Peace Processes and Policies Database

[Nepali army running exercises: from Spotlight Nepal]

Defense & Army Restructuring
The main issue of SSR within Nepal is that of political will:
"Security sector reforms (SSR) is a relatively new term in the Nepal’s security discourse. The Royal Nepal Army never felt it necessary to ‘reform’ itself..."[1]
This is one of the vital issues to be addressed by SSR in Nepal as the country transitions from a monarchy to a democratic government. As such, the new Nepal Army (formerly Nepal Royal Army) was a force meant to primarily protect the monarchy. Due to the transition, it is important for the army to have the interests of the Nepali people at the forefront. Finally, the it must be able to reintegrate those on the Maoist side of the conflict into its own army as to avoid another conflict.

[Nepal Supreme Court: from Government Website]

Justice System
Throughout Nepal to this day there is an uptick in armed criminals and potential spoilers of peace. "The need to undertake police, justice, and intelligence reform has been increasingly emphasized due to the increase in domestic and cross-border crime." [2] Some of these spoilers are splinter groups of the Maoist army others are organized crime groups. Thus, one of the primary concerns of SSR that has been addressed with the creation of the Nepal Police Force and Justice System was that of police reform and justice reform.

[UN Troops & Nepal Army at a peace ceremony: From UNMISS website 

DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration & Reconciliation)
As is with most SSR policies, DDRR is vital. DDRR in Nepal is no different. The demobilization is the first major step in Nepal, as both sides agreeing to demobilize and disarm in achieving peace. Then, due to the change in government a majority of those in the PLA, and the Maoist side of the conflict had been discriminated due to class a real socio-economic solution had to be proposed for peace to last in Nepal. Another issue in this is that there is a subsection of the PLA that are women and child combatants. So, reintegrating civilians back into civil society as well as establishing rule of law. Another important part to address is the reintegration, and rehabilitation of citizens throughout the change in government. This is one of the most important parts as the conflict within Nepal has been one that has spanned over a decade, so to establish peace it is important to reintegrate all combatants.

[Word cloud from Samriddhi Foundation, a Nepal advocacy group]

Good Governance (GG) & Democracy

One of the key issues of the conflict are the socio-economic disparity during Nepal’s time as kingdom. This led to the Communist Party of Nepal’s violent uprising as the PLA to replace the royal parliamentary system. As such, the government of Nepal must work for the citizens of the country. Furthermore, there must be a push for the army and military forces to be democratize as well, and as addressed above the army must protect the people of the nation. This will, in turn move better political will within Nepal’s citizens as well as lead to longer lasting peace.

[1]: Pandey, Nishchal N. “Security Sector Reforms in Nepal.” South Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 253–271., doi:10.1177/097152310901600206.

[2]: “Security Sector Reform in Nepal: The Role of Civil Society.” USIP.org, United States Government , Dec. 2006, www.usip.org/publications/2006/12/security-sector-reform-nepal-role-civil-society.

Nepalese Armed Forces: During and prior to the civil war, the Nepalese Army (NA) was known as the Royal Nepalese Army to reflect its allegiance to the monarchy.The Nepalese Army was poorly configured and deployed to face the challenge posed by the Maoists during the insurgency; doctrine and training was predisposed towards the defence of Kathmandu rather than on maintaining internal order. When the insurgency began in 1996, the army had a strength of 46,000 personnel and consisted of 1 Royal Guard Brigade, 7 infantry brigades, 44 independent infantry companies, 1 Special Force brigade, 1 artillery brigade and 1 engineering brigade. The small air force consisted of one Bae-748, 2 Skyvans and 11 helicopters (of various makes). The army was however unable to achieve a decisive victory over the Maoist insurgents,

The integration of the PLA into the NA was a major demand of the former rebel group before entering into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. Apart from the Maoists, seven leading political parties who were parties to this agreement also felt that restructuring of the NA and rehabilitation of the PLA cadres within the army would bring a logical conclusion to the peace process. Given the importance of this issue, it was also included in the Interim Constitution (IC). The new government led by the Maoists accorded due importance to this issue and formed the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC), headed by the Prime Minister, in October 2008.

PLA (Maoist):

The PLA was formed by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to fight against the government of Nepal. Estimated as having a strength of 19602 soldiers who were combat capable, the PLA operated as a semi-conventional guerilla force, wearing uniforms and operating with a defined command structure under central party control.

