Military reform

During the conflict, the military wielded immense influence and had a major role in the human rights abuses and genocide of Indigenous communities (1). The subsequent Peace Accords emphasized curbing the military’s power in favour of the civilian government (2). Despite the implementation of some changes, military reform has been slow (3).

Police reform 

Similar to the military, the police force was responsible for significant human rights abuses and genocide of Indigenous communities during the civil war (4). With the Peace Accords, old police forces were removed to create the National Civil Police (5). But this effort has not addressed the long-term issues of corruption, abuse and incompetence (6).

Judicial reform

Guatemala has long struggled with corruption — an important issue since establishing the rule of law is a significant component of peacebuilding (7). In 2006, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) in Guatemala was created to help prosecute serious crimes (8). While this did lead to some improvements, the Guatemalan government withdrew its support in 2019, prompting renewed concerns about corruption (9).

Indigenous rights

83 per cent of the victims of genocide and human rights abuses during the civil war were Mayan (10). Indigenous women also faced significant gender-based violence, with many being survivors of mass rape (11). For security reforms to be effective, they must also take into account this racial tension.

1. J. Mark Ruhl, 55
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Marie-Louise Glebbeek, 431.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Jessica Gramajo
8. “International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.”
9. Sandra Cuffe
10. Christian Tomuschat et al, 13
11. Ibid.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

CSOs have played a key role in leading reforms in the security sector working outside of, but in tandem with, the Guatemalan government — they remain a key dissenting voice in the country. There are thousands of NGOs and community-based organizations in Guatemala that fall under this umbrella, with mandates addressing security sector reform and general social change ranging from organizations that promote land rights and unions to those that defend Indigenous  rights  over  their  culture and access  to  justice (1). According to the report, “a good number of CSOs in Guatemala have matured and have become more professional, and are capable of high level discourse, dialogue and proposition” (2).

Rebel Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG)

A main rebel group (though there were many throughout The final peace agreement between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) signed in 1996 comprised 11 accords that were signed on a range of substantive issues related to SSR (3).

Commission of Historical Clarification

The truth commission borne out of a 1994 agreement, whose job it was to look into the abuses suffered by the Guatemalan population during the armed conflict (especially Indigenous peoples). The commission later created a report called “Guatemala: Memory of Silence” that was explicit and did not shy away from the violent truth (4) (5). 

The Guatemalan Military

The Guatemalan military formed one side of the long-winded civil war; its military and paramilitary units engaged in “kidnapping, torture and executions” during it (6).

National Defence Ministry (Ministerio de la Defensa de la Nación, NDM)

The NDM is the government agency responsible for the military of Guatemala — its training, budget, and policies.

National Civil Police (PNC)

Created following the 1996 Peace Accords, “which prescribed the restructuring of police forces with the goal of strengthening civil power, as well as the role of the Army in a democratic society. As of 2017, the PNC numbered 35,000 personnel with which to guarantee the security of over 16 million Guatemalans” — but this body, too, has been accused of corruption — most notably by the US government (7).

1. Manolo Sánchez et al, 26
2. Ibid
3. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, section 3
4. Commission for Historical Clarification: Charter
5. Christian Tomuschat et al, 13
6. Mireya Navarro
7. “Guatemala SSR Background Note”

International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)

This commission was established by the UN, at the Guatemalan government’s request, to act as an independent international body aiming to investigate “illegal security groups and clandestine security organizations” in the country (1). The establishment of CICIG in 2007 and its subsequent renewal every two years received a great deal of praise. In September 2018 however, President Jimmy Morales announced he would not renew CICIG’s mandate — which ends in September 2019 — to huge international outcry (2).

