When Indonesia occupied Timor-Leste between 1975-1999, Timorese people suffered gross human rights violations, including torture, starvation and extrajudicial killings. The violence intensified after the 1999 independence referendum, as Indonesia attempted to retain power through mass killings and village razes. Around 200,000 Timorese died during the conflict, out of a population of 600,000 [1]. In October 1999, the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) was established to assist Timor-Leste in building capacity for self-government. In part of a response to the coalition government’s call for a truth and reconciliation commission, under Regulation 2000/10, UNTAET established the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) [2].

Under its mandate, CAVR aimed to uncover the truth about the conflict and respond to victims’ needs. Within its operation from 2002-2005, CAVR held eight national hearings, provided urgent reparations to 700 victims, and conducted 52 community-based court proceedings. CAVR’s final report, entitled Chega! (Portuguese for ‘no more’), was delivered to then-President Xanana Gusmao in October 2005 [3]. Critics believe that barriers existed in CAVR that left justice incomplete, such as the lack of power to bring perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice, especially those in Indonesia. Regardless, CAVR had its success through its robust framework and vision that incorporated groundbreaking research methods, cultural integration within crime prosecution, and more.

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[1] The Center for Justice and Accountability. “Timor-Leste (East Timor).” The Center for Justice and Accountability, The Center for Justice and Accountability, cja.org/where-we-work/archives/timor-leste-east-timor/?list=type.
[2] Hirst, Megan, and Howard Varney. International Center for Transitional Justice, 2005, Justice Abandoned? An Assessment of the Serious Crimes Process in East Timor, www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Justice-Abandoned-2005-English.pdf.
[3] “After 10 Years, CAVR Report Still Resonates in Timor-Leste and Around the World.” International Center for Transitional Justice, International Center for Transitional Justice, 23 Feb. 2016, www.ictj.org/news/10-years-cavr-report-timor-leste-truth.

The stated objective of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, known as the Portuguese acronym CAVR (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste) was to promote human rights and national reconciliation in Timor-Leste after years of violence and political instability [1]. The mandate of the TRC can be separated into two broad categories: 

1. Truth-seeking 

Under CAVR’s truth-seeking mandate, its task was to investigate violations of human rights which occurred between 25 April 1975 and 25 October 1999. This period included the violence during and after the entry of Indonesian forces in December 1975 and the massacre which occurred after the referendum in 1999. A significant aspect of CAVR’s truth-seeking mandate was that it granted extensive investigatory powers such that it could freely request information nationally and abroad, order witnesses to testify before the commission and was given search and seizure powers [1]. Moreover, it was instructed to examine both the role of international state and non-state actors and inquire into whether the violations were patterns of systemic policies authorized by state and non-state actors. CAVR was to produce a final report documenting these findings and using objective truths, to deliver recommendations concerning legal, political or administrative reforms “to prevent the repetition of human rights violations and respond to the needs of victims of human rights violations” [2]. CAVR emphasized its truth-seeking function through social science methods: household survey and comprehensive survey to produce two TRC databases [3]. The key issues addressed by the CAVR are as follows:

The Violation of Human Rights Perpetrated by Indonesia

Aligning to its mandate, CAVR examined and reported on human rights violations committed by the Indonesian government and Indonesian National Military (TNI) which included torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, indiscriminate bombing and the use of chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, its truth-seeking function also focused on the crimes committed on women and children. It investigated the reports of mutilation of women, gang rapes, sexual enslavement and violence against children. CAVR sought to examine these violations and determine if the violations were systemic and widespread and whether they were an explicit policy to demoralize the Timor-Leste resistance [4]. One significant case of indiscriminate killing the CAVR was mandated to investigate was the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 where Indonesian troops fired upon a crowd of unarmed student demonstrators near the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Many of the casualties from this event occurred after the shooting when Indonesian soldiers killed wounded demonstrators and secretly disposed of their bodies. This case was significant because it drew international attention such that the Indonesian government had to establish their own Committee of Inquiry. However, these efforts by the Indonesian government to investigate and punish the perpetrators were largely inadequate— absolving all responsibility from Indonesian authorities for the massacre and attributing the violence to mistakes and lack of control [5].

Forced Displacement and Famine

 The CAVR inquired into displacement and famine. It established that these consequences were largely attributable to Indonesian military campaigns [6]. The indiscriminate killing, torture, rape committed by the Indonesian military during the invasion and the period of occupation forced the Timorese people to flee to the mountain districts controlled by a Timorese resistance group, the Fretilin. However, resistance groups did not have adequate supplies to provide food and medical aid. While they developed farms to feed the influx of fleeing civilians, the farms were destroyed by airstrikes which released poisonous chemicals on the crops, effectively destroying any source of food [7]. Therefore, the greatest loss of human life (approximately 100,000-180,000 Timorese civilian deaths) during this period occurred due to famine and famine-related diseases [8]. When civilians returned to the Indonesian-occupied territories to flee the famine, they were often publicly executed, tortured and forced into resettlement camps where the lack of basic survival needs led to more civilian deaths [9]. 

