1. Land ownership, inequality, and appalling living conditions of the peasantry in rural areas - One of the main historical causes of La Violencia is precisely such issues of imbalanced land ownership and underdevelopment of rural areas(1). A 2011 UNDP report recorded 1,1% of the total population owns 50% of Colombia´s land(2), making Colombia one of the most unequal countries in land distribution. This inequality fuelled leftist factions in Colombian society to rebel and have continued to do so today.

2. Political participation (including former FARC members and grassroots organizations and marginalized communities) - After the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC-EP, the creation of new political parties comprised of previously marginalized groups has allowed them to express their political, social, and economic concerns through official institutions and mechanism. FARC in this process have also transformed from an insurgent group to a political party, as legitimized by the Peace Agreement. The government is committed to guaranteeing transparency in electoral processes and the creation of a discourse of peace and inclusion, although this is not without public backlash given the inclusion of former perpetrators of violence(3).

3. Ceasing of hostilities, guarantees of security, and the reincorporation of ex-fighters into civil life - The DDRR and SSR processes triggered by the Peace Agreement and starting with the ceasefire are controversial especially regarding the reincorporation of ex-combatants to society and the guarantee of security in a new stage of coexistence. With help from the United Nations and funding from foreign governments, the Colombian Government designed specific programs and policies to achieve sustainable reintegration and give legitimacy to its practices, with the UN Verification Mission acting as monitor. The below sections will provide detailed explanations of the barriers to successfully implementing some of these projects.

4. Drug trafficking and the ineffective prohibition of illicit crops - In tackling agrarian issues, the government proposed new rural economic development initiatives through the National Comprehensive Substitution Program for Illicit Crops. This is targeted to eliminate a key source of income for FARC, which previously depended heavily on the production and sales of illicit crops for profit. To further combat profits made from drug trafficking and production, the government created a new drug policy in which to some extent, the use of drugs is decriminalized, transforming drug use to an issue of health and not one of criminality(4).

5. Victims and justice - One of the hallmark achievements of the Agreement was the birth of the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Repair, and Non-Repetition for the purpose of achieving some justice for the victims, guaranteeing legal security, and contributing to reconciliation and avoiding a repetition of crimes committed in this longterm conflict. The System creates a search unit for missing persons, effectively integrating reconciliation while strengthening a sense of security of communities(5).

Endnotes

1 Colombian government. General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016, 12-34.
2 Eduardo Sánchez and Vicente Sánchez. "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, 370.
3 Ibid. 57-97.
4 Ibid. 98-123.
5 Ibid. 124-143.

1. Government of Colombia - Once elected President from 2010 to 2018, Juan Manuel Santos broke with the previous President Álvaro Uribe Vélez´s discourse and started exploratory dialogues with the FARC. In October 2012, Santos announced the start of formal negotiations in Oslo(1), and that he was willing to negotiate historically ignored clauses in previous peace processes(2).

2. Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) - FARC, the main actor in Colombia's civil war, has carried more political and military weight than other guerrilla groups, as well as it has governed vast swaths of territory. Moreover, FARC prompted the rise of other counterinsurgency and paramilitary forces, such as the United Self-Defense Forces(3).

3. The Democratic Center (right wing, Catholic opposition party) - The party with support from the former president, Alvaro Uribe were part of the “No” campaign, which won the plebiscite on Sunday 2 October by a margin of 0.4 per cent. They pushed the government to include some of their demands, which were reflected in the New Final Agreement signed on 12 November and approved by Congress on 1 December(4).

4. Bandas Criminales (BACRIMs) - coined by the former President Álvaro Uribe, the BACRIMs is an umbrella term describing organized crime organization and insurgent groups not linked to FARC. For example, the paramilitary group and main rival to FARC, ELN is a part of BACRIMs(5).

5. National Liberation Army (ELN) - The triumph of the Cuban Revolution caused the expansion of communist movements in Latin America and influenced the creation of the National Liberation Army” in Colombia in 1964. It was a group formed by student and young activists who were trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba(6).

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 10.
2 Pedro Valenzuela. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation". Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, 213.
3 Carranza-Franco 87.
4 Ibid. p. 11.
5 David Maher and Andrew Thomson. “A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia”. Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, 2248.
6 Carranza-Franco 42.

1. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia - The Final Peace Agreement in 2016 specified that the UN should be responsible for monitoring and verifying the DDRR process in Colombia. This includes verification on a community, local, regional, as well as national level(1).

