• Military Reform: Specifically in Iraq, SSR reform the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) is a militia group turned government entity in 2016. This is an example of successful military reform while partaking in SSR as the government now has control of this group as opposed to the group having no recognition. It’s good that the government is taking control of the militia; without government support, the militia would be rogue and under related to SSR. Because the government is taking control, the PMFs are a form of SSR.
  • (Saliba, Issam. Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Global Legal Monitor, Last Updated 7 December 2016, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/iraq-legislating-the-status-of-the-popular-mobilization-forces/.)

• Political Reform: Since the American invasion of 2003, there has been multiple political reforms beginning with America capturing Saddam Hussein. Prior to his capture, Hussein was the President of Iraq for 24 years. The Americans captured Hussein in Operation Red Dawn  in 2003, transferring power to an American interim government. In June 2004, America handed over sovereignty to a new Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.
  • (The Guardian Staff and Agencies. “US Hands over Power in Iraq.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 28 June 2004, www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/28/iraq.iraq1.)

• Ethical / Social Reform: In Iraq, ethical and social reform has come in the form of international aid. For example, the International Centre of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are foreign entities which assist people impoverished by violence. Specifically in Iraq, the ICTJ advises Iraqi peoples on accountability and justice; the Red Cross provides aid to refugees and other people affected by the violent conflict.
  • (Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq. International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2013, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf.)

• Judicial Reform: Through SSR, the state of Iraq has implemented entities which investigative and focus on terrorism, organized crime, and governmental corruption. Two of these entities include the Special Judicial Body for Crimes Against Yezidis and the CPA Central Criminal Court. It’s essential for these bodies and courts to be present in Iraq in order to prevent further violence and punish those who have inflicted violence.
  • (Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf. )

• • Ba’ath Party: The main tool Saddam Hussein used to retain control over Iraq. One of the main aspects of SSR reform in Iraq has been the dismantling of the Ba’ath Party, however, it has remained an active political group post-2003, and is linked to many civil organisations in Iraq.
  • Kurdish Peshmerga: responsible for the security of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan
  • Naqshbandi Army: A Ba’athist and Sufi military insurgency group, created with the intention of restoring the Ba’ath party to power in Iraq. Has strong nationalist tendencies and ideologies.
  • Popular Mobilisation Forces, Kurdish Regional Government Forces, Iraqi Army and Police Force: Heavily involved in the fight against ISIS, retaking the cities of Mosul,  and Telafar, among others
  • Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: formed as terrorist organization in the early 2010s. ISIL has been recruiting Iraqis and foreigners to fight for their jihadist cause. The extremists have battle against the Iraqi forces since 2013 and, at one point held Mosul and Fallujah
  • Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS): Iraqi Special Forces unit created by the coalition forces after the 2003 invasion, separate from the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. Heavy involvement in the fight against ISIS.

Sources:

Alaaldin, Ranj. Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news. Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

Knights, Michael and Alex Mello. THE BEST THING AMERICA BUILT IN IRAQ: IRAQ’S COUNTER-TERRORISM SERVICE AND THE LONG WAR AGAINST MILITANCY. War on the Rocks, July 19, 2017, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-best-thing-america-built-in-iraq-iraqs-counter-terrorism-service-and-the-long-war-against-militancy/.

BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Reid, Robert H. Major Players in the Iraq Conflict. Stars and Stripes, June 26 2014, available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/major-players-in-the-iraq-conflict-1.288687.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

Kafala, Tarik. The Iraqi Baath party. BBC News, 25 March 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.