The Support of International Actors to Indonesia 

The widespread violations of human rights, invasion, and occupation by the Indonesian government materialized because of the direct and indirect support of international Western actors who saw benefit from an alliance with resource-rich Indonesia. The CAVR was to investigate the extent that international actors played in allowing these human rights violations to materialize and their motives for supporting the Indonesian government and military from committing these atrocities. For example, the United States had provided billions of dollars in military equipment, training, financial aid and diplomatic support to the Indonesian government from the Carter administration (1977-1980) to the Bill Clinton administration in 1993. This support was integral to Indonesia’s ultimate decision to invade Timor-Leste and occupy the territory until 1999. Moreover, before the Indonesian invasion, the UK ambassador to Indonesia stated that “the people of East Timor are in no condition to exercise the right to self-determination” which implicitly consented to the absorption of Timor-Leste into Indonesia [10].

A key issue that critics felt that CAVR omitted was the lack of intervention from international actors to prevent the atrocities committed by the Indonesian government during the occupation and 1999 referendum. For example, the Australian government was acquiescent to Indonesia’s plans and other Western governments such as Canada and Germany who were also complicit to Indonesia’s actions. No international actors (US, Britain, Australia, Japan) who had a sizable power over Indonesia influenced the Indonesian government to prevent violence following the referendum despite evidence showing that they were aware of Indonesia’s intentions to not grant a peaceful transition of power [11]. Before the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, government officials in the US, Canada and Australia argued that indiscriminate killing and other violations of human rights had ended under the new Suharto regime in Indonesia, implying that intervention was not necessary [12]. However, CAVR largely omitted the impact that non-intervention and complicity had in emboldening Indonesia’s government to commit human rights violations. 

The Violations of the Rights of the Child 

Another key issue addressed by the CAVR was the human rights violations perpetrated against children by all actors of the conflict, namely, the Indonesian military and the Timorese pro-autonomy militias such as Tim Saka, Tim Alfa and Halilintar. This issue was an important consideration because following the invasion, children were forced to carry ammunition and supplies for the Indonesian battalions—the impact which resulted in forced separation of children from their communities and subjected them to intense physical labour unsuitable for their physical well-being. In addition, CAVR investigated sexual violence perpetrated openly to children by both the Indonesian military and the Timorese paramilitary groups. CAVR inquired into the violations of children’s rights committed by the paramilitaries such as how children were recruited into paramilitary ranks by coercion and intimidation. The harmful impacts of the violation such as psychological trauma, feelings of guilt, displacement and separation from communities and the hardships in reintegrating into their communities because of ostracization were investigated [13]. 

Economic Exploitation and the Coffee Sector 

In addition to truth-seeking on violations committed by state and non-state actors, the CAVR also focused on structural economic inequality and how policies during the Indonesian occupation further exacerbated economic inequalities. For example, in the coffee industry, Timor-Leste’s largest export sector, there was corruption by Timor-Leste’s larger coffee exporter, PT Denok, who helped finance Indonesia’s invasion and occupation in exchange for protecting their coffee monopoly [14]. The Indonesian government also implemented policies that transferred the control of Timor-Leste’s coffee production into state proxies. In this corrupt arrangement, Indonesian military officials and the Indonesian government made enormous profits while small coffee producers in Timor-Leste earned almost no profit nor earned an income to support an adequate standard of living [15].

2. Reconciliation 

The CAVR was mandated to promote reconciliation to alleviate community divisions,  reintegrate individual actors who had participated in minor crimes back into their communities, and grant reparations to victims and to facilitate the process of healing for the victims. There were various methods to facilitate reconciliation. CAVR held public hearings where leaders from various Timorese political parties publicly admitted to their crimes, expressed remorse, and accepted responsibility for their crimes. CAVR also hosted hearings for victims to share their experiences. The hearings allowed victims to restore their dignity, release the anger, and fill in the historical gaps  through multiple victim perspectives and experiences [16]. A significant component in the CAVR’s mandate was the Community Reconciliation Procedure (CRPs) where individuals who committed minor criminal acts such as ex-militias could admit to their guilt, express remorse in a community hearings, and seek to be re-integrated into their former communities. In CRP, a panel would determine the “appropriate act of reconciliation” which could include community service, reparation or public apology [17]. Under the mandate, the individuals who engaged in “less serious crimes'' could participate, which were determined by the nature of the crime, the total number of crimes committed by the deponent, and their role in the criminal act.

A key issue that CAVR did not address was the reconciliation and reintegration for actors who had engaged in “serious crimes” which included genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture. Instead, the CAVR could only investigate serious crimes but prosecution would occur under the Office of the General Prosecutor. However, critics expressed the barrier in clearly demarcating between serious and less-serious crimes as deponents could commit crimes of both nature, which may bar certain deponents from reconciliation. Moreover, the CAVR was not granted the power to grant amnesty which created barriers in incentivizing individuals to participate in the CRP process. These issues are closely linked to the barriers to the TRC process discussed in the subsequent section [18]. 