2. Government of the United States of America - Although not directly involved in negotiations, the US played a role in supporting it through the appointment of a special US delegate to the peace process and a $450 million dollar per year aid to Colombia for post-conflict development(2).

3. Government of Norway - Norway acted as a guarantor and played a key role in the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC in the period 2010-2016. It was already involved in former peace processes in 1998-2000(3).

4. Government of Cuba - Acted as key guarantors with Norway and Havana was the first site of the secret exploratory meeting. Both Cuba and Norway continued to be involved in the peace process from secret preparatory talks (2010–2011), to secret exploratory talks (2012); and formal, public negotiations (2012–2016)(4).

5. Government of Venezuela - A companion to the negotiations, showed notable support in the earlier years of secret talks between the FARC and Colombian government. Former Hugo Chávez especially joined the Government of Cuba and advocated for a negotiated settlement(5).

6. Government of Chile - Also a facilitator with Venezuela, it is commitment to the process of monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreements, hence its continued commitment in supporting exploratory peace talks between Colombia and another major rebel army, ELN, after the success of the FARC-EP agreement(6).

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 11.
2 Ibid.
3 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. NORAD Evaluations Department, 2018, p. 5.
4 Ibid. p. 21.
5 Carranza-Franco 74.
6 "Chile to host Colombia peace talks". Euronews, 21 April. 2018.

1. Exclusion of other armed groups in peace deal
The Colombian Government's main obstacle is its inability to withhold its guarantee of security for the demobilized guerrillas and political actors. The peace accord does not concern other armed groups; therefore, the BACRIMs still spoils peace with kidnappings and assassinations of those partaking in DDRR. To jeopardize the process, they directly target FARC members or deter people from getting involved in politics in general. Many FARC rebels have expressed concerns for their safety after/during disarmament since forty assassinations of demobilizing FARC members occurred just after the signing of the deal(1). Also, the FARC as a political party remains a target as its former self was during the violent campaign against the Unión Patriótica in 1980(2).

2. Dissenting FARC members slipping back into violence
FARC dissidents who were either unsatisfied with the peace deal, not participating in demobilization, or unwilling to complete the DDRR process harms successful reintegration(3), increases the risk of these outliers being recruited by illegal armed groups still active in Colombia, and creating even more difficulties for the Government to include them effectively in reintegration.

3. Stigmatization of former FARC members
The fighters’ reintegration in society seem to be the most challenging step of the DDRR process since almost half of Colombia's population which voted NO in the 2016 referendum still view the FARC as criminal group rather than a political party. The goal of the above-mentioned referendum was to involve civil society in legitimizing the agreement, but it failed because a big part of the population sees voting YES to the deal as a vote for impunity and that this would recognize the violent FARC as a legitimate political entity(4). The population's attitude towards the fighters need to change for further successful reintegration.

4. Cleavages in the transitional justice framework
The process of DDRR within the transitional justice framework is still an issue that polarizes public opinion. For many people, the only acceptable condition to accept former combatants in their communities is for them to undergo criminal trials and receive deprivations of liberty. Many think that amnesty will not change the fact that FARC members committed heinous crimes. If those who committed severe crimes do not even qualify for amnesty, these criminals 'benefit' from receiving alternative penalties (which are viewed by the public as too light)(5). Thus, the decision to adopt a lenient approach has been cited as an attempt to foster impunity.

4. Gendered violence and the government's lack of response
The protection mechanisms for women are weak because they have not been able to avoid the increased risk of gender-based violence inside the Transitory Zones of Normalization (TZN) and in the former territories of the FARC. The fact that the gender approach has not been taken into account in the physical adaptation of TZN has situated many pregnant women and their children in precarious conditions(6). Aside from some cases of gender-based violence inflicted by former FARC members, the BACRIMs and other paramilitaries allegedly perpetrated most cases of sexual violence against women since the demobilization of the FARC. One main reason for this is that the social control of a territory is interpreted as the control of women(7).

Endnotes

1 David Maher and Andrew Thomson. “A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia.” New ed., 39 vols. (2018) 2151.
2 Germán Pataquiva. “FARC, Origins and Evolution.” (UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 19, 2009) 166.
3 Francesca Capone. “An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?” Global Jurist. 2017, p. 7.
4 María Teresa Aya. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.”, Estudios internacionales (Santiago), new ed., 49 vols. (2018) 177.
5 Ibid.
6 Kroc Institute. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia, (Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz Universidad de Notre Dame, 2017) 15.
7 Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. La reintegración: logros en medio de rearmes y dificultades no resueltas, (2010) 229.

