Disbanding and Disarming All (Lebanese and non-Lebanese) Militia Groups:

A large threat to stable security and SSR in Lebanon was due to the many militia groups, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, involved in the conflicts. Since the outbreak of the civil war Lebanese authorities have continuously tried to condemn the existence of militia groups. The efforts to disband, disarm, and rehabilitate militia fighters have been unsuccessful, were the lack of reintegration has left fighters to rely on their own means for reintegration, making them vulnerable to society. (Karamé)

Protection of Civilians and Vulnerable Groups:

One of the main concerns within the implementation of SSR and the ending the unrest and violence in Lebanon is ensuring the protection of civilians. Throughout the Lebanon conflict(s), UN missions had to balance a fine line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Protection of civilians involved actions from the delivery of humanitarian aid to ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops to assisting in the safe return of displaced persons and groups. (Murphey)

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons:

In the years that had led up to the Lebanese Civil War, the state of Lebanon received an influx of approximately 100,000 Palestinian Refugees after the creation of the state of Israel. The establishment of Israel dramatically changed the religious dynamic of the region as many of the refugees fleeing to Lebanon were of Muslim faith. Because of this religious divide, Israel continuously posed themselves as a threat to Lebanon, invading Lebanon in 1982 and 2005. (CNN)

Security Groups Divided Along Sectarian Cleavages:

The implementation of SSR within Lebanon was greatly affected because of Lebanon’s geographical location, as Lebanon is a small nation surrounded by three middle-eastern powers. Along with the several international actors present, this created a problem of trust among Lebanese forces and civilians. All these actors and elements at play creates a high risk of conflict escalation and violence, where SSR is focused on short-term goals to defuse the violence instead of addressing long-term goals for systemic change. (Kraft)

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

Internal Security Forces (ISF)

 Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)

Lebanese National Movement (LNM):

A leftist nationalist movement, founded in 1969, advocating for a secular political system in Lebanon. The movement was made up of Arab Nationalists, which included Palestinians.

Kata’ib Party/Lebanese Forces (LF):

An overwhelmingly Christian party, the Kata’ib party was absorbed by the Lebanese Forces in the later years of the Lebanon conflict. The party advocated for liberal economic values and maintaining Lebanon’s political ‘status-quo’.

Progressive Socialist Party (PSP):

This socialist party gained most of their support from Lebanon’s Druze community, as the party was a major supportive element to the LNM during the Lebanese Civil War.

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO):

This umbrella organization claims to represent all Palestinians of whom lived in Palestine and then were displaced in the creation of the State of Israel. The organization came together in 1964 in order to centralize various Palestinian advocate groups into one body.

Amal Movement:

The Amal political party, also known as the Hope Movement, is a primarily Shia Muslim community party with alliances with PSP and Hezbollah parties.

Hezbollah:

A radical Shia Muslim combatant group, provoked by Islamic revolution in Iran and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, in which they worked towards liberating all occupied Lebanese territories and POW’s from Israel’s control. In Lebanon today, Hezbollah is both a strong-armed movement and political party.

South Lebanon Army (SLA):

The creation of the SLA was an after-effect of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the southern region. After Israel’s partial withdrawal, Israel maintained a security zone to create a security buffer between Israel and Lebanon with the allied militia of the SLA in order to maintain the zone.

Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA):

Lebanese NGO focused on reducing corruption and promoting the principles of good governance while encouraging society civil society towards more transparency and accountability in Lebanon.

Former Fighters for Peace (FFP):

Lebanese NGO working with ex-fighters, youth, and civil society activists in working towards building civil peace and reconciliation. This organization unites ex-fighters in Lebanon from different political, religious, and social backgrounds, where former fighters can find peace within their lives and communities.

Lebanese Association for Civil Rights (LACR):

Lebanese NGO focused on promoting a culture of non-violence in Lebanon working for civil peace, socioeconomic and political rights, humanistic education, and justice.