• • Coalition of actors who supported the 2003 Invasion: George Bush: President of the US, Tony Blair: British PM, Jose Maria Aznar: PM of Spain,
  • US-led Global Coalition Against ISIS: in operation since 2014 to reduce the threat of ISIS, involves a military campaign, civilian effort, counter-messaging program and counter-finance program. It is the largest international coalition in history.
  • International Centre of Transitional Justice (ICTJ): the ICTJ has worked in Iraq since 2003 in advising Iraqis on accountability and justice options and monitoring measures taken to address the past
  • International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: provides support and aid to refugees, Dips and other people affected by violent conflict in Iraq
  • United Nations Development Program (UNDP): has been present in Iraq since 1976, promotes emergency livelihoods, community dialogue, stabilising newly liberated areas, providing technical assistance to support governance reforms and decentralization.
  • United Nations of High Commission of Refugees: works closely with refugees and displaced groups in Iraq, focusing on the crisis that resulted from the 2014 conflict
  • PAX: a Netherlands-based organisation, working to address the root causes and patterns of conflict in Iraq. Implements programs designed to build trust between communities, facilitate dialogue between policy-makers and citizens, enhance gender sensitivity, etc.
  • Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): CPA was the provisional government in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, headed by an American diplomat, Paul Bremer.
  • United States Institute of Peace (USIP): the United States Institute for Peace provides financial and technical assistance to civic groups and government institutions involved in peacebuilding efforts, since 2003.
  • Multinational Force Iraq: the military command during the 2003 invasion and the following Iraq War, led by the US, UK, Australia, Spain and Poland.
  • United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI): formed by UNSC Resolution 1500 in 2003 to support national development efforts throughout the country.

Sources:

The Iraq War. Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/The-Iraq-War#ref793786.

Peace Insight. Iraq: International Organisations. Peace Direct, accessed 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/iraq/internationals/.

BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Reid, Robert H. Major Players in the Iraq Conflict. Stars and Stripes, June 26 2014, available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/major-players-in-the-iraq-conflict-1.288687.

U.S. Mission to Canada. Fact Sheets: The Global Coalition – Working to Defeat ISIS. U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Canada, 2019, available at: https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

• Recruitment and staffing in the new security sector: the US decided to disband the former Iraqi army, which created a large pool of angry, unemployed young men. These people are ideal targets for recruitment into terrorist/extremist organisations. Choosing who to recruit into a country’s new security forces is a difficult task which can be a barrier to successful reform if the policies carried out are contrary to the development of peace and reconciliation. The strict policy of de-Baathification has made recruitment into the security sector difficult, and there are concerns that such a strict policy of exclusion will result in an inability to find a consensus for the future of Iraq.
• Different Cultures in Reform: One issue highlighted in the literature was the potential clash between intervening countries’ cultures and Iraq’s culture. When creating methods for reform, the intervening state must take into consideration local culture and the local political environment. One issue post-2003, was that US reform attempts were seen as the forcible intrusion of Western power and Western values into Iraq, a country with its own long-standing cultures and traditions, and a distinct religious history. This poses a risk of mutual estrangement which can inhibit post-conflict recovery if not dealt with properly.
• Barriers to Reconciliation: a series of courts have been founded/are being founded across Iraq that seek to bring perpetrators of human rights violations in relation to ISIS to justice. However, little attempt is made to allow for victim and witness participation in these trials. In the case of the Yezidi people, a Board for compensation has been created, and a special judicial investigative body has been created, however there is little public knowledge about this, and many Yezii leaders claim to have never interacted with these bodies. Thus, these initiatives, without due focus on community reconciliation, may not affect the tensions that remain in Iraq, which increases the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and the resumption of conflict.
• Armed Groups Post-ISIS: While regional and local power structure remain unstable after conflict, there are many armed groups left behind, seeking to consolidate their position post-ISIS. One example is the recently legalised PMF, which is a coagulation of armed groups who came together to fight ISIS in Iraq. These groups represent widely varied ideological perspectives, and there is a risk that now that the conflict has officially ended, the fracture of this group could result in a resumption of ethnic and religious conflict. Similarly, following the recent referendum on Kurdistan’s independence, the movements of Iraqi Security Forces have brought political issues back to the forefront of conflict again which have gone unresolved during the previous conflict.

Sources:

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. Investing in Iraq: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Institute, 20 February 2013, available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/investing-iraq-prospects-and-challenges.

Taylor, Andrea. Three Pressing Barriers to Forming an Iraqi Government. Atlantic Council, 21 August 2018, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/three-pressing-barriers-to-forming-an-iraqi-government.

U.S. Mission to Canada. Fact Sheets: The Global Coalition – Working to Defeat ISIS. U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Canada, 2019, available at: https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/.

