, there are many reasons to be concerned for the region. Afghanistan still ranks among the worst countries for girls to get an education because many are unable to finish school due in part to the young age at which girls are married[vii]. Ethnic tension is still very high with violence between groups not uncommon. Many warlords still operate throughout the country but now with the U.S.-led coalition’s approval through their positions in the Afghan Local Police, and these same warlords have been accused by the Human Rights Watch of serious abuse against civilians[viii].

There have also been encouraging results from the negative peace building aspects of the SSR. Through the UNDP Afghan New Beginnings Programme, the militias handed over almost 9,000 heavy weapons and tens of thousands of small/medium weapons[ix]. Through the UNDP Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Programme tens of thousands of soldiers/militias were disarmed and disbanded and received varying levels of reintegration and rehabilitation[x].

However, in terms of negative peace, the SSR was largely a failure. The Taliban have inflicted devastating casualties on the Afghan security forces, more than 28,000 from

2015-2018[xi]. The Afghan government only controls 53.8% of the districts which include 63.5% of the population[xii]. Of further concern, is that the casualty statistics and amount of territory controlled by the Taliban are on an upwards trend which indicates that the Afghan government’s fight is far from over.

In conclusion, while there are islands of hope it is largely in a sea of despair. SSR in Afghanistan is far from a success story, and as coalition forces contemplate a complete pullout of the country, many fear that the worst days still lie ahead. Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous and least-developed countries in the world, and there are few signs of that changing any time soon.

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[i] Karen, McVeigh. "Afghanistan Bucks Global Trend with Sharp Rise in Civilian Casualties." The Guardian. January 11, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/11/afghanistan-bucks-global-trend-with-sharp-rise-in-civilian-casualties.

[ii] World Bank Group. "Primary Education, Pupils." The World Bank Data. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRL?locations=AF&view=chart.

[iii] Paula, Bronstein. "I Won't Be a Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick" | Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan." Human Rights Watch. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-afghanistan.

[iv] "Building Gender Equality in the Afghanistan Police Force." GAC. December 17, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2018/afghanistan_police_equality-afghanistan_police_egalite.aspx?lang=eng.

[v] Ruby, Mellen. "Afghanistan Ranks Among the Worst Places for Girls to Get an Education." Foreign Policy. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/afghanistan-ranks-worst-places-girls-to-get-an-education-africa/.

[vi] “About Afghanistan." UNDP in Afghanistan. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/countryinfo/#Introduction.

[vii] “About Afghanistan”

[viii] Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local Police." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2015. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police.

[ix] Amin, Tarzi."Disarmament in Afghanistan: which Militias and What Weapons?" ReliefWeb. April 20, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/disarmament-afghanistan-which-militias-and-what-weapons.

[x] United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG): Annual Project Report, 2010. Available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/445~v~United_Nations_Development_Programme_Afghanistan_Disbandment_of_Illegal_Armed_Groups__DIAG_.pdf

[xi] Rod, Nordland, and Fahim Abed. "Afghan Military Deaths Since 2015: More Than 28,000." The New York Times. November 15, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/asia/afghanistan-military-death-toll.html.

[xii] Rod, Nordland."Afghan Government Control Over Country Falters, U.S. Report Says." The New York Times. January 31, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-territory-control.html.

Primary texts and documents

A joint report by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” February 3, 2013. Available from https://www.fpri.org/docs/ReformingAfghanNationalPolice.pdf

Afghanistan Agreements: A Collection of Official Texts from 2001 to 2011. Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2012. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afghanistan_Agreements_June2012.pdf.

Afghanistan's Fight against Corruption: From Strategies to Implementation. May 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_from_strategies_to_implementation-14_may_2018.pdf.

Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (2016) (statement of John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf.

"Building Gender Equality in the Afghanistan Police Force." GAC. December 17, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/stories-histoires/2018/afghanistan_police_equality-afghanistan_police_egalite.aspx?lang=eng.

Federal Ministry of the Interior. "The German Police Project Team in Afghanistan." Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. September 25, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-node.html.