Joint Command Council:

The command council was the early institutions of the LF and was established to prevent crime and examine security concerns. The council became an official police force in 1978.

Palestinian Armed Struggle Command:

The command force was the police force used by the PLO that established a court system in 1972 in order to prosecute violations by armed forces and to mediate disputes between the PLO and other parties.

Syrian Military:

An ally of Lebanon, called upon by the Lebanese government to help put an end to the civil war. However, as the violence and conflict persisted, Syria did not withdraw their troops until 2005.

 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL):

This UN Peacekeeping mission was first deployed as an interim force in 1978, focusing on providing a security buffer in Southern Lebanon and striving to maintain peaceful condition in the nation.

Arab League Peacekeeping Force:

Also known as the Arab Deterrent Force, the force created by the Arab League, deployed with the goal of deterring the outbreak of violence between conflicting sides and maintaining the cease-fire by supporting the Lebanese government authority.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF):

Driving and shaping SSR policy and programming worldwide, DCAF in Lebanon works closely with the Lebanese government and civil society organizations to strengthen public institutions and enhancing governance in the security and justice sectors.

 United States Government:

The United States has traditional close ties with Lebanon. Supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1559, the US has been assisting with relief, recovery, rebuilding, and security in Lebanon.

 Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD):

Aim to promote policies that will improve economic and social well-being in the countries which they support. The organization has been working with Lebanon to continue to improve the well-being of vulnerable communities and institutions in the nation.

 Euro-Arab-Muslim Dialogue (ASSAM):

A grassroots organization aiming to create a peaceful dialogue among Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, as the coexistence between these two religious communities is necessary for addressing structural challenges effecting SSR in the region.

International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC):

The UN commission that was established in Lebanon in 2005 to investigate the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The commission concluded that Lebanese and Syrian security/intelligence agencies committed the assassinated through Hezbollah.

Financial and Administrative Corruption:

A lot of government institutions were substantially damaged during the war and the post war phase, including the internal security institutions which were not adequately rebuilt especially in regard to their ethical standards and mechanisms of inspection and accountability. Economic difficulties further encouraged corruption where officers within the ISF, the GS, and the ST devised methods to collect money from citizens and private companies. High ranking security officers often favour staff for religious, political and sectarian.

Inadequate Staff Development:

ISF officers lack adequate training and are not specialized in their line of work. The lack of professionalism is particularly evident when reading investigative reports which are hand written in stylistically untailored. Investigative methods are primitive and inefficient leading officers the threat of violence to extract confessions during interrogations. Officers tend to also have informal and inappropriate interactions with civilians often acting as womanizers or bullies, insulting citizens who break the law.

Insufficient and Unsuitable Equipment:

Both the ISF and the GS are missing basic necessary equipment for law enforcement. Most stations are not equipped with computers, photocopying machines, and the filing system is unorganized and confusing. Forensic labs are also often missing necessary chemicals. The ISF uses old and inadequate trucks to transport prisoners that sometimes cause them to faint from heat and lack of oxygen upon arrival to their destination.

Rivalry and Lack of Coordination:

The current local security apparatus arrangements are characterised by encouraging multiple organizations which weakened accountability. Sources of failure were hard to pin down when so many institutions were considered in charge of security without clear specializations. This lack of clear mandates leads to tensions between various security institutions as they would find themselves investigating the same crimes which creates difficulties when it comes to crime scene management, and the collection and transportation of physical evidence.   In 2005, the ISF development an intelligence service however its biased political label made it relatively limited and inefficient and rivalry with Army intelligence further accentuated these limitations (Nashbe, 2009, The Arab Reform Initiative). The confessional ecology of the security apparatus which guarantees that all major sects be represented in the leadership of a security institution, while informal cannot be ignored by leaders since this historic convention balances out the interests of different sectarian constituencies within the security forces. This sectarianism has created a low level of trust in the agencies amongst citizens which is reported to low reporting rates (Walsh, 2019, The Middle Eastern Institute).