Alaaldin, Ranj. Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news. Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

O’Driscoll Dylan, Dave van Zoonen. The Future of Iraq: Is Reintegration Possible? Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/future-iraq-reintegration-possible.

Rudaw. Yezidis cautiously welcome Iraq court tasked with prosecuting ISIS. Rudaw, 12 June 2017, available at: http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/12062017.

Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq has been mostly successful at establishing a democratically free country and suppressing the influence of terrorist organizations within Iraq. Following the successful invasion of Iraq in 2003, the USA government wanted to implement changes within the Iraqi government and security sectors following the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ordered the Iraqi army and security sectors to disband, causing 400,000 men to demilitarize. This action was a simple demobilization, which was not enough to solve the conflict. Unemployed and angry young men became perfect targets for recruitment into other non-state armed forces. This decision to disband the Iraqi army was a decision made as opposed to choosing an alternate option to re-integrate the soldiers in society and start programs designed to promote DDR effectively. It is possible that this action would have been more effective in ensuring lasting security than the simple demobilization of the entire Iraqi armed forces.

Despite the ramifications of the CPA order, in 2005, the coalition forces helped implement a new Constitution in Iraq and, soon after, parliamentary elections took place within the country. Despite the elections, some Iraqis continued to revolt against the American-led forces and insurgent attacks became a regular occurrence during the late 2000s. The aggression against the Coalition forces did not stop the democratic proceedings however, and the Iraqi government is considered today to be the most-free political system in the Arab world with more than 11 million people voting in the 2014 elections. Furthermore, despite the effects of the CPA order to disband the army, the soldiers who fought for Saddam Hussein could no longer be used to oppress Kurdish and Shia Arabs in the country systematically.

In light of the American invasion of Iraq, there was an influx of NGOs and international governmental organizations that came to the aid of the Iraqi people. For example, the United Nations formed a political mission to coordinate humanitarian efforts within Iraq. The mission has had broad implementations since its formation in 2003, as the UN has aided the Iraqi government in judicial, DDR, and humanitarian efforts to counter the terrorist organizations in the country. The assistance of the UN has helped the Iraqi government implement essential services for citizens within the country while also presenting opportunities for economic reform through the inclusion of international financial institutions, such as the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.

Following the US decision to remove American troops from Iraq, the Coalition forces began training and equipping Sunni Muslim men to combat al-Qaeda and take over the security duties. The training became a major military goal for the Coalition forces. Initially, the security forces were organized, despite the Commander of the Multinational Division commenting on how reformers were unprepared for the ongoing conflictual situation, and a breakdown of law and order would accompany the post-conflict reforms. The commander proved to be correct as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) increased its territorial hold in 2014 and the institutions that had been created to stop insurgents in Iraq swiftly fell apart. The thousands of trained police officers, border control guards and defence corps who made up the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) could not handle the increasing strength of ISIL, and the security sector was suffering as a result. In light of the near collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a prominent Sunni Muslim leader called for effective action against the Islamic State. The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) formed pockets of ethnically and ideologically-opposing groups whom all agreed to fight against ISIS forces. The PMF has been successful against the Islamic state; however, some of these militias pose severe risks to national unity through the militarization of ethnosectarian nationalisms, which can potentially lead to further conflict after ISIL has been dealt with.

The US-led invasion of Iraq was beneficial for the Iraqi people as it established democracy in Iraq and freed the citizens from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. However, the invasion was also responsible for Iraqi insurgent groups, who oppose the Coalition authority in the country. These insurgent groups aided the rise of al-Qaeda and, later on, ISIS in the nation. Because of the prominence and influence these two terrorist organizations have had since the mid-2000s, the results of SSR have varied. Despite implementing democracy in Iraq, the consequences of the 2003 invasion has split Iraq into multiple, secluded ethnic groups. Without further security sector reform, Iraq may continue to have issues with the nationalist and ethnically different militias within a post-ISIS country.

Sources:
Hasan, Mehdi. “Blowback: How ISIS Was Created by the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” The Intercept, 29 Jan. 2018, theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/.

Hermesauto. “The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” The Straits Times, 17 Feb. 2019, www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/the-rise-and-fall-of-isis-in-iraq-and-syria.

