Key issues to be addressed by Security Sector Reform
Human Rights
There is still almost total impunity for past and present human rights abuses, particularly sexual and gender-based violence. In the 1,511 rape cases registered in 2014 and 2015, less than 4 percent of the alleged perpetrators were convicted. Many alleged perpetrators, even if arrested, are not held accountable under the law.
Increased budgetary Support for National Police
In the budget for 2015/16 for the Liberia National Police, $14.2 million covered salaries and $1.7 million covered operations. As a consequence, the national police lack sufficient mobility, communications, uniforms, computers and generators, which undermines operational performance. The late or partial payment of salaries also has had a destabilizing effect.
Military Discipline/Budgetary Support
In both the army and the coastguard, discipline is a major issue and development is hindered by a lack of resources. The army faces operational challenges due to insufficient funding, which hampers its ability to deploy quickly or sustain operations outside of Monrovia. The coastguard has a limited operational role because it lacks personnel.
Development of Strong Democratic Institutions
Throughout its past Liberia has had a weak democratic structure due to its violent suppression the general populace by the ruling parties. As a result, the region has been a victim of intense conflicts due to the lack of accountability towards the government
Key actors: Domestic
State Security Forces:
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) - The official military force of Liberia fighting on behalf of the Government.
Special Security Service (SSS) - Special forces troops selected to guard Charles Taylor.
Liberian National Police (LNP) - Main force responsible for the security of the people of Liberia. At the time of the civil war much of the National Police force had dwindled down due to budget cuts.
National Port Authority - National entity that controls the main port in Monrovia the cities capital. This authority is extremely important as the port is vital to Liberia's economy.
Anti-Terrorist Unit - Miltiary force formed by former NPFL troops under Charles Taylor with little to no government oversight.
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) - Charles Taylor's old military front which he used to win the first Liberian Civil War. During the Second Civil War this outfit remained loyal to Taylor.
Non-State Security forces:
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) - Liberian rebel group that formed in 1999 at the beginning of civil war. The group received support from various countries around the world.
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) - Liberian rebel group formed in 2003 based out of the Ivory Coast.
Local NGOs/civil society/governmental agencies working on SSR:
Liberia Media Project - organized a number of peace festivals around the country to help reconcile divided groups and communities
Mandingo and Lorma ethnic groups - initiated reconciliation efforts involving traditional cleansing ceremonies
Liberia Community Infrastructure Programme - helped finance reconciliation efforts
Kissi community of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone - organized a reconciliation event with high-level political participation from each country to resolve the Yenga border dispute between the Kissi people of Sierra Leone and Guinea.
Mano ethnic group of Guinea and Liberia - organized meetings to recommit to a nonaggression pact signed during the Taylor period
Kpelle and Mandingo ethnic groups - organized a meeting where US$5,000 and LR$30,000 was received in pledges and cash to clean up the city of Gbarnga
Key actors: International
DynCorp - a US private company that assisted in the reform of the AFL
International Committee of the Red Cross - corrections system support
Japan - Reform of the Liberian National police
Netherlands - Reform of the Liberian National police
Norway - Reform of the Liberian National police, corrections system reform
United Kingdom - Reform of the Liberian National police
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Sponsored reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, rehabilitate critical roads
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) - ensured the issue of child combatants was a part of the DDR program and organized a program for war-affected youth, which included vocational and literacy training and trauma counseling
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) - rehabilitate critical roads, rehabilitate secondary and feeder roads
United Nations police - assisted with reform of the Liberian National Police, human rights promotion, judicial system support, corrections system reform
United States - Reform of the Liberian National Police, reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia, consolidation of state authority, corrections system reform
World Bank - rehabilitate critical roads
World Food Programme (WFP) - corrections system support, rehabilitating secondary and feeder roads
World Health Organization (WHO) - promoted women’s issues during the planning and implementation of the DDR program
Barriers to Successful Reform
Lack of Financial Ability
The global decline in commodity prices and the Ebola virus outbreak of 2014 and its continued effects have constrained Liberia’s limited financial space, hampering the government’s ability to implement reforms in a number of security areas, including the Liberian National Police and the Armed National Forces. As a result, there is a lack of personnel, logistics, and transport required in order to operate at a full capacity. Nearly ninety percent of funds allocated towards security agencies are for salaries and recurrent costs, with little remaining for development-related expenditures.