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[1] Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 105. 
[2] United Nations (New York, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR. July 1996, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/untaetR/Reg10e.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2020.  
[3] Roosa, John. "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 576. 
[4] Nevins, Joseph. “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities” Pacific Affairs vol. 80, no. 3, Winter 2007-2008, pp. 594. 
[5] Dunn, James. “Genocide in East Timor.” Centuries of genocide: essays and eyewitness accounts, Samuel Totten and WIlliam S. Parsons, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, pp. 292.   
[6] “7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 4. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm. 
[7] Dunn, “Genocide in East Timor,” pp. 289. 
[8] Nevins, “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities,” pp. 594. 
[9] Dunn, “Genocide in East Timor,” pp. 289. 
[10] Nevins, “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities,” pp. 595. 
[11] Nevins, “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities,” pp. 597. 
[12] Dunn, “Genocide in East Timor,”pp. 289. 
[13] “7.8 Violation of the Rights of the Child.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 2-3. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm. 
[14] Nevins, “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities,” pp. 601. 
[15] “7.9 Economic and Social Rights.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 11. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm. 
[16]  Nevins, “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities,” pp. 599. 
[17] Lyons, "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor," pp. 105. 
[18] Lyons, "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor," pp. 100.

Timor-Leste:
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) and Special Panels for Serious Crimes:
In late 1999, UNTAET established SCIU and Special Panels within the Dili District Court. The two bodies had exclusive jurisdiction over serious crimes during 1999; SCIU was responsible for indictment preparations, while Special Panels managed prosecution [1].

National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT):
Formerly an umbrella organization of Timorese groups dedicated to resistance, CNRT became a coalition party in April 1998. CNRT proposed and subsequently unanimously endorsed the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in August 2000 [2].

Steering Committee:
A committee comprised of CNRT, human rights NGOs, the Catholic Church, Association of Ex-Political Prisoners, UNTAET and UNHCR that carried out the consultation process for CAVR between September 2000-January 2001. The committee held community-based hearings across all districts and formulated the Community Reconciliation Process [3]. 

Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation or Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste (CAVR)
Mandated by UNTAET Regulation 2001/10 and led by seven Timorese commissioners, CAVR was an independent truth commission that operated from 2001-2005. CAVR investigated truth seeking for the violence that occurred in 1974-1999, moderated community reconciliation for less serious crimes, and formulated recommendations based on their findings [4].

Community Reconciliation Process (CRP):
Within CAVR, a program called CRP was created to address low-level crimes and reintegrate offenders into their community through public hearings. The hearings fused legal principles with traditional practices, and involved local leaders, formal courts, and community members [5].

Lia nain:
For every CRP, a traditional elder was part of the investigating team. They ensured CRPs followed nahe biti boot, the traditional Timorese conflict resolution procedure that involves ceremonial elements and local beliefs called lisan [6].

Timorese political leaders:
In a public hearing, some political leaders who were directly involved, complicit or representative of violent institutions (called ‘agents of the process’) during the conflict publicly apologized for their personal or organization’s actions. The unprecedented public expression of regret and reconciliation with civilians was broadcasted across the nation [7].

• Agents of the process: President of Timor Leste, Xanana Gusmão, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, Nobel Peace Laureate and Foreign Minister, José Ramos Horta and then-President of Fretilin, Francisco Xavier do Amaral

Acolhimento and Victim Support Division:
Part of the CAVR, the Division focused on outreach to Timorese refugees in West Timor, monitor of recent returnees, as well as a number of victim support programs including healing workshops and an Urgent Reparations scheme [8]. 

Coalition of West Timor NGOs:
In 2003, a coalition of seven NGOs from West Timor was created within CAVR to help carry out information dissemination, raise awareness, and promote dialogue with Timorese refugees in West Timor [9]. 

Fokupers, Arte Moris, Canossian Sisters of Balide:
CAVR formed a partnership with these organizations for its healing workshop initiative. The healing workshops were aimed to provide emotional support, referrals, and grant use planning for victims [10].

Working Group for Victim Support:
CAVR established a unit to create and oversee policies related to victim support, consisting of three Commissioners and three human rights NGOs: Assosiasi HAK, Fokupers and NGO ET-Wave. Their programs focused on working with victims and their communities [11]. 

Chega for Us Association (ACbit):
An organization that aims to raise awareness on the Chega! report. ACbit’s programs include outreach, research and training, advocacy and community organization, as well as victim assistance based on CAVR recommendations [12].

Indonesia:
Government of Indonesia:
The government initially denied involvement of Indonesian military in the violence that occurred in Timor-Leste, and rejected the formation of an international tribunal. The government also refused to transfer Indonesian suspects to Timor-Leste for trial, and consistently ignored a Memorandum of Understanding that outlines mutual assistance [13]. 

National Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste (KPP-HAM):
Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights created a special team to investigate and record gross human rights violations that occurred in 1999. The subsequent report concluded institutional responsibility of the Indonesian military, and called for the establishment of what would then become the ad hoc human rights tribunal [14]. 

Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on Timor-Leste:
A tribunal was formed in Jakarta to try crimes against humanity in Timor-Leste during the period of April-September 1999. The tribunal was largely criticized for an evident lack of political will in prosecution, insufficient resources for judicial and prosecutorial proceedings, and weak conformity to international law [15].

 Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR):
AJAR is a non-profit human rights organization in Jakarta that advocates for accountability, justice and education on mass human rights violations. AJAR conducts research and writing to analyze the impact of Chega! in Indonesia, and supports the report’s recommendations [16].

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[1]  Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, 2005, pp. 1–3, Country Summary: East Timor, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/pdf/etimor.pdf.
[2] Hirst, Megan, and Ann Linnarssonn. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2010, pp. 7–8, Children and Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/355544784.pdf.
[3] “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 8-10. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[4] Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste. Timor-Leste, 2010. Archived Web Site. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0003485/>.
[5] “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 10-14. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[6]  “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 16-23. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[7]  “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 37-38. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[8] “10. Acolhimento and victim support.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 1–6. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[9] “10. Acolhimento and victim support.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 6-11. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[10]  “10. Acolhimento and victim support.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 30-38. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[11] “10. Acolhimento and victim support.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 38-46. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[12] “Chega! for Us: Socializing a Living Document.” Truth & Reconciliation, 19 May 2019, reconciliationtim.ca/timor/chega-for-us-socializing-a-living-document/.
[13] Amnesty International. Amnesty International & JSMP, 2004, pp. 24–34, Indonesia & Timor Leste - Justice for Timor Leste: The Way Forward, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/96000/asa210062004en.pdf
[14] Amnesty International. Amnesty International & JSMP, 2004, pp. 24-28, Indonesia & Timor Leste - Justice for Timor Leste: The Way Forward, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/96000/asa210062004en.pdf
[15]  United Nations Security Council. United Nations, 2005, pp. 2–6, Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (Then East Timor) in 1999, www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0715report.pdf.
[16] Hernawan, Budi, and Pat Walsh. Asia Justice and Rights, 2015, pp. 1–28, The Fate of the Chega! and Per Memoriam Ad Spem Reports on Timor-Leste, asia-ajar.org/2015/09/inconvenient-truth-the-fate-of-the-chega-and-per-memoriam-ad-spem-reports-on-timor-leste/.

The United Nations
There were numerous ways that the UN assisted the TRC process including the following: 

UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) and the UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees engaged in consultations with civil society groups to establish CAVR. CAVR was governed by UNTAET. UNTAET and UNHCR provided technical support and advice by providing permanent international advisors. 

The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) assisted the government and institutions of Timor-Leste to promote stability, democratic governance and facilitate dialogue to encourage the national process of reconciliation and cohesion. It monitored human rights violations and promoted the process of reconciliation [1]. 

The UN sponsored a Commission of Experts to submit a report to the UN Security Council that analyzed Timor-Leste’s prosecution of violators of human rights and violators that were not held accountable. The COE supported the findings of CAVR and presented identical recommendations presented in the final CAVR report, recommending the establishment of an international tribunal [2]. 

Secretary-General Kofi Annan published a report on Justice and Reconciliation for Timor-Leste on 26 July, 2006 where he expressed his “sincere hope that the Report of the CAVR will be an enduring contribution and will help to prevent the occurrence of such tragic events in Timor-Leste.” He urged the Timorese government to act upon the CAVR’s recommendations and also recommended establishing a solidarity fund to assist the victims of human rights violations [3]. 

International Organization of Migration (IOM)
The IOM aided the UNHCR run returnee transit centres to assist refugees returning from West Timor and provided logistical aid such as providing funds for travel. 

The International Centre for Transitional Justice
The ICTJ in New York also advised and supported the Commission from the creation of the CAVR to its completion by providing technical support and advice. 

The Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG)
They assisted the CAVR by maintaining the human rights database and supporting with CAVR’s truth-seeking function by conducting death toll research and data analysis on findings of human rights violations [4].

UK NGOS: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, TAPOL, Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
This group of NGOS launched an event in the UK parliament to acknowledge the CAVR commission, highlight and urge the implementation of the CAVR by the Timorese government and the UK National Parliament to support the TRC process and bring to justice the perpetrators. However, they were unsuccessful in generating any political action by the UK parliament [5]. 

All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group (UK)
This group sent a letter to Francisco Guterres, the current President of Timor-Leste on 24 January, 2006. The letter urged the Timorese government to quickly implement the recommendations made in the CAVR [6]. 

Asia Watch
Asia Watch aided the process of collecting eye-witness accounts critical to the truth-seeking mandate of the CAVR. They also aided in publicizing the findings of the CAVR and urging the international community to press the Indonesian government for the full disclosure of the military action of the Indonesian army during the massacre of unarmed demonstrators on November 12, 1991. 

Amnesty International
Amnesty International continued to engage with the findings published by the CAVR after the TRC’s closure and continued to seek to bring to trial the perpetrators which committed violations of human rights during the independence vote in 1999. They further published a report  which stated that the failure to implement the recommendations of the CAVR continued to contribute to the instability of Timor-Leste [7]. 