The SSR and DDRR process triggered by the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC in comparison to those in the history of the conflict-ridden state is arguably productive, albeit existing problems with spoilers and assassinations, amongst others. The success following 2016 is achieved largely due to the inclusivity, localization, and development orientation of the DDRR and SSR policy (1).

The first tangible achievement of the Peace Agreement is the disarmament of FARC members, as in total, 11,049 ex-combatants have demobilized (2). Their reintegration to society has been largely successful, as supported by the creation of the Transitory Zones of Normalization and diverse training and economic programs. By 2018, 20 collective income-generating projects had been implemented, helping 1,340 former combatants achieve economic success (3). The agrarian issue, one of the main historical causes of the conflict, is being solved through the re-partition of land and various productive programs to support the development of rural communities, reducing the inequality gap between the rural and the urban. This is closely related to the positive progress of the Substitution Program for Illicit Crops, which supports sustainable and legal farming practices and discourages Colombia’s former development model based on cultivating illicit crops. By December 2018, approximately 32,929 out of 51,721 hectares of coca have been eradicated voluntarily and 9,096 families have benefited from the program (4).

The key issue of political participation has been put into practice with the creation of new political parties, which included not only FARC (as a political party) but other grassroots movements as well. Today, FARC hold eight seats in Congress, five in the Chamber of Representatives and four in the Senate (5). Furthermore, elections have been carried out in a more transparent and inclusive manner in comparison to past practices. Regarding transitional justice, the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition has been established since November 2018 to promote reconciliation between the Colombian society and former guerrilla fighters, and to address cases of missing family members (6). The Commission has yet to deliver its findings due to the recency of events, however it is notable to highlight the gendered approach to truth and reconciliation, with focus on the victims and their individualized narratives of victimization (7). In fact, the gender-based approach is written into the very Peace Agreement that the entire SSR and DDRR process is based on; putting women’s rights and gender equality at the center of every program birthed during and after the negotiations (8).

Colombia’s hardfought peace with FARC after five decades of conflict is expectedly being challenged by a number of factors. The multiplicity of actors generated a complex dynamic during the implementation process since the participants often have conflicting agendas and interests. Thus, it was difficult to operate an inclusive process that incorporated all civil organizations and communities claiming to be crucial actors in peacebuilding, and at the same time, deal with illegal actors who actively try to sabotage peace because it went against their interests, e.g. Bandas Criminales, paramilitaries, and drug dealers.

Moreover, the Colombian government has yet to overcome formerly overlooked external issues in the peace agreement. The two most worrisome concerns the continued violence of Bandas Criminales (BACRIMs) and the polarization of Colombian society. These issues represent obstacles to the SSR process since they had created other challenges for implementation; the BACRIMs pose the most significant threat to the peace since its bloody assassinations of ex-combatants and activists expose the lack of security guarantees to former FARC members, indigenous peoples, women’s rights and human rights activist in non-state controlled and rural territories (9). Also, the criminalization and stigmatization of former FARC members have impeded their complete integration. Consequently, this leads some former FARC members to defect from the DDRR process and rejoin organized crime groups such as ELN or BACRIMs in furthering the cycle of violence (10).

Historically since the 20th century, many peace processes, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in Colombia started but eventually ended when violence was rekindled by personal attacks and the killing of former combatants (11). Since the agreement’s implementation only started a few years ago, it is too early to inflict a similar forecast onto the current process. On the flip side, many measures bridging ex-FARC fighters back into society are seeing unprecedented progress. Similar to an individual’s reorientation after a conflict, peace requires high commitment from Colombia and its population over the long term. As for 2019, we shall witness whether the above achievements and shortcomings will survive politicization in Colombia’s regional elections come October.

Endnotes

1 Francy Carranza-Franco. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. (New York: Routledge, 2019) 81.
2 Ibid. 12.
3 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia, 26 Dec. 2018 1.
4 Ibid. 4.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Kroc Institute. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia, Nov. 2017 15.
8 Ibid.
9 Francesca Capone. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?", Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 6 Oct. 2017, 6.
10 David Maher and Andrew Thompson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 7 Dec. 2018, 2143.
11 Carranza-Franco 18.