PLA soldiers were equipped to wildly varying standards, reflecting the organisation’s limited industrial capacity and logistics network- combatants wielded arms ranging from .303 Lee-Enfield Rifles (which had been replaced by the British Armed Forces in frontline service in 1957, who had concluded that they were antiquated as battlefield weapons), to FN FAL battle rifles and modern assault rifles such as the M16A1 or Norinco Type 56. The actual conduct of the insurgency was based upon the Maoist principle the “the party must command the gun”, with political officers being utilised to maintain ideological rigour within combat forces. In addition, the insurgents deployed IEDs to inflict casualties on the RNA whilst limiting the risk posed to the comparatively small number of combatants available for military operations. However, the PLA, in contrast with many insurgent groups, displayed excellent infantry tactics against the RNA, enabling them to conduct sophisticated operations against military and police installations. (John Mackinlay (2002) A military assessment of the Nepalese Maoist Movement, Jane’s Intelligence Review, December)

Following the signing of the CPA, ex-combatants spent more than five years in cantonments around the country before the final decision was made for reintegration into the army and civilian life.This process was directed by central commanders of the PLA and government forces, with minimal consultation of the mid-low level PLA combatants in the cantonments.. Weapons were retained within the cantonments under the terms of the agreement brokered by the UN between Maoist and Nepalese Government forces- “all arms and ammunition except those required for the security of the cantonments shall securely be stored in the cantonment and the keys shall be kept by the concerned party after installing a single lock. In the process of installing such a lock, a device with a siren for the monitoring by the United Nations for its record shall be assembled”- due to the fact that the Maoists saw themselves as victors, they had insisted on this agreement as it would allow them to return to armed struggle if necessary.

Maoist Women:  Women constituted 19.63% of the total verified combatants fighting for the PLA (Maoist), with 3846 of 19602 PLA fighters being women, according to the post conflict analysis conducted by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (Dahal 2015: 187). In spite of this, the United Nations Population Fund  (UNFPA) noted that there was no participation by women during negotiations on the 12 point understanding between the Maoists and the seven political parties signed in New Delhi in November 2005. Furthermore, no women participated during the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) in November 2006, despite their involvement in the civil war as both combatants and support elements of the Maoist PLA.

Source:https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351657433

Child Soldier use: In areas firmly under their control, particularly in the insurgency's heartland in Nepal's west and far west, the Maoists operated a "one family, one child" program whereby each family had to provide a recruit or face severe punishment. Once recruited, children were kept in the ranks through punishment or the fear of it; any children who considered escape also had to consider the real possibility that the Maoists would exact reprisal upon their families. The Maoists used a variety of techniques for recruiting children: kidnapping of individual children; abduction of large groups of children, often from schools; and use of propaganda campaigns to attract children as "volunteers."

Source: https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/02/01/children-ranks/maoists-use-child-soldiers-nepal

The Seven Party Alliance: comprised of Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Sadbhavana Party and United Left Front, an alliance formed to resolve the constitutional crisis and the Maoist insurgency through peaceful agitation. The Seven Party alliance was present for the Comprehensive Peace Accord Talks 2005 onward.

UN:

UNMIN: UNSC Resolution 1740 23 January 2007

The United Nations Country Team including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other United Nations representatives in Nepal,

1.           Decides to establish a United Nations political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the following mandate based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report:

       (a)   To monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;

       (b)   To assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, as provided for in that agreement;

       (c)   To assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements;

       (d)   To provide technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere, in consultation with the parties;

       (e)   To provide a small team of electoral monitors to review all technical aspects of the electoral process, and report on the conduct of the election;

2.           Decides that the mandate of UNMIN, in view of the particular circumstances, will be for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution, and expresses its intention to terminate or further extend that mandate upon request of the Government of Nepal, taking into consideration the Secretary-General’s expectation that UNMIN will be a focussed mission of limited duration;
3.           Welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal that his Special Representative will coordinate the United Nations effort in Nepal in support of the peace process, in close consultation with the relevant parties in Nepal and in close cooperation with other international actors;
4.           Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress in implementing this resolution;
5.           Requests the parties in Nepal to take the necessary steps to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNMIN and associated personnel in executing the tasks defined in the mandate;
6.           Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNMIN was responsible for implementing numerous CPA policies with the agreement of the Maoist and government factions in Nepal. A key example of this is the registration of arms belonging to both the NA and PLA, so as to prevent the proliferation of unaccounted for small arms. The UN also monitored the DDR process though agencies such as the UNPFA, which analysed demographics within the negotiations and combatant makeup. UNMIN operated from 23 January 2007 until January 15, 2011.