Australia
The Australian government, which had been found to be responsible for supporting the Indonesian government and the actions the Indonesian military undertook in the 1999 referendum, did not officially comment on findings. Instead, it supported the TRC process by being a donor and contributing to the cost of CAVR through AusAID. Australian representatives aided the TRC process by holding senior roles in the commission. Notably, Pat Walsh acted as a special advisor to the TRC and Patrick Burgess was the Principal Legal Counsel. 

International Donors: Japan, Norway and Germany
Following the completion of the CAVR, the Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat was created. Its function was to distribute the CAVR report internationally and maintain the Comarca heritage site and the CAVR archives. The above countries provided the funding for the Secretariat [8]. 

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[1]Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.100.
[2] Dunn, James. “Genocide in East Timor.” Centuries of genocide: essays and eyewitness accounts, Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, pp. 302.
[3] United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste. July 2006, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/446/74/PDF/N0644674.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 24 November 2020.
[4] The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. “Chega!” 2013, pp. 62. https://timorarchive.ca/uploads/r/bishops/1/d/8/1d8e003084941e37443e4691d015fe0ae8953be9cc7e179a4fa9f1ad4659a0e3/Chega_All_Volumes.pdf. Accessed 18 November 2020.
[5] UK NGOs. The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. 2006, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/Update%20News/UK%20NGOs_letter_to_Timor_Parl.PDF. Accessed 15 November 2020.
[6] All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group. The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. 2006, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/Update%20News/UK%20MPs%20letter%20to%20Timorese%20Parliament.PDF. Accessed 25 November 2020.
[7]Amnesty International. Timor-Leste Still No Justice For Past Human Rights Violations. 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA5745132016ENGLISH.pdf. Accessed 25 November 2020.
[8] Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliac̦ão Timor Leste. Chega: The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Pós-CAVR, 2005, pp. 4. www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.

Issues in Social Science Research 

CAVR’s testimony collection lacked methodological descriptions. Therefore, a statement’s quality depends on the note-takers' diligence [1]. CAVR also rarely assigns interviewee follow-ups for clarification. As such, the oral interviews were unable to create specific incidents’ conclusive constructions. Furthermore, there were no mechanisms to enforce CAVR’s investigatory powers abroad. Therefore, CAVR lacked testimonies from major Indonesian perpetrators [2]. Additionally, the mass deaths from the late 1970s meant that interviews focused on the Santa Cruz massacre. Therefore, household survey numbers were underestimated. In graveyard surveys, researchers failed to account that many victims were buried informally or not buried [3]. Therefore, academics criticized that CAVR’s historical accounts were not insightful nor added new insights [4].

 A Perpetrator-Driven CRP Instead of Valuing Victims’ Inputs 

The CRP was perpetrator-driven, prioritizing social harmony over the victim’s desire for retribution. The CAVR commission determined the deponent’s act of reconciliation without the victims’ consent.  Furthermore, victims were only present at CRPs to verify deponents’ statements  [5]. The hearings also lacked verification capability, as victims often could not be identified, while perpetrators often were unable to name victims [6]. As such, deponents could downplay their harmful acts and emphasize on their good deeds and limited options during conflicts, potentially using CRP to gain amnesty from their serious crimes. Therefore, deponents’ sincerity to reconcile is questionable. 

Downplaying Gender Violence in Reconciliation 

Lisan was controversial because its patriarchal setting failed to adequately include female victims or deponents and address gender violence crimes [7]. Participating female deponents were mostly not deponents but related to the perpetrator such as through marriage [8]. Furthermore, Timorese culture broadly identifies men as main victims; therefore, only five among 852 sexual violence cases were formally tried or included in the CRP [9]. Sixty percent of the domestic violence cases were also resolved through patriarchal traditional law or by monetary payments instead, which sometimes was against the victim’s wishes [10]. 

Perpetrators “Slipping Through the Gaps” 

CAVR could not hold most perpetrators for gross violation responsible as they reside in Indonesia. This was due to lacking incentives for perpetrators to come forward, as CAVR does not grant amnesty for serious crimes [11]. Jakarta’s refusal to cooperate in extradition further worsens this barrier [12]. Additionally, domestic-residing perpetrators of serious crimes may downplay their crimes through CRP applications and blame accountability on perpetrators abroad [13]. The faint line between less and serious violations also added obstacles to correctly categorize CRP applicants. As Timor-Leste citizens desired for an international tribunal, this barrier created further frustration in the inability to bring perpetrators to justice.

Paradoxical Outcome Reports with Unworkable Recommendations

CAVR’s report downplayed nations who indirectly supported Indonesia. For instance, the report attributed the US’s military support for Jakarta as a Cold War strategy to combat communism. However, this overshadowed the US’s desire to support Indonesia for the rich-resource market and low-wage workforce [14]. The report also created confusing contents such as praising Australia’s support for the referendum but condemning Australia’s acquiescence to Indonesia’s violations to gain maritime boundaries [15]. Furthermore, the report recommends states involved to fund reparation costs. However, Indonesia dismissed CAVR’s report, claiming that Western colonization was worse while CAVR was reopening old wounds inappropriately. Its Western allies also paid little attention with no mainstream media coverage [16]. The national government also rejected recommendations due to high cost while CAVR lacked economic policies that address victims’ low living standard [17].