1. General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace. Colombian government. Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. 26 August 2012, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/133811/pdf/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

2. Decree by which the National Comprehensive Substitution Program for illicit crops is created. Presidency of Colombia. 29 May 2017. es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%20896%20DEL%2029%20DE%20MAYO%20DE%202017.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

3. La reintegración: logros en medio de rearmes y dificultades no resueltas. Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. 2010. www.ideaspaz.org/tools/download/52283. Accessed 14 March 2019.

4. “Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia.” Guterres, Antonio. Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. September 2018, https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_colombia_spa.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

5. Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del acuerdo de paz en Colombia. Kroc Institute. November 2017, https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/257593/informe_kroc.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

6. Decree by which the Law 434 of 1998 is modified and the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence is created. Colombian Ministry of the Interior. 26 May 2017. es.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/Dec885_20170526.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

7. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. October, 2018. https://norad.no/contentassets/33fb8fa056be4d2b9b6eadfda9f6b3e1/10.18-evaluation-of-norways-support-to-the-peace-process-in-colombia-20102016.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

8. Final Agreement for Peace, the opportunity of building peace. Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. 24 November 2016. http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

9. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Colombia. United Nations. 26 September, 2017. colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/last_sg_report_on_the_un_mission_in_colombia_eng.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Verification Mission in Colombia. United Nations. 26 December, 2018. colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1845592.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

11. Indigenous women and Colombia’s peace process: pathways to participation. Conciliation Resources. June 2018. https://www.c-r.org/downloads/Indigenous%20women%20and%20Colombia%E2%80%99s%20peace%20process.pdf. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Cantey, Seth, and Correa, Ricardo. "Making Peace: Next Steps in Colombia." Parameters, vol. 47, no. 4, 2017, pp. 85-96.
Cantey chronicles the recent transformation of FARC from a combat group to a political party immediately after the peace agreement. The article starts with a historical overview of Colombia’s civil conflict and gives examples of previously failed attempts at negotiating peace, before describing the success and struggles of the peace accord in Havana, Cuba, particularly from the perspective of the FARC negotiators. This is to point out the move towards positive change in Colombia, as the author puts forward policy recommendations for the US Department of Defence to support the country in its DDRR process.

Carranza-Franco, Francy. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. Routledge, New York, NY; Abingdon, Oxon, 2019.
Centered around empirical analysis and comparative studies of Colombia’s DDR process in the past decade and a half, even when the country is not in a peaceful environment, Carranza-Franco argues in his book, that both the former FARC fighters and the victimized and marginalized local population need to successfully negotiate their citizenship in a post-conflict society in order to achieve sustainable peace.

Capone, Francesca. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?" Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017;2018.
Capone’s paper focuses on the implementation framework for transitional justice set up by the 2016 Peace Agreement, as she asserts the current DDR process satisfies many factors for success comparatively to past efforts. Capone gives an explanation of DDR, outlines Colombia’s history of attempted peace negotiations, provides a description of post-2016 DDR and the role of transitional justice in the process. She sporadically jumps from analyzing general DDR practices to the role of justice and concludes that the current DDR process looks successful on paper despite the challenges ahead with negative public opinions towards ex-FARC fighters during their reintegration.

Smitmans, Aya and Teresa, María. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.” Estudios internacionales (Santiago), vol. 49, no. 187, 2018, pp. 163-179.
The article discusses the challenges to the implementation of the peace agreement, specifically the polarization of the Colombian society after the result of the referendum. Aya points the stigmatization of the former FARC members as the primary cause of the "No" victory. In this, the agrarian issue (including the plantation of drugs in rural areas) played an important factor since it encouraged the formation of a perception of FARC as a criminal group. The author concludes saying that the victory of "NO" was not because the population voted against peace; instead, it was a vote against both impunity and the recognition of the FARC as a political group.

Maher, David, and Thomson, Andrew. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172.
The article presents an investigation that states that paramilitary groups in Colombia can pose a threat to the peace agreement. First, the authors highlight the government posture that denies the existence of paramilitarism and the liability of the criminal bands (BACRIMs) of the perpetration of the post-agreement violence. Second, through quantitative analysis, the investigation claims that the successor paramilitary groups are the key spoiler threat to the peace process by violently targeting demobilized FARC members.

Leech, Garry M. The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. Fernwood, London;New York;Halifax; 2011.
The book studies FARC insurgency since its origins until the present. It starts examining the principal characteristics of the guerrilla, their aims, ideology, and organizational and operational structures. Then, it makes a historical journey, studying how FARC has changed and adapted depending on its relationship with the government in turn and external factor. Finally, it analyzes the possible future of the guerrilla and the opportunity of a peace agreement.