The UN

The United Nations has played a significant role in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes in Guatemala. The contribution started with the organization’s two-year role in brokering Guatemala’s Peace Accords, which brought not only negative peace but also vision for positive peace in the country (3). This work was carried out under the UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, which includes both a short-term peacekeeping mission and long-term peacebuilding activities (4). Another significant peacebuilding contribution from the UN includes the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, which supports Guatemalan government bodies in prosecuting serious crimes. The commission was created in 2006 by the UN at the request of the then-Guatemalan administration (5). Currently, it’s unclear if this is continuing because the current Guatemalan government just recently withdrew its support for the commission (6).

The European Union

The European Union provides support for Guatemala’s justice reform effort through the Programme for Security and Justice in Guatemala initiative (7). In particular, the six-year program focuses on helping to restructure security and justice institutions, as well as decreasing the level of impunity. The EU contributes €20,000,000 to the program’s operations (8).

The United States

The United States’s main involvement in Guatemala’s security sector reform effort is through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs programming (9). Besides combating narcotics and gang violence, the contribution focuses on training and assisting the National Civil Police; the US also supports the justice reform effort, which ranges from “procedural and institutional changes” to providing “training to prosecutors and judges.” It’s unclear how the US’s recent plan to cut aid to Guatemala would affect this support (10).

1. “International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.”
2. Cuffe
3. “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.”
4. “Guatemala - MINUGUA: Background”
5. Markus Schultze-Kraft, 137
6. Cuffe
7. Soraya Long, 3
8. Ibid
9. “Guatemala.” US Department of State
10. Ibid

Inadequate training of the PNC

The peace accords signed in 1996 between the URNG and President Álvaro Arzú included the abolition of existing peace forces (PN) and the ensuing creation of a new National Civil Police, or Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) (1). Since its creation, the PNC has been understaffed, inadequately trained and has lacked career development for its staff (2). During the peace accords, the Guatemalan government announced that the Spanish Civil Guard would offer training and assistance to the PNC. This decision allowed for the influence of a militarized form of policing to enter the police academy. Consequently, training for new police recruits has included military-style procedures and a great deal of formality and hierarchy (3).

Lack of funding & resources

Police and judicial reforms in Guatemala have suffered severe budgetary cutbacks and a lack of resources, which has led to poor personnel training, insufficient presence in rural areas and widespread, institutionalized corruption across the judicial system (4). Further, recruiting capable instructors to train the PNC has been difficult due to the low wages offered, and has in turn resulted in a reduced quality of training in the police forces (5).

Lack of public confidence in the PNC

Corruption and a lack of professionalism within the Policía Nacional Civil combined with various policing strategies based on dissuasion, containment and violence have created a widespread sense of distrust and a lack of confidence towards the Guatemalan police. This lack of confidence has led many citizens to take justice into their own hands, often using public lynching as a mechanism of justice (6). The Guatemalan government has consequently responded to the PNC’s lack of professionalism by militarizing public security – an action condemned by many at the international level but supported by citizens at the domestic level due to their lack of trust towards police forces (7).

Limitations of the Peace Accords:

While the peace accords signed in 1996 were undoubtedly a step in the right direction, the framework provided did not include sufficient details and steps to indicate the way in which the reform would be implemented (8). Indeed, many scholars have contended that the framework in itself was “overly-ambitious” and suggest that it has been viewed by government officials as a short-term political challenge rather than as a long-term process vital to the future of the country’s fragile democracy (9).

1. Glebbeek, 431
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,” section 3
5. Émilie Noël, 29
6. José Miguel Cruz, 53
7. Noël, 93
8. Glebbeek, 451
9. Susanne Jonas

A 36-year civil war characterized by violence, human rights abuses, authoritarian rule and a national security doctrine militarizing the state was finally put to an end in 1996, when Peace Accords were signed between the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) guerrilla forces and the Guatemalan government under President Álvaro Arzú (1). The Peace Accords were signed on several issues concerning human rights and laid out a solid foundation for extensive security sector reforms. The final draft, titled “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” included the reconstruction and consolidation of the Guatemalan peace force into a new National Civil Police (PNC), military reform and the strengthening and modernization of the justice system (2). A UN Mission (MINUGUA) established by the Security Council in 1994 played a significant role in these peace accords by verifying the implementation of the ensuing security sector reforms between 1996 and 2004 (3). While Guatemala has indeed taken significant steps in the right direction towards security and institutional reform, current high levels of violence, impunity and corruption within the security sector reveal that there is still a long road ahead towards effective SSR in the country.