Furtos, Reka. “Sharp Drops in Opium Poppy Cultivation, Price of Dry Opium in Afghanistan, Latest UNODC Survey Reveals.” United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. November 19, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Kubota Makiko, Nami Takashi, Mayesha Alam, Anna Applebaum, Briana Mawby. Strengthening the Afghan National Policies: Recruitment and Retention of Women Officers. Japan International Cooperation Agency. Available from https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/l75nbg00000697z9-att/Case_Study_on_Afghanistan.pdf

LTC Lewis D. Troy. “Training the Afghan National Army: A Monograph.” United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies. United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545579.pdf

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. Report no. 18-51-AR. Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Efforts. Government Publishing Office, 2018. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-18-51-AR.pdf.

United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG):Annual Project Report, 2010. Available from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/445~v~United_Nations_Development_Programme_Afghanistan_Disbandment_of_Illegal_Armed_Groups__DIAG_.pdf

Annotated Bibliography

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Hurray for Militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience." Small Wars & Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (2016): 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169.

Vanda Felbab-Brown is an American expert on international and internal organized crime. She is a Brookings Institute senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program. Felbab-Brown drew from over a decade of fieldwork in Afghanistan on militias. Afghanistan has legitimized and institutionalized local militias through the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which may prolong direct conflict especially as the government attempts greater regulation of irregular forces. The forces tend to be abusive and have contributed to greater insecurity and instability across the country. The accepted of militias has developed the international community looks for inexpensive yet effective methods of securitization. It demonstrates how Mark Sedra’s work on Afghanistan’s slide towards expediency in 2006 is still relevant.

Kamminga, Jorrit. "From Disengagement to Regional Opium War? Towards a Counter-Narcotics Surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan." UNISCI Discussion Papers 29 (2012): 91-112. http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/view/40662/38984.

Since 2005 Dr. Jorrit Kamminga has conducted extensive field research in Afghanistan, and is the previous director of the International Council on Security and Development (an international think tank focusing on conflict zones including Afghanistan. Dr. Nazia Hussain is a Postdoctoral fellow at the United Nations Center for Policy Research. The article outlines how the Afghan forces are unprepared as foreign troops are pulled out. The international community’s commitment to Afghanistan is waning and the state’s security infrastructure will suffer. A focus is placed on how conflict may increase as counter-narcotic efforts break down in the wake of transition to Afghan power. It highlights the much-needed work that must be done to achieve greater negative peace before structural violence may be addressed in addition to how the weak border security may exacerbate the problem. Efforts to confront structural violence rooted in economic inequalities would be beneficial towards counter-narcotics policies, which both the paper and ISAF failed to address.

Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

Major William Selber of the United States Air Force (USAF) is currently a commander of Detachment 2, 18^th Intelligence Squadron at Osan Air Base, Korea, but previously deployed to Afghanistan multiple times as a US Central Command foreign area officer. These included working on provincial reconstruction and police transition teams. The article explores how and why the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement has failed even though reconciliation and reintegration is important to tribal cultures of Afghanistan. DDRR was poorly designed and implemented before the end of an insurgency; therefore, not enough territory was controlled to create incentive to give up arms. Parties still felt insecure, which is why DDRR is usually executed after a peace agreement, not before like in the case of Afghanistan.

Murray, Tonita. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process.” International Studies 48, no. 1 (January 2011): 43–63. https://doi/10.1177/002088171204800103.

Tonita Murray is the former gender advisor and senior adviser to the Minister of Interior of Afghanistan. She is currently a consultant at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. From 2003 to 2008 Murray experienced the successes and failures of security sector reform first hand, which gives the article a unique perspective from an individual who was attempting to make change. She points to on-going insurgencies, lack of leadership capabilities, and non-existent vision of transition to Afghan control of Afghan forces as the major flaws in security sector reform. It cumulates in the international community postulating what they think Afghanistan needs, rather than Afghanistan articulating their wants. Written in 2011 the article looked forward to the 2014 Afghan security and political transition. The ANSF has seen assumed greater responsibilities and there has been a formation of a democratically elected government; however, Murray’s observations are still relevant in the post-transition era.