“The Iraq War.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

Roy, Avik. “Important Objective Measures Show That The Iraq War Was A Success.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 3 June 2017

1. Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.
2. Saliba, Issam. Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Global Legal Monitor, Last Updated 7 December 2016, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/iraq-legislating-the-status-of-the-popular-mobilization-forces/.
3. PAX Alliance. Engendering the Transition to Peace and Security in Iraq. PAX Alliance, 2018.
4. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The Current Situation in Iraq: A USIP Fact Sheet. USIP, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/current-situation-iraq.
5. Human Rights Watch. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawed-justice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq.
6. Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.
7. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf.
8. Witty, David. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.
9. Witty, David M. Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf.
10. Sissons, Miranda and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi. A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq. International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2013, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf.

• Ahn, Julie, et al. The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq. 2018, www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree programs/MPP/files/Finalized PAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf.
  • This source was a book on the SSR and ISIS prevention techniques occurring in Northern Iraq. It looks at how to prevent ISIS from regaining influence in the Northern region of Iraq through the implementation of policy in the country. The book calls for more work on the liberation of Northern Iraq, as many militias remain in the region. Furthermore, the book emphasizes the importance of the US and Iraqi governments in securing the region, which undermines the militias influence in the region and how they can help with peace. The book gives too much credit to the American forces in Iraq and states that security would be difficult to attain without US assistance.
• Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.
  • This source looks at the role of the Coalition Provisional Authority in SSR in Iraq post the 2003 invasion. It provides an assessment of the CPA’s role in reforming the security sector, however demonstrates the U.S. and Coalition point of view. It is useful in looking at what the CPA did post-invasion, despite its pro-U.S. stance. It concludes that the CPA succeeded in restoring Iraq’s public services due to prior U.S. planning, however that the CPA was unable to stop Iraq’s civil war, which it claims was the result of the return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Thus, the report demonstrates a biased view which represents the U.S. opinion, and must be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, it shows the policies and actions implemented by the CPA during its tenure.
• Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.
  • In this report, the lessons of the Polish experience in administering Iraq under the Multinational Division are examined. It provides a critical view at how reform attempts in the security sector succeeded and failed, and what can be learned for future SSR missions. It also provides suggestions for how to overcome these difficulties and barriers to successful reform, and thus is useful for anyone involved in SSR, as it provides lessons from a learned experience in Iraq. It provides a relatively balanced overview of the failures of the administration of the Multinational Division, so that the mistakes made and problems encountered can be learned from.
• The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 27 Oct. 2015, www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda-in-Iraq.
  • This source explains the founding of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its involvement in the Iraqi conflict. More specifically, an important point made in the article examines the weakening of Al-Qaeda in 2007, which is a form of Security Sector Reform. The weakening of Al-Qaeda was assisted by militias paid by the United States to counter Al-Qaeda insurgency attacks. This plan is important as the US Army began teaching local groups who and how to fight properly, a form of military reformation. These new found US funded malities were then known as the “Awakening Councils”.
• Gompert, David C; Binnendijk, Hans, Lin, Bonny. “Chapter Fourteen - The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003.” Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174.
  • This book chapter provides the reasoning behind American President George W. Bush’s decision to invade the Middle Eastern country of Iraq. President Bush was convinced Iraq’s controversial President Saddam Hussein had access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the terrorist attack in New York on September 11th 2001, President Bush was convinced of imminent national danger from the Middle East. The threat of WMDs and terrorist groups, like Al-Qaeda, grew fear amongst the American population of a larger, more detrimental attack on US soil. In the name of national security, President Bush gave the orders to wage war on Iraq, in order to protect American sovereignty. This information is useful for analysis on why the United States interfered in a domestic conflict of Iraq. Arguably, the reason for invasion could have been peacekeeping or in American national interest and security.
• O’Driscoll Dylan, Dave van Zoonen. The Future of Iraq: Is Reintegration Possible? Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/future-iraq-reintegration-possible.
  • This source looks at the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces in combatting ISIL in Iraq. It provides an assessment of the PMF’s role in the battle and how the PMF has been able to work together, despite ethnic differences. It is important to observe how the ISF failed against ISIL and how the PMF formed in response to the ISF’s failures. The report states that PMF forces must be treated carefully, in order to avoid any further disruptions between the ideologically different militias. Nevertheless, the report underestimates the importance of the PMF in combatting ISIL and does not give enough credit to the different ethnic groups working together.