POLICE REFORM

While the creation of the new Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) was indeed a noteworthy step in the SSR process, poor training, budgetary cutbacks and a lack of staffing and resources have contributed to high rates of corruption within the police academy. A 2017 US Department of State Human Rights Report revealed widespread institutional corruption and detailed various recent instances of human rights abuses, mistreatment and extortion by PNC members (4). Inadequate training of police recruits can partly be traced back to the government’s decision to receive training, counselling and assistance from the Spanish Civil Guard during the establishment of the PNC. As aforementioned, this resulted in a militarized form of policing characterized by violence and dissuasion. Technical skills were often learned during training but rarely used in or incorporated in work routines and operations (5). In December 2010, a National Commission on Police Reform (CNRP) was created as an internal investigation body under the Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) in order to investigate and monitor these government efforts to modernize and strengthen the police forces — however, this too has seen little progress since its establishment (6). Further, concerns of partiality have been raised regarding the CNRP, seeing as the head of the commission is appointed by the president himself (7). Conclusively, on an index measuring the public’s perception of corruption, Guatemala was placed 144^th out of 180 countries (with 1 being the least corrupt), slotting the PNC as among the most corrupt institutions (8).

MILITARY REFORM

Military reform in Guatemala encompasses a twofold transformation: from internal conflict to peace, and from authoritarian to democratic ruling (9). Demilitarization and reform have moved very slowly due to significant resistance from military authorities to comply with the conditions of the Peace Accords (10). Initially under President Arzú’s presidency, the armed forces did reduce both their troop numbers and budget however, they have since expanded and have been heavily involved in public security as part of a government effort to resolve the rampant rates of crime across the country (11). This particular issue of militarizing public security was the subject of a 1999 constitutional referendum asking citizens if they supported the reformation and separation of the military from police forces. Ultimately, the referendum was defeated – a result considered by many to be a significant setback in SSR for the country (12). Currently, the military resumes the constitutional responsibility to maintain internal security and despite MINUGUA protests and explicit violation of the 1996 peace accords, several former military officers (many of whom have been linked to the atrocities committed during the civil war) have been incorporated into the PNC (13). Impunity and corruption run rampant in Guatemala’s armed forces as reflected in countless reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings by military officers combined with an estimated impunity rate of 97% (14).

JUDICIAL REFORM

The establishment of CICIG – the UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala – in 2007 was a significant step in Guatemala’s judicial reform process. The commission was charged with assisting the justice system in prosecuting, investigating and dismantling organized crime groups within the country’s security sector (15). While the CICIG has indeed seen great successes since its inception, a recent announcement from current President Jimmy Morales in September 2018 revealed that he would not renew CICIG’s mandate – a decision that has been met with huge international outcry (16). In addition, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, unfair and often incomplete trials are commonly found in Guatemala. These factors combined with the government’s failure to fully protect witnesses, judicial officials and civil society members from threats or intimidation exacerbate the need for further security sector reform (17). Overall, Guatemala’s justice system requires major improvement in order to successfully prevent Guatemalan citizens from taking justice into their own hands and attributing to the country’s rising levels of crime

1. “Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.”
2. “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society.”
3. “Guatemala SSR Background Note”
4. “Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report,” 1
5. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice”
6. “Guatemala SSR Background Note,” 1
7. Ibid
8. “Guatemala.” Transparency International
9. “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,” section 3
10. Schultze-Kraft, 153
11. Noël, 90
12. Ruhl, 55
13. Noël, 90
14. Gramajo
15. Schultze-Kraft, 153
16. Cuffe
17. “Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report”