Analysis of Success:

Lebanon gaining independence from Syria in 2005 has been a major catalyst for the inadequacy of effective security sector reform (SSR) due to the protest/riots, the war with Israel, and the destruction of Nahr-el Bared that followed soon after that gain of Lebanese independence. The destruction of the Palestinian refugee camp, Nahr-el Bared, in 2007 led to the loss of homes and properties of the Palestinian community. The Nahr-el Bared mini-war was a war launched in opposition to the LAF and the Fatah-Islam an armed organization group led by Palestinian commanders and composed of Jihadi fighters (Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.9). This operation for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) did not prove itself successful due to a lack of coordination skills, organization, and proper training. This mini-war was not only a defeat for the LAF but it also was a loss in the sense that this proved the LAFs need for foreign assistance on winning victories through the help of Western backed powers like the US. But what Nahr-El Bared produced as an indirect consequence of the war was the effects of the mass displacement of Palestinian refugees which compounded the already severe socioeconomic conditions facing these refugees and constitute a chronic humanitarian crisis (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). This lack of the Lebanese government to deal with the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian issue within its own borders has ultimately resulted in the dispersion of many Palestinian camps outside of the control and jurisdiction of the Lebanese state, which has allowed terrorist organization and armed militia groups to occupy and form groups within these unstable Palestinian refugee camps. This has led to a major security breach that the Lebanese government has not addressed through effective SSR strategies.

To implement successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) what needs to be addressed is an implementation of a new mandate or constitution forged between the countries of Lebanon and Syria. Since, 1969 the Lebanese state has chosen to refrain from entering these camps, allowing for the free movement of Palestinians and other organizations (Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.10). But the securing of Lebanese borders works in direct conjunction with the Syrian state and their border security. This fusion between Syrian and Lebanese border protection was mandated through a “UN resolution, in particular UN resolution 1701, demand that Lebanon secure its border with Syria in order to prevent the entry of weaponry. But the borders between Lebanon and Syria have historically been porous and the Syrian reluctance to delineate borders and facilitate the monitoring of the movement of goods and people only exacerbate the problem. The Syrian and Hezbollah opposition to the deployment of international forces to deploy along the border has placed the burden on the Lebanese security sector, which is ill designed and equipped to perform this mission satisfactorily, and is politically constrained as is illustrated by instances in which weaponry seized by security forces is returned to Hezbollah for fear of escalation (Hokayem & Mcgovern, 2016, p. 10). This has caused SSR to be delineated itself towards the implementation of a community policing procedure in Lebanon in order to rectify the lack of support from Syria to reinforce proper border security measures on their part. Therefore, “the Lebanese government at an international donor conference in Vienna in June 2008, reiterated the need to re-establish security and order in the camp through community policing. The government’s proposal met the common criteria for community policing as it emphasized the need to deploy a police force to the camp that would be culturally and politically sensitive to the plight of Palestinians, and hence be able to build close ties with camp residence and offer proactive policing services” (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute).

In order to secure effective SSR measures to be implemented in the case of Lebanon, there must not only be amendments made or the forging of an entirely new constitutional mandate that would uphold Syria's role of the responsibility of protecting the border between Lebanon and Syria. But there should be stipulations that reduces US or Western backed funding on community policing programs. For instance, Nahr-el Bared residents were rather suspicious of the new community police in their camp. US involvement in funding the program led to the impression among residents that community policing was an international plot under the guise of a program designed to serve them that would ultimately bolster the Lebanese state’s control over the camp populations (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute). That is why it is important to build relationships and bridge divides between the citizens of the community itself and the police force. For example, The Policing Pilot Project (PPP), jointly funded by the American and British embassies in London, was set to showcase how proactive community policing can be to enhance citizen’s experiences with the police force beyond the Nahr el-Bared experience. The West Beirut neighborhood of Ras Beirut was chosen as a project to test this new policing project because the area represented a microcosm of Lebanon filled with residents, visitors, members of the LGBTQ community, migrant workers, expats, and refugees. This sounded nice in theory but did not produce adequate results in practice. “In sum, the effects of community policing in Ras Beirut clearly mirrors those in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camps: community policing, regardless of its intention, increases policing directly against refugees and hence reproduces their insecurity (Mazzola, 2018, Middle East Institute). Therefore, to enhance SSR in the region and to produce effective results it requires a police force that does not receive western backing/funding, and it must not operate in such a way that promotes the over targeting of minority communities and clientelism amongst the police force in order to reduce further insecurities amongst citizens/civilians.