• USAICoE Command History Office. “Operation RED DAWN Nets Saddam Hussein.” Www.army.mil, Dec. 2003, www.army.mil/article/116559/operation_red_dawn_nets_saddam_hussein.
  • This article is a review of the mission to capture Iraq’s disgraced leader, Saddam Hussein. Almost immediately after the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, Hussein fled to a secretive location in hopes of escaping American custody. The American led invasion of Iraq was intended to oust Hussein of power and to set the Iraqi people free from his dictatorship. The article praises the United States army and intelligence teams for the capture of one of the world’s most wanted men. Teams such as the 4th Infantry Division and Tactical HUMINT Teams were specifically used to track and capture Hussein alive. After being convicted of crimes against humanity, Hussein was executed three years after his capture in 2006. The capture of Hussein was the first step towards Security Sector Reform in Iraq.
• Witty, David M. Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter-Terrorism Service. The Washington Institute, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf.
  • This source examines the recently-formed Counter-Terrorism Service in Iraq, looking at its successes and failures. It provides a critical analysis of this aspect of security sector reform by the United States, to conclude that it is one of the most successful aspects of U.S. reform in Iraq, and the author provides the opinion that it can be used as a paradigm for nonsectarian forces in a country trying to rebuild its security sector. Witty provides reasons for its success and a balanced assessment of both the U.S. and Iraqi role in its achievements. The source is useful for those looking for a positive and successful aspect of SSR in Iraq, and is useful for anyone involved in SSR, regardless of region.

Ahn, Julie, Campbell, Maeve, Knoetgen, Pete. “The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq.” 2018,www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree programs/MPP/files/FinalizedPAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf.

Al Makhzoomi, Khairuldeen. “Trump, here’s a solution for Iraq after the defeat of ISIS.” Middle East Eye, 17 March 2017, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/trump-heressolution-iraq-after-defeat.

Alaaldin, Ranj. “Legalising PMF in Iraq: Why it’s not all bad news.” Al Jazeera, 1 December 2016, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/legalising-pmf-iraq-bad-news-161129140729509.html.

Baker, Deane-Peter. “Special Operations Remote Advise and Assist: an Ethics Assessment.” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 21, no. 1, 2018, pp. 1–10., doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9483-3.BBC News. Iraq key players, then and now. BBC News, 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7297592.stm.

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya. Investing in Iraq: Prospects and Challenges. Middle East Institute, 20 February 2013, available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/investing-iraq-prospects and-challenges.

Chulov, Martin. “The Rise and Fall of the Isis 'Caliphate'.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 24 Mar. 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-theisis-caliphate.

Coalition Provisional Authority: Government of Iraq. Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed on 20 March 2019. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coalition-ProvisionalAuthority. Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended) The Central

Criminal Court of Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004,https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpairaq/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_    mended.pdf.

Crook, John R. “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Contemporary Law.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 102, no. 1, 2008, pp. 155–158., www.jstor.org/stable/40007777?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

Dobbins James et al.Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. RAND Corporation,2009https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.sum.pdf.

Domisiewicz, Rafal. Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq. The International Security Sector Advisory Team, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Consolidating-the-Security-Sector-in-Post-Conflict-States-Polish-Lessons-from-Iraq.

Gompert, David C; Binnendijk, Hans, Lin, Bonny. “Chapter Fourteen - The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003.” Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 161–174.

Hasan, Mehdi. “Blowback: How ISIS Was Created by the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” The Intercept, 29 Jan. 2018, theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/.

Hermesauto. “The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” The Straits Times, 17 Feb. 2019, www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/the-rise-and-fall-of-isis-in-iraq-and-syria.

Human Rights Watch. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawedjustice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq.

Iraq Operations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accessed 20 March 2019. http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2547#_ga=2.22123645.779465724.1553545210-1869412164.1553545210.

Kafala, Tarik. The Iraqi Baath party. BBC News, 25 March 2003, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.

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