Lack of Political Will
There is a lack of political will on the government’s part to address the issues of accountability, human rights, and human law. For example, there remains legislation that goes against its promises to protect human rights that have been used to limit fundamental rights. Additionally, the government has suspended two opposition media outlets, apparently in an attempt to silence opposing voices. This has negatively affected the reform process of a number of security areas, including the judicial and corrections systems. It has also had an effect on the ability of the security forces, including the Liberian National Police, to operate and protect citizens.
Lack of Civil Society Engagement
The Government has made inadequate efforts to involve and engage civil society in reforms and empowering them as citizens. This has led to a lack of mistrust of civilians in the security sector, specifically the Liberia National Police and Armed Forces of Liberia, with poor state-society relations posing a risk to sustaining peace and security.
Security/Justice Structure reform
As it currently stands the trust within the armed forces of Liberia is at a very low point due to the systematic abuses of power during both civil wars. While efforts are being made to retrain troops by the private US company DynCorp the civilian trust in the institution will take significant amounts of time to rebuild.
Brief analysis of success
The DDRR programme in Liberia was generally considered a success. In July, President Johnson-Sirleaf officially closed the national disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme, which had successfully disarmed and demobilized more than 101,000 ex-combatants, and provided reintegration assistance to more than 90,000 former combatants since 2003. During this process, all rebel groups involved in the conflict were disbanded and disarmed as well. According to a survey of ex-combatants undertaken by UNDP in March 2006, ex-combatants who “formally disarmed, registered, and completed a reintegration training experienced an overall 8 percent increase in their socio-economic situation.” About 94 percent of the ex-fighters in this survey indicated that they have not had problems being accepted into their communities.
The two key forces of security, the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia, were completely reformed. In 2016, the Armed Forces of Liberia completed its training and is considered a professional and credible army that is well trained and equipped. The Liberian National Police consists of new, fully trained officers, with improved leadership and management officers. However, mistrust of the population against both forces persists and hinders the operational capabilities of the police force. In addition, a lack of resources hampers the operational capabilities of both forces.
Some reforms of the judicial system have been made. Courts are operational in all counties, with trained prosecutors and public defenders deployed across the country. The legal framework has been improved, and the code of conduct for lawyers and judges has been reformed. Despite these reforms, however, the judicial system still needs to be met with significant reforms, including access to courts, the need to update many laws, the lack of transparency and accountability, bribery, and a lack of resources and personnel. Many still rely on the traditional justice system for dispute resolution, where efforts to bring it in line with international human rights standards have still been unmet. In addition, prisons are operational in all counties except Grand Kru. However, many are still unguarded and unarmed and many are overcrowded.
The security situation in Liberia has remained relatively stable since the conflict, even after UNMIL handed back security responsibilities to the Liberian government in 2016. While there has been a significant success in increasing the budgetary support and stability across all departments in Liberia. This success has been built off the strong DDRR programs implemented. This success has been in spite of the slow institutional change that occurs in the region.
Overall the DDR process itself has been a great success as much of the society has been able to reintegrate itself. While this has been a success the country still suffers greatly from other issues like corruption that are rampant across the region.
Primary texts and documents
Defense Agreement Between the US and Liberia, 2005
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185774.pdf
RAND Report on Liberia National Security Sector, 2007
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG529.pdf
Accra Peace Agreement, August 2003
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accra-peace-agreement
Human Rights Watch Report on Child Soldiers in Liberia, February 2004
https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/02/02/how-fight-how-kill/child-soldiers-liberia
UN Security Council Report on UNMIL, December 2006
National Defense Strategy of Liberia, 2008
Refugee Review Tribunal Research Response, 2006
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b6fe2882.pdf
Global Network of Women Peacebuilders Report, 2011
http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/GNWP_Monitoring_Liberia.pdf
UNDP Human Development Report, 2018
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/LBR.pdf
UNMIL Report on Human Rights Situation, 2007
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47454d132.pdf
Annotated Bibliography
(2014) Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, International Peacekeeping, 21:2, 214-230
This work analyzes SSR interventions in various situations including Liberia in order to trace patterns and draw insights into the 'hybrid security models' that are implemented as a result of the merging of SSR models with domestic models. The work uses specific focus on Norms and Rules, Organizational structures and Technical Capacities in order to form a hybrid measure which provides a stronger assessment. This assessment has resulted in the evaluation that there needs to be a stronger focus on correct implementations of SSR which are unique to each case rather than applying blanket approaches across different countries.