Ta’if Agreement: https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version_.pdf

UN Resolutions 425 & 426:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IP%20SRES%20425.pdf

UN Resolution 1701:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20SRES1701.pdf

UN Resolutions 520 & 521:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNIFIL%20SRES520.pdf

National Reconciliation Pact (Includes Court Reforms):

http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/leb.pdf

Letter of Agreement on Law Enforcement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Lebanon:

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/130486.pdf

ISF Code of Conduct:

http://www.isf.gov.lb/files/1582100364CoCEnglish.pdf

Hezbollah's Program/Manifesto:

https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/files/hezbollah_program.pdf

Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf

Cairo Agreement:  

Brynen2_09.htm

Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector

Hokayem, Emile El-, & McGovern, Elena. (2008). Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon:

Prospects for Security Sector Reform. Washington: The Henry L Stimson Center. P.

1-48.

This is an article that details the security vacuum in Lebanon primarily caused by the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, protests that advocated political upheaval, the assassination of political leaders, and the war between Lebanon and Israel. The war between Lebanon and Israel has highlighted the need for Lebanon to tighten its security measures, especially after the attack on Nahr el-Bared, in which Lebanon was dealing with a Palestinian refugee crisis within their borders. It also details the fact that in order for Lebanon to gain a level of adequate security they must develop their own independent security force without relying upon the US to coordinate and fund it, especially since the withdrawal of Syrian forces. This would be best achieved through a national security strategy. The strength of this article is that it displays the effects of both the changes in the political regime and the event of the Nahr el-Bared attack that exposed faults in Lebanon's national procedures for securing the border with Syria, and the need for Lebanon to produce reforms that reduce the leverage of Western powers in organizing their own national security regimens. A weakness of this article is that although it eludes to the need to for Lebanon to bring about a reform in security and to produce a national security strategy, and offers these suggestions after detailing the events in Lebanon that produced these vast security vacuums along their border. But it does not specify the specific policies or amendments implemented in the new national security reform. This is partially due to the fact that this article was written in the year 2008 and it was only until around after 2008 that the Lebanese state enforced some new initiatives, especially new programs surrounding community peacebuilding. We will use the events of Nahr el-Bared in this article and how it led to a security vacuum along the Lebanon-Syria border.

Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon

Karamé, Kari. “Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, pp. 495–514.

This is an article that outline and highlights the processes of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Lebanon. The article is able to give an overview of the different militias and Lebanese forces, giving summaries of the main actors involved in the civil war. The DDR process did not involve any cooperation between international actors and the Lebanese government which resulted in the DDR programmes being ineffective. The article presents the many weakness and pitfalls of DDR that left many ex-combatants to rely on untraditional and unregulated methods of social and economic reintegration. When reintegrating militia fighters, many were not found to be suited for reintegrating into the Lebanese forces, making these fighters potential threats to the peace process, as they can become ‘spoilers’. The strength of this article is its ability to show the problems within DDR in Lebanon while giving an overview of the different militia actors involved in the process. The article also is able to give a critical view of actions that limited the success of DDR and the ways civil society compensated for the lack of official state support. Overall, this article demonstrated the importance of taking into consideration social factors in DDR in order bring about positive social processes within DDR.

Walking the Line

Kraft, Martin, et al. Walking the Line: Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon. Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), 2008.