In addition, following reports of child soldier use by the PLA, the UN included Nepal in a list of 7 nations targeted for a newly created systematic monitoring and reporting mechanism to improve the collection of information on grave violations against children in conflict situations, under UNSC Resolution 1612.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch staff conducted investigations of battle sites in Nepal, often within mere days of kinetic events, noting the presence of child soldiers recruited by Maoist forces. In addition, HRW conducted interviews with former child soldiers, documenting their recruitment and responsibilities within the PLA to secure evidence of such activities. This was particularly crucial in undermining the PLA’s claims that they did not proactively recruit child soldiers during the conflict, stimulating the UN to target Nepal under Security Council Resolution 1612.

USA:

The United States, following the 9/11 attacks, underwent a significant evolution in the provision of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) with regards to counter-terrorism, adopting a more vigorous and proactive approach in its efforts to support foreign governments against all forms of non-state actor violence; this translated into an increased willingness to support the Nepalese government and armed forces in their struggle against the Maoist insurgency. A 2002 supplemental appropriations package provided $12 million of FMF in addition to $2 million already funded. The total of $14 million in FMF to Nepal in 2002 came after no allocation of FMF in 2001. In 2003, forces from US Pacific Command participated in exercises with Nepalese Army and Police to improve interoperability and train Nepal in antiterrorism techniques. (Vaughn, Bruce. Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2006. p19) In total, US assistance to Nepal was over $40 million dollars per year between 2002 and 2006, although FMF decreased significantly after 2005 as the conflict approached resolution.

“The People’s War in Nepal” and the following conflicts with different political groups has reformed the government system in Nepal. One of the main sectors that was reformed during the Wars and conflict is the Security Sector Reforms (SSR). These reforms has led to Nepal to become a stronger nation in following human rights as well as, building a more confident government system for both its citizens and the rest of the world. However, achieving the reforms were not easy due to the tension between the different groups that were involved.

One of the biggest issues with the security sectors in the nepal is the “role of monarchy and its unwholesome association with the security forces as an obstacle to institutionalising democracy and initiating peacebuilding in Nepal” (Dhungana, 70). When the Monarchy faced opposition from the society and from opposing political parties the monarchy employed the military to fight, this was also the case with “The People’s War”. Due to the strong ties that and the power that the military was given by the  Monarchy the “security sector (especially the army) has stood historically as the pillar of an authoritarian system” (Dhungana, 73). In order for the SSR to reform, a change in the Nepal government system is needed however, the peace talks needed to change the system was hindered by the extreme views of the Monarchy and the Maoist. The ideologies of the parties were on opposing end of the political spectrum. The Maoist groups wanted a strong presidency however, the congress prefered Parliamentary rule which, caused political instability and caused more tension and the democratic reform to be stagnant. The transformation of the Nepal Military and Army is “the wider security sector, is of central importance to the conflict transformation and peacebuilding process in Nepal” (Dhungana, 73) however, due to the disagreements with the political parties and the Monarchy system talks of SSR was unable to until the end of the war.

An external factor that affected the success of the SSR during the war was caused by the third party intervention, the Media. During the conflict between the government and the rebels groups, the media had covered the issues and reported to the citizens however, the Media did not “give adequate coverage to the different side of the identity issues” (Lawoti, 138) but instead “gave a lopsided amount of space and airtime to federalism’s foes” (Lawoti, 138). Many of the citizens were ill-informed but those who were from a higher socioeconomic class were unaffected, were usually the supporters of the Monarchy, continue to dominate the political system which, allowed the unfair treatments.  Due to many citizens not being educated on Nepal political situation, they were not aware of the graveness of the issues and which resulted in less discussion on the issues of SSR. The instability between the government & military, and the lack of public pressure allowed the involved parties to take their time and this resulted in a less responsive government and caused the SSR to delay.  

Security Sector Reform was not a topic of interest in Nepal’s political agenda until recently. Monarchy was the main form of government agency in Nepal and the Monarch had control over the Security Sectors of its governance in the Military. The Military was the frontline of Nepal’s security sector. During the Monarchy reign, the military under the command of the head, committed many atrocious acts that violated human rights and did not give confidence to the citizens. However, after the war between the rebel groups and the attention of the UN, SSR is slowly being transformed in Nepal. The success of SSR in Nepal is through the reformation of democracy in Nepal, and the implementation of law and regulation from third party interventions.

In 1996, the start of The People War in Nepal, ideas of SSR was introduced to Nepal through peace talks however, SSR was not implemented until the end of the war in 2006 with the signing of the CPA, also known as Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement ended the armed conflict and the parties involved got together shortly after and discussed the need for a reformation in the Ministry of Defence. This was a crucial step in the success of SSR because it allowed the government to transform the army, police force, and also integrated ex-combatants into the system. Most importantly sections of the CPA addresses the democratisation Nepal’s Army which, allowed the Army to recognize that the “Nepalese people as the ultimate source of power, following the principles of accountability, transparency, representation, rule of law and human rights, social justice and good governance, and international provisions and standards” (Upreti & Vanhoutte 172). The refocus of the Nepalese Army allowed for SSR to transform. The reconstruction of the political system in Nepal has allowed for SSR to advance which, helps with building peace within the country.