Sánchez Iglesias, Eduardo and Sánchez Jiménez., Vicente "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, pp. 365-387.
The article studies the agrarian issue of the Peace Agreement through a historical examination of its transcendence and analysis of the reforms created to implement the plans established. The article examines the possible impact of such reforms and the degree in which they could accomplish the historical agrarian issue in Colombia.

Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 205-217.
The article analyzes the interplay and contextual factors in which peace negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC takes place, besides it does a comparison with the latest peace negotiations and the reasons of their failure. It studies the correlation of forces, intraparty factors, the public opinion, and the international context.

Amnesty International. “Colombia: Autoridades deben respetar los derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas del Chocó.” November 2018, www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2018/11/colombia-autoridades-deben-respetar-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-del-choco/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Atuesta, Maria. “Colombia's Peace Experiment: 'Collective Reincorporation’.” The Olive Branch, 11 February. 2019, www.usip.org/blog/2019/02/colombias-peace-experiment-collective-reincorporation. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Smitmans, Aya and Teresa, María. “El Proceso de Paz en Colombia: dos pasos adelante, un paso atrás.” Estudios internacionales (Santiago), vol. 49, no. 187, 2018, pp. 163-179.

Cantey, Seth, and Correa, Ricardo. "Making Peace: Next Steps in Colombia." Parameters, vol. 47, no. 4, 2017, pp. 85-96.

Carranza-Franco, Francy. Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship. Routledge, New York, NY; Abingdon, Oxon, 2019.

Capone, Francesca. "An Overview of the DDR Process Established in the Aftermath of the Revised Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC: Finally on the Right Track?" Global Jurist, vol. 17, no. 3, 2017;2018.

Chalaby, Odette. "Colombia’s peace agreement is the world’s first to have gender at its core." Apolitical, 12 January 2018, apolitical.co/solution_article/colombias-peace-agreement-worlds-first-gender-core/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

"Chile to host Colombia peace talks". Euronews, 21 April 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/21/chile-to-host-colombia-peace-talks. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Brown, Kimberly. "Why are former FARC rebels leaving reintegration camps?" Al Jazeera, 29 March 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/farc-rebels-leaving-reintegration-camps-180327141706796.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Daniels, Joe Parkin. "Colombian activists face 'extermination' by criminal gangs." The Guardian, 23 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/23/colombian-activists-face-extermination-by-criminal-gangs. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Diaz, Fabio and Jiménez, Magda. "Colombia’s murder rate is at an all-time low but its activists keep getting killed." The Conversation, 6 April 2018, theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602. Accessed 14 March 2019.

González and Casey. “Colombian Prosecutor Investigating FARC Is Accused of Taking Bribe for Ex-Rebel.” New York Times, 1 March 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/americas/colombia-prosecutor-farc.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Herreño, Juan and Muñoz, Juan. “Radiography of the Plebiscite”. CNN, October, 2016, cnnespanol.cnn.com/2016/10/03/colombia-los-departamentos-con-mas-victimas-votaron-mayoritariamente-si-en-el-plebiscito/. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Human Rights Watch. "Recycled Violence Abuses by FARC Dissident Groups in Tumaco on Colombia’s Pacific Coast". 13 December 2018, www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/13/recycled-violence/abuses-farc-dissident-groups-tumaco-colombias-pacific-coast#. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Leech, Garry M. The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. Fernwood, London;New York;Halifax, 2011.

Maher, David, and Andrew Thomson. "A Precarious Peace? the Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in Colombia." Third World Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2142-2172.

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. “Así es la cedulación para los miembros de las FARC.” March 2017. http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/cedulas-farc-registraduria/index.html. Accessed 14 March 2019.

Pataquiva, Germán. "FARC, Origins and Evolution”. UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 19, 2009, pp. 154.

Sánchez Iglesias, E., and V. Sánchez Jiménez. "La Paz y La Solución Al Problema Del Campo En Colombia: Un Análisis Comparado Entre El Acuerdo De Paz y El Plan Nacional De Desarrollo." Araucaria, no. 39, 2018, pp. 365-387.

Valenzuela, Pedro. "The End of the Armed Conflict in Colombia: A Multiple Causal Factor Explanation." Peace & Change, vol. 43, no. 2, 2018, pp. 205-217.