This is an article addressing the deeper, structural challenges of the Lebanese conflict that need to be addressed in order for the country to move forward in their effort of maintaining peace. The Lebanese civil war highlighted how the regional and international conflicts surround Lebanon affected the state, focusing specifically on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Along with Lebanon’s geographical location in the Middle-East, the country was seen as of high strategic value for stakeholders in surrounding conflicts. The article highlights the core problems that led to the initial conflict in Lebanon with the begging of the civil war, focusing on the sectarian-based patronage system, the lack of a viable central government, the large influx of Palestinian refugees, and private sectarian-based political identities. The causes are outlined in the article, among others, and goes on to suggest approaches for conflict transformation and address these structural issues. The article strongly enhances the research as it gives insight into the structural causes of the conflict and give recommendations for conflict transformation and peacebuilding between suited to Lebanon and the core structural issues at the heart of the conflict. Overall, the article recommends enhancing strategic peacebuilding approaches in Lebanon, reassessing the role of external actors, and the investment in conflict sensitivity and transnational justice.

Community Policing in Lebanon

Mazzola, Francisco. (2018). Community Policing in Lebanon. Washington: Middle East Institute.

Community Policing in Lebanon is an article that details the politics and policing currently occurring in Lebanon, specifically the introduction of the Policing Pilot Project (PPP). The Policing Pilot Project was jointly funded by American and British embassies and was a way to address the lack of Lebanese state jurisdiction in policing certain communities and refugee camps. The problem with the Policing Pilot Project was that it tried to strengthen citizen and police participation with one another, but it often resulted in the Police force heighten insecurities amongst marginalized groups, such as refugees, members of LGBT community, sex workers, and drug users etc. This heightened insecurity was mainly caused by the over targeting of members of these communities by the Policing Pilot Project (PPP). The strength of this article is that it explains how effective police reform can act as a strategy of the promotion of state building. A strength of this article also argues how policy intervention that claims to be apolitical in ‘fixing’ police-citizen relations might be more divisive and produces a lack of cohesion than other types of policy. However, this article needs to build upon how maybe it is the way the governmental system in Lebanon is built that leads to clientelistic practices amongst the police forces, it essentially needs to elaborate more upon the clientelism aspect in the police force. We will implement the facts of the Policing Pilot Project and the plight of marginalized communities at the hands of this new British and US backed program, and how it resembles the failures of the security initiatives in the aftermath of the Nahr el-Bared attack.

Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security

Nashbe, Omar. “Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security.” The Arab Reform Initiative, 2009, 1-9.

This article provides a general overview of the origins of security sector reform in Lebanon, the factors that limited its success, recommendation on how to engage in more effective security sector reform, figures on personnel, budgets, and hierarchies of security institutions, as well as basic legal references to decrees that created, reformed and adjusted security institutions.  The article was published in 2009, meaning that it is does not take into account the more recent and slightly more successful security sector reform initiatives undertaken in the 2010s. It also does not reference academic theories in its analysis. However, the author’s arguments and perspectives are all in line with other research conducted and his analysis is sound relative to the events that took place. The article enhances our research because firstly it gives us the perspective of a local Lebanese scholar based out of Lebanon, as opposed to a Western outlook. Secondly, the author has conducted interviews with high ranking security officers in Lebanon meaning that his analysis of the impediments to success of SSR takes into account an insider perspective from the sector itself, which is not something we have come across in our research.

Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection

 Ray Murphy, Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, Pages 373–402.

This is an article that highlights the role of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and their successes and failures in the protection of civilians. As the name suggests, the peacekeeping force in Lebanon was only an interim force, meaning they were only supposed to be implemented in Lebanon for a temporary period of time. The article speaks to the complexity of the Lebanese conflicts, and the difficulty of various armed groups posed on the peacekeeping force. The continuous escalation and de-escalation of violence in Lebanon has made this ‘’interim’ force a now seemingly permanent force, still present in Lebanon today. The strength this article brings to the research is its ability to outline the history of the Lebanese conflict whilst explaining and analyzing the role of the UNIFIL, bringing a critical view of the peacekeeping force by showing the strengths and weakness of the UNIFIL mission. However, the article focuses specifically on civilian protection and does not go into much detail about other aspects of the SSR carried out by the UNIFIL. Overall, the article is able to show the difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping missions and their ability or inability to be able to protect civilians in situations of escalating violence.