Petersohn, Ulrich. “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. July 25, 2015. Available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228396821_Outsourcing_the_Big_Stick_The_Consequences_of_Using_Private_Military_Companies

Dr. Ulrich Petersohn is a Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor in International Politics at the University of Liverpool. The working paper submitted to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University outlines the negative consequences on state governments when Private Military Companies (PMCs) are utilized and authorized in the security sector. It provides necessary background to why Afghanistan is experiencing a lack of belief in the state’s monopoly on power. An unprecedented number of PMCs are and have operated in Afghanistan They have undermined security sector reform efforts, which is explained in how PMCs erode accountability, democratic principles, and transparency

Sedra, Mark. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency.” International Peacekeeping. 13:1, 94-110. 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424868

Mark Sedra is an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, focusing on state building and peacebuilding. The article is rooted in the belief that security sector reform (SSR) is neglecting import building blocks of long-term sustainability and stability in exchange for maximizing momentary security force effectiveness. Thus, he concludes that SSR is aiming to become convenient, and possibly improper, while forgoing the original holistic visions and approaches to entrench accountability and democratic governance. Written in 2006 the information is relevant to understand why specific events have occurred. Sedra pointed to Afghan ownership of SSR as the key to its success, which has still failed to be implemented across the country.

Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. "Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda's Old Hotbed." Connections 16, no. 1: 37-49. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://connections-qj.org/article/islamic-state-enters-al-qaedas-old-hotbed-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

Dr. Mona Kanwal Sheikh is a research coordinator and senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Her expertise is in the Taliban, and transnational jihad (Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State movement). Connections is a quarterly peer reviewed open-access journal covering scholarly topics related to conflict, defense, and security. The article exams the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) in opposition to the ‘old’ movements of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ), which are both still active. The majority of the article examines the ideological characteristics of ISIL-KP, AQ, and the Taliban; however, it is relevant to security sector reform as it demonstrates that Afghanistan is still experiencing an ongoing and evolving insurgency that SSR must address.

Simms M. Daniel, Toby W. Waine & John C. Taylor (2017) “Improved estimates of opium cultivation in Afghanistan using imagery-based stratification”, International Journal of Remote Sensing, 38:13, 3785-3799. https://doi.org/10.1080/01431161.2017.1303219

Dr. Daniel M. Simms is a research fellow in remote sensing and GIS at Cranfield University in the Department of Environmental Science and Technology; Dr. Toby Waine is a senior lecturer in applied remote sensing in the Centre for Environment and Agricultural Informatics at Cranfield University; and John C. Taylor completed the analysis of opium cultivation in Afghanistan based on the United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (UNDOC) and United States Government remote sensing data. There are discrepancies in data, which is attribute to the difficulty to accurately discern locations and rates of cultivation due to insecurity. The article identified where majority of opium cultivation occurs (Helmand province). The remote sensing data of where cultivation occurs is similar to regions of Afghanistan where the government holds no de facto power. It gave additional background to how the key issue of opium needs to be addressed in security sector reform, and which rural areas must be targeted.

Full bibliography

"About SIGAR." Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.sigar.mil/about/index.aspx?SSR=1.

"Afghan Warlords Maintain Grip on Power in Rural Provinces." BBC News. November 27, 2012. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-20516013/afghan-warlords-maintain-grip-on-power-in-rural-provinces.

"Afghanistan and the OSCE." Organization for Security and Co-Operation Europe. Last modified December 1, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.osce.org/mc/87191.

Ayub, Fatima, Sari Kouvo, and Rachel Wareham. “Afghanistan Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” The International Center for Transitional Justice. April 2009

Available from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Security-Reform-2009-English.pdf

Bronstein, Paula. ""I Won't Be a Doctor, and One Day You'll Be Sick" | Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan." Human Rights Watch. October 17, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-afghanistan.

Central Intelligence Agency. "Afghanistan." The World Factbook. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Chughtai, Alia. "Afghanistan: Who Controls What." Afghanistan | Al Jazeera. October 19, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html.

"Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Programme." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/youth-and-adult-education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-iii/.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Afghanistan's Opium Production Is through the Roof-why Washington Shouldn't Overreact." Brookings. November 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/21/afghanistans-opium-production-is-through-the-roof-why-washington-shouldnt-overreact/.

Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Illiteracy Persists among Afghan Troops despite US Education Drive." The Guardian. January 28, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/illiteracy-afghan-troops-us-education.

Gharib, Malaka. "'This Is Not The Way': Afghan Women Push Back On U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks." NPR. March 05, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/700173721/this-is-not-the-way-afghan-women-push-back-on-u-s-taliban-peace-talks.