Commission for Historical Clarification Agreement: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Guatemala-Charter.pdf

Guatemala: Memory of Silence (the report for the Commission for Historical Clarification): https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/357870-guatemala-memory-of-silence-the-commission-for.html

Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961229_AgreementOnFirmAndLastingPeace.pdf

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1094 (Central America: efforts towards peace): http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1094

Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_960919_AgreementStrengtheningCivilianPower.pdf

Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961212_AgreementOnBasisOfTheLegalIntegrationOfURNG.pdf

Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer (UN document): https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_940623_EstablishmentCommissionClarifyPastHumanRightsViolations.pdf

Agreement on the Creation of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: https://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato/cicig_acuerdo.pdf

Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report (a report by the US’s department of state): https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265802.pdf

Guatemala’s White Paper for Security (El Libro Blanco de Seguridad): https://stcns.gob.gt/docs/2015/Libro_Blanco/Libro-Blanco-de-Seguridad-de-Guatemala.pdf

Brett, Roddy. “Peace without social reconciliation? Understanding the trial of Generals Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez in the wake of Guatemala’s genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, Volume 16, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 285-303. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1186955

Roddy Brett’s paper examines the effect of annulling the trial of general Efraín Ríos Montt, who were found guilty for crimes against humanity. The paper finds that the initial verdict against Montt validated the harrowing experience of the Indigenous communities and victims during the civil conflict, just as much as the annulment’s indication of how Guatemalans still disagreed on historical narrative of the conflict. The paper also notes that Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the verdict due to “pressure from elite economic, political and military actors” is evidence of the lack of rule of law in Guatemala. In general, this discussion shows that while there’s negative peace in Guatemala with the Peace Accords, positive peace has yet to be realized.

Cruz, José Miguel. “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 53, Issue 4, Winter 2011, Pages 1-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41342343

José Miguel Cruz’s paper examines the lower level of violent crimes in Nicaragua versus the higher rates in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In particular, the paper argues that beyond the effects of “war, socioeconomic underdevelopment, and neoliberal structural reforms,” the discussion also has to look at the impacts created by a corrupt state security sector. For instance, many of the new Guatemalan police officers were part of the old militarized police force, which was heavily involved in repressive violence prior to the Peace Accords. This paper shows that structural police reform in Guatemala is needed not only to move on from the repressive state-sponsored violence, but also to guard against contemporary insecurities like gang and drug-related violence.

Glebbeek, Marie-Louise. “Police Reform and the Peace Process in Guatemala: The Fifth Promotion of the National Civilian Police.” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2001, Pages 431-453. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3339023

Marie-Louise Glebbeek’s paper examines the police reform effort under president Alvaro Arzú’s regime between 1996-2000. Like the military, the police was an instrumental part of repressive state violence prior to the Peace Accords. While there was an intention to reform the police force, the paper finds that the Guatemalan government mainly used short-term approaches rather than those would systemically change the structure. In particular, while the government created a new National Civil Police, the hierarchy was still dominated by officers from the old police force and connected with the military. There was also little improvement in the recruitment and training process for the officers. As a result, there were some tangible police reforms in the short term, but they didn’t facilitate long-term changes.

Isaacs, Anita. “At War with the Past? The Politics of Truth Seeking in Guatemala.” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2010, Pages 251–274. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijq005

Alongside security sector reform, a large part of the peacebuilding process has to do with reconciliation. Anita Isaacs’s paper examines the process of truth seeking and reconciliation in post-war Guatemala, in which it finds that both the survivors and perpetrators were unsatisfied with the Commission for Historical Clarification. At the same time, the antagonistic dynamic between those two sides were still being played out during the post-war truth commission, potentially triggering more “polarization and violence.” However, the paper does find the truth commission does energize the Indigenous communities and civil society to push for more reforms. Overall, the case shows that truth commissions might not always deliver restorative justice in the short run but could have long term positive impact on peacebuilding.