(2008) Lessons Learned from Liberia, The RUSI Journal,153:1, 62-66
This article talks of the impending failure of the SSR process expected by the author due to the ineffectiveness of the process following the conflict in Liberia which saw intense abuses by National armed forces. It further draws upon the lack of trust within the country against a force that has done to its people. The article uses this to paint a picture of what must be done in order to derive a formula for a successful SSR process. The article comes to the conclusion that the comprehensive nature of SSR takes decades to complete in most cases especially when it occurs in failed states such as Liberia.
(2016) Building a more competent security sector: The case of UNMIL and the Liberian National Police,International Peacekeeping, 23:1, 158-191
This article analyzes the effectiveness of reforming the Liberian National Police in an attempt to create a formula for the implementation of a similar process in future SSR processes. Specifically, this article looks at determiners for success within the reform process and is able to see that there is no single aspect that determines the ability for a force to reform but rather that a stronger emphasis on learning needs to be made in order for there to be a success.
Alexander Loden, Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 297–307
This paper seeks to analyze the SSR process and deem whether it was an effective tool since the Accra Peace Accord. The article strongly focusses on the civil rights and development in the region and its evolving context. Additionally, there is context on the importance of civic engagement within the process and how it plays a significant role in the SSR process.
(2009) The political economy of DDR in Liberia: a gendered critique, Conflict, Security & Development, 9:4, 475-494
This article looks at the reintegration aspect of DDR with a specific focus around gender and the focus on male combatants. The article makes the argument that the programmes in Liberia defaulted to this assumption and therefore failed to address a large percentage of the population who are female. Further focus on this aspect will result in a process that appeals to a wider variety of conflicts and will enable further programmes to be more effective.
(2012) Revisiting DDR in Liberia: exploring the power, agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants, Conflict, Security & Development, 12:4, 359-385
This article further focusses on the DDR programmes and looks at the actual effects in order to understand how DDR works with relation to governance. It also takes a further look at local and international actors with regards to what makes a combatant. This plays a specific importance as this definition is significant when designing various DDR programmes.
Jennings, Kathleen M. “Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies—The Case of Liberia.” Global Governance, vol. 14, no. 3, 2008, pp. 327–345. JSTOR
This article uses Liberia as a case study to show the vagueness and contradictory nature of reintegration and how this can significantly change the strategy of many DDR programs. This change often leaves many programs unable to meet the initial needs and ultimately lead to a massive failure. Additionally, Jennings provides strong recommendations for the improvement of this process by promoting the use of local actors within this process rather than outsiders in order to create a stronger chance for reintegration to succeed.
(2013) Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia, International Interactions, 39:4, 535-557
This article examines the role of women within the DDR process and explores how they have been ignored from the DDR process. Specifically, it looks at female ex-combatants and points to the need for frameworks that address this problem. This will increase the effectiveness of the DDR process and allow for future programs to implement a more gendered approach to the process.
Full bibliography
Jaye, Thomas. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia. International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Liberia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf.
Liberia: Rehabilitation and Reintegration Projects Approved for Ex-Combatants. United Nations Mission in Liberia, 2004, https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberia-rehabilitation-and-reintegration-projects-approved-ex-combatants
“Liberia SSR Snapshot.” International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), The International Security Sector Advisory Team, Aug. 2018, issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Liberia-SSR-Snapshot.
“Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers.” Liberia: The Promises of Peace for 21,000 Child Soldiers, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr34/006/2004/en/.
“UNICEF Backs the Re-Commencement of DDRR in Liberia.” UNICEF, 16 Apr. 2004, www.unicef.org/media/media_20447.html.
United Nations. “Liberia's Disarmament Process off to a Good Start.” UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2003/12/3fd495764/liberias-disarmament-process-good-start.html.
United Nations Security Council, Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/958 (11 December 2006), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20S2006958.pdf
United Nations Security Council, Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2016/706 (12 August 2016), https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1624814.pdf
United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/969 (15 November 2016), https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_unmil_sg_report_15_november_