During the peace talks, many international actors were involved. Third party interventions are one of the reasons to successful SSR in Nepal. In Nepal case, intervention from United Nations, UNMIN and the AMMA helped with the process of SSR in Nepal. The main purpose of these third party interventions was to oversee and help make sure that promises were being held by the different parties. The interventionist, also helped implement and teach SSR to the government through support. Some examples of the contribution are: The UN helped the registration of the ex-combattants, AMMA helped with the rehabilitating of the ex-combattants and UNMIN helped with the registration of the armed weapons between the two groups. By having the “involvement of the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in monitoring Nepal’s peace process the Agreement on the Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), the promulgation of the interim constitution, the completion of the Constituent Assembly election (on 10 April 2008) and the declaration of the republic have paved the path for a wider SSR process in Nepal” (Upreti & Vanhoutte 172) in the future. Although Nepal has advanced a lot in SSR, Nepal still have a lot of improvements to make in their SSR systems.

United Nations Security Council President. “Statement by the President reaffirming peace processes. January 2011” http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/nepal%20sprst%202011%201.pdf

United Nations. “United Nations Security Council S/RES/1740 2007: Resolution Establishing UN Mission in Nepal for twelve months” Kathmandu, Nepal: UN Security Council. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Nepal%20SRES%201740.pdf

United Nations. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Nov. 2006: Signed Between Nepal Government and Communist Party of Nepal” Kathmandu, Nepal, UN Security Council.
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_061122_Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CPN%20%28Maoist%29.pdf

United Nations. “Letter From Nepal Requesting UNMIN Assistance: Nov. 2006”  Kathmandu, Nepal to President of UN Security Council.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Nepal%20S2006920.pdf

United Nations.  “UNHR Nepal Conflict Report: Executive Summary: 2012” Kathmandu, Nepal.

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_ExecSumm_Nepal_Conflict_report2012.pdf

USIP. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Nov. 2006: In Original Nepali” Embassy of Nepal, Washington, D.C. United States Institute of Peace: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/nepal_cpa_20061121_nepali.pdf

Al Jazeera. “Timeline of Nepal's Civil War.” News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 8 Apr. 2008, www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2008/04/2008615165932572216.html.

This timeline is critical for understanding the Nepal Civil war, it provides context and a good outline for what events occurred and when. Furthermore, in terms of Security Sector Reform it not only helped to focus in on when things happened but why they happened as well. It shows key events throughout the conflict and helps to provide perspective about what actions have been undertaken to achieve SSR and build peace in the country.

Anderlini, Sanam Narghi, and Camille Pampell Conaway. “Security Sector Reform.” Inclusive Security, Apr. 2012, www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/46_security_sector_reform.pdf.

This source is less focused on Nepal as a whole but SSR as a concept. It helped to provide better understanding and was crucial in elucidating some of the SSR topics that were covered in class. It was an expansion of theory. Though it does have a gender-equality slant, it's definitely still important to understanding SSR, how policies are implemented and who oversees them.

Battarai, Rajan, and Rosy Cave. “The Concept of Human Security and Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal.” Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal A Collection of Essays, Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS), 2008, pp. 13–38.

This chapter from a very helpful book source was crucial in understanding the changing role of the government in the transition from a kingdom to a democracy. Though we did use other parts of the book as sources to further understand SSR in Nepal, this chapter in particular was important to show the difference of how the Nepali army is meant to act and how the People's army resorted to fear tactics and what this would mean for DDRR. It addresses the changing political atmosphere in Nepal as well as how this would reflect on security sector reform.

Dhungana, Shiva K. “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 70–78., doi:10.1080/15423166.2007.360918411040.

This journal article from the Journal of Peacebuilding & Development was crucial as a post reflection on what went right during initiatives that were being set in place in Nepal. It further shows the roots of the Maoist uprising and the tensions of how it happened. Further, it emphasizes on the need for SSR in the country. It helped provide an analysis for internal security issues in Nepal as well as external issues which arose from US and India interfering throughout the decade long conflict. It expanded our understanding of the Nepal army's role within the conflict as well as moving into the future as their government transitions.

“Nepal’s Peace Process: A Brief Overview.” International Security Sector Advisory Team , July 2013, issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's Peace Process_A Brief Overview_Eng (2).pdf.