Gross, Eva. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The EU's contribution.” The European Institute for Security Studies. April 2009. Available from https://issat.dcaf.ch/sqi/content/download/8823/83148/file/european%20union%20institute%20for%20security%20studies.pdf

Greenfield, Victoria A., Craig A. Bond, and Keith Crane. "A Household Model of Opium-Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan." Journal of Policy Modeling 39, no. 5 (2017): 741-761.

"History MCN." History MCN - Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Accessed March 30, 2019. http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/1835/history-mcn.

Hartzell, A. Caroline. “Missed Opportunities The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan.” The United States Institute of Peace. April 2011. Available from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR270-Missed_Opportunities.pdf

Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.

Mansfield, David. “Turning deserts into flowers: settlement and poppy cultivation in southwest Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly. 39:2, 331-349. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1396535

Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. “Warlords As Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/warlords_as_bureaucrats.pdf

Nato. "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan." NATO. July 18, 2018. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm.

NATO. "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified September 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

"Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit." NATO Resolute Support | Ministry of Defense Takes Command of Police Unit. March 27, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://rs.nato.int/news-center/feature-stories/2018-feature-stories/ministry-of-defense-takes-command-of-police-unit.aspx.

Mashal, Mujib. "U.S. Plan for New Afghan Force Revives Fears of Militia Abuses." The New York Times. September 15, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/world/asia/afghan-local-police.html.

Major Selber, William. “A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 344-366. 2018. https://doi/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433514

"National Military Academy of Afghanistan." Military School Directory. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://militaryschooldirectory.com/afghanistan-national-military-academy/.

Nordland, Rod, and Fahim Abed. "Afghan Military Deaths Since 2015: More Than 28,000." The New York Times. November 15, 2018. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/asia/afghanistan-military-death-toll.html.

Nordland, Rod. "Afghan Government Control Over Country Falters, U.S. Report Says." The New York Times. January 31, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-territory-control.html.

Pike, John. "Military." DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ddr.htm.

Simms M. Daniel, Toby W. Waine & John C. Taylor (2017) Improved estimates of opium cultivation in Afghanistan using imagery-based stratification, International Journal of Remote Sensing, 38:13, 3785-3799. https://doi.org/10.1080/01431161.2017.1303219

Sedra, Mark. “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency.” International Peacekeeping. 13:1, 94-110. 2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424868

State of Affairs: Three Years after Nisoor Square: Accountability and Oversight of U.S. Private Security and Other Contractors. September 2010: 3 Accessed March 28, 2019. http://www.ciaonet.org/record/21700?search=1.

The World Literacy Foundation “The Economic & Social Cost of Illiteracy: A snapshot of illiteracy in a global context.” August 24, 2015. Available from https://worldliteracyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WLF-FINAL-ECONOMIC-REPORT.pdf

Tarzi, Amin. "Disarmament in Afghanistan -- Which Militias and What Weapons? - Afghanistan." ReliefWeb. April 20, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/disarmament-afghanistan-which-militias-and-what-weapons.

The Future of the Afghan Local Police. Asia Report no. 268. June 5, 2015. Accessed March 29, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

"The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative." The Northern Alliance (or United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan - UIFSA) Narrative | START.umd.edu. October 25, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/northern-alliance-or-united-islamic-front-salvation-afghanistan-uifsa.

United Nations. "Mission Statement." United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://unama.unmissions.org/mission-statement.

"USAID Improves Livelihoods for Afghan Women through Credit Shura [EN/Dari/PS] - Afghanistan." ReliefWeb. March 6, 2019. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/usaid-improves-livelihoods-afghan-women-through-credit-shura-endarips.

Weqar, Khaksar. "Vision, Mission, and Long-term Goals." Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization. Last modified August 21, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2019. http://anhdo.org.af/?p=728.

World Bank Group. "Primary Education, Pupils." The World Bank Data. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRL?locations=AF&view=chart.

Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl, Thruelsen Jonathan, Vaccaro Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady. “The Long March Building an Afghan National Army.” The National Defense Research Institute. 2009. Available from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf

Zimmerman, and S. Rebecca. "Is It a Good Idea to Privatize the War in Afghanistan?" RAND Corporation. August 04, 2017. Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/is-it-a-good-idea-to-privatize-the-war-in-afghanistan.html.