Nakaya, Sumie. “Women and Gender Equality in Peace Processes: From Women at the Negotiating Table to Postwar Structural Reforms in Guatemala and Somalia.” Global Governance, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 2003, Pages 459-476. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800497

One half of Sumie Nakaya’s paper examines the roles of women’s groups in fostering gender equality in post-war Guatemala. The paper concludes that while women were able to get a seat at the negotiating table, this initial success didn’t automatically mean there would be systemic change. Instead, a deeper success would require the local community to have long-term and active ownership over the integration of gender equality and peacebuilding process. This finding highlights the need to have track-three diplomacy — especially for the promotion of women’s rights — for the peacebuilding process, instead of just track-one diplomacy.

Noël, Émilie. Weaknesses of Security Sector Reforms in Central America: Excludable Policing Strategies and Violence. 2015. McGill University, Master’s thesis. http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1553569062403~600

With examples from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, Émelie Noël’s paper looks at how weak security sector reform efforts have led to high level of violence. In particular, while Guatemala’s Peace Accords mandate a reduction in the power of the military — which was a major part of state violence — the police force’s low capacity and professional training has maintained the military’s presence. At the same time, there has been little progress in terms of advancing accountability mechanisms for the security forces. Ultimately, weak reforms keep the security sector as an “excludable” good — where it benefits a few and not all groups within society — thus creating distrust in citizens and leading to more violence. Overall, the paper reinforces the importance of strong security sector reforms in facilitating peace in Guatemala.

Ruhl, J. Mark. “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 47, Issue 1, Spring 2005, Pages 55-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4490389

J. Mark Ruhl’s paper touches on an important discussion around military reform in Guatemala. The paper finds that president Alvaro Arzú (1996-2000) was able to secure the military’s acceptance of the Peace Accords, but many important changes weren’t implemented. There was even less reform under President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004), especially as he allied with Efraín Ríos Montt — a former military leader who was later convicted of genocide. The reform picked up steam under President Oscar Berger, but the paper was published soon after he took office so it’s unclear how much progress has been made since. Overall, the paper attributes the lack of reform mainly to “insufficient commitment” from the civilian administration, rather than resistance from the military.

Schultze-Kraft, M. “Security and the Rule of Law in Colombia and Guatemala: Priorities, Trade-offs and Interdependencies.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 135-177. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000085

Partly using the Guatemalan case study, Markus Schultze-Kraft’s paper challenges the notion within liberal peacebuilding that pushing for security sector reform and straightening rule of law are “interdependent and complementary.” The paper finds that the effort to reduce impunity via a UN-sponsored commission was mainly used only when the elites were threatened by illegal competitors — instead of being genuinely for improving the rule of law. Meanwhile, Guatemala’s security sector reform was partly failing due to the large presence of the old and corrupt force in the new police force, meaning rule of law was also elusive within the security sector itself. As a result, the paper stresses the need to improve the rule of law for civilians and shape security sector reform in that direction for a more effective approach.

“Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace.” United Nations General Assembly, 29 Dec. 1996, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961229_AgreementOnFirmAndLastingPeace.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019

“Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.” United Nations General Assembly, 12 Dec. 1996, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961212_AgreementOnBasisOfTheLegalIntegrationOfURNG.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“Agreement on the Creation of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.” International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, 12 Dec. 2006, https://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/mandato/cicig_acuerdo.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer.” United Nations, 23 June 1994, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_940623_EstablishmentCommissionClarifyPastHumanRightsViolations.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019

“Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society.” United Nations, 16 Oct. 1996, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_960919_AgreementStrengtheningCivilianPower.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019

Brett, Roddy. “Peace without social reconciliation? Understanding the trial of Generals Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez in the wake of Guatemala’s genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research, Volume 16, Issue 2, June 2016, Pages 285-303. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1186955