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[1] Roosa, John. "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 569-580.
[2] Roosa, "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR," pp. 577.
[3] Roosa, "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR," pp. 576.
[4] Roosa, "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR," pp. 575.
[5] Jenkins, Catherine. "a Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?"Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 7, no. 2, 2002, pp. 233-251.
[6] Larke, Ben. "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 37, no. 4, 2009, pp. 646-676.
[7] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor,” pp. 658.
[8] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor,” pp. 669.
[9] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor,” pp. 670.
[10] Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
[11] Jenkins, "a Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?" pp. 245.
[12] Nevins, Joseph. "The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 593-602.
[13] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." pp.243.
[14] Nevins, "The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities." pp.596.
[15] Nevins, "The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities." pp.596.
[16] Nevins,"The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities." pp.601.
[17] Jenkins, "a Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?" pp.246.

Regardless of its barriers, CAVR's success lies in having a robust vision in peacebuilding and reconciliation framework, which should serve as a model for how future TRCs should operate. This is not to say TRCs should replicate CAVR’s framework, but keep CAVR’s ideology in mind when designing a locally tailored, sustainable reconciliation. CAVR’s success includes groundbreaking research methods, breaking perpetrator-victim binary, local culture incorporation, and community outreach.

Although CAVR’s social research faced challenges, its methods were ground-breaking. Unlike past TRCs, CAVR emphasized on more extensive social science surveys by generating two unprecedented TRC databases: household survey and comprehensive survey on graveyards [1]. CAVR also planned a robust investigation team with local history experts to conduct 1,000+ oral interviews using incident analysis – interviewing witnesses from the same incident and comparing different accounts to form robust historical accounts [2]. CAVR also sought to examine witnesses and officials abroad [3]. This would ensure no external governments can justify their bystander or pro-Indonesia position [4]. Although CAVR did not successfully implement these methods, its methodology is a good reference for how future TRC can better frame research for a comprehensive report.

CAVR also had a strong vision for reintegrating perpetrators of less-serious crime back in the community [5]. Differing from past TRC rhetoric of a tried-and-tested truth commission, the CRP envisioned to resolve hostile divisions within communities between the victims, West Timor refugees, and those forced to commit crimes by Indonesia [6]. The CRP emphasized on the politically neutral term “deponent” to abolish the victim-perpetrator binary. This reinforced that no one was a real perpetrator and that everyone deserves to listen to each other, appreciate how everyone was able to escape Indonesia’s violent regime [7]. The importance of diminishing this binary relationship was seen by the CRP Hearings in Fehelebo (see storymap) [8] where deponents successfully justified their actions that victims misunderstood or viewed as crimes.

Aside from terminology, CRP’s success was envisioning the transformation from community-stigmatized shaming (i.e. gossiping, which enhances negative labels) to reintegrative shaming through confessions, apologies, and confrontation [9]. Testimonies showed that pardoned deponents felt more relieved as people directly engaged in conversations with them instead of avoidance and gossiping [10]. CAVR believed that confrontations influence deponents psychologically, building conscience voluntarily instead of forcibly through punishments. Although CRP’s inability to properly distinguish degrees of crime and over-emphasis on perpetrators over victims were barriers, CAVR’s terminology vision is a crucial element for TRCs to form sustainable social harmony.

Another success was its vision to create locally tailored reconciliations by incorporating lisan. This methodology showed how CAVR acknowledges that TRCs should tailor to local communities instead of a standardized reconciliation method by copying past TRC’s success. CRP also respected those communities by making this program voluntary. CRP would firstly contact community members in their local language, request participation, and include community representatives when assessing deponent applications [11]. Such an approach shows that CRP had a genuine attitude that sought to form respectful collaborations. 

CRP also emphasized flexibility. For example, in the Lela Ufe hearing [12], the deponents wished to reconcile with the community (Lela Ufe) outside their own. The CRP fulfilled their wishes by holding the ceremony in Lela Ufe and invited the deponent community’s members. This flexibility reintegrated thirty deponents and reconciled deponents with victims outside of their community, fulfilling a more complete picture in reconciling victims and deponents beyond community borders. 

Although CRP faced barriers such as overlooking women participation and inability to tailor flexibly to all scenario - i.e. Case of M was unable to incorporate all communities involved due to complexity [13], CRP showed how TRCs should create locally tailored programs and offer flexibility to better serve reconciliation.