This policy paper published by The Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) helps to provide a multitude of information for the Nepal Conflict. At its forefront it is a brief overview of the entire peace process and peacebuilding that took place. It provides numbers and figures to help elucidate the amount of socio-economic as well as physical loss throughout the conflict. It stresses the need for Good Governance in Nepal as it shows that managing the funds as the government transitions is crucial for the success of peace in Nepal.

Pandey, Nishchal N. “Security Sector Reforms in Nepal.” South Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 253–271., doi:10.1177/097152310901600206.

This Sage Journal article by Nischal Pandey is critical to understanding the framework that has to exist for the success of SSR in Nepal. It describes what has to occur during the state of transition between a monarchy society to the democratic society that Nepal is now. It helped to provide research on how the various armies are best reintegrated into society and how this is important more Nepal civil society. Furthermore, the paper stresses the need for a holistic approach towards SSR which is crucial for peacebuilding.

“Security Sector Reform in Nepal: The Role of Civil Society.” USIP.org, United States Government , Dec. 2006, www.usip.org/publications/2006/12/security-sector-reform-nepal-role-civil-society.

This publication was very helpful for providing a western perspective of peace that had to occur in Nepal. Not only did it echo the key issues that are brought up in the various articles describing the reform that has to occur in Nepal but it provided perspective on why they are important. It again stresses the need for SSR and DDRR within the country and why it was important to bring together the Maoist armies and reform the Nepal army to better reflect the needs of the people. It discusses on a programmatic level what has to occur for Nepal to have a lasting peace.

Singh, Ajit Kumar, et al. “Nepal: Consolidating The Peace – Analysis.” Eurasia Review, Eurasia Review , 24 Apr. 2012, www.eurasiareview.com/24042012-nepal-consolidating-the-peace-analysis/.

This article by Ajit Singh highlights the consolidation of the PLA into the Nepal army in early 2012. This was a crucial step for Security Sector Reform in Nepal as it showed not only the demobilization of the Maoist forces but also how they were reintegrated into the Nepalese army. It highlights the processes that were taken to achieve this process. But also it describes the problems and issues that arose from reintegrating said soldiers. It provides explanation for the cantonments where they were held and what this was like for them as well.

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Al Jazeera. “Timeline of Nepal's Civil War.” News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 8 Apr. 2008, www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2008/04/2008615165932572216.html.

Anderlini, Sanam Narghi, and Camille Pampell Conaway. “Security Sector Reform.” Inclusive Security, Apr. 2012, www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/46_security_sector_reform.pdf.

Battarai, Rajan, and Rosy Cave. “The Concept of Human Security and Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal.” Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal A Collection of Essays, Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS), 2008, pp. 13–38.

Dhungana, Shiva K. “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection.” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 70–78., doi:10.1080/15423166.2007.360918411040.

Human Rights Watch. (2019). Children in the Ranks | The Maoists’ Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal. [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/02/01/children-ranks/maoists-use-child-soldiers-nepal [Accessed 31 Mar. 2019].

(John Mackinlay (2002) A military assessment of the Nepalese Maoist Movement, Jane’s Intelligence Review, December)

Kolås, Å. (2017). Women, Peace and Security in Nepal: From Civil War to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 1st Edition (Hardback) - Routledge. [online] Routledge.com. Available at: https://www.routledge.com/Women-Peace-and-Security-in-Nepal-From-Civil-War-to-Post-Conflict-Reconstruction/Kolas/p/book/9781138067349 [Accessed 31 Mar. 2019].

Lawoti, M. (2014). Shifting tides in south asia: Reform and resistance in nepal. Journal ofDemocracy, 25(2), 131-145.

“Nepal’s Peace Process: A Brief Overview.” International Security Sector Advisory Team , July 2013, issat.dcaf.ch/download/111494/2023947/Nepal's Peace Process_A Brief Overview_Eng (2).pdf.

Pandey, Nishchal N. “Security Sector Reforms in Nepal.” South Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 253–271., doi:10.1177/097152310901600206.

“Security Sector Reform in Nepal: The Role of Civil Society.” USIP.org, United States Government , Dec. 2006, www.usip.org/publications/2006/12/security-sector-reform-nepal-role-civil-society.

Singh, Ajit Kumar, et al. “Nepal: Consolidating The Peace – Analysis.” Eurasia Review, Eurasia Review , 24 Apr. 2012, www.eurasiareview.com/24042012-nepal-consolidating-the-peace-analysis/.

Upreti, Bishnu Raj. “Nepal From War to Peace.” Peace Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, pp. 102–107., doi:10.1080/10402659.2012.651040.

Upreti, B.R (2009). Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities in Security. Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, 165–87.

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