Commission for Historical Clarification: Charter. United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala, 1994. Web. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Cruz, José Miguel. “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 53, Issue 4, Winter 2011, Pages 1-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41342343

Cuffe, Sandra. “Alarm as Guatemala bans head of UN anti-corruption body from country.” The Guardian, 5 Sept. 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/05/guatemala-cicig-ivan-velasquez-jimmy-morales-ban

Glebbeek, Marie-Louise. “Police Reform and the Peace Process in Guatemala: The Fifth Promotion of the National Civilian Police.” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2001, Pages 431-453. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3339023

Gramajo, Jessica. “Impunity exceeds 97% in Guatemala.” Prensa Libre, 3 Apr. 2017, https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/la-impunidad-supera-el-97-en-guatemala/

“Guatemala.” Transparency International, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/country/GTM

“Guatemala.” US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/j/inl/regions/westernhemisphere/219167.htm. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“Guatemala 2016 Human Rights Report.” US Department of State, 12 Apr. 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265802.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“Guatemala SSR Background Note.” International Security Sector Advisory Team, 26 Jan. 2018, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Guatemala-SSR-Background-Note

“Guatemala - MINUGUA: Background.” United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/minuguabackgr.html. Accessed March 31, 2019.

“International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.” United Nations Department of Political Affairs, https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/cicig. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Isaacs, Anita. “At War with the Past? The Politics of Truth Seeking in Guatemala.” International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 4, Issue 2, July 2010, Pages 251–274. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijq005

Jonas, Susanne. Of Centaurs And Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process. Colorado: Westview Press, 2000.

“Libro Blanco de Seguridad: Guatemala 2025 con Seguridad y Desarrollo.” Guatemala National Public Security Council, 2015, https://stcns.gob.gt/docs/2015/Libro_Blanco/Libro-Blanco-de-Seguridad-de-Guatemala.pdf. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Long, Soraya. Report on European Union Security and Justice Cooperation Programmes in Guatemala and Honduras. ACT Alliance EU, CIFCA and HIVOS, 2016. Web. March 31, 2019.

Nakaya, Sumie. “Women and Gender Equality in Peace Processes: From Women at the Negotiating Table to Postwar Structural Reforms in Guatemala and Somalia.” Global Governance, Volume 9, Issue 4, October 2003, Pages 459-476. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800497

Navarro, Mireya. “Guatemalan army waged ‘genocide,’ new report finds.” The New York Times, 26 Feb. 1999. https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/26/world/guatemalan-army-waged-genocide-new-report-finds.html

Noël, Émilie. Weaknesses of Security Sector Reforms in Central America: Excludable Policing Strategies and Violence. 2015. McGill University, Master’s thesis. http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1553569062403~600

The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008. Web. March 31, 2019.

Resolution 1094. United Nations Security Council, 20 Jan. 1997, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1094. Accessed March 31, 2019.

Ruhl, J. Mark. “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform under Arzú and Portillo.” Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 47, Issue 1, Spring 2005, Pages 55-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4490389

Sánchez, Manolo et al. Support Models for CSOs at Country Level: Guatemala country report. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2007. Web. March 31, 2019.

Schultze-Kraft, Markus. “Security and the Rule of Law in Colombia and Guatemala: Priorities, Trade-offs and Interdependencies.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 135-177. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000085

Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Kevin Sieff. “Trump plans to cut U.S. aid to 3 Central American countries in fight over U.S.-bound migrants.” The Washington Post, 30 Mar. 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/trump-plans-us-aid-cut-to-3-central-american-countries-as-fight-widens-over-us-bound-migrants/2019/03/30/d6814b42-52ff-11e9-bdb7-44f948cc0605_story.html?utm_term=.d6146f75416b

Tomuschat, Christian et al. Guatemala: Memory of Silence. The Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations, 1999. Web. Accessed  March 31, 2019.