CAVR also emphasized community outreach for long-term sustainability in reconciliation and program awareness. CAVR partnered with Western Timorese NGOs to launch a program called Acolhimento to monitor, reintegrate and outreach to recent returnees and refugees in West Timor [14]. Additionally, CAVR launched victims reparations programs and healing workshops for the state to reconcile with the victims, which further builds restorative justice. CAVR also broadcasted the weekly radio program Dalan ba Dame (the Road to Peace) to cover the CRP progress and increase CAVR’s transparency and awareness. This indicates that CAVR seeks to ensure its community reintegration programs are sustained and widely-recognized.

CAVR may not instantly have produced widely-deemed successful outcomes. Nevertheless, it served as an important beginning to raise awareness and gather information on the violence in Timor Leste. CAVR’s research also contributed to a new TRC formed by Indonesia and Timor Leste in 2005 - the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF). CTF utilized CAVR’s findings and published a report where both states acknowledge that Indonesia did commit gross human rights violations in 1999. Although Indonesia was not responsible for compensation, they acknowledged the need to resolve bilateral security issues through cooperation [15]. This showed how CAVR’s effort paid off by paving a way for CTF to build upon its research and better reconcile the two nations.

---

[1] Roosa, John. "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 569-580.
[2] Roosa, "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." pp.577.
[3] Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
[4] Lyons, "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." pp.104
[5] Jenkins, Catherine. "a Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?"Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 7, no. 2, 2002, pp. 233-251.
[6] Larke, Ben. "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 37, no. 4, 2009, pp. 646-676.
[7] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." pp. 660.
[8] “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 1-50. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[9] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." pp. 663.
[10] Larke, "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." pp. 663.
[11] Lyons, "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." pp.107.
[12] “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 1-50. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.
[13] “09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 23.
[14] Lyons, "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." pp.111.
[15] Strating, Rebecca. "The Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship: Enhancing Bilateral Relations at the Expense of Justice." Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 36, no. 2, 2014, pp. 232-261.

All Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group. The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. 2006, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/Update%20News/UK%20MPs%20letter%20to%20Timorese%20Parliament.PDF. Accessed 25 November 2020. 

Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliac̦ão Timor Leste. Chega: The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Pós-CAVR, 2005, pp. 1–1200, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm. 

Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliac̦ão. “dalan ba dame - Subtitle Indonesia.” YouTube, uploaded by Asia Justice and Rights, 10 March 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1kRN6wXeKc&feature=emb_logo. 

Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women. Laporan Investigasi Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur, Maluku, Tanjung Priok dan Papua [Investigation Report on Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, Maluku, Tanjung Priok and Papua]. Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women, 2003, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwSyakH_J8_nX3FhRHA0QW9HckE/view.

International Center for Transitional Justice. Unfulfilled Expectations Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste. International Center for Transitional Justice, 2010,https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Unfulfilled-Expectations-2010-English.pdf

UK NGOs, The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. 2006, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/updateFiles/english/Update%20News/UK%20NGOs_letter_to_Timor_Parl.PDF. Accessed 15 November 2020. 

United Nations (New York, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR. July 1996, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/untaetR/Reg10e.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2020.  

United Nations Commission of Experts. Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999. S/2005/458. United Nations, 2005, https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0715report.pdf. 

United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste. S/2006/580. United Nations, 2006, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4537856d0.html 

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1704 (2006). S/RES/1704. United Nations, 2006, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1704 

The Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. United Nations, 2001, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/etimor.htm  Accessed 20 November 2020 CAVR Timor-Leste

Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat. CAVR Archives and Libraries, Commission for Reception/ Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor. 2005,  http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/archives.htm. Accessed 20 November 2020

Burgess, Patrick. "Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor. The Relationship between the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and the Courts." Criminal Law Forum, vol. 15, no. 1, 2004, pp. 135-158.

• Patrick Burgess headed two UN peacekeeping missions to Timor Leste and acted as the Principal Legal Counsel for CAVR. His paper is a brief yet comprehensive overview of Timor Leste’s truth and reconciliation process, the historical events that led up to it, and four major mechanisms for accountability on atrocities that were (or were not) established. Burgess strongly demonstrates the intimate link between justice and reconciliation, explaining how the Special Panels and CRPs lacked the power to punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The paper is also noteworthy in its acknowledgement of cultural integration in CRPs and how that aids in community reconciliation given Timor Leste’s unique circumstances.

Dunn, James. “Genocide in East Timor.” Centuries of genocide: essays and eyewitness accounts, Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, pp. 279-316. 

• This chapter outlines the history of conflict and human rights violations that occurred from the 1975 Indonesian invasion to its independence in 2002. Dunn identifies the lack of reaction from the international community as a core factor that led to atrocities, highlighting the support of international actors such as the US sale of arms which allowed Indonesia to undertake a campaign of destruction and repressive occupation. He focuses on how political and economic considerations caused countries like the US, Australia, Japan to underplay Indonesian atrocities in Timor-Leste. Dunn also argues that Indonesia’s actions constitute cultural genocide. This chapter compares how history has been framed in history books to the chega! and identifies potential gaps in the story told in CAVR.

Jenkins, Catherine. "a Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?"Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 7, no. 2, 2002, pp. 233-251.