Nahr el-Bared Camp

The United Nations. Nahr el-Bared Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for PalestinianRefugees in the Near East

This is an article and a summary produced by the United Nations relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees detailing the events that occurred at the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian Refugee camp during the year of 2007. This article provides a detailed account of the aftermath effects of the destruction of the camp and the effects of Palestinians being displaced from their homes. It provides estimates and figures of how many people were displaced in the process and how much money/funding went into reconstructing the camp by the United States. The strength of this article is that it focuses directly upon the effects of the displacement and how this displacement has led to the reliance on assistance from the UNRWA. Another strength of this article is that it provides the actual cost estimates of both US and UNRWA funding for the reconstruction of the camp. However, this article is rather short and is just to provide a brief summary of what happened to the Palestinian refugees after their displacement from the camp and the amount of funding they receive from Western powers after being dislocated from their homes. It does not provide a deep theoretical analysis of the effects of why the funding off the camp reconstruction failed or made no difference, rather the article merely just states the estimates of why it made no difference without much explanation. But we will use the detailed summary in this article of what happened to the Palestinian refugees after being dispossessed from their camp in 2007.

Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon:

Walsh, Alex. “Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon.” The Middle Eastern Institute. 2019.

This article begins by detailing the progress of donor funded SSR, the challenges it faces and a few public polls to measure the effects on the citizenry. The article was published in January of 2019 taking into account the most recent initiatives and some future ambitions. The public polls also give us direct insight to what Lebanese citizens view as the challenges meeting their security agencies and whether they feel like security sector reform are impacting their interactions with security officer and the quality of the services they provide.

Barak, Oren. “Representation and Stability in Postwar Lebanon.” Representation, vol. 48, no. 3, 2012, pp. 321–333.

Baylouny, Anne Marie. “Born Violent: Armed Political Parties and Non-State Governance in Lebanon’s Civil War.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 329–353.

Gaub, Florence. “Multi‐Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned from Lebanon.” Defence Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2007, pp. 5–20.

Hokayem, Emile El-, & McGovern, Elena. (2008). Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform. Washington: The Henry L Stimson Center. 1-48.

Karamé, Kari. “Reintegration and the Relevance of Social Relations: The Case of Lebanon.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, pp. 495–514.

Kingston, Paul. “The Pitfalls of Peacebuilding from Below.” International Journal: Canadas Journal of Global Policy Analysis, vol. 67, no. 2, 2012, pp. 333–350.

Kraft, Martin, et al. Walking the Line: Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon. Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), 2008.

“Lebanon Fast Facts.” CNN, Cable News Network, 31 Aug. 2018, www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/meast/lebanon-fast-facts/index.html.

Mazzola, Francisco. (2018). Community Policing in Lebanon. Washington: Middle East Institute.

Nashbe, Omar. “Security Sector Reform in Lebanon: Internal Security Forces and General Security.” The Arab Reform Initiative, 2009, 1-9.

Newby, Vanessa F. “Positive Hybridity? Unpacking UN Security Sector Reform in South Lebanon.” Contemporary Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, 2016, pp. 156–174.

Ray Murphy, Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 17, Issue 3, Winter 2012, Pages 373–402.

Rowayheb, Marwan George. “Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War: The Case of Lebanon.” Civil Wars, vol. 13, no. 4, 2011, pp. 414–436.

The United Nations. Nahr el-Bared Camp. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.

Walsh, Alex. “Security Sector Reform and in the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon.” The Middle Eastern Institute. 2019.