• This article was published in 2002, before CAVR happened. It compared and examined whether any lessons learned from South Africa’s TRC should be applied to CAVR by inspecting five elements - the decision to establish a TRC, potential risks of a TRC, South African TRC’s achievements, reconciliation frameworks, and retributive justice. Overall, Jenkins concluded that CAVR had the opportunity to set a similar TRC by modelling South Africa’s successful components. However, CAVR must acknowledge its potential barriers including reparation barriers as most perpetrators reside in Indonesia. This article is worthy for scholars to analyze how Jenkins’ predictions in CAVR’s barriers resembled the actual barriers now that CAVR has concluded. Thus, scholars can also learn what barriers could have been addressed if CAVR had better analyzed its potential challenges.

Larke, Ben. "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 37, no. 4, 2009, pp. 646-676. 

• This article provides a detailed analysis of CAVR’s CRP process, which is useful for scholars interested in focusing on the community reintegration, restorative justice perspective of TRCs. Larke highlighted how CRP has a robust element in facilitating a reintegrative process with confession exchanges at its core, building a customary reconciliation procedure based on a cultural justice system, and utilizing reintegrative shaming for perpetrators to re-enter their social group (community). On the other hand, Larke also presented a well-balanced critique by highlighting CRP’s weakness which was how CRPs occurred at the expense of the victim’s competing needs.

Lipscomb, Leigh-Ashley. "Beyond the Truth: Can Reparations Move Peace and Justice Forward in Timor-Leste?" Asia-Pacific Issues, no. 93, 2010, pp. 1-12.

• This paper looks at both of the TRCs that were established for Timor-Leste, namely CAVR and CTF. It details some of the efforts that have been done since the completion of CAVR, and notable things that have been left unaddressed in the long term, such as systemic factors to violence and poverty, sexual violence during the conflict, and how reparations should be dealt. The paper also includes possible solutions to address the persistently unsolved issue of prosecuting perpetrators of gross human rights violations, and these solutions are compelling in that they acknowledge legal limitations and complicated diplomatic relations between Timor Leste and Indonesia.

Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

• The article outlines the origins of the CAVR and summarizes its objectives and mandates including its truth-seeking mechanism and community reconciliation process. Lyons also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the design of CAVR, identifying its broad investigatory power as its main strength. However, Lyons identifies the lack of amnesty as a critical flaw to the design of CAVR as there are no incentives for perpetrators to testify. Lyon argues that the main barrier to the TRC process is the lack of power over Indonesia to bring to trial perpetrators in Indonesian territory. This article identifies critical aspects to consider in the process of designing a TRC learned from the experience of CAVR.

Nevins, Joseph. “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities” Pacific Affairs vol. 80, no. 3, Winter 2007-2008, pp. 593-602. 

• The article analyzes the findings and recommendations of the final CAVR report. He criticizes how CAVR framed the involvement of international actors as a story of an ideological contest during the Cold War. Nevins argues that the Western countries’ support of Indonesia stemmed from political and economic considerations. Nevins identifies the positive impact of CAVR, praising its documentation of human rights violations by Indonesia and its attempt to address structural economic inequality in Timor-Leste. Nevins also considers the methods of CAVR to achieve national reconciliation such as public hearings and community reconciliation procedures to analyze the extent of CAVR’s success. 

Roosa, John. "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 569-580. 

• This article critiques CAVR’s methodology in collecting research data, including testimony collection, social science surveys, oral interviews, and community forums (CRP). Such critique is useful should any scholar want to investigate CAVR’s success and barriers. Furthermore, the article argues that future TRCs can learn from CAVR’s success and barriers to better frame research methods including how statements should not be considered as a data collection method, social science surveys for death scales face severe limitations in states with rare census counts, oral interviews are indispensable for uncovering new information, and that group discussion on local history are more than just therapy sessions, but are useful information for historical context research.

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Dunn, James. “Genocide in East Timor.” Centuries of genocide: essays and eyewitness accounts, Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, pp. 279-316. 

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Larke, Ben. "'. . and the Truth Shall Set You Free': Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor." Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 37, no. 4, 2009, pp. 646-676

Lipscomb, Leigh-Ashley. "Beyond the Truth: Can Reparations Move Peace and Justice Forward in Timor-Leste?" Asia-Pacific Issues, no. 93, 2010, pp. 1-12.

Lyons, Beth S. "Getting Untrapped, Struggling for Truths: The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor." Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

Nevins, Joseph. “The CAVR: Justice and Reconciliation in a Time of Impoverished Political Possibilities” Pacific Affairs vol. 80, no. 3, Winter 2007-2008, pp. 593-602. 

Roosa, John. "How does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth is? the Case of East Timor's CAVR." Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2007, pp. 569-580. 

Strating, Rebecca. "The Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship: Enhancing Bilateral Relations at the Expense of Justice." Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 36, no. 2, 2014, pp. 232-261.

United Nations Security Council. United Nations, 2005, pp. 2–6, Summary of the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (Then East Timor) in 1999, www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0715report.pdf.

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“09. Community Reconciliation.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 1-50. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.

“10. Acolhimento and victim support.” Chega!, Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, 2005, pp. 1